Bismarck's Aims example essay topic

Bismarck – How Much Did Bismar Essay, Bismarck – How Much Did Bismar Bismarck – How much did Bismarck's success from 1862-70 depend on the errors and misjudgements of others? According to the traditional German view, German unification was achieved in 1871 as a result of the actions of one great man, Otto von Bismarck, the Minister-President of Prussia, who planned the events leading to unification in detail. However, more recent historians have argued that Bismarck had no such "master plan'. Instead, Bismarck's success was a result of his flexibility as a statesman, combined with the advantages Prussia enjoyed both in its resources and its diplomatic situation, the latter of which was improved by the mistakes and misjudgements of others. There were essentially two halves to Bismarck's supposed master plan: defeat Austria, keeping her as an ally by treating her leniently, and defeat France. Defeating Austria required the neutrality of France and Russia, and a way in which to trick Austria into declaring war with Prussia, so that Austria would appear to be to blame.

According to the traditional view, Bismarck planned ways in which to carry this out. Originally it was said that Bismarck's handling of the rebellion in Russian Poland resulted in Russian neutrality: the rebellion was a potential threat to Russia, so Bismarck offered the Tsar military help, thereby gaining Russia's friendship. However, this was not entirely the case, and Bismarck almost ruined the good diplomatic position he had inherited: There was almost a French, British and Austrian alliance of liberal opposition against Prussia over the matter, and Russia resented Prussian interference. In the end, Russia's friendship with Prussia remained intact, and the Prussian benefit was that Austria's relations with Russia had worsened over Austrian opposition to Russia's Polish policy. Furthermore, this could not have been part of a master plan since Bismarck had no way of knowing about the rebellion in advance. It is more likely that Bismarck was simply following Prussia's Polish policy, and his ability to lie low in order to prevent any further damage to his position shows his flexibility as a diplomat.

It also seems unlikely that Bismarck planned in advance to use the Schleswig-Holstein dispute as a pretext for war with Austria. His aim instead was to annex the duchies to Prussia, hence the joint action with Austria in 1864 which reduced the chance of other powers intervening. This aim gradually widened to that of Prussian dominance in north Germany, and Bismarck hoped that, using the Convention of Gastein, Austria would give up north Germany peacefully. However, though he would have preferred to make gains peacefully, Bismarck was prepared to go to war with Austria should the need arise. As early as 1856, in a report to the Prussian foreign minister Manteuffel, Bismarck wrote, "we shall be obliged sooner or later to fight Austria for our existence'.

Bismarck's policy always allowed for war, and he merely took this option when Austria broke her agreement with Prussia by taking the dispute to the Confederation Diet and thereby closing the option of a peaceful arrangement. It was therefore Austria that misjudged the aims of Bismarck, and Austria's actions that led him to take advantage of his situation and declare war. The traditional view makes the guess that, at a meeting with Napoleon at Biarritz in 1865, Bismarck gained French neutrality in return for some vague promises about territorial compensation for France. However, it is more likely that no real agreement was made: Bismarck told a Foreign Ministry official on 23rd October 1865 that "Napoleon will dance a cotillion with us, without being clear in his mind when it will begin or what figures it will include'.

So when Bismarck went to war with Austria, it was unknown how France would react, and if the war lasted a long time, there was a risk that Napoleon might interfere. This is in fact what happened. On 4th July 1866, Napoleon wrote to King William I proposing an armistice. If Bismarck refused, there would be the risk of France joining the war, and a longer war would allow Austria to transfer troops from Italy at a time when the Prussian army was being weakened by spreading cholera.

Fortunately for Bismarck, Napoleon's terms were generous, and allowed the creation of a North German Confederation dominated by Prussia, in return for the promise that the south German states should remain independent from Prussia and allowed to form their own federation. Bismarck had anticipated having to make greater concessions, as shown by his preparations to buy off France with the Saar. As a result, Bismarck made peace promptly with Austria, and this haste required that the terms of the peace treaty be lenient towards Austria. This meant that by the time Napoleon had changed his mind and had started demanding greater concessions, Bismarck was in a position to reject the demands.

Thus Napoleon's initial demands forced Bismarck to end the war promptly, with France getting the worst deal. Napoleon's misjudgement meant that now Austria had good relations with Prussia, while Prussia had gained power at the expense of France's position. The North German Confederation was a step towards German unification, with the next step being the incorporation of the south German states into the Prussian empire Bismarck had created. However, it was not Bismarck's immediate aim to gain south Germany.

