Battles Of Jacksons Valley Campaign example essay topic

Many traits are associated with Thomas Jonathan Jackson and his leadership in the confederacy. He is known for stark determination, military genius beyond all others, and the ability to turn any army into a fighting machine. Jackson became legendary when a South Carolina general, seeking to rally his own men at Bull Run, pointed to Jackson and shouted, Look, there is Jackson and his men standing like a stone wall against the enemy. Thus he forever became Stonewall Jackson. Jacksons military legacy had begun even before this moment, when he diverted 20,000 northern troops in the Shenendoah Valley of Virginia, with only 7,000 troops of him own. The image of Stonewall Jackson has forever been one of the most fascinating associated with Civil War military operation.

However, the true military genius of Jackson lies in his understanding of movement in war. He could maneuver a brigade under the nose of opposing armies, march his men farther and faster than anyone before, and understood the critical importance of railroads to the war effort. Using all these techniques, he single-handedly distracted much of the Union force headed to Richmond (including McClellan). The operations of Jackson in the Shenendoah during the first half of the year 1862 constitute one of the most brilliant episodes of military movement in history and continue to be a standard for military study today.

Beginning with the Battle of Kernstown on March 23 and ending with the Battle of Fort Republic on June 9, Stonewall Jackson produced the single greatest military operation in the Civil War. The almost impossible marches, the unbelievable defeats of armies triple the size of his own, and the continuous confusion the Union faced made his maneuvers legendary. Two factors gav the region military value. The Army of Northern Virginia was almost dependent on its agricultural products. And secondly, it became a fortress that had to be occupied to advance into Virginia (specifically Richmond) [Appendix A]. Jackson recognized that this valley was the key to military movement, and military supremacy, in the eastern theater.

Soon after the battle of Bull Run Jackson was promoted to command the Valley District of Virginia. 1 His command revolved solely around the Shenendoah, of which the Union forces held Romney and the north side of the Potomac. Jackson had only a small regiment at his disposal to try and regain this territory. The campaign had no definitive beginning, but the movement during the month of March signaled the first action.

On March 23 at Kernstown, Jackson was handed his only loss when he battled Nathaniel Banks and his 9000 men with less than 3000 of his own men. Jacksons regiment was routed, but the battle caused Banks to postpone his move on Washington, thus freezing a large body of union troops in the valley 2. Moreover, it convinced President Lincoln that Jacksons army could be cut of and destroyed. 3 He now retired up the valley. He appeared suddenly at McDowell on May 8 and sent a Federal force on retreat.

One confederate officer recalled the effects of the battle: Jacksons prompt action and bold attack had completely changed McClellans plans, and instead of establishing Banks near Manassas, he ordered him to remain in the valley, and even sent [reinforcements], to aid in driving back Jackson. 4 Marching with the speed that earned his troops the nickname the foot cavalry he attacked and defeated a small union garrison at Front Royal 5 and then fell upon Banks retreating main army at Winchester on May 25. Here he defeated 64,000 troops with his own 17,000 by flanking his position in the city. Stonewall Jacksons small valley army had turned the tables on Banks and the Washington government, and now held control of the entire Shenendoah. 6 Threatened by Jacksons close proximity to Washington, Lincoln diverted Federal troops to surround his army.

Jackson watched three Federal columns converge to destroy him, but narrowly escaped by falling back on Harpers Ferry on May 31, forcing part of his army to march 50 miles in two days to elude the trap. Jackson continued to withdraw up the valley with Union forces in hot pursuit. Jackson foresaw the two Federal columns converging on Port Republic; therefore, he concentrated forces there and kept Fremont and Shields separated. General Richard Ewell held off Fremont forces at Cross Keys to allow Jackson time to plan a strike. Jacksons forces crossed the Shenendoah River and attacked Shields on June 9.

