British German Relations Prior To The War example essay topic

The origin and causes of World War I have been subjects of great interest to many 20th century historians. The history, policies, and controversies surrounding the major countries involved in WWI have evoked many discussions on whether or not the war could have been avoided, as well as various accounts of what actually took place. The focus of this essay will be to examine the entering of England into WWI, in particular her relations with Germany prior to the war, and the degree to which these relations influenced England's eventual participation in the war. The main sources for this essay were the works of Joachim Remak The Origins of World War I, 1871-1914, AJP Taylor, The First World War, Edward McCullough, How the First World War Began, and Zara Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War. All had varying views on England's position prior to entering the war. The different opinions offered by these sources, aided me in trying to remain impartial until the end of the essay, where, based on the various arguments, I made my own conclusions.

In order to better understand the circumstances under which Britain became involved in WWI, it is important to first try and establish the basic facts and historical sequence of events that led to the war itself. In 1907, Europe was divided into two basic groups: the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, and the Triple Entente of Great Britain, France, and Russia. There were various conflicts among the members of these opposing groups, which need be taken into account when examining their eventual participation in the war. The French and the Germans had been involved in several conflicts over the territory of Morocco, and this led to a possibility of war between the two nations. Britain and Germany were both trying to establish their supremacy on the seas and had become international rivals. The great naval race that ensued gave rise to tension between the two countries.

Germanys new naval developments led to her being more competitive in trade, and this new competition arose a feeling of concern and resentment in Britain, as did an increase in the importation of British goods. Adding to British alarm was the competition from the Germans in the British colonies. It was the growing rivalry between Austria and Russia for control over the Balkans that was the actual trigger for the eventual international disaster. Bosnia was a recent Austrian acquisition and many of its inhabitants resented having been brought under Austrian rule, instead of being allowed to join Serbia. On June 28, 1914, the heir to the Habsburg throne Archduke Francis Ferdinand visited Sarajevo in an Austria-ruled Bosnia.

The Archduke and his wife were assassinated on this visit, and this assassination was a blow to Austria's position as ruler of Bosnia and to her already declining position as a Great Power. It provided Austria with a reason for military action against Serbia, of whom was suspected the plotting of the assassination. In an effort to avoid humiliation and to retaliate against the assassination, Austria sent an ultimatum to Serbia. Serbia refused it and Austria declared war on Serbia on July 28. It has been suggested that perhaps one of the Great powers was simply waiting for this trigger as an excuse for war, and that the pre-existing tension between the Great Powers would have snapped eventually, trigger or not. Now although it seems this trigger was a conflict between Austria and Serbia alone, due to the tensions and relationships that already existed between the major alliances, this is not what occurred.

Russia's role as a great power would not allow it to let one of its client states be defeated, and so Russia was determined to help Serbia. Germanys only real ally was Austria, and could not afford for Austria to lose to Russia, so Germany supported Austria. Germany assumed that France would support Russia, and strategically decided to invade France first, through Belgium. The British, concerned for the attack on their ally France as well as for the preservation of Belgian neutrality (which had been guaranteed since 1839), declared war on Germany on August 4. This essay will look to examine the views of several historians on the extent of the tension between England and Germany prior to the war, and whether that tension made the ensuing war inevitable. Prior to World War I, most of the power in Europe was found in two countries, Britain and Germany.

Both countries were dominating over the rest of Europe in arms, in navy, in colonization, and in trade, and Anglo-German economic rivalry was great. In the past, Britain had been more dominant, and saw her navy as second to none. But German industrial growth had been phenomenal, and she was now threatening Britain's supremacy on the seas. As Britain was dependent on her navy for economic survival, this raised the level of tension between the two countries, and the British became suspicious of Germany when rumors reached Britain that Germany was secretly accelerating her naval building program. Some historians have claimed that the British had become so alarmed at having lost some of their European monopoly to Germany, that they took preventative actions against the advancement of Germany. For example, Edward McCullough, in his How the First World War Began, devotes an entire chapter of his book to "England's Estrangement from Germany".

He claims that the British government attempted to block German colonial expansion all over the world, and that British representatives abroad worked to thwart German colonial ambitions at every turn. He writes that although the injury to the British by the Germans trade advancement was exaggerated, it should be considered as a reason for the growing resentment in England towards Germany. Zara S. Steiner, in her Britain and the Origins of the First World War, tends to agree with McCullough, and suggests that no amount of goodwill between Germany and Britain could ever overcome the fact that Germany was a European power embarking on a world stage and that Britain was an imperial power with few European interests. Steiner asserts that a German alliance with Britain was never within the realm of practical politics and that British and German politics did not mesh.

She claims that the domestic situation was so difficult that the temptation to exploit the prevailing hostile mood was always present. In contrast, Joachim Remak in The Origins of World War I, 1871-1914, contends that the relations between England and Germany were not as tense as they seemed to have been, and that although the friction between the countries was not insignificant, it was not irreparable either. "Trade rivalry there was, but there was also beginning to be an understanding on the peaceable division of the world's markets, with the British concentrating on trade with the Empire, the Germans on that with continental Europe". Remak goes on to argue the opposite of Steiner, that " There was no immutable rule which stated that Britain and Germany could never again inhabit a world in which their interests would once more run parallel". The French were also concerned with German expansion, and as a result of the Moroccan crises, they were not particularly friendly with Germany, despite the French foreign minister's claim that France was a resolutely pacific nation.

