1st Division Marines And The Japanese example essay topic

Introduction The fight for Guadalcanal, code-named Watchtower, was the first offensive of the Pacific theater, thus it was subject to many hard lessons, the brunt of which was borne by the 1st Division of the United States Marine Corps and the others that landed in the initial months. Great efficiency was shown by U.S.M.C. Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift and the Marines under his command. The role of the U.S. Marines in the Guadalcanal campaign was to establish a U.S. base of operations and defend it from Japanese assault in the first months of the "island-hopping" campaign. Efficiency and perseverance of the Marines under Vandegrift were demonstrated through: the seizure of Japanese outposts at Guadalcanal and Tulagi; the rebuttal of every major Japanese counteroffensive through better strategic and tactical employ of units; recognition of the importance of the "Cactus" air force on Henderson Field; the resourcefulness of utilizing the Japanese supplies in the initial landing as well as throughout the occupation; and their ability cope with starvation, disease, and death on this quite inhospitable island in the Solomons.

The Pacific Land Battles Thus Far Prior to the initiation of Operation Watchtower, Japanese forces had been met with little and ineffective resistance. However, the Japanese Special Naval Landing Force, or their "Marines" met the United States Marines at Wake Island. "Their [U.S. Marines] brave defense had taken the lives of over 800 Japanese, with American losses of 120, in what the President saluted as the 'heroic and historic defense' when he announced the award of unit citation" (Costello 170). The strategy used by the Japanese at Wake Island would become all too familiar to the American forces. The Japanese made all of their amphibious landings further down the beach than the target and in the cover of the night as they had in their second attempt at Wake Island. The U.S. Marines also used a similar strategy in landing on Guadalcanal, but they were not met with the resistance.

Initial Landing and Early Strategy Figure 1: Landing (Leckie 62) Fortunately, little resistance was encountered upon landing as most occupants were construction crews for the all-important airfield that was nearing completion. U.S.M.C. Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift headed the operations once on shore. Vandegrift performed well throughout the campaign in thwarting all of the major Japanese attacks. Tactically, he recognized that it would be better to land just east of the airfield and maneuver in. However, it is quite fortunate that little resistance was met because on this day the Marines had yet to be tried in battle and mistakes made on this day alerted Vandegrift to changes that he would later have to make in his command structure.

When they finally seized the future Henderson field, they found there "three antiaircraft batteries, ammunition dumps, radio station, a refrigerating plant, an air compressor plant, vehicles, and stacks of supplies. Most of this booty was entirely intact, for neither the former owners nor the bombardment had caused significant damage" (Frank 81). These supplies would be fully utilized and were greatly needed later as Rear Admiral Richard K. Turner, who was in charge of the amphibious operation and unloading of supplies, was forced to withdraw as a result of a naval loss of Savo Island and aerial bombardments on August 9th with a great quantity of supplies and reinforcements. This forced the Marines to go to a diet of two meals a day beginning on August 12th. Vandegrift recognized the strategic significance of finishing the airfield the Japanese began. This was important because Japanese raids came daily from Rabaul, a Japanese base on the island of New Britain.

The defense that aircraft would provide would allow for a sooner supply run and reinforcements, which were greatly needed. Additionally, this would assist the allies in having a more firm hold on the Solomons. The coast watchers as they were called were a great service and fully utilized by the Marines and "As soon as General Vandegrift learned how vital the coast watching service was, Mackenzie's operation was augmented by four marine radio operators... his men monitored the coast watcher network twenty-four hours a day. The word of an incoming raid or anything else of importance was given to the marines by field telephone" (Hoyt 94). So the Marines worked using Japanese equipment, improvising for anything they were lacking along the way and completed Henderson field. Aircraft began coming on 20 August.

Thus, the 1st Division Marines and Vandegrift showed their great ability to make do with what they had. Operation KA "KA, the first syllable of the Japanese word for Guadalcanal, was the code name for the joint Army -Navy plan to recapture that island [Guadalcanal]. Colonel Ichiki's force the 900 already on Guadalcanal and the remaining 1500 still steaming down The Slot represented the Army's contribution. It was to be supported by much the greater part of Yamamoto's Combined Fleet" (Leckie 116). The first stages of Operation KA provided the first real contact that the 1st Division Marines and the Japanese had in the war. Ichiki, like so many other Japanese commanders that the Marines met in this campaign, made the tactical mistake of driving with a thin file of men in a frontal assault.

