Burma's Military Leaders example essay topic

The Prospect of Democracy in Burma The prospect for the development of a democratic state in Burma has recently become a remote possibility. Burma's military leaders have been holding talks with the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). The dialogue started while Aung San Suu Kyi was still under house arrest. When she was released in 2002, the international community and the people of Burma expected the process to evolve to the next stage - substantive political negotiations.

However, the whole process has stalled. Burma's military remain in control. In justifying the hiatus, the Burmese military leaders engage in various forms of platitudinous rhetoric, carefully designed to obfuscate their totalitarian intent. The theme of this rhetoric is that the country is undergoing a transition toward a multi-party democracy.

Burma's influential intelligence chief, General Khin Nyunt, has warned that "such a transition cannot be done in haste or in a haphazard manner. The world is full of examples where hasty transition from one system to another led to unrest, instability and even failed states". However, this linguistic charade is not consistently maintained. Burma's generals have made disturbing pronouncements that overtly envision a highly compromised, paternalistic democracy. They assert that any democracy in Burma must incorporate 'Asian values', and is therefore incompatible with Western models of democracy. The generals have proved recalcitrant in the face of international pressure, and persist with their particularly Burmese variant of democracy.

Nyunt recently said that "The democracy we seek to build may not be identical to the West but it will surely be based on universal principles of liberty, justice and equality". It is more than likely that Burma's military rulers are now looking at the Chinese political model as the basis of their new constitution. This rhetoric, centered around various abstractions and elaborations of political vision, is calculated to distract from the decidedly non-democratic Burmese political reality. What has actually been happening is that the country's top military leader - Senior General Than Shwe - has strengthened his control over both the army and the administrative structure. Ever since the arrest of four members of the former military dictator General Ne Win's family in early 2002, it appears that Than Shwe is intent on establishing and cementing his own personal dynasty. In line with this agenda, Shwe dismissed two top generals accused of being heavily involved in corruption.

He then made major changes within the army high command, transferring 10 out of 12 of the country's regional commanders, who exert almost complete authority in the areas under their control. They have been replaced by officers whose allegiance to Than Shwe is unquestioned. As a senior military officer has said: "General intends to hold onto power for another 10 years. He is prepared to talk to the opposition leader, work with the NLD in an interim administration, and even consider power-sharing at some point, but his main strategy is to drag the dialogue process out and retain power as long as possible". The nepotistic trend of recent promotions in the army is a clear indication that the military leadership in Burma does not intend relinquishing power to any form of popular representation. More than pursuing the consolidation of military power, General Than Shwe appears to be consolidating a lineage of his own, which models the Ne Win dynasty.

This nepotism is flamboyantly displayed - Than Shwe is now often accompanied on his official travels around the country by his teenage grandson, who has even been wearing military uniform. This public display of his personal agenda is underlined by Than Shwe's public pronouncements. A senior Asian politician recently asked the general how he saw Burma's political game - between the army and the pro-democracy opposition - working out in the future. He replied "You " ve got it all wrong. We are the umpire not one of the teams in the match". Despite the obstinate attitude of Burma's military leadership, moves towards political discussions are still being encouraged by the United Nations, which has consistently demanded that the regime improve its human rights record and institute political negotiations with pro-democracy leaders.

For the past 12 years, a special 'rapporteur' on human rights in Burma has compiled annual reports, which have been tabled at the UN General Assembly. These reports have been the principal basis for the UN resolutions -adopted unanimously every year - that urge Burma's government to respect human rights, free all political prisoners, and honour the election results of 1990 that would have seen pro-democracy candidate Aung San Suu Kyi assume power. The 1990 elections remain one of the most contentious unresolved issues of Burmese politics. The Burmese military had honoured the outgoing military dictator Ne Win's 1988 promise to hold national elections, which saw the NLD swept the elections on 27 May 1990, winning over 80 percent of the seats. However, the military regime then reneged on its promise to honour the election results and held onto power despite international condemnation and large scale protests throughout Burma.

Such political and human rights outrages have provoked reactions which extend beyond the UN to more direct regional protest. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has urged the military leadership in Burma to become more progressive. This cumulative international pressure has proved significant in improving the chances of democratization for Burma. R azali Ismail's, special envoy for the UN, convinced the generals that they should release Aung San Suu Kyi if they wanted to end their international isolation.

The import of this priority was to build confidence between the dissident NLD leader and the generals to overcome mutual suspicion. For the NLD, the main demands were the immediate release of all political prisoners, the reopening of the party offices, and assurance that party members would be allowed to function without being harassed or intimidated by the military authorities. The general expectation was that with the release of Burma's most prominent political figure, national reconciliation would progress to a phase of substantive political dialogue. Suu Kyi told a news conference in Rangoon immediately after she was released that "both sides agree that the confidence-building phase is now over. The authorities have said they look forward to moving to a more significant stage of the talks". However, since her release, there has been no meeting between Suu Kyi and the generals.

The generals seem to be intent on stalling any talks and maintaining control. The opposition leader and the NLD are still far from making any substantial progress. In fact, the talks proved to be little more than a diplomatic and public relations exercise - Suu Kyi was quickly returned to, and remains under, house arrest. In addition to this incarceration, the NLD has been rendered ineffective in a material and operational context - offices throughout the country have been non-operational for years and the party headquarters have fallen into disrepair. This latter political disadvantage is crucial to the matter of the NLD's prospective political influence.

