Alexander The Great And The Hellenistic Empire example essay topic

The designation of Alexander as Great is heavily dependent on the definition of great used. Generally, Alexander's greatness is seen to describe his universal attributes. His overall skills, personality and success are combined into a single-syllabled definition of character, which has come to identify him as one of the most revered men in history. A reverence that he is perhaps not worthy of.! SS History judges us not only by the outcome of the war, but by the manner in which it was fought. !" In terms of the outcomes of Alexander's life: of the merit attained by him at the zenith of his existence, he is in no doubt great.

An observation of his achievements, from behind, would clearly demonstrate how successful he was. This relies on the traditional definition of greatness and elementary approach to history: where what happened is more important than how and why. He conquered territories on a superhuman scale, he established an Empire until his times unrivalled, and he died young, at the height of his power. At the youthful age of 20, in 336, he inherited the powerful realm of Macedonia, which he controlled Greece with. In 334 he invaded Persia, and within a decade he had defeated the Persians, subdued Egypt, and pushed on to Iran, Afghanistan and India. As well as his vast conquests Alexander is credited with the spread of Greek culture and education in his Empire, not to mention being responsible for the physical and cultural formation of the greater Hellenistic world.

Thus, within a dozen years Alexander's Empire stretched from Greece in the west to India in the Far East, and he was even worshipped as a God by many of his subjects while still alive. On the basis of his military conquests contemporary historians, and especially those writing in Roman times who measured success by territory gained and battles won, he was deemed great. If history were to judge simply on the outcomes of actions (which in most cases it does) it would without doubt worship Alexander as great (which it largely has). However, if the greatness of Alexander is to be truly assessed, not only the outcomes of his actions, but the way in which he conducted himself in attaining those outcomes are important. What led to certain events and how he performed in their duration is relevant in terms of his greatness, rather than simply the reputation that accompanies him, which could merely be a result of inevitability, coincidence, or someone or something entirely removed playing their own part in history. If Alexander did simply reap the benefits from the results of events that he had little influence on, then although the outcomes could deem him great, his conduct would betray him as unworthy of such a title.

Alexander's greatness as a soldier, a leader and a person must be analysed. Alexander's abilities as a soldier are rarely questioned. Arrian reports that: ! SS in military dispositions he was always masterly. !" Indeed, Burn even goes so far as to say that: ! SS no soldier in history is more indisputably! yengreat! | than Alexander.

!" Martial ability can be in many ways measured, however. A the most primal level, that of individual combat competency, Alexander as certainly skilled. He is known to have had an amazingly athletic form, and to have been trained by the finest swordsmen in Macedonia. In the field he could fight well and strike fear into any enemy. On the next level of this spectrum of militarism are tactics. Tactically, Arrian constantly revered Alexander; however, this is probably an area in which the title of! yengreat! | is not fully warranted.

Firstly, the seemingly constant military success of the Macedonians was in part due to factors which Alexander had little influence upon. Phillip, his father, not only trained an extremely skilled force, but equipped them with tactics and arms, particularly the Phalanx formation wielding lengthy spears, which would have little trouble against the Asiatic hordes! V regardless of their commander. Alexander and his tactics, although showing considerable expertise in some cases, such as the curved line at Gaugamela, partition of the cavalry at Hydaspes, were in other cases very elementary, or were simply betrayed by his arrogance. At the battle of the Granicus he threw his force, against the advice of his staff, across a fast-flowing river and up a steep embankment at a readied enemy.

Regardless of his confidence in himself and his men, such tactics would have afforded him unnecessary losses. Again at Tyre, he spent months, men and resources in a huge operation of constructing a land bridge to an island city as part of a greater moral battle, which he was having with cities that resisted his hegemony. Had he only bypassed the city, or even used his navy against it, which he had regrettably decided to disband! V being a Macedonian and not sharing the traditional Greek fancy for sea-borne warfare, then he probably would have come to control it regardless: saving time, men and supplies. Alexander's tactics usually involved rushes, which only succeeded due to his experienced field staff, the skill of his own men, and the inferiority of his opponents.

Realistically, his tactical ability was never great. Strategically Alexander was little better. Although his intentions can never be surely known, his actions do little to collaborate any greater plan. Again, the disbanding of the navy was probably a poor choice! V the Persian fleet in the Mediterranean was far smaller than that in the Indian Ocean, and Alexander could easily procure more hardened crews and boats from Athens and his other Greek allies. In addition, he began a march to destroy the greatest Empire in the world with supplies for only thirty days.

Had he not been able to take but a few cities, and Alexander's army would have been in a starving retreat, or cut down in weariness by the Persians. Nearing the end of his campaign, with his force threatening mutiny, he ignored warnings from locals and began a march through the most searing desert in the known world. While moving in Gedrosia, Alexander lost one third of his force to starvation and exhaustion, when he could simply have made the journey by ship with Nearchus. His grand campaign strategy was simplistic and unsophisticated. Although it was ultimately successful, the plan to simply march across Asia and meet any army that opposed him was dangerous and inefficient. Had he faced opponents with greater scope for strategic defense, then the campaign could easily have been a failure.

Probably because his situation never forced him to be, Alexander was by no means a great strategist. Alexander, like any conqueror, was faced with a difficult task in leading his followers. Both the men in his army and the groups he subjugated required skilled guidance and control. Once again, in terms of his leadership abilities, Arrian is greatly praiseworthy of Alexander. He says: !

SS noble was his power of inspiring men and filling them with confidence. !" Once again however, Arrian is probably very unreliable, at least when recounting the quality of Alexander's personal abilities and attributes. Alexander was able to pilot a huge force for a long time in lands distant from their homes. His leadership was not without have flaw however. If examined, Alexander's leadership of his men reveals itself.

