Boundaries O example essay topic

The paper examines "nordic ness" as an instructive instance of maintaining difference without independence (in the sense of national autonomy without independence from Europe or from the nordic area as a whole), and considers what that suggests about the terms available for the establishment and / or maintenance of boundaries to group identities. The contemporary problem of boundaries is their un fixedness under globalizing conditions. The consequences are an increasingly explicit choice of identity without the boundedness provided by the primacy of national-state borders or easily visible independent cultures, and a proliferation of instances of existing on the margin. A brief account of the coherence of Nordic distinctiveness over recent centuries suggests that its necessary conditions are those of a strategic marginality: dependence upon the larger world (of Europe), a degree of external threat and common weakness, plus a degree of acknowledgement of these factors. This account can be aligned with a broader model of self-location at, and attempts to gain from, a position on the margins.

The model is sustained from sources in IR, sociological / anthropological and world systems theories. Nordic identity and the practice of a "nordic" politics emerge as an instructive, relatively successful case of witting marginality. Introduction: What is the problem of boundaries? o o My discussion does not refer to boundaries between, or within states, or even to any clearly defined boundary on the ground. Nonetheless, I am talking about a boundary: that between one (supposed) type of society - the "nordic"scandinavian", "northern" etc etc - and another - Europe, the West, other versions of modernity. A boundary is a boundary for all that. So there's a lot to be learnt by looking at the range in one discussion, and with comparable concepts.

I assert that the nordic boundary is an instructive instance of how to bound identity in relation to what lies beyond. The un fixity of boundaries as a problem for theorists o o explaining or anticipating change in both location and character o o This is the primary concern of the stream, in many analyses and comparisons of how clearly identifiable borders / boundaries. The whole hopefully builds towards an overall understanding of how borders / boundaries are changing. For Europe in particular, the question of how its overall boundary is changing, and how boundaries within it are changing have been considered in their own right. (Anderson and Bort 2001, Fontana 1995, J"onsson et al. 2000, Bideleux and Taylor 1996, Maz ower 1998) o o my theoretical exercice: "bracketing" out boundaries to identify the possible grounds for them o o This is meant to work alongside other studies.

The idea is: avoid the presupposition that there have to be any boundaries, let alone those there in fact are, the better to model why there are those there are, and how they change in location and in character. I do not actually believe this. But I do contend that it would be theoretically unsafe to assume that that it is not true -to assume, that is to say, that boundedlessness is impossible. Wherever a boundary occurs, it's existence and functioning is in need of some explanation.

The idea resembles the notion of entropy, then: theoretically the universe could be devoid of energy, even and still; so why isn't it, and what are the consequences of its not being so? Globalization theory could also be described as a way of confronting the possibility of borderlessness, though it is quite often a more or less wild speculation about what coming borderlessness is going to be like (Al brow 1996, Schulte 2000). Sociological approaches yield both structural (e.g. Gellner 1994) and behavioural explanations (anthropological / microsociological analyses - e.g. Elias 1994, Geertz 1986, Handler 1994) That's why I'm here to meet sociologists researching borders. Explaining the existence and functioning of a boundary might permit of answers at three levels: 1.1. "structural forces" promoting boundaries; 2. behaviours that promote, infringe, negotiate with boundaries etc; and 3. the motivations behind "boundedness" o o Sociology / anthropology has many fine contributions to answers of this kind (not necessarily under the heading of border studies): e.g. o o Gellner's structural explanation (quotation); o o on "pre-modern societies (which he called "agrarian societies") the social consequences of their "Malthusianism" are "a high valuation of aggressiveness, and a low valuation of work": in "a thug dominated society, the benefits go to the rulers, not the inventors", hence "In the society, the main role of culture... is to be a mark of status.

