Bank's President example essay topic

Andrew Jackson, president from 1829-1837, was the only two-term president of the era, and by far the most memorable one. He presented a spectacle of rampant growth, diversification and redefinition of culture as dramatic as any time in American history, which some see as the period in which the American character took shape. At the beginning of his era, there was hardly anything that could be called a factory, and the seaboard cities from Baltimore to Maine specialized in overseas shipping. In the 1820's and 30's, a strong manufacturing interest began to grow. The centrally located coastal states, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and above all New York, began to leverage their geographical strengths by building roads and canals, to attempt to occupy the center of a web of commerce. The great Erie Canal, completed in 1826, made the western New York State frontier blossom, and provided a water route between one of the world's great harbors and some of the farthest reaches of the American wilderness.

Thus New York became the "Empire State'. During his period, technological change (the railroads and steam boats) turned weeks of arduous travel into days, and days into hours; and the telegraph gave the farthest provinces an immediate awareness of events all over the country, instead of learning events weeks after they occurred. His enemies portrayed Andrew Jackson as a monarch, trampling on the Constitution and abusing the veto power. During the Election of 1824, Jackson received more electoral and popular votes than Adams, Clay, and Crawford, but not a majority.

During his presidency, however, he appointed many government jobs to his allies. One such example is that he appointed Roger B. Taney as U.S. attorney general. Jackson chose John Eaton as secretary of War – and old and close friend who had done much to get Jackson elected. Jackson deliberately undermined the government service by appointing his friends without seeing if they were qualified or not (spoils system). I vote that Andrew Jackson is guilty of this charge due to the evidence at hand. Jackson has also been charged with failing to carry out the principles of the Declaration of Independence in regards to blacks, Indians, women, laborers, Mormons, Catholics, and others similarly without power.

John Eaton had a problem; he had recently married a young widow in "unseemly haste' after the suicide of her husband, John Timberlake. Timberlake was an officer in the navy, away from home for months or years at a time. Peggy was the daughter of a Washington innkeeper, constantly in contact with men, pretty, lively and forward (offensively so at times). She had had much contact with Eaton, a lawyer who had aided her in that capacity, and who also, with Jackson, stayed at O Neil's when in Washington. Some believed (and some still believe) Timberlake had killed herself over his wife's infidelity. She was said to have been Eaton's mistress, and in some versions to have carried on affairs with many men, or to have borne children by Eaton.

The truth of the matter may never be known. Washington was quite a small society with elaborate social rituals of one party "calling on' another, and it being a clear insult not to reciprocate. Mrs. Eaton was socially boycotted, with Mrs. Calhoun playing the leading role. Was this a simple matter of aristocratic ladies resenting an "innkeeper's daughter', and perhaps a "loose woman' being put down in the middle of their society? Jackson was quite incensed over the slandering of another innocent female, as he saw it, much as his wife had been slandered and driven to her grave (even Jackson's mother was called a "common prostitute' in the campaign). Jackson did not try to help to resolve these matters.

The main military activity at that time was the driving of Indians out of lands, which white Americans were pouring into, or were about to pour into. This was a direct order from Jackson. Sometimes there was the justification of Indian raids and massacres, sometimes not. Also Jackson did not try to put an end to slavery in the South.

In my opinion, I feel that Jackson is guilty of this charge because he treated many of the women, laborers, Indians, and blacks unfairly. The charge of Jackson undermining the federal system of government by eroding the power of the governments includes The Nullification Crisis, Indian Removal and The Maysville Road veto. The tariff bill of 1832 disappointed the pro-tariff Henry Clay, but it also disappointed the anti-tariff Nullifiers. They had hoped that with their proclamation of the principal of Nullification, and the Vice President being the author of the principal, and Jackson's partial tendencies towards States rights – Jackson and the Congress would go a long way in their direction. But the reduction of the tariff was too little, Calhoun was losing power, and Jackson, with his stance of "The Union must and will be preserved' was on his way to reelection. On October 22 1832, the South Carolina legislature declared a convention on November 19, to decide whether the state would, according to Calhoun's formula, Nullify the new tariff.

