Boethius Through The Character Of Philosophy example essay topic

Literary Patterns of European Developement Trinity College The Consolation of Philosophy was written in the early 6th century by Boethius. A statesman and intellectual, well educated in liberal arts, Boethius fell from the favor of the Gothic emperor Theodoric, under false charges of treason by his enemies. He was imprisoned in Pavia, and while there used his time to reflect on his situation and attempt to answer many of the questions which have plagued human kind throughout history. The text is written in the form of a dialogue with Philosophy, who appears in the form of a woman and represents that part of Boethius mind which has strayed during his difficult ordeal.

One of the possible enigmas of this text surrounds the title. Boethius wrote this piece during his confinement, and was certainly very aware of the fate which awaited him; he knew he would be executed. We know that Boethius was at least to some degree, a religious man, and several works of Christian writing are ascribed to him. He is also accredited with five small works... of theology, the authenticity of at least four of which is beyond a doubt. They are completely orthodox in doctrine... (p. 13) One may reasonably ask why Boethius chose philosophy, and not his religion, to console him in those final months of his life. It seems that a Christian would find the most comfort in his religion and his God, rather than exercises in logic and reason.

But I would contend that the reason Boethius finds consolation in philosophy is for the very reason that philosophy leads him back to the God from which he has strayed. While it may seem quite unreasonable that the basic logic of philosophy would lead a person to that which by its very nature is illogical, Boethius has no problem using philosophy as a conduit to God. From several statements made within The Consolation, one might safely assume that Boethius saw a very strong relationship between reason and belief in God. The beginning of the book depicts a Boethius who is so enamored by the Muses of Poetry that he has forgotten his own sense of reason, and thus fails to even recognize Philosophy when she comes to his aid. In Book II, Boethius explains the importance of philosophy in life. So soon as your words stop sounding in our ears, the mind is weighed down again by its deep seated melancholy. (p. 59) This is to say that when philosophy leaves us, things tend to seem quite desperate.

Philosophy diagnoses Boethius problems as a fixation on the loss of good fortune... you are wasting away in pining and longing for your former good fortune. It is the loss of this which, as your imagination works upon you, has so corrupted your mind. (p. 54) The mention of the imagination here is somewhat of a foreshadowing of the conclusions drawn later in the book concerning the nature of Fortune. Philosophy reminds Boethius that in better times, he would never have submitted himself to the friendship of Fortune. It used to be your way whenever she came near with her flattery to attack her with manly arguments and hound her with pronouncements taken from the oracle of my shrine. (p. 54) This would suggest that Boethius sees philosophy, that is reason, to be somewhat opposed to Fortune. The portrayal of Fortune by Philosophy is all-together unattractive.

In his discovery of the changing faces of the random goddess, Philosophy explains that Boethius has perceived Fortunes true nature... To you she has revealed herself to the full. (p. 55) Philosophy reminds Boethius that it is by virtue of her perpetually changing behavior that Fortune, in fact, does not change but always stays the same. Thus we should expect nothing more from her than complete capriciousness. Philosophy concludes her discourse on Fortune with the following sentiments: She has nothing worth pursuing, and no trace of intrinsic good; she never associates with good men and does not turn into good men those with whom she does associate. (p. 72) Now, assuming that Boethius normally subscribes to philosophy, which is reason, and thus in this subscription denounces Fortune, which is chance, he thus rejects chance and embraces an ordered reality. In Book IV, Boethius tells Philosophy that she is truly the guide to the light. You, I said, who are my leader towards the true light, all that you have poured forth in speech up to now has been clearly both divine to contemplate and invincibly supported by your arguments.

You have spoken of things I had forgotten because of the pain of what I had suffered... (p. 116) The light which Boethius speaks of is God, whom he associates with perfection and order. I could never believe that events of such regularity are due to the haphazard's of chance. In fact I know that God the Creator watches over His creation. (p. 50) Thus it should not seem altogether strange that Boethius, through the character of Philosophy, attacks Fortune and everything she stands for. He realizes that belief in Fortune has lead him away from the philosophic reasoning which helps him to maintain his sanity and composure. All of these ideas imply another truth which Boethius clearly came to understand while he was imprisoned. The idea that mental stress and anxiety causes us to stray from philosophy and thus reason relates well to the idea that humans often forget God in the face of tribulation.

Belief in the ideals of fortune, subscribing to the belief that our lives are little more than a collection of haphazard transpiration's, has the potential to drive a person quite mad. Without the conviction that all things happen for a reason, an idea which comes from a belief in the existence of some divine orderer, a person will easily forget the precepts of philosophic reason and loose sight of himself and his reality. In his confinement, Boethius began questioning all of those things in life which are the most nebulous and confounding. One of those issues concerns the idea of good and evil, and in the end it boils down to the most basic question, namely "If there is a God, why do bad things happen to good people" Boethius questions the justice of the universe, and in doing so prompts philosophy into a justification of such seemingly unjust occurrences.