And culture tends to be very differentiated and nuanced; there is no earthly reason why it should delimit political units. On the contrary, its main role is to indicate the position of people in a social structure". (p. 9) o o microsociological analyses like Norbert Elias et al's 1965 study of a small town in Leicestershire, and how by stigmatization its component parts were able to structure the problem of delinquency - with an intro. by Elias called "A Theoretical Essay on Established and Outsider Relations". o Geertz's influential advocacy of viewing others as " alternatives to us as opposed to alternative for us", i.e. of defining identities by relating across boundaries (quotation). o o. ".. we have come to such a point in the moral history of the world... that we are obliged to think about diversity rather differently than we have been used to thinking about it... Imagining difference... remains a science of which all we have need". (p. 120) o o Sociology / anthropology has had to work hard to move away from earlier structural accounts which assumed that identities naturally / necessarily / properly clustered within fixed boundaries, outside of which individuals or groups were "a nomic", and to judge what position to adopt in relation to boundaries between identities - Geertz has a distinguished role in challenging the ethnocentricity here - see Handler who follows Geertz, arguing that "identity" is an unquestioned concept interconnecting, replicating everyday individuality with / in the group, attached to a specifically western conception of the self as special, independent and bounded, and collusive with nationalism - see also Smaze 2000.) The problem of boundaries for actors: "strategies of difference" o o A special problem for states, which are traditionally defined by b orderliness. This has marked effects on European states because the formal principles of their union are uniquely intrusive of their legal and institutional sovereignty, (Anderson and Bort 2001, J"onsson et al. 2000, Murray and Holmes 1998).

So far, in connection with integration, there is relatively little consideration of how structures promoting boundedness may be changing. o o States and other actors are aware of choices to make / shift /unmake boundaries - incl. to alter behaviour vis-'a-vis those on the other side All actors may find that the boundaries they suppose are amended by others (secessionism, pursuit of ethnicity) or from outside ("integration", globalization) State's difficulties have consequences for behaviours within, especially near to state borders (Wilson quotation 1), and most disruptively where earlier "politicized ethnicity" breaks down (Wilson quotation 2). .".. the relationships of power and identity at borders and between the borders and their respective states are problematic precisely because the state cannot always control the political structures which it establishes at its extremities... ". (p. 10) "a focus on borders does not allow us to forget that national identity is a politicised ethnicity. In our view many national identities come about when ethnicity is politicised in the course of pursuing self-determination". (p. 13) This gives rise to a number of new (ish) patterns of behaviour as actors try to negotiate with modified or dissonant boundaries: e.g. 1.1. bottom-up organization across state boundaries, which is the stuff of border studies in Europe 2. secessionism. See Katz 1999, arguing that Post-Cold-War bigger states are not prepared to bear the cost of suppressing secession and could perfectly often negotiate with it; Bartk us 1999 attempts a predictive account of secession in terms costs / benefits of membership / secession. 3. the use of non-state ethnicity as a point of reference against values from above, e.g. that wrapped up in the given state and its supposedly given values (Hall 1991), 4. ditto against the global (ibid.) 5. the kind of "narcissism" on a world scale that Jonathan Friedman analysed (see below). o o o o "Strategies of difference" are what actors use or need to adopt to invent, sustain or demonstrate difference and hence boundedness / identity This category is very much under defined: in particular, it is unclear why actors should "need", or (to alter the problem without simplifying it) "feel the need" to sustain etc difference and boundedness. That is amongst the fundamental questions of motivations, listed above amongst those I am trying to pursue, and subtending border studies in general. I suggest that some general characterization of why boundedness is needed / felt to be needed could be achieved; but that no answer should be sought / could be reached for the broader, normative question: When is boundedness / difference justified.

I wish now to set out "nordic distinctiveness" and consider its assets as a "strategy of difference". Nordic distinctiveness This part derived from "Differentiating, collaborating, outdoing: Nordic identity as a response to the pull of Europe" (2001), + the IR theory and categories from: "Marginal Manoeuvres: Danish and British Postures in Europe" - also available on web Original structural marginality: remote position dominating access to larger European space - gains of marginality: difficult to attack, rent from supplying resources (cf. "neo-realist" IR) The basis of nordic distinctiveness found in the fact of geography / location : o o relatively inaccessible to authority and to (counter) attack - thus late / incomplete centralization + consensual nationalist / monarchist democracy and few attempts at direct control from outside; o straddling of supply routes for Europe further south (wood, herring, steel); tendency to live off / adopt as necessary structures from Europe; o o Even where the weight and significance of the geographical / locational changes, the habits and lessons of adapting in the past remain a force / asset. A history of adaptations to Europe: viking christianity & trade; protestant absolutism; freedom of the seas / neutrality ; democracy; social welfare o o Vikings exploit and then adopt European monotheism to sustain political suzerainty over an extensive maritime network o Lutheran Protestantism strategically adopted with little internal resistance in a form that underpinned absolutism - military in the case of Sweden o Neutrality: Neutrality at sea originally put forward (with naval backing) by Netherlands and Britain, adopted in 18 C as Scandinavian states moved towards non-conflict amongst themselves and holding off the power of the big European powers - see Holbraad 1991 o Democracy & social welfare: states with reduced international power and limited domestic reach forced by comparatively late industrialization to accept consensual social citizenship: consociation al democracy, recognition of social partners, welfare rights o o Disregarding the disagreement about the term: "nordic", "scandinavian", "baltic", "northern."Nordic" itself originated in 19 C myth of independence Apparent demise: 1980's debate as the post- WWII basis of nordic distinctiveness is undermined by the end of the Cold War basis for neutrality and Nordic (Swedish and Finnish) membership of the EU (which are, of course, connected events). But Nordic difference has always been a weak force unable to stand in direct opposition to bigger forces from outside (Strath 1980). The late-19 C "nordic nationalism" version in any case produced much less than appeared: loyalties and affinities between populations, but no commitment to union (amongst either populations or states). See Sorensen and B. Strath 1997 Nordic distinctiveness as a marginal strategy Marginal "strategy of difference": i.e. sustaining autonomy without independence 1.2. 3.1.