The convention did declare the law null in South Carolina, by a vote of 136 to 26. Actually, they said the law would become "null', and "no law' after February 1, allowing two months to work out a compromise. The South Carolina legislature also took Robert Y. Hayne out of the Senate and made him governor, replacing a more radical nullifier, while Calhoun resigned the Vice Presidency to replace Hayne in the Senate. This all suggests they were looking for a way out the tight spot they had put themselves in. On December 11, 1832, Jackson published a proclamation giving strong constitutional arguments, written by the Secretary of State Livingston", I consider then, the power to annul a law of the United States, assumed by one State, incompatible with the existence of the Union, contradicted expressly by the letter of the Constitution, unauthorized by its spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which it was founded, and destructive of the great object for which it was formed'. It ended in a strong plea and threat, which was mostly pure Jackson: "Those who told you that you might peaceably prevent [the execution of the laws] deceived you; they could not have been deceived themselves Their object is disunion.

But be not deceived by names. Disunion by armed force is treason. Are you really ready to incur its guilt? If you are, on the heads of the instigators of the act be the dreadful consequences; on their heads be the dishonor, but on yours may fall the punishment. On your unhappy State will inevitably fall all the evils of the conflict you force upon the Government of your country I adjure you to retrace your steps. ' Most of the nation responded to this with wild enthusiasm.

Jackson claimed he could have 100,000 men on the side of the Union in a matter of weeks. Still, the South Carolina legislature authorized its Governor to call a draft, and appropriated $200,000 for arms. Jackson's actual military moves were on a fairly large scale, but careful, and calculated to avoid confrontation while negotiations went on. Meanwhile a battle went on in Congress. Jackson was skillfully wielding threats and promises.

On January 8, the administration submitted a bill, known as the Verplanck bill after one of Van Buren's allies, which cut the tariff in half over two years. On the 16th Jackson also sent to Congress the "Force Bill' (often called the "Bloody Bill'), to get Congressional approval for deploying the military to put down armed rebellion. It was another ringing Jacksonian propaganda document, and made Jackson the "first and only statesman of the early national period to deny publicly the right of succession (Remini, Life p 246) '. Nullifiers and Clay's pro-tariff men rejected the Verplanck Bill. Then came a move to save Calhoun's face and take credit away from Jackson.

Clay stood up to propose a "Compromise bill', and was seconded by Calhoun. The bill was, in fact, much less of a tariff reduction (at least until nearly 10 years out) than the administration bill. Clay got a friend in the house to deftly swap his bill for the Verplanck bill and it was quickly passed, taking the administration by surprise. The Senate then passed this bill with the nullifiers perversely lending their support. Meanwhile the Force Bill had passed in the Senate 32-1, with nearly all the nullifiers having walked out to avoid casting any vote. And on March 1, the Senate passed the "Compromise Tariff' and the House passed the Force Bill 149-48.

In South Carolina, with such face saving as the revised tariff gave them, the legislature rescinded the nullification proclamation against the tariff. They also declared the Force Bill to be null – a petty act since Jackson no longer had any need for a Force Bill. I feel that Jackson did everything in his power to keep the union whole. I do not think that he is guilty of any wrongdoing.

Jackson has also been charged with undermining the economy of the U.S. by ill-advised and politically motivated actions. Jackson came to the presidency with a jaundiced view of banks in general, and especially the Second Bank of the United States (or "BUS'). This was a bank in private hands with a very special relationship with the government. The government used it as a repository for all its gold and silver, and the bank's bills were accepted as equivalent to gold for any payments to the government. At this time there was no government issued paper money.

Any bill of paper "money' was actually an I.O.U. from a particular bank "redeemable as specie', specie meaning gold or silver. A puzzling question to the economic novice might be "Why wouldn't everyone convert any paper he had to gold or silver; certainly trusting a bank to redeem it some day had the disadvantage of uncertainty when compared to getting your gold or silver today. Banks did have crises of confidence leading at times to their collapse, or "suspension of payment' in specie. However that may be, the existence of paper money has been credited with greatly increasing the amount of commerce that could go on. One example of how banking could greatly facilitate commerce is as follows: A farmer wants to buy a farm for $1000. While the farmer can't immediately produce $1000, the banker deems him a "good risk' i.e. concludes that, over time, he will be able to supply the $1000, and something additional ("interest') to make it worth while for the banker to risk his money.

