1920's Ussr's Foreign Policy example essay topic

1,275 words
Soviet foreign policy in the 1920's and 1930's was more practical than ideological. Do you agree? In order to properly assess this question we must understand the nature of the Soviet foreign policy within these two decades. When observing the events of this time we can see that a duality of policy existed within the USSR. One was the obvious ideological policy and the other a more discreet practical policy. During the 1920's USSR's foreign policy seemed very ideological, however in reality there were several concealed examples of more practical actions.

As time continued throughout the 1930's USSR's foreign policies did not only become more apparent but also more practical and less ideological. The USSR entered the 1920's with a rather traditional policy, stressing the importance of the global revolutionary movement. This was embodied in the Comintern established in 1919. The Comintern or Communist international was introduced with the mission of encouraging global revolutions. Communists worldwide were called to infiltrate armed forces, factories and villages in capitalist countries, to support colonial revolts, and to mainly support Soviet Russia. As a foreign policy this affected many Western European democratic countries that feared that the Comintern might actually succeed in starting a revolution and therefore disrupt the balance of power.

Another example of an ideological policy was USSR's relationship to China. A small Chinese Communist party was formed in Shanghai. Even though the Comintern had ideological aims it used a practical method to achieve them. This was done by advising the Communist party to ally with the Chinese Nationalist party. This peculiar allegiance was needed to fight against foreign influence and armed warlords who ruled China at the time. This policy turned out to be a catastrophe.

After several successes in Northern China, the Nationalists turned on their allies killing thousands of Communists in the process. The Soviets hoped for widespread revolution at the start, but when this seemed less and less probably they had to learn to deal with capitalist countries. Because of economic necessity the USSR began building connections with other countries. Both Britain and France recognized Soviet Russia's existence in 1924. There were also minor successes in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Relations with Poland normalized due to the signing of the Treaty of Riga in 1921. These were definitely more pragmatic moves, putting ideology aside for the good of the economy. However these policies were not without problems. The main barrier to French and USSR co-operation was the repudiation of imperial Russian debts.

Two million French citizens had bought war bonds, so it was difficult for the French Government to agree to their cancellation. Relations with Great Britain seemed to be on the right track when trade treaties were signed in January 1924. Yet again, problems began to occur when a conservative government, who was hesitant to ratify these trade treaties, came to power. The likelihood of the establishment of trade treaties dwindled when the "Zinoviev letter" surfaced. The letter encouraged Communists to infiltrate the armed forces and trade unions in Britain. The letter did not impact the trade treaties directly however it further damaged British public opinion of the USSR.

Connection between USSR and Great Britain was finally severed in 1927 when communist propaganda and evidence of espionage was found in London. The Treaty of Rapallo is a piece of evidence, which shows that Russian foreign policy was more practical than ideological. Under this treaty USSR agreed with Germany to renounce all reparations and financial claims, which resulted from World War One. Germany also promised financial aid to the development of the USSR. Russia's motive for the agreement of this treaty was to find alternative financial assistance in a country that had similar aims. Russia benefited from access to German military technology, and the opportunity to stir up a revolution in Germany.

While Germany benefited by sending it's troops to train in Russia. More importantly it gave Germany the opportunity to circumvent the part of the Versailles Treaty, which prohibited its development in offensive weaponry. Russia and Germany's alliance strengthened with the signing of the Treaty of Berlin in 1926 under which each country agreed to observe neutrality if the other was attacked by a third power. By the 1930's the Soviet Union abandoned the ideological anti-western and anti-capitalist policy to apparent cooperation with Western powers. USSR joined the League of Nations proving that it was no longer judged as a "band of thieves".

One reason for this move was to gain as much support as possible because of Hitler's new anti-communist policy. Germany and Russia's alliance from the 1920's seemed now to be breaking up. Therefore, Communist parties were told to attempt to join alliances with Liberal and Democratic Socialist Parties to form 'Popular Fronts' against fascist parties coming to power. This alliance was another example of USSR's sacrificing ideology for practicality. Stalin knew that alliances with Britain and France were unlikely because they feared that such action might spark a war. In addition these countries were not ready militarily for war.

Neither Britain nor France had interests in the Eastern block. Britain's primary interest was its empire not Europe. Even though alliances with France and Czechoslovakia were established they were just a scare tactic against Hitler. There was no true commitment that France would attack Germany if they attacked Czechoslovakia. France had no desire for anything except a defensive war if one had to occur. Any attempt to help Czechoslovakia or France meant the Red Army had to go through Poland and Romania.

This was highly unlikely. The 1930's Soviet Russia's involvement in the Spanish Civil War helped Moscow gain many sympathizers in the West, making the communists more popular than ever in western left-wing and liberal circles. However, ideology was yet again sacrificed for practicality when Stalin decided to stop sending aid to the Republicans because he didn't want to risk a conflict over Spain with Germany while trying to pursue the Nazi-Soviet Pact. From a practical perspective the Soviets began to seriously doubt whether Britain and France were willing to stand up to Hitler, so they very quietly began to make low level contacts with the Nazis in 1935.

An alliance between the Nazi's and Communist's seemed far from the lines of ideology. But Soviet foreign policy made another drastic turn in 1939 with the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. This was a formal pledge by both countries to maintain peaceful relations with each other. Russia's foreign policy in 1939 was one of non-aggression mainly because it had no other alternative. The western view of appeasement was popular and the western powers were unwilling to accept Russia's terms of alliance. In conclusion we can see that Russian foreign policy during this time was much more practical than ideological.

Even though the Comintern, the support of the Chinese Communist Party, and the assistance in the Spanish Civil War were examples of ideological motives, they were usually replaced for more practical reasons. Practicality of foreign policy existed within these two decades in order to ensure the security of Soviet Russia on both grounds of economic and conflict. Gradually wearing down of ideology was a result of Russia's economic situation in the 1920's. Practicality reached its pinnacle in 1939 with the Nazi-Soviet Pact.