Atomic Bomb Japan example essay topic

On August 6th 1945, a United States B-29 bomber flew over the city of Hiroshima in Japan and dropped the first atomic bomb ever to hit a populated area. Over the years since that event, there has been a lot of controversy whether the bomb should or should not have been used. President Harry Truman of the United States was the one who makes the decision to drop the atomic bomb. He has been criticized for this decision ever since. Some historians believe that the bomb was dropped to scare the Soviet Union, others believe that is was dropped to quicken the end of the war with Japan, and others believe it was not necessary to use the atomic bomb at all.

Many historians have criticized the use of the atomic bomb to end the war, however these critics made their objections after the event took place, which of course is an easy thing to do. Only one man, Harry S. Truman, the president of the United States could only make this decision. The dropping of the atomic bomb is looked upon as the beginning of a new era, a nuclear era. The United States wanted to keep the development of the atomic bomb a secret. In order for Truman to decide to use the bomb he had to consider many things.

He wanted the earliest possible end to the Pacific war and he wanted it without the need for an American ground invasion 1. Truman feared a ground attack, which would jeopardize thousands of American soldier's lives. Paramount in his decision was the fact the Japanese had resorted to suicidal or Kamikaze attacks against American ships in the latter stages of the war when conventional attacks proved unsuccessful due to the American superiority in firepower. President Truman was fearful that should an invasion of the Japanese home islands by U.S. forces take place. The Japanese kamikaze attacks would increase a hundred folds resulting in the loss of many American.

He could not let this happen. Truman knew that the use of the bomb would lift a load of anxiety from the soldiers backs and those of their families 2. Before the final decision was made to use the atomic bomb the United States had set up an extensive naval blockade around Japan. The sea blockade had shut off overseas supplies of food, oil, and industrial raw materials vital to the civilian and military economy 3. The Japan of July 1945 was hanging by a thread.

It was isolated, cut off from the overseas resources it depended upon and the need for which had helped spur its expansion in the first place 4. By mid 1945, most of the Japanese fleet had been sunk along with their merchant marine 5. The United States had been systematically bombing the Japanese home islands since November of 1944 when bases in the Marinas became operational and the B-29's could strike at their cities with a significant bomb loads 6. The war had devastated the Japanese economy, due not so much to the physical damage of bombing its cities and industries but rather to the effectiveness of the navel blockade 7.

Top U.S. navy officials were convinced that the sea blockade alone would force Japan to capitulate 8. United States Air Force leaders did not think the atomic bomb essential: General Curtis LeMay an Air Force Commander is reported to have felt that even without the atomic bomb and the Russian entry into the war, Japan would have surrendered in two weeks 9. This was reinforced at the Potsdam Conference on July 16th 1945 when General Arnold and the US Airforce Commander made a specific point of reading into the record his judgement that Japan could be compelled to surrender without the bomb a month before the scheduled invasion of the Japanese mainland 10. Japan, in fact, will become a nation without cities, with her transportation disrupted and will have tremendous difficulty in holding their people for continued resistance to our terms of unconditional surrender 11. Even before the United States dropped the atomic bomb Japan knew that they were in trouble. Their economy was destroyed and the civilians were reaching the point of poverty and starvation.

In February 1945 the Japanese government had approached the Russians with a request that they act as intermediary in arranging a peace with the Western powers 12. The Russians, however, set their price of mediation so high that the Japanese temporarily dropped the matter 13. After this there were many attempts to have peace talks but none of these talks succeeded. But after a meeting with Stalin in Moscow on May 27 1945, before the trial A-bomb was even tested in New Mexico, the US Secretary of State Harry Hopkins cabled president Truman from Moscow that Japan is doomed and the Japanese know it, and peace feelers are being put out by certain elements in Canada 14. Japan looked to Russia to play the role as mediator for peace talks with the United States. Japan told the Russians that they wanted peace at any price.