After a vicious battle, the Federals were routed and retreated northward, leaving Jackson master of the Valley. 7 He had thwarted every Union effort made against him. 8 He did so through a combination of hard marches, knowledge of terrain, unexpected tactics, singleness of purpose, heavy attacks concentrated at one point, and self confidence arising from the thought that God was on his side. However, Jacksons rout is explained best by his own words to an officer at the battle of Cross Keys: Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy, if possible. And when you strike and overcome him, never let up in the pursuit so long as your men have strength to follow. Such tactics win every time, and a small army may thus destroy a large one in detail, and repeated victory will make it invincible.

9 Adroitly executing his astute military intellect, Jackson had occupied nearly 60,000 troops in the fruitless effort to bring him to bay. 10 These movements had a profound impact on the Civil War, having both immediate and lasting effects. The most obvious effect is the diversion Jackson caused on Union forces heading toward Richmond. Becuase of Jacksons movements, Lincoln dispatched 20,000 troops to check him. While these troops were on there way, Jackson stealthily slipped between them and stationed at Ashland, directly north of the capital. Protecting Richmond was the key to Confederate success 11, and Jackson preserved its safety with his movements in the Valley.

Each battle in the campaign had strong ramifications that were felt in Washington and throughout the Union. The bold attack on Kernstown, though unsuccessful, led to many important results. The first effect was the recall of Federal troops from Manassas to the Valley by the petition of General Shields. He explained the reasoning behind this move stating, Though the battle had been won, I still could not believe Jackson would have [struck] so far from the main body without reinforcements; so to be prepared for such a contingency, I set to bring together all the troops within my reach. 12 Thus a body of 20,000 troops was thought necessary to guard against Jacksons 3000 and the imaginary reinforcements.

McClellan was also deprived of 10,000 men in his command that were placed defending against Jackson. And finally Lincoln felt so insecure over the defense of Washington, that he ordered McDowells entire corps to be added to 70,000 already in defense, rather than letting them assist McClellan. Thus by striking to prevent General Johnston from leaving the Valley, Jackson had accomplished much more than he expected. His trickery had achieved all he could have hoped for.

At the tactical level, the battle of McDowell can be viewed as a draw. However, strategically it was a brilliant success for Jackson and the South. Through the use of terrain and leadership, Jackson demonstrated his ability to concentrate his men against a smaller section of the opposition, without letting the opposition concentrate against him. The news of Banks defeat here caused the Federal government to call upon all the states to send militias to protect Washington against the pursuit. Jackson was showing the Union that the Confederacy was not going to be easily defeated. He carried the momentum of this win to Front Royal and Winchester later in the month.

At Front Royal and Winchester the Federal forces came to learn that Jackson was not to be caught by any of the combination of movements they could bring about. 13 While it was true he had only a quarter of the men concentrating on his rear, he had no doubt of the ability to divide these forces and meet them on his own grounds with superior tactical strength. The battle of Cross Keys signaled the end of the campaign with the end of the pursuit on Jackson. Here he brilliantly defeated two separated armies under the command of Fremont and Shields by deft maneuvering and clever use of terrain. With this double victory, Jackson ended his campaign and was free to join Lee at Seven Pines.

In this exciting months campaign, Jackson made great captures of stores and prisoners; but this was not the chief result. Without gaining a single tactical victory, he had achieved a great strategic victory, for by skillfully moving his 15,000 men, he had neutralized a force of 60,000. It is perhaps not too much to say that he saved Richmond, for he had caused McClellans forces to be greatly diverted to the Valley and not concentrated on Richmond. However, this diversion was not the goal of Jackson when he entered the Valley. Jackson saw the Shenendoah as the lifeline of the Confederacy. It was the clearest path to Richmond from the North, contained many agricultural products, and was the location of many train lines that fed the Confederate troops.

Crucial to understanding the importance of the Valley to Jackson were the railroads. The B&O, W&P, and more importantly the Manassas Gap Railroad all ran through some part of the valley [Appendix B]. Jackson understood the parallel between victory on the rails and victory in the war. The Manassas Gap Railroad can easily be called the meat line on the Confederacy. 14 Along its tracks were found the largest meat packing plant in the Confederacy and three depots of stores that fed the largest section of troops. It was the most commonly used rail to transport newly arriving soldiers into the army as well.