The result of Britain's heightened sense of insecurity over German competition, was that she was less willing to stay isolated and without allies as she had done when she'd dominated most of Europe. France saw common ground between Britain and herself, and became a suitor for British friendship. In 1904, the two countries formed the Anglo-French Entente, an entente which was based upon supporting colonial arrangements. Although the British claimed that any friendship between Britain and France did not imply any hostility towards Germany, nor that Britain would support France should a Franco-German war break out. Historians differ again on this point as well, some claiming that Britain had no desire to participate in a war with France against Germany, others saying that Britain knew of France's aggressive intentions and that Britain was enthusiastic about the possibility of war. AJP Taylor, in The First World War, contends that British had no desire at all to be involved in war, nor did they wish to support France in a war against Germany. .".. the British had hesitated until now, determined not to be drawn into what they called a "Balkan quarrel", many of them reluctant to act even in support of France".

Remak supports what Taylor says, by noting that Britain had never officially committed to aiding France in a war with Germany, and that had she only done so, Germany might not have attacked France to begin with. The British would consistently refuse a clear-cut promise to come to the assistance of France, let alone of Russia, in case of war... If the Germans had been altogether convinced that to invade France would undoubtedly involve them in a war with England, might history not have taken a happier course". McCullough claims the opposite, maintaining that the English would be supportive of France if a war were to break out with Germany.

There had been a series of unilateral declarations of support made to the French by the English service chiefs. The conversations which were initiated between the French and British general staffs in December, 1905, continued until the outbreak of war. He claims that the replacement of Lansdowne as British foreign minister by Sir Edward Grey ensured that Britain would enthusiastically support France if a war did indeed break out. He goes on to suggest that the British were also eager for a war with Germany, and he cites a letter written by Sir John Fisher, First Sea Lord, that said this was a "golden opportunity for fighting Germany in alliance with the French".

He asserts that Fisher's principle aim was to wipe out German commerce and he thought the British navy could easily destroy the whole German merchant navy. McCullough then accuses the British press of stirring anti-German sentiment in the British people, and of supporting a war with Germany as well. "The anti-German sections of the press were eager for a war with Germany. The Times said war was so certain that the country should be alerted to the danger it faced. There were articles urging that the German fleet should be destroyed". Steiner agrees with McCullough on the subject of Sir Edward Grey and claims that when Grey entered the foreign office, he had identified Germany as the enemy.

Steiner also claims the opposite of Taylor and Remak, stating that although Grey avoided directly saying that England would support France against Germany, he did so unofficially. Both McCullough and Remak have placed some of the blame of the increasingly hostile relations between Britain and Germany on the press and on the media. Remak however, stays more neutral, simply stating with that the new mass literacy and the creation of a mass-circulation of press in the nineteenth century, the press played an influential role in the nations mood for war and in international friction as well. The conflict between Austria and Serbia (including eventually France and Russia) affected Britain and Germany to different degrees. McCullough sees for Germany, the possible defeat of Austria as a matter of life and death whereas the possible defeat of France a mere inconvenience for Britain. Another point on which historians have varying views on, is the issue of British involvement in the war due to the violation of Belgian neutrality.

Some historians, such as Taylor, have suggested that the only reason Britain became involved in the war was this violation. "The German demand on Belgium removed all doubts, except among a tiny minority. Great Britain entered the war a united nation". Taylor goes on to explain Britain's war aims by stating that secure behind the guns of the Grand Fleet, they were in no danger of invasion. They had gone to war for a cause -the neutrality and independence of 'little Belgium'.

The British would not be content with victory, they wanted somehow to make a better world. Remak also eludes to Britain's reason for entering the war as being the German violation of Belgian neutrality. He claims that Britain considered the defense of Belgium all but a part of the defense of the realm and that the British cabinet had decided that if and only if the Germans were to violate Belgian neutrality, and the Belgians resisted, would Britain then intervene. However, Remak does note that it was possible that England would have joined Germany's enemies anyway, but that we will never know.

He also points out that the violation of Belgium had not affected Britain directly in any way and that the British government's decision on a course of action was not necessarily a unanimous one. The violation of Luxembourg's neutrality had not disturbed the British unduly. It was true that Britain was signatory to a treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Luxembourg, but the country was very small and possessed no coast line facing the channel. The day before the British cabinet had still been divided over what course of action to take.

McCullough however, claims that when Grey informed the German ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky, that the neutrality of Belgium would play an important role in England's decision to take part in the war, and Lichnowsky asked him if England would remain neutral if Germany did respect Belgian neutrality, Grey responded that he could not promise that. So it seems then, that what Grey was telling Germany that whether they attacked France through Belgium or not, the British were not likely to stay neutral. In examining the varying views of Taylor, McCullough, Steiner and Remak, we can conclude that there are definitely opposing opinions concerning Britain's relations to Germany prior to WWI and how those relations affected Britain's eventual participation in it. There is the view that British-German relations prior to the war were so effected by the naval race and the German industrial advancement that Britain actually wanted to go to war. Then there is the opposing view that although relations were strained, they were not strained enough to warrant war, that Britain merely entered the war to protect Belgian neutrality and in fact tried to stay out of things as long as possible. Both sides can be argued, and it is difficult to look at the situation in a neutral fashion.

Remak makes an important point, in that all of the conflicts prior to the war, such as the naval / arms race for example, can falsify what took place and obscure what good will did exist between the two countries. Remak also points out that at the time, many of the issues were fairly casual matters and that it is only in retrospect that the instances of Anglo-German friction look so momentous. Remak tends to argue a compromise between the two opposing opinions, although at times he may lean towards the British, and is careful to try and show both possible points of view. I tend to agree with most of his arguments, notably the one that the war was not inevitable, and was a result of many factors and not just particularly the state of Anglo-German relations prior to the war. However I do agree many times with McCullough, in that Britain's resentment of Germany's industrial advancements was a factor in the estrangement between the two countries and in Britain's participation in the war.

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