It was hoped that Moscow would inform the United States and Britain at the Potsdam conference of Japan's desire to discuss peace 15. But instead of an answer from the Big Three the United States, and Great Britain, Ambassador Sato in Moscow was told by Molotov on August 8 of Russia's entry into the war against Japan, effective immediately 16. Throughout the war, Japan had relied on Russian neutrality. As soon as Russia declared war on Japan the Japanese felt betrayed, and knew that they had to reach a peace agreement before their economy became destroyed even further. The United States was willing to give Japan an unconditional surrender in the peace agreement. The Japanese wanted a conditional surrender, they did not want to lose control of their economy and their government, they wanted an agreement that would ensure their sovereignty.

But the only warning to a Japan already militarily defeated, and in a hopeless situation, was the Potsdam demand for unconditional surrender issued on July 26, when the US knew Japanese surrender attempts had started 17. When the Japanese surrender was negotiated about two weeks later, after the use of the atomic bomb, the unconditional surrender demand was made conditional 18. The US dropped the bomb at a time when Japan already was negotiating for an end of the war but before those negotiations could come to fruition 19. The United States demanded unconditional surrender, then dropped the bomb and accepted conditional surrender, a sequence which indicates pretty clearly that the Japanese would have surrendered, even if the bomb had not been dropped had the Potsdam Declaration included a promise to permit the Emperor to remain on his imperial throne 20. If the United States would have accepted a conditional surrender from Japan then the Pacific war would have been ended a lot sooner than it was.

Acting Secretary of State, Joseph Grew, advised Truman that a change in the unconditional surrender demand was likely to end the war 21. Truman has been criticized for the way he went about deciding to use the atomic bombs. In the back of President Truman's mind was the chance that the use of the atomic bomb would be a failure. Nothing would have been more damaging to our effort to obtain surrender than a warning or a demonstration followed by a dud-and this was a real possibility 22. If the project proved a failure, it will then be subjected to relentless investigation and criticism 23. Perhaps the greatest immediate danger which faced the United States was the probability of an arms race in the production of these devices between the United States and Russia 24.

There are other considerations as well. If the Japanese received a warning that such a weapon would be exploded somewhere over Japan, their remaining aircraft might create problems that could lead to the failure of the mission 25. The Japanese were not impressed with the bomb as much as the Americans were. The Japanese civilians did not know the horrible affects of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima: and even so, they had endured fire raids against Tokyo which had caused more casualties then the atomic bomb and had devastated a greater area than that destroyed at Hiroshima 26. There is no evidence that Truman hesitated for long, or that he was troubled or even anguished over the decision 27. Truman was worried about the Russians and their late entry into the war against Japan.

He wanted to ensure that the Soviets did not interfere directly with the peace talks with Japan. The United States thought that since they had fought the majority of the war against Japan by themselves that the Soviet Union was not entitled to a any say in the peace talks. It is said that Truman used the bomb to send a message to Joseph Stalin to give the United States a better bargaining position in the peace negotiations that would come 28. Truman was also scared of the Russians reaction to the atomic bomb, especially if they had found out about the bomb before it was used. If the information were given to the Russians, even in general terms, Truman feared that Stalin would ask to be brought into the partnership 29. Truman argued that the bomb's diplomatic value would be diluted if Stalin were informed of the weapon prior to it use 30.

The most desirable program for him was to maintain superiority by pushing ahead as fast as possible in production and research, while at the same time making every effort to better our political relations with Russia 31 The question of the necessity to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain today. In my view, as horrendous an act that it was, it was likely necessary. The use of the bombs ended the war against Japan very, very quickly. There was no more time consuming negotiations after the bombs were dropped. The Japanese surrendered! Had the bombs not been used, the war would have continued and air raid would have killed more Japanese civilians.

Indeed, the fire bombing of Japanese cities inflicted more casualties than the casualties from the atomic bombs. As well, a land invasion of Japan would result in a huge loss of life, including American servicemen and President Truman was not prepared to accept this. He made a decision, stuck with it and will go down in history as the only head of state to order the use of nuclear weapons against another country. Was he right? I think the decision was justified but any decision that results in loss of life of non-combatants in war has to be scrutinized and questioned. 31 e.