Why this is all turned upside down, why good men are oppressed by punishments reserved for crime and that men can snatch the rewards that belong to virtue surprises me very much, and I would like to know from you the reason for this very unjust confusion. (p. 133) From earlier discussions regarding happiness, we can gather that Boethius has somewhat dealt with this problem. Philosophy points out that all men, good or bad, attempt to find happiness through their actions. She then reasons that happiness is good. .".. Happiness is a state made perfect by the presence of everything that is good". (p. 79) Thus men who desire happiness also desire God, and the most supreme and perfect good is God.

"Since nothing can be conceived better than God, everyone agrees that that which has no superior is good. Reasons shows that God is so good that we are convinced that his goodness is perfect". (p. 99) Thus, God is the essence of happiness. But since men desire things for happiness and happiness equals goodness, then trying to obtain happiness through evil goes against nature, and so the evil are never really happy. Furthermore, it thus follows that since good and evil are opposed, and God is Supreme goodness and happiness, there is no true happiness for the evil because they are in constant opposition to God. This argument is far from convincing. It is difficult to accept that those people who rob and steal from others and get away with it do not derive some happiness from their actions.

Furthermore, the idea of false happiness, which Boethius attributes to both the gifts of Fortune and such material concerns as wealth and power, is difficult to distinguish on the most basic levels from any other sort of earthly happiness, especially when the end of both types is a satisfaction of sorts. With this separation between true and false happiness, Boethius reasons that life is indeed fair, since the bad never really find true happiness, but instead only false happiness if any at all... riches are unable to quench insatiable greed; power does not make a man master of himself if he is imprisoned by the indissoluble chains of wicked lusts; and when high office is bestowed on unworthy men, so far from making them worthy, it only betrays them and reveals their unworthiness... (p. 71) Boethius takes all of this step further when he deduces that evil does not exist. "Evil is nothing, since that is what he cannot do who can do everything". (p. 112) He makes no attempt, however, to answer the next logical question, namely, "If evil is nothing, and evil men are powerless, then why do men do bad things and how is it that such people have the power to affect the lives of others" Similarly, after Boethius has reasoned that evil is nothing, he tells us that the bad people should be pitted because divine justice does, in fact, cause them much suffering. .".. For just as weakness is a disease of the body, so wickedness is a disease of the mind. And if this is so, since we think of people who are sick in body as deserving sympathy rather than hatred, much more so do they deserve pity rather than blame who suffer evil more severe than any physical illness". (p. 132) The book ends with a discussion of fate verses free will, a topic on which I feel Boethius is not altogether convincing.

He clearly creeps around the topic, carefully deducing certain aspects while contriving others. By nature of his earlier statements concerning the nature of the divine, we know that Boethius believes that the world is ordered in some way, and that things dont just happen purely at random. This still leaves the question of how ordered things are, in other words, it is just the nature of the universe that is ordered, or are the lives of human beings also ordered in some way To some degree, it seems somewhat unreasonable that such an omnipotent God as earlier described by Boethius would not have some type of knowledge of earthly events, most probably foreknowledge of future events. While Boethius admits that this must be a truth, he seems rather uncomfortable with the implications of such a truth. Clearly, it seems that if God has foreknowledge of future events, there cannot be any free will on earth. Well, the two seem clean contrary and opposite, Gods universal foreknowledge and freedom of the will.

If God foresees all things and cannot be mistaken in any way, what Providence has foreseen as a future event must happen. So that if from eternity Providence foreknows not only mens actions but also their thoughts and desires, there will be no freedom of will. (p. 150) Boethius also reasons that in light of universal foreknowledge, prayer and hope are rather useless, because the reason behind peoples prayers and hope is the desire to influence the course of some future event. Furthermore, since prayer is in many respects the only link between the divine and humanity, the one and only means of communication between man and God is removed... (p. 153) The implication here follows as such: if prayer and hope have no power to influence the future, then prayer has no power at all, and if prayer has no power, then it is useless to pray, and so humans are basically cut off from the divine. I do not find that divine foreknowledge makes hope and prayer completely powerless. Earlier in the book, Philosophy reminds Boethius that although humans do not understand Gods plan, this fact should not lead to doubt concerning the inherent goodness of all things. But even if you dont know the reasons behind the great plan of the universe, there is no need for you to doubt that a good power rules the world and that everything happens all right. (p. 133) And while many believers subscribe to the idea that God is good and that everything eventually works out in the end, this does not keep people from continually asking God for the very thing which they basically accept will happen anyway.