So the banker provides the man with a paper or papers that the bank warrants to be redeemable for the $1000, and the man signs a contract to return $1000 plus interest to the bank over time – which the proceeds of the farm will allow him to do. The consequence if he doesn't will be that land is forfeited to the banker. As long as the bank enjoys trust, the papers supposed to be worth $1000 will be accepted by the former owner of the land, who may either save them, deposit them in a bank, or redeem them. Had it been necessary for the farmer to carry a pile of gold to the seller, it is quite likely that the bank would not have had it on hand. Perhaps what I'm saying is too obvious, or on the other hand, it may be largely wrong. One function of the BUS, which most historians say it performed well, (though Jackson didn't think so) was to maintain the stability of all the circulating currency.

Under normal conditions it was believed, and the rule generally held good, that a bank should have immediate access to "specie' worth one-fifth the value of the bills it put into circulation. This was thought, and generally proved, sufficient for the bank to be able to redeem the claims that would be made on it. In theory, everyone could try to redeem their bills on the same day so that even a "solid' bank, by these standards would be unable to fulfill its pledge, but under normal circumstances this did not happen. However, a bank that had immediate access to only a tenth or a twentieth of the specie value of its circulating bills was a real danger to itself and to its clients. The BUS would try to detect such situations in the making, and when detected, would buy up large quantities of the paper of the offending bank, and present them for redemption. Thus the bank, which tried to lend far more money than it could reliably stand behind, might be put in embarrassing straights, which would stop them from such activities.

One result of this was that the bank had two kinds of enemies. Jackson and Thomas Hart Benton exemplified one kind; i.e. those who basically considered gold and silver the only legitimate form of currency. The other class of enemies was bankers, or their business partners, who were kept by the BUS from involvement in risky schemes (which they probably thought they were entitled to attempt). There were also quite legitimate causes for concern about the BUS. It did enjoy an advantage over other banks; and for this, it paid little price of accountability to the government.

Also, with its unaccountability and great money power, it could in effect bribe candidates or occupants in office, or buy newspapers to campaign for those friendly to its interests. When its existence was threatened, in the 1832 election year, it did these things on a large scale. Jackson came into office believing that the bank, in its current form, was a menace and that something had to be done about it. Though bold when committed to a course, he did not, tend to rush into things. And there is good reason to suppose he might have only set out to constrain rather than destroy the bank, if the other side had shown a will to compromise.

For his second cabinet, he had even appointed Louis Mclane, who was pro bank, secretary of the treasury. And his message to Congress at the start of the 1831-2 was conciliatory. The opposition could not know this for sure though, and could well be supposed that Jackson considered war on the bank an unpopular issue, and meant merely to keep out of the debate until after the election, (almost surely his last) when he might, with perhaps even more allies in Congress, to kill the bank. Clay considered the bank issue, if it could be made an issue, to be in his favor.

In 1836, the bank would die, or cease to be national bank, if not re-chartered by congress. Clay, Webster, and others convinced Nicholas Biddle, the bank's President that it could be re-chartered in 1832 with the present congress, and Jackson's need (so they though) to avoid the issue in order to be re-elected. But Clay and Webster indicated they could not be so sure of the re-charter (and they might lose interest in the matter) if it were put off until after 1832. If Jackson did veto the bill, he might lose the critical votes of Pennsylvania, the home of the bank, and other states with a strong commercial interest.

Or, as Biddle might see it, as least bring in a veto proof majority in Congress for the bank. Roger B. Taney, Jackson's Attorney General said, "Now as I understand the application at the present time, it means in plain English this – the Banks says to the President, your next election is at hand – if you charter us, well – if not, beware of your power'. Probably this move, understood just as Taney put it, convinced Jackson that no compromise could be made with the bank. An odd anti-Jackson combination was taking shape in Congress. The proponents of Tariffs and of the U.S. as a nation with national transportation projects, joined their most extreme ideological opponents, headed by Calhoun. The most extreme of these, including Calhoun, claimed a state's right to declare federal laws (especially tariffs) Null, and secede from the Union if the Union sought to force them to comply.

The first major act of these "strange bedfellows' was, in January 1832, the rejection of Martin Van Buren for Ambassador to Great Britain. He had been appointed in the congressional recess and served since the summer. He was a fine secretary of state. No one could doubt he was well qualified for the job.

The action seemed like little more than the National Republican's indulgence of Calhoun's personal feud with Van Buren. In fact a tie vote was artificially contrived so that Calhoun could exercise the Vice-president's right of breaking such ties. This only made it easy for Jackson to have Van Buren, rather than Calhoun, as Vice President in his next term. In January too, a formal proposal was made to re-charter the bank. Administration forces in Congress did all they could to obstruct its passage, or buy time, while the administration press worked on public opinion.

