Castro's Peasant Revolution example essay topic

The idea that the Cuban Revolution of 1959 was a peasant revolution or had a peasant character is a widely held misconception, one which has been dispersed by the rebels post-revolutionary rhetoric and the wealth of sympathetic knowledge which based its interpretation of the revolution upon this propaganda. To assign an event as complex as the Cuban Revolution any particular nature is a drastic simplification and confuses the many factors which led to the revolution and its victory. Being the protagonists in the uprising the revolutionaries themselves understood very clearly that their revolution was not the result of just the peasants support, so they must have had certain reasons for reconstructing the revolution the way they did. The first element to look over is the reconstruction itself, through the post-revolutionary propaganda, and to determine exactly what kind of a vision the rebels wanted to promote as the uprising. Next the actual revolution will be studied and compared to the rebels imagined revolution. Finally, some of the possible reasons for the rebels deviation will be stated and the revolution itself will be reexamined considering the ideas brought forward.

When Castro and his group reached Cuba on the Granma December 2, 1956, their strategy, as they stated atthe time and admitted later, was to take Santiago with the help of Frank Pais urban insurrectionary organization, and then attack the rest of Cuba from there in coordination with a huge general strike (Bonachea & San Martin, 1974). This part anarcho-syndicalist, part Blanquist strategy was quickly delayed, however, as the attack on Santiago failed on all sides and the guerrillas were forced to flee to the Sierra Maestra. The rebels in the mountains quickly came into contact with the peasants there and a cooperative relationship began to develop between the two after initial mistrust by the peasants. The peasants who had to endure the persecution of Batista's military unit gradually began to change their attitude toward us. They fled to us for refuge to participate in our guerrilla units. In this way our rank and file changed from city people to peasants (Lavan, 1967, p. 10).

Out of this practical relationship, which Che Guevara explained in April 1959, grew the mythology that became the revolution's legacy. Guevara later said theguerrilla and the peasant became joined into a single mass, so that... we became part of the peasants (Thomas, 1977, p. 154). It was this mysterious bond that gave the revolution as a whole its peasant nature. By living with the peasants, the rebels explained, they had come to feel for their needs, the principle need being land reform. Thus, as Guevara explained, the rebels adopted their land reform slogan which mobilized the oppressed Cuban masses to come forward to fight and seize the land. From this time on the first great social plan was determined, and it later became the banner and primary spearhead of our movement (Lavan, 1967, p. 11).

The post-revolutionary vision was one in which land reform was the spearhead, and the intellectuals were the spear bearer, for, as Castro explained in February 1962, the peasantry is a class which, because of the uncultured state in which it is kept needs the revolutionary and political leadership of the revolutionary intellectuals, for without them it would not by itself be able to plunge into the struggle and achieve victory (Kenner, Martin, & Petr as, 1969, p. 113). From the mountains, this united peasant-rebel force would sweep down into the plain and capture the cities from the countryside. The rebels wanted the world to believe that the entire revolution had only succeeded through vast campesino participation. The other revolutionary element that the rebels aggressively reconstructed, after they took power, was the role of the urban resistance. As theirs was a peasant revolution, the cities had to have played a secondary roll, so much time was spent downplaying the role of the cities in the revolution. The rebels anti-city propaganda took two forms theoretical and practical.

Theoretically, Castro stated in 1966, It is absurd and almost criminal to try and direct guerrillas from the city (Kenner et al, 1969, p. 132). The urban rebels were too ready to compromise and make truces, they could not understand the guerrilla and would most likely work against them. Several instances of the rebels disclaiming their urban counterparts help to fulfill this theoretical consideration. It was after the failure of the general strike of 9 April, 1958, Guevara claimed, that the rebels realized that the urban movement could not succeed (Lavan, 1967, p. 11).

The urban revolution can all too easily be smothered by the government (Alloy, 1972, p. 9) and thus the countryside was the necessary site for the revolution. The revolution that these men created was one of basic peasant base and character, led by a small group of intellectuals which had gained the peasant class awareness through sympathetic contact, and that swept over the counterrevolutionary cities on its way to starting a government which would be the best friend of the peasants (Kenner et al, 1969, p. 58). The authenticity of this image is obviously doubtful. Although it has its supporters, the earliest perhaps being Huberman and Sweezy in their book, Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution, most of the facts on which they base their findings are clouded, in this case, gotten during a short visit to Cuba with interviews from only high ranking leaders. What is important however, is to obtain what of the rebels post-facto vision is grounded in fact and what is a well constructed fiction. From there a conclusion may be reached as to the reason for their historical deception.