To be effective it will be essential for the NLD to show that it has the capacity and administrative wherewithal to govern Burma in the future. Although the party won the 1990 elections convincingly, that victory was seen by many political analysts not so much as an endorsement for the NLD, but as the public embrace of its charismatic leader Suu Kyi. NLD leaders have even admitted privately that the party would be nothing without her. The party also faces the problem of inadequate expansion. Membership is falling in the NLD. "We once attracted the students, but we now have great difficulty in interesting them in joining us" admitted a senior NLD politician.

There is also some resentment among young NLD activists over the past decade toward Aung San Suu Kyi. In particular the younger rank and file express a growing impatience with the party machinations. They are calling for more transparency in the negotiation process. "We are frustrated by constantly being told to be patient and trust our leader" said one young NLD member.

The generals' delay in facilitating dialogue could potentially deepen the generational divide in the opposition, and prove a successful strategy in maintaining control. The party's problems are further compounded by the gap between the NLD and the pro-democracy opposition groups in exile (such as the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma) which regard any dialogue with the military as futile. This attitude conflicts with Aung San Suu Kyi's present political strategy, and if the divide becomes more pronounced, it could diminish her ability to be the unifying force she currently is. Despite these potential differences over strategy, Aung San Suu Kyi and the party are preparing for future talks with the generals. This process entails taking a substantial number of important policy decisions and clarifying the party's explicit position on many issues. The two major issues are the status of the 1990 election results and the NLD's participation in the military's National Convention - the NLD walked out of the convention in 1996 when it became apparent that the possibility of real democracy was absent in the military's proposed constitution.

The NLD leadership will also have to aggressively formulate and promote concrete policies in regard to issues of great import to the Burmese people. Many of these issues have international implications - for example, the vexatious matter of trade sanctions imposed on Burma. The biggest question that will confront the party, however, and one that gives the military regime the greatest scope for manipulation, is how to involve Burma's ethnic leaders in any substantive talks about the political future of the country. Ever since the secret talks between the opposition leader and the generals began, there has been pressure to involve the leadership of ethnic groups. So far the NLD has been advising ethnic leaders that they need to organize themselves before they can directly participate in talks. The de facto leader of the ethnic groups, Khun Tun Oo - head of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (NLD) - has alternately proposed that ethnic groups form their own national convention to discuss their common concerns, political aspirations and, above all, to build trust and confidence between all the ethnic groups before they are even involved in the dialogue process.

However, the military regime to date has not given up talk of a unitary state, whereas the ethnic groups want a federal state. The army's resistance to ethnic autonomy and a federal system has always been clear. When the army first seized power in 1962, it claimed that it had been forced to take control in order to prevent Burma from being split by ethnic rebel guerrillas demanding autonomy, and plunging the country into anarchy. If the generals do allow the ethnic question to be raised, it may prove another successful strategy for them to maintain power by denying the possibility of a combined opposition. Despite the exigencies described above, it may be that the rapidly deteriorating social and economic situation in Burma may bring about a change in government more decisively than any formal dialogue between the generals and Pro-democracy leaders. Inflation is now at over 50 percent a year.

Even bribes, which are necessary to keep basic amenities like phone lines in working order, have escalated. Medical costs have more than doubled since the border with Thailand was closed. Wages and salaries have not kept pace with the rise in prices. The average monthly income of professionals - teachers, university professors, government officials - is less than 10,000 kyat (USD 10).

Burmese economists estimate that an average family of five needs more than 80,000 kyat (USD 80) a month to live. This estimate includes the cost of food, medicine and transport, but not luxury goods. For a significant portion of the Burmese population, even these straitened circumstances and budgets are generous. Many families, especially those living on the outskirts of Rangoon or in the poorer rural districts, can afford only one meal a day. They supplement this with a bottle of glutinous water that is left over from cooking and is available for less than a cent in roadside markets. Average Burmese living standards are declining rapidly, and UN officials have said that a massive humanitarian crisis is looming.

They estimate that already at least one child in three under the age of five suffers from malnutrition. These subsistence conditions may have revolutionary consequences. Food shortages have in the past brought people out onto the streets in protest against the government. There has been increases in crime levels, especially in Rangoon. This new spate of crime is certainly a reflection of Burma's rapidly worsening economic conditions, especially in the cities, and could develop into significant political unrest. Political unrest sparked off by economic collapse will seriously compromise the government.

But neither would the NLD welcome such an outcome. For the NLD, the process of building a relationship with the military leadership has come a long way, and it understandably fears a return to the absolute repression of a few years ago. Burma's political future is now critically balanced. As has been discussed, the military may have effective political control, but the economic situation is by turns precarious and chaotic. Social unrest may cause the both the government and the NLD to loose control.

In its attempts to form a credible voice and instrument of dissent, it will be necessary for the NLD to achieve a delicate balance between a revolutionary fervor and political pragmatism. This will involve the daunting program of rebuilding and mobilizing its support base against the government - without provoking violence - while at the same time cooperating with the generals in a dialogue which recognizes the limitations of its current political potency.

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