They launched an investigation into the bank, turning up much pressure exerted on journalists and politicians. In June the re-charter bill passed both houses, and soon after, Jackson vetoed the bill, and accepted it as an election issue. When Van Buren returned from Europe, after several weeks of visiting following the news of his Senate rejection, he found a haggard Jackson declaring, "The bank, Mr. Van Buren is trying to kill me but I will kill it'. The veto message was a stirring campaign document, one of the most powerful ever, though some have said it smacked of demagogy, or class warfare. Part of it went " when the laws undertake to add to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful, the humble members of society – the farmers, mechanics, and laborers have a right to complain of the injustice of their Government'. That is about as demagogic as it gets, and very mild indeed by modern standards.

The constitutional justification of the veto, contained in the message, is generally considered poor. Jackson was still hedging a bit, not quite asserting that the Constitution unconstitutionally gives the president the right to veto a bill. He was still rationalizing his veto on the grounds that he considered the Bank unconstitutional, despite the Supreme Court's ruling to the contrary. A modern president would avoid the issue of constitutionality as beside the point.

Biddle compared Jackson's veto message to "the fury of a chained panther biting at the bars of his cage a manifesto of anarchy, such as Marat or Robespierre might have issued to the mobs'. And he and his allies were well satisfied that it would prove Jackson's undoing. This only proved how little they understood the electorate. On May 6, Jackson and his entourage embarked on a tour of the country, mostly in the Northeast, where pro Union sentiment was especially strong. Huge cheering crowds greeted him wherever he went, and received an honorary Doctorate of Law from Harvard, to the disgust of John Quincy Adams. He finally had to cut the trip short due to "bleeding at the lungs'; at least partly due to the bullet he had carried in his chest for more than 20 years.

Soon after, at this zenith of his popularity, Jackson set out to ensure the demise of the Second Bank of the United States. The Bank's money still gave it enormous power, and Nicholas Biddle was more desperate than ever to preserve the bank, as later events would show. Jackson had already kicked his pro-bank Secretary of the Treasury, McLane, upstairs to the more prestigious State Department (Livingston was willingly made ambassador to France). McLane's replacement was William J. Duane, at first thought to be amenable to Jackson's bank position. He also said he would resign should he be unable to carry out the President's policy. In the summer of 1833, Amos Kendall went on a trip around the country looking for banks into which the Federal banking deposits could be deposited should they be withdrawn from the BUS.

While some banks were afraid of the BUS's vengeance, or refused on principle to accept the deposits, the trip proved that there were plenty of banks, which would agree to hold government funds despite the BUS's wrath. When Jackson told Duane to begin transferring Federal deposits to other banks, however, Duane refused, and would not resign. Jackson dismissed Duane, and he left, establishing another Jackson precedent – the firing, without pretense of resignation, of a cabinet member. Roger B. Taney then replaced Duane, a man who enthusiastically supported the destruction of the BUS. As the withdrawal of funds went forward, the bank began a severe tightening of funds, restricting loans, and calling in as many debts as it could. The opinion of Remini, Bowers and others is that this went far beyond anything justified by the reduction in the banks funds, and that the bank in fact deliberately engineered a panic.

The panic was real, causing widespread loss of jobs, and grinding to a halt of industry. At first, National Republicans accepted the panic as being caused by the withdrawal of bank funds. As it continued and deepened, the country became more polarized. It was in this period (in 1834) that the National Republicans assumed the name of Whigs, the name, since the 17th century of the English party against an all-powerful king, and for giving the highest authority to Parliament. Thus they labeled Jackson "King Andrew I', and drew political cartoons depicting him as a king, with a scepter labeled "Veto'.

Before 1834 was over, however, many former friends of the bank became disgusted at its conduct, and even the governor of Pennsylvania economically aided as it was by the Bank in Philadelphia, denounced the bank. Webster separated himself from the other National Republicans on this issue, spoke out against it (as he had spoken out against Nullification), and became, for a while, a good friend of the Democratic administration. In the end, the BUS was stripped of the funds which the government had placed in its keeping. It lost its friends, including Clay, and quietly lost its standing as a national bank.

It was re-chartered as a state bank in Pennsylvania, but only lasted a few years after that. Jackson is not guilty of this charge because he searched for many different solutions to end this problem.