It was a guidance of fervour rather than of calculation. Apparently Alexander was "! K brave and adventurous! K" with great "! K passion for glory". He was a man who lead from the heart not the head, making rash decisions in the heat of the moment, while always affected by his own pride.

This most probably led to his neglect of the desires of the troops. Indeed, in many instances he demonstrated compassion and thoughtfulness to his forces: such as releasing newlyweds home during the first winter of campaigning or visiting the wounded after the battle of the Granicus. This consideration in leadership was only ever present though when Alexander's spirits were high, and his ego significantly inflated after the fortunate resolution of some affair. When he was displeased he showed little quarter to enemy or friend. After failing to apprehend Darius during the resolution of the battle of Gaugamela, he relentlessly led his force through the desert in pursuit without rest. He failed to capture the Persian King and lost a great proportion of his men and horses in the chase.

The same could be said of his decision to move overland through Gedrosia after the mutiny of his soldiers. His temper caused him to make bad decisions in leadership. The simple fact that an entire force would revolt against their leader after little but success on campaign, especially following yet another victory at the battle of Hydaspes River, indicates that while Alexander may have been able to win when he needed to, he was out of touch with the men he led. Alexander was constantly forced to control the discontent of his subordinates, be it through appeasement with booty and leave or simple executions: such as those of Cleitus, Parmenio and Callisthenes.

Alexander's leadership of those he conquered was even more problematic than his leadership of his men. He did not have as many outright matters of insurgency from a people scared into subjection, yet his relationship with them did cause many more complex issues. It is most probable that Alexander desired, from the outset, to lead a great global Empire that he had united. His leadership however, was often far from popular. Regardless of the reputation of invincibility that he and his army had gained, many subjects, especially the hill-men of Bactria and those in the eastern outskirts of the Empire would not head to his control. He had no solution to this but military force.

Indeed, when he returned from campaigning in 324 he purged many of the Persian satraps that he had installed for abuse of their power, in the so called! yen reign of fear! |. Generally, Alexander did make some attempts to lead favourably; such as his introduction of Proskynesis, or adoption of Persian dress in 330. Detachment from his Macedonian troops and officials led to big problems however. Alexander was incapable of bringing about any sort of synergy between the two groups he led: appeasing one would always mean affronting the other. However, some credit must be given to Alexander with regards to his leadership abilities.

Commanding such a vast Empire or army away from home would have been very difficult, and he did it (until 326) with little difficulty. In fact, Alexander was able to uphold a great Empire, which would collapse instantly without his management: it was only he who was capable of commanding such a domain. The third element that defines a great man is the man himself. Alexander's very character and personality were on show as he rampaged his way through Asia, however filtered by Arrian's accounts.

He exhibited himself as a contemporary historical role model, yet was betrayed by his own insensitivity and ravenousness. Alexander was sometimes not akin to great leadership or soldierly ness: he was always far from being a great man. It is indeed Alexander's value as a person, as well as the tactile effects of his campaigning, which establishes his as great. On many occasions Alexander demonstrated his bloodthirstiness, not only in bids to gain or maintain power, but also simply on a drunken whim or in the fury of insult. In 336, when Alexander's succession was challenged, Attalus was murdered on Alexander's orders, and Cleopatra and her infant son, who held claim to the throne, were assassinated on account of Olympias - yet the orders for these killings probably also originated with Alexander.

At a very early age Alexander revealed that he had no hesitation in killing if he needed to. Soon after, he would show that he had little hesitation killing for no reason. When the state of Thebes revolted against Alexander's regime he, according to Arrian, ! SS!

K indiscriminately slaughtered the Thebans, who no longer put up any organised resistance. They burst into houses and killed the occupants; others they cut down as they attempted to show fight; others, again, even as they clung to temple altars, sparing neither women nor children. !" Over 6 000 Thebans were killed that day, and 30 000 sold into slavery. Alexander, for the first time, demonstrating his horrible vengeance and instability. There are dozens of other examples of such character flaws of Alexander. In 328 Alexander impaled Cleitus during a drunken brawl for a simple insult.

Later, Alexander would pass a resolution convicting Cleitus posthumously of treason, thus making his action legitimate. Such actions continued throughout Alexander's campaigns: he had Hermolaus, a noble youth, whipped in public for killing a boar before he could while hunting. In a related incident, Alexander had Callisthenes, a renowned philosopher and historian, implicated in a conspiracy said to have originated with Hermolaus. The adolescent, and some others, were stoned to death, while Callisthenes was dragged behind Alexander's column for seven months, until he died of exhaustion. It is most probable that Callisthenes had nothing to do with the conspiracy, and was simply removed due to his expression of contempt towards Alexander's policy of proskynesis. On some occasions Alexander is reported to have shown compassion, yet these instances would largely have been to serve an ulterior motive, and under the polish of Arrian.

In general, Alexander was a person ruthless and terrible character, a man far from great. The judgement of Alexander as great is a derivative of the definition used to understand greatness. If simply the results of his life are surmised in rigid mathematics, and an assessment is based on enemies killed or territory won, Alexander is indeed worthy of the title! yengreat! |. If, however, the means and motives by which this end was reached are understood, then a very different view is most probably reached.

PRIMARY SOURCES "h Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander. Penguin Classics, Harmondsworth, 1971. SECONDARY SOURCES "h Bradley P, Ancient Greece: Using Evidence. Cambridge University Press, Australia, 1988. "h Burn A R, Alexander the Great and the Hellenistic Empire. English Universities Press, London, 1959. "h Bury J B & Meigg's R, A History of Ancient Greece. Macmillan Press, London, 1975. "h Tarn W W, Alexander the Great.

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1964.