The Asia turmoil begun in the middle of summer of 1997. The problem started in Thailand when Bath (known as Thai was getting weaker and weaker against US dollars. At that point, the rest of the world started to see that Thai s economy was starting to fall apart. Some people predicted that the problem would not stay longer than a few months. However, it was wrong. As manner of fact, the problem spread among's some of Asian Countries.

Even the mighty Japan was effected by this problem. United stated of America was also effected by this problem. That was a time that the US stock market was going down due to the fact that Many American corporation invested in this some of Aisan countries. Even today, the problem has not been fully recovered and who knows when.

Cause The main problem of the turmoil is the lack of management. Each countries has all similar problem. As we found out in our research, we noticed that banking holds the main role and the key player to the turmoil. Many privates and Government banking loaned too many credit for a big and similar project at the same time without checking the creditor s solvency.

Ofcourse among the creditor also, the money supposedly. And this is, of course, the second problem of the cause of the turmoil. Third, many creditors believe that their project will become successful without a proper preparation and planing. Solution Malaysia s National Economic Recovery Plan Causes of the Turmoil in the Region In today s world, large sums of money move across borders and provide more countries with access to international finance.

The daily currency turnover in the foreign exchange market in 1995 is about US$1. 2 trillion, compared with an average of US$190 billion a decade ago. The early 1990 s saw the dramatic increase in the flows of private capital from the industrial countries to the emerging countries. This was partly contributed by pension funds from the United States and Europe in search for higher returns overseas. The amount of private capital flowing into emerging markets was US$50 billion in 1990; the figure was US$336 billion in 1996. With greater international capital flows, financial markets become more volatile as money moves across borders with a mere keystroke of a computer.

The unusual successful economic performance in the region attracted large inflows of foreign portfolio funds into the Asia Pacific region, which became a root cause for the currency crisis. During the early to mid-1990 s, China recorded growth rates between 9-14 per cent per annum, while Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand experienced high annual growth rates that ranged between 7-12 per cent. Rapid growth rates were also recorded in Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. While there were sizeable current account deficits for some countries, especially for Malaysia and Thailand, these were the outcome of the shortfalls of private savings to match private investment, not public sector dis saving. Foreign capital inflows made up for the shortfall in national savings to meet the very high national investment.

While the net private inflows for China and Vietnam were foreign, direct investment (FDI) dominated, short-term inflows were substantial for Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Thailand had a high level of short-term inflows of around 7-10 per cent of GDP. During 1995-96, Malaysia s short-term capital was 4-4. 5 per cent of GDP, while its FDI was at 5 per cent of GDP. The decline in asset yields in the industrial economies prompted fund managers to invest into the Asian emerging assets, which gave higher returns. The ASEAN countries suffered losses in competitiveness when the U.

S. dollar, against which their currencies were closely linked, appreciated against the yen beginning in mid-1995. The rapid economic growth of the Southeast Asian economies was accompanied by rapid credit growth to the private sector and asset price inflation, including in real estate markets and in equity markets, rising the concern that their exchange rates were not sustainable. Weakness in the financial sector compounded the problem.

The financial institutions in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea were weakened by large-scale exposure to the property sector, high non-performing loans, and short-term loans that against currency movements. Inadequate disclosure of information and data deficiencies increased uncertainty and adversely affected confidence. There was also the lack of transparency in policy implementation. A brief explanation about IMF IMF is not a charitable institution, nor does it carry out its operations at taxpayers expense.

It operates much like a credit union. On joining the IMF, each member country subscribes a sum of money called its quota. Members normally pay 25 percent of their quota subscriptions out of their foreign reserves, the rest in their national currencies. The quota is like a deposit in the credit union, and the country continues to own it. The size of the quota determines the country s voting rights, and the United States, with over 18 percent of the share, is the largest shareholder. Many essential issues require an 85 percent majority, so that the United States effectively has a veto over major Fund decisions.

When a member borrows from the Fund, it exchanges a certain amount of its own national currency for the use of an equivalent amount of currency of a country in a strong external position. The borrowing country pays interest at a floating market rate on the amount it has borrowed, while the country whose currency is being used receives interest. Since the interest received from the IMF is broadly in line with market rates, the provision of financial resources to the Fund has involved little cost, to the creditor countries, including the United States. MF- Supported Programs in Asia IMF-supported program to countries like Thailand, Indonesia and Korea have called for a substantial rise in interest rates to attempt to halt the downward spiral of currency depreciation.

Over US$100 billion has been committed to the region under the IMF auspices since the crisis began. Conditions attached to the loans parallel those of the Latin America crisis of the 1980 s. These programs have called for forceful, up-front action to put the financial system on a sounder footing as soon as possible. The fiscal programs vary from country to country. In each case, the IMF asked for a fiscal adjustment that would cover the carrying costs of financial sector restructuring -- the full cost of which is being spread over many years -- and to help restore a sustainable balance of payments. In Thailand, this translated into an initial fiscal adjustment of 3 percent of GDP; in Korea, 11/2 percent of GDP; and in Indonesia, 1 percent of GDP, much of which will be achieved by reducing public investment in project with low economic returns.

World Bank s Agenda to Restructuring the East Asian Economy These are long-term issues and fixing the problems in these respective areas will take many years. Restructuring the industrial sector, changing the governance of the banking and the corporate sector and the relationship to the States, and adjusting the globalization process to the level and capacities of the economy is not something than can done easily. Since the beginning of this crisis, about $110 billion have fled out the five major crisis countries - Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines. This is about 10 per cent of the GDP of these countries. In addition to that, credits banking credits have also been reduced by about $88 billion which is approximately another 8 per cent of the GDP. It means that about worth 18 per cent of the GDP of these countries has just vanished in terms of funding of the economies.

This withdrawal of funds has had the tremendous impact on the stock market and the exchange rate. Automatic corrections should come from the depreciation of the exchange rates and from the booming of exports. Japan is in recession and is extremely sensitive to the region. The total amount of credits that the Japanese bank banking sector has allocated or distributed to the region is worth about 40 per cent of its total, still in these five countries - it is worth about 40 per cent of its capital. Given the vulnerability of the economies it is a major additional problem for the Japanese financial sector. Japan is exporting about 20 per cent - is making about 20 per cent of its exports in these countries, and the collapse of the economies there is impacting its performance.

These countries a remaking between 15 and 25 per cent of their trade with Japan, and the recession in Japan is a major blow for all of them and isa major reason for this low demand that they are met with. In order to get out of the crisis, World Bank addressed the issue of clarifying the environment. One has to have a dynamic Japanese economy since Japan is an engine of growth in the region. The potential of the exports in Europe and in the US, provided these economies remain in an acceptable shape, or dynamic as is the case in the US, the potential for export cannot compensate in the short run for the decline in the markets in the regional and Japanese markets.

Another issue is within the region itself within the countries. However, the question is how to move an entire region up at the same time, given the fact that there is no possibility of success for an isolated country in such a depressing regional environment. There is no.