In the spring of 1862, Union forces were closing in on the tracks, and only such Confederates as Lee and Jackson understood the magnitude of the loss. 15 Jackson also understood the importance that movement of supplies played in the North. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was a regular target for Jacksons men who smashed its tracks and took its supplies. 16 It was one of his cherished objectives to destroy that railroad and reclaim northwestern Virginia. During the entire campaign, Banks was receiving his supplies on the Manassas Gap and then having them carted to him. Jackson reasoned that if the road were cut at Front Royal, Banks would be forced to rely on a long wagon haul from Winchester; that such a supply would be so vulnerable to cavalry raids, 17 he could force Banks to fall back down the valley.

He calculated that by using the Massanuttens as a barrier he could swiftly take the rail at Front Royal before Banks became aware of the purpose. He swept out of the woods, and routed the Federal troops left to guard the railroad, leaving Banks cut off from his supply line. Jacksons recapture of the little town and railway spelled disaster for Banks. He could now easily dispel Banks back to Winchester and out of the Potomac completely.

Clearly Stonewall Jackson knew how to use a railroad to escape victorious against larger foes. On May 19th Jackson had began his valley campaign-a campaign that resulted in brilliant success for the Southern cause. With the defeat of Fremont on June 8th and Shields on 9th, he had been on march for 23 days; covered 200 miles; had McDowells forces from Fredericksburg rerouted; had seized valuable supplies at Front Royal, Winchester, and Martinsburg, and, although surrounded by 60,000 men, had escaped the snares set for him and brought home prisoners and captured goods. And he had done this with a comparatively small loss of men. The Battle of Port Republic was his most costly victory, but its results were so brilliant that it was a fitting close to a scene of warfare that will live in history with the great campaigns of the world.

It raised the fame of Jackson to the highest pinnacle of military renown, giving him a position among the greatest soldiers of the age. The battles of Jacksons Valley Campaign are known to students of the war, not only in the United States, but across the world. General Norman Schwarzkopf recently cited Jacksons campaign as one of the guiding lights behind his strategy in the Middle East. Field Marshall Erwin Rommel visited the valley and followed in Jacksons footsteps through the valley to understand the genius behind it.

The military skills which Stonewall Jackson used in the Shenendoah Valley campaign have been analyzed and studied by war historians for generations in hopes of repeating the brilliant execution. Many future military leaders used Jackson as a basis for their command. In England, from 1875 on, many officers were expected to read the autobiography of Stonewall Jackson, with special emphasis on the Shenendoah in order to learn a correct application of strategy of interior lines. 18 Erwin Rommel, commander of the German forces in Africa, used the Valley Campaign to learn to successfully defeat armies larger in size.

Clearly, Stonewall Jacksons legacy in the valley lives on forever. Jacksons brilliance in the Shenendoah is directly linked to his consummate understanding of the fact that to win in war is to understand the movements of war. By marching his men under the nose of other commanders, isolating smaller sections of armies that could easily be defeated, capitalizing on railroads opportunities, understanding the necessary sections that the union must travel to attack, and attacking the correct sections of the valley, Stonewall had developed a military acumen that was unprecedented. In a matter of a short time since enrollment into the Confederacy, Robert E. Lee and he were controlling the fate of the war despite Federal advantages in industry, railroads, men, and supplies.

With Jacksons death at Chancellorsville, many believe the hopes of a southern victory died. Jackson had shown that military genius can defeat superior numbers repeatedly, but the death of the consummate commander caused the South to lose its greatest hope. Historians and war experts agree that Jacksons Valley campaign of 1862 is one of the greatest examples of military movement in history. However, Jackson would not take credit for the brilliant upsets and victories saying simply, God has been our shield, and to his name be all the glory. 19.