In November 1869, Bismarck wrote to King William I, "In regard to the South German situation The distant and by far the greater aim is the national unification of Germany. We can wait for this in security We cannot accelerate it unless out of the way events in Europe offer us an unsought opportunity to do so '. In short, Bismarck was not planning to actively pursue unification, but suggesting a wait-and-see policy; although there is always the possibility that by "out of the way events' he was alluding to the Hohenzollern candidature crisis. Bismarck always denied involvement in the Hohenzollern candidature crisis, although it is likely that he was involved. It is less certain, however, what exactly Bismarck's aims were in the matter. In the traditional interpretation, Bismarck intended to annoy France and spark a war.

However, Bismarck again appeared to want to avoid war in the near future; on 26th February 1869, he wrote to a Prussian envoy, "I also think it probable that German unity will be forwarded by violent means. It is quite another matter however, to bring about such a violent catastrophe and to be responsibility for the choice of time for it'. Instead, it appears that Bismarck initially just wanted Prussian influence in Spain; on 9th March 1870, he wrote to King William I, "For Germany it is desirable to have on the other side of France, a country on whose sympathies we can rely and with whose feelings France is obliged to reckon'. At some point, though, Bismarck's aims – or at least, what he thought he could do – changed. The situation changed when a telegram with news of Leopold's arrival "about the 26th' was decoded as "about the 9th'. As a result, the secret of the candidature leaked out, and it agitated France.

In a desire to prevent the war which France threatened, the Prince of Hohenzollern renounced his candidature. When France demanded an apology from King William I, Bismarck edited William's reply, the Ems telegram, to make it more provocative, with the result that France declared war on Prussia. Bismarck's denial of involvement in the candidature does not help reveal his aims in involvement. If he was deliberately manipulating the situation towards war with France, lack of evidence of his involvement would make Prussia's position appear to be legitimate when France declared war.

But equally, Bismarck could not reveal his involvement even if his aim was just Prussian influence in Spain. Either way, it was France's handling of the situation that led to Bismarck's success after the war in forming the German Empire. France overreacted to the candidature crisis, Bismarck saw the opportunity to exploit this, and France made the mistake of starting a war which they would not win: The diplomatic situation was against France, since Italy, Russia, Austria and the south German states were friendly with Prussia at that time, while Britain had been alienated by France's plan to annex Belgium. Bismarck had a number of other advantages that made his victories against France and Austria surer.

Prussia had a formidable economic strength. Prussia had come to dominate Germany economically, through the Prussian-dominated Zollverein and the growth of its population. The Prussian currency dominated Germany at the expense of the Austrian currency. This put Prussia in a strong military position, since it could rely on an expansive railway network for mobilising its armies and a metal industry for arming them. Furthermore, Bismarck was in a good situation financially.

Previous Prussian governments had ensured that the government shared in the economic prosperity by investing government money in the railways. So, when Bismarck came to fight a war, he had enough money to fight it without needing to raise any extra taxes. Previous governments had also spent large sums on the Prussian army, investing in new weapons. Bismarck was also fortunate that liberal opposition in Prussia was willing to make concessions. Had he needed to raise extra taxes, the Landtag would have put up a fight against him. However, the liberals were prepared to trade in their liberal views in exchange for the German unification that Bismarck eventually won.

Many preferred that Prussia be the driving force in unification, since unification under Prussia would improve prosperity more than Bismarck's policies would temporarily reduce it. Bismarck also inherited Prussia's strong diplomatic position. Some major external obstacles to German unification had already been removed by the time Bismarck came to power. Firstly, the Holy Alliance between Austria and Russia had been destroyed by the Crimean War.

Secondly, the rise to power of Napoleon in France was an advantage, since Napoleon was more open to the idea to re-organising Europe along the lines of nationalism compared with his predecessors. Bismarck's successes from 1862-70, resulting in German unification in the form of the German Empire, did owe a lot to the errors and misjudgements of others. Austrian misjudgement of Bismarck's aims in the Schleswig-Holstein dispute led to the situation in which Bismarck could declare war on Austria. France's misjudgement of the situation when it called for an armistice in the war led Bismarck to conclude peace quickly, strengthening Prussia's position at the expense of France. Later, France's mistakes in the Hohenzollern candidature crisis led to the war which Prussia won, allowing the founding of the German Empire.

In each case, others' mistakes created a situation which Bismarck was quick to exploit. Bismarck's ability to exploit these situations was dependent on Prussia's long-term position of military strength, combined with the favourable diplomatic situation for Prussia in Europe.