This is indicative of the Japanese "samurai" ideology of the time. It showed the great overconfidence he had in the bushido principles instilled in the young Japanese warriors. The Marines learned their preference for these methods in the first wave of attacks of the battle with Ichiki, "some 250 Japanese, the spearhead of the Ichiki Detachment, flung themselves in a violent and headlong attack across the sandbar at the mouth of the river, firing as they ran. 'Bonzai!'. .. it was supposedly infallible" (Lee 82). The Marines took advantage of all such frontal assaults by utilizing their mortars, howitzers, and concentrated machine gun fire on these lines.

This is tactically significant because it shows the ability and will of the Marines to not be swayed and hold their positions. The significance of holding their positions and not retreating is that they did not allow the Japanese to break their lines. If this would have happened, then Ichiki would have made it inside the perimeter to Henderson field. The Marines used the little barbed wire they had gained from the Japanese and cattle fences in the area to hold the perimeter around the suspected attack zone.

In addition, Ichiki not only underestimated the quality of the fighters, but also their numbers. Due to inaccurate intelligence, the Japanese believed that there were only 2,000 soft, capitalist soldiers holding the area. Actually, there were about 12,000 there at the time and about 15,000 if one included Tulagi. However, most of the division was dispersed around other points of the perimeter to guard against further attack from the north, south or west.

This also brings another important point. Throughout the campaign, Vandegrift never left lines vulnerable to attack and held positions on all fronts while keeping at least one battalion in reserve. In the final count the Japanese had lost almost all of the 900 attackers including Ichiki, whereas the Marines Figure 2: Battle of Ten aru (Frank 150) had under 100 casualties, including the 35 dead. Edson's Ridge The Battle of Edson's Ridge is one of the toughest engagements the Marines had to endure on Guadalcanal.

Though the defenders were not part of the 1st Division, they were under Vandegrift's command and had been there throughout. Colonel Merritt Edson commanded the defending troops just south of the airfield, which were made up of the First Battalion Raiders and the Marine parachutists. Kawaguchi, selected an excellent point to break in, but Edson predicted the ridge and set up artillery and had his men dig in around it. The hardships the Marines had to sustain in this battle were the naval bombardment they had to endure for more than three days, the superior numbers of the enemy, and fatigue and illnesses from the island for having been there longer than Kawaguchi's troops. The Japanese had advantages on the island because their naval support, especially during the night was much greater.

The ships that made supply runs and dropped off the forces were called the Tokyo Express and were rarely caught by the timid U.S. ships. However, the Marines showed great skill in using the information they had to attack these points and seize or destroy the Japanese supplies when they were unguarded. Ironically, this meant that the U.S. Marines were better supplied because of the Tokyo Express and many of the Japanese starved. For this battle's purposes though, the Japanese were better rested, in better health, and had superior numbers. Kawaguchi's forces numbered 6400 on the island and had over 2500 available on the ridge, the remainder attacked to the east and west or remained to guard supplies or in reserve. 1700 Japanese put extreme force on the Edson's group.

The Marines again showed their discipline by keeping order and not breaking their lines. If the 700 Marines at this point had let the Japanese through to the Henderson Field, they could have lost Guadalcanal and even the war because land-based air support was what kept them alive. Many of the men had been kept awake for the last couple of nights due to the incessant shelling from the shore that the Japanese naval support provided. This bombardment began on September 12th and the main attack from the Japanese came on the night of September 13th. Contrastingly, the U.S. naval forces had withdrawn and were even considering abandoning the whole project, which meant for the time being, the Marines were alone.