It seems to me that knowledge of divine foreknowledge does not tell us anything about the future, only that everything will definitely happen precisely according to plan. While this makes it impossible to change the future through prayer, people will continue to hope and pray that the outcome of events plays in their favor, just as people who took a test three weeks ago hope they got a good grade as they open the envelope to see the results. This is not prayer to influence the outcome, but rather a hope that the outcome is favorable. In his attempt to explain the forces which govern the universe, Boethius considers the idea that foreknowledge does not necessarily impose necessity upon the future, and that freedom of the will is not infringed by foreknowledge. (p. 155) And while Boethius is clearly uncomfortable with the idea that free will does not exist, he seems equally unsettled by the separation of divine foreknowledge and necessity of events. On page 151, Philosophy attempts to illustrate that foreknowledge does impose a kind of necessity on the future. But what I am trying to show is that, whatever the order of the causes, the coming to pass of things foreknown is necessary even if the foreknowledge of future events does not seem to impose necessity on them. (p. 151) Then on page 155, Philosophy tells Boethius that he should not discredit this idea that foreknowledge and necessity can be separated.

Take the case of those who believe that foreknowledge does not impose necessity upon the future... I would like to know why you consider their reasoning ineffective. (p. 155) We must try to keep in mind that Boethius is, in reality, debating with himself, or more specifically, his philosophic reason. But at this point, the character in his mind appears to be contradicting herself. This would indicate that Boethius reasons both concepts as somewhat true, and in response, formulates a conclusion which incorporates both divine foreknowledge and human freedom of will. While this might not make much sense to most people, (I dont believe it made much sense to him) Boethius circumvents this problem in one statement... human reason refuses to believe that divine intelligence can see the future in any other way except that in which human reason has knowledge. (p. 162) In other words, we cannot know the mind of God. One might reasonably think that with this revelation, Boethius would stop trying to figure things out, but he perseveres, and begins to discuss the nature of Gods knowledge... since the sate of God is ever that of eternal presence, His knowledge, too, transcends all temporal change and abides in the immediacy of His presence.

It embraces all the infinite recesses of past and future and views them in the immediacy of its knowing as though they are happening in the present... (p. 165) This leads to the explanation that Gods knowledge should not be thought of as foreknowledge of the future, but instead as the knowledge of a never ending presence. (p. 165) It seems to me that since human beings dont live with regard to a perpetual presence, the fact that God may view time in that way has no bearing on us. What is eternal presence to Him is the most definitely the past and future in this realm of existence. Consequently, while God may consider His knowledge to be in the present, that knowledge is of our futures, and thus translated brings us right back to the idea of divine foreknowledge. On this point, Boethius and I concur. He agrees that the knowledge of the divine is in fact foreknowledge and that all things which the divine foresees happen necessarily.

If you say at this point that what God sees as a future event cannot but happen, and what cannot but happen, happens of necessity, and if you bind me to this word necessity, I shall have to admit that it is a matter of the firmest truth, nut one which scarcely anyone except a student of divinity has been able to fathom. I shall answer that the same future event is necessary when considered with reference to divine foreknowledge, and yet seems to be completely free and unrestricted when considered in itself... (p. 166) This is to say that while things may have the appearance of being the products of free will, they are in fact all part of the plan, foreseen by God and occurring in accordance with that which only He knows. While Boethius must admit that free will exists only in the minds of humans, he maintains that things are not deprived of their true nature by the necessity of their happening. In spite of the fact that they do happen, their existence does not deprive them of their true nature, in virtue of which the possibility of their non-occurrence existed before they happened. (p. 167) The major themes of The Consolation of Philosophy can be summarized as follows.

While it is true that the upright often suffer and the corrupt often take much pleasure in their lives, justice is always served by virtue of the fact that goodness is its own reward, while the wicked never find true happiness, because happiness is goodness and goodness is God. Evil is nothing and has no power, but the wicked derive their power from weakness. Fortune is a fickle goddess whom is neither to be trusted nor associated with. God views time as a perpetual presence, and consequently does not foresee the future, but rather always knows the present. But the present time of God is sometimes the future of humans, so God knows the future and thus things happen out of necessity. But just because all things happen out of necessity doesnt mean that their ability to not happen is taken away; it just couldnt possibly happen.

One may reasonably conclude that many parts of the book seem confused and contradictory. His logic often seems to manipulate reason, and the conclusions drawn from such logic may appear contrived and largely unbelievable. But one must consider the fact that Boethius was facing the eminence of death as he wrote this, and certainly felt the necessity to find the answers to those philosophical questions hed been asking all his life. Even if the answers he found may not be convincing to a reader of this work, it does propose some very interesting solutions and is certainly worth reading if only for the fact that it will inevitably lead the one questioning his own convictions on such obscure topics. One might safely assume that Boethius was writing this largely for his own benefit. If this is true, then clearly the most important thing is not that he convinces his audiences through time, but that he himself believed these things and found peace and consolation in his thoughts and words.