Exploiting marginality has not entailed internal unity, 2. The tendency to conflict over the spoils of marginality (i.e. straddling the Baltic Sea) only faded in 19 C, as the hold of the bigger powers over the overall situation in the Baltic Sea area was born in upon the Scandinavian countries (Wi berg 2000). This generated a capacity to layer boundaries in the Scandinavian area, which is consequently put forward by some as its essential post-modernity: e.g. Ole Waever's, concluding chapter to Joenniemi 1997, entitled "The Baltic Sea: A Region of Post-Modernity" (Neuman quotation) "Norden is, inter alia, the domain of the blurred dividing lines, and it is vital that the emerging Northern Europe also becomes an area where fluid distinctions between EU and non-EU countries... prevail". (p. 266) 3. and has not aimed at total independence o o o o Rather, it has meant responding to the greater forces outside (military, economic and cultural) by clubbing together, while acknowledging that those forces cannot be wished away. o o o o This entailed vs. uncomfortable situations for the international relations of DK, SW and FIN during WWII o Can be seen in a degree of cultural sycophancy: See Holm 1999, or recent press reports on how "american" Sweden is. 1.2. 3.1. Nordic distinctiveness has included periods of "outdoing" the original - neutrality, social democracy o o o o e.g. : Marshall Childs. This tendency is very much alive. See o o o o 1990's debate on the (European) Social Welfare state: Es ping-Andersen 1996, Torffing 1999, Greve 2000 o Scandinavian states' environmental agenda in EU policy o Therborn's descriptions of modernity in Europe - including at this conference 1.2. 3.1. i.e. and claiming distinctiveness from the centre as an asset ("alter nativity") o o o o The term is defined in, Parker 2000: 34 (quotation) "an appearance of difference which can be politically useful for putting forward an ideological alternative to a dominant centre" (p. 34) For a sample, see the language used by Vivekananda n at this conference (quotation) "From India, we look at the Nordic welfare state system as the largest successful human solidarity project in the world, and it is viewed with great admiration.

Many developing countries, including India, have drawn inspiration from the Nordic welfare state system and tried to emulate it in their own limited way". Comparing other strategies of difference under globalization The local-global relationship after colonialism (Friedman) Friedman asserts that globalization engenders various versions of "narcissism", where the self is alienated into the consumption of values and / or images from a (now declining) western capitalist centre (cf Said 1993). The nordic combination: o o acknowledged peripherality, o survival of identifiable local elites and culture, and o "outdoing" o o permits a local-global relationship drawing on the stronger external forces (now present in what is called "globalization") without alienating identity The flow of modern ities (Taylor) (With an eye to the phenomena of globalization?) Taylor develops within World System theory to emphasis: o o i) different versions of modernity; and ii) the cultural / identity processes involved in the spread of one modernity after another ) especially the pressure / pull on less modernized elites to "emulate" the "more advanced" form of modernity from the metropole (quotation) "The critical process through which [over the course of history] hegemony influenced fellow members of the core was emulation: because each hegemon is indisputably a great success story in its path to high hegemony, its rivals try to emulate them [sic] in processes commonly known as mercantilism, industrialization and Americanization". (p. 39) Hence, admiring, and (for elites) identifying with the "modern" is no new phenomenon. The alienation of identity and social breakdown it engenders may not be necessary. The peculiarities of the Nordic difference and the Nordic strategy of difference show a record of (but not the guarantee) of emulating, and adopting elements from the external modernity of the moment - including that of "globalization" - without alienating identity..