The Marines were able to hold their lines because of their own efficiency and how effective their methods were with the Japanese troops. The methods were concentrated artillery fire from the 11th Marine Regiment of the 1st Division, concentrated small-arms fire, and pre-battle preparation in the forms of holes and barbed wire. The reason these methods worked best against Figure 3: Edson's Ridge (Frank 236) was that the Japanese, as stated earlier, adhered to the principle that they would succeed by mere bravery in thin files of attack. Due to the concentrated weapons fire, Kawaguchi's troops were shot or shelled almost entire platoons at a time because of their close proximity and narrow attack. This allowed Marines to shoot one line of troops, then the next.

This pattern followed nearly throughout the campaign. In terms health and nutrition, the situation at Guadalcanal became increasingly worse. By the time the 1st Division Marines left in December of 1942, they were mentally and physically worn out. "We'd taken plenty of battle casualties, but the real problem was the health, both physical and mental, of the troops. The division had really had it by December '42. God almighty, were the men beat!

Half of them looked like walking zombies" (Berry 101). This condition was a growing problem throughout the campaign. Most of the diseases caught by the men were malaria cases, but the island also provided other problems such as poisonous insects and many cases of wound infections and "jungle rot". Also, the wormy captured Japanese rice and only two meals a day caused them to lose weight and made for additional fatigue. In this battle, the effects were first starting to settle in. Reinforcements and Bloody Ridge "There were 4,286 Marines of the Seventh [Regiment, 1st Division], a welcome reinforcement in a cause not yet won, and with them the first supply of aviation gasoline and ammunition for the hard-pressed men of General Vandegrift...

Stacks of cases grew on the sands and captured Japanese trucks bore loads into the grove beyond" (Davis 109). These reinforcements on September 18th were a long time in coming, but played a very important role in relieving some of the wounded and disease-ridden troops. Additionally, Vandegrift decided to probe the Japanese around Matanikau and the 7th Marines provided willing scouts. Some of Colonel "Chesty" Puller's 1st Battalion 7th Marines scouted an area behind the Matanikau River and suffered casualties, but produced little effect.

Tactically, Vandegrift only asked for this in order to extend his western perimeter, but it also had the additional effect of allowing the Marines to take a more aggressive stance, rather than just defensive. However, later near Matanikau on the 7th through 9th of October, enemy casualties were great, especially near Puller's Battalion, and the Marine casualties were relatively few. The importance of these skirmishes were that they eliminated Japanese forces, thus giving the Marines better odds. The action near Matanikau, which also occurred on October 23rd to the 26th, allowed the Marines to know more about the enemy and also disrupt the supply runs that the Tokyo Express had been making more and more frequently by directing the Marine planes of Henderson Field to bomb them.

The Japanese had naval support all around the island, but the U.S. Navy had somewhat abandoned them in this period. Finally, the Japanese, due to their extreme overconfidence, had very little supplies such as food and artillery. Kawaguchi's men were all fatigued and starving because they had expected to displace the Marines by then and thus eat their food. As this did not happen when they attacked Edson, they were all worn out by the time they fought at the same place, but against the 7th Marines and the 164th Army Infantry; the 164th Army Infantry, who had arrived on October 13th with fresh supplies, was initially in reserve. The Japanese met these combined forces at Bloody Ridge on October 24th through 26th. The set-up was almost identical to what happened with Edson.

Again, the Japanese were inferior tactically because they failed to recognize the significance of enemy mortars, machine guns, and small arms fire on their bonzai charges. Again, the Marines never broke their lines. The effect can be seen in 1st Battalion 7th Marine's Sergeant John Basilone's defense of Puller's perimeter Figure 4: Bloody Ridge (Davis 136) with machine gun fire. "Basilone's fire piled up so many bodies in front of his gun he had to send his men out to push them down to clear the fire lane...

An accurate count of Maruyama's casualties could no be made, but it was estimated over twelve hundred Japanese died that night. Probably a quarter of them were killed by some of the twenty-five thousand rounds of ammo Manila John and his men fired that night" (Murphy 70). Basilone had even taken over foxholes where all the men had perished and split his crew to man two machine guns. Additionally, he made several runs for ammo for his crew, firing when he returned. The tactics of leaders of this caliber were what made the Marines such a tough enemy for the Japanese, for Japanese tactics depended on striking terror in the hearts of their enemies and it just did not happen with the Marines.

Koli Point Actions and Final Matanikau Actions The strategic significance of the Koli Point Actions on November 12th and 13th are that they interrupted the supply of the already starving Japanese troops, allowed the Marines to gain some much needed supplies, kept the attrition rate of the Japanese up, and also gave the Marines the morale boost that comes with taking an aggressive stance. "On November 12 the marines captured a number of landing craft and 15 tons of rice. The latter hurt, for the Japanese were extremely short of supplies... The marines and army troops were critically short of food ammunition, aviation gas, bombs, and torpedoes at Henderson Field. On the ground the marines harried the Japanese almost constantly... the Japanese had broken into many small groups and worked their way back into the jungle" (Hoyt 235,236).

The significance of these actions are that Vandegrift knew that the Japanese would be better supplied than his troops if the Tokyo Express were allowed to run smoothly. As he recognized Figure 5: Koli Point Actions (Frank 419) the U.S. Navy would not take care of it, the Marines took care of it. Tactically, in further engagements the Japanese did not have the stamina nor the energy for battle, for their food supply was even more meager than the Marines' who, incidentally, were living largely off of Japanese rice. The Matanikau actions that took place in late November mainly involved the 164th Army Infantry and as this commentary is limited to Marine efficiency, it will not be assessed, except that the result of the confrontations made life easier for the Marines and further secured the perimeter. Final Conclusions As stated earlier, much of the success the Marines met with was due to excellent leaders.

Many of these effective leaders had served in the Nicaragua or other Latin American campaigns. Unfortunately, the Marines had to deal with some mistakes. For example, some commanders would complain of mixed battalions defending certain points instead of a regiment. This produced confusion among the men as to who was in command. Some of these leaders would offer advice for further action in the Pacific, "We " ll have to get over the idea that we " re the greatest people on earth in every respect, that we " re infallible and that no one else has ideas worth considering. One of the reasons we had to fight odds at Guadalcanal was this insufferable American notion of superiority, and our carelessness in the face of danger.

It goes back to Pearl Harbor and far beyond" (Burke 161). These candid words were spoken by Lt. General Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller of the United States Marine Corps, newly returned from Guadalcanal. In this statement, he referred to the bad state of supply that the Marines were kept in throughout their stay because the Joint Chiefs determined Guadalcanal came after the European front in terms of priorities. The leaders of the Marines' determination at these critical junctures to demand supplies and be efficient with what they had won the conflict. Without their determination, the other defeatist leaders would have abandoned the cause. Fortunately, the positive effects of the victory were not merely limited to military strategy, but were also extended to enthusiasm from the rest of the United States: "Back in America, the dramatic island victory on Guadalcanal and its heroes galvanized a new wave of American boys.

The Marines, a volunteer force, had suddenly become the branch of choice, especially among boys who, like Jesse Boat wright, were looking for the biggest challenges: 'We felt they sent the Marines to the toughest places, and if it wasn't tough, the Army went in' " (Bradley 68). In conclusion, from the amphibious landing of the 1st Division Marines and various other Marine groups on August 7th, 1942 to the withdrawal of most of the original forces on December 9th 1942, U.S. Marines fought vigilantly and mostly secured Guadalcanal. Their efforts were largely responsible for breaking the newly formed Japanese reputation for invincibility. This was clearly a Marine offensive, though it received much support at certain junctures from the U.S. Navy. The area would finally be secured by Major General Alexander M. Patch and the forces under his command, who arrived to relieve the Vandegrift on December 9th.

In a larger strategic sense, the victory at Midway was the turning point for the U.S. Navy and the sea war, but Guadalcanal was the turning point of the land war and largely due to the Marine effort and determination. The "Cactus" air force provided the military with a means to begin their "island-hopping" campaign and provided the defenses that Vandegrift knew were necessary to hold the island. Incidentally, the "island-hopping" plan had even been formed by a Marine, Lieutenant Colonel Earl (Pete) Ellis, in the 1920's. As in the rest of this "island-hopping" campaign, the performance on Guadalcanal proves a great example of the courage and efficiency exhibited by the United States Marine Corps in World War II.

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