The best way to analyze the revolution is chronologically, beginning with the inauspicious landing of the Granma and following the development of the revolution from there. This brings up the first distortion of history, that because the rebel party consisted of only eighty-two guerrillas, quickly cut down to eighteen before they reached theSierra Maestra, it is assumed that it was the extraordinary heroism of this small group that finally defeated the government. This ignores the fact that there was already a well-founded urban insurrection movement, on which theguerrilla band would depend on entirely. The urban M-26-7 group, under the direction of Frank Pais, was awaiting Castro's arrival to take Santiago. In addition there was also the Directorio Revolucionario, led by Echevarria, dedicated to violent urban revolt.

These two groups, along with many other organizations and individuals, would provide much needed support to Castro when it was most essential. Quickly after the Granma disaster, Castro and his compatriots regrouped in the Sierra Maestra, the area to which they were to retreat in case of failure (Bonachea & San Martin, 1974, p. 78). They did so with the assistance ofthe local peasantry, who led them through the dense forests to find each other (Bonachea & San Martin, 1974, p. 89). The rebels set up a base to run their operations.

These operations however, soon involved much more than single encounters with rural guard barracks; as they lived in the midst of peasants, they depended on them, not only for guides or purchasing supplies, but on their loyalty. The peasants had no sympathy for the rural guard, but neither did they for the rebels, thus, they would often turn informer on Castro and his men (Bonachea & San Martin, 1974, p. 90). In order to counteract this, Castro set up a system of brutal but fair revolutionary justice. All informers were executed immediately, and the executions were advertised widely in the peasant population. At the same time, however, the rebels were very fair in their commercial dealings with the peasants, and Castro established a strict revolutionary code to keep his soldiers in line, including provisions defining rape and other crimes against the peasantry as a capital offense.

Although the revolutionary law was harsh, at least it was not elective, and the peasants gradually came to see the revolutionaries as the law of the Sierra. The Sierras peasants were aware that their survival and security depended mainly on whether they helped the guerrillas or not (Bonachea & San Martin, 1974, p. 91), one scholar wrote. Thus the peasants were half terrorized, half encouraged to support the guerrillas over thebatistianos. The role of the peasants within the movement was not as heroic as it was later made out to be.

Of the troops themselves, figures differ as to the proportion of peasants to urban recruits. Bonachea & San Martin, for example, states that a majority of the rebel forces were city people, mostly young, educated, and male (1974, p. 95). To support this statement is the March 3, 1957, movement of fifty-two armed and supplied men from Santiago to theSierra. According to Bonachea & San Martin, the number of guerrillas continued to grow due to these regular urban inflows, despite regular peasant desertions, who would rather return to their small, unproductive plots of land (1974, p. 95). Huberman and Sweezy on the other hand, claim that from three-quarters to four-fifths of the rebel forces were peasants (1961, p. 78). However, the idea that peasant support in the forces, at any level, would give therevolution a peasant character is disputed by two facts.

First, the peasants were not promoted to officers and, in fact, most were not even soldiers; they were mainly used for transportation and communication. Since there were no peasants in leadership, it is hard to believe that the movement had any true peasant nature. Second, as late as May 1958, even the most Revolutionary sympathetic writers only put the total number of guerrillas at three hundred (Huberman & Sweezy, 1961, p. 63). Even if they were all peasants, three hundred peasants scarcely seems like a massive popular movement. As Castro's movement in the hills began to bring together his hold on the land and the people, Pais began planning seriously for a general strike, which was to coincide with Castro's emergence from the Sierra and attack upon cities (Bonachea & San Martin, 1974, p. 142). Bonachea & San Martin make a point here that Pais was still the real leader of the M-26-7, and that Castro was still subordinate to him (1974, p. 146).

The general strike was the real weapon, Castro was just there to take over once the strike had immobilized Cuba. However, Echevarria, who had also been involved in planning the strike, was killed in March, and Pais was killed in July, so the only revolutionary leader left was Castro. Desiring to make his base even firmer before the strike began, Castro instructed all other revolutionary movements to keep him well supplied in the Sierra (Bonachea & San Martin, 1974, p. 146). Since hew as the only popular leader remaining, Castro's power, support, and resources grew immensely. In September, there was an uprising at the Cayo Loco Naval Base in Cienfuegos which involved planning between the M-26-7 and naval officers. Being a plot begun mainly by the military, it did not need Castro's help.

The revolt ended in full urban warfare between the M-26-7 forces and the sailors against Batista's army troops. The lack of coordination between the cities prevented the movement from growing, and the revolt was soon stopped by Batista and was followed by very brutal repression (Bonachea & San Martin, 1974, p. 147). But what this event truly shows, is that there was already contention in the military due simply to disgust with Batista. At this time also, the Directorio Revolucionario sent eight hundred guerrillas to the Sierra Es cambray in order to establish an urban and rural guerrilla struggle (Bonachea & San Martin, 1974, p. 184). A few months later, Raul Castro was sent to the Sierra Cristal to establish the second front, Frank Pais. Once again the development of the second front in Oriente was largely the result of the urban underground efforts of May ari, Gauntanamo, and Santiago de Cuba (Bonachea & San Martin, 1974, p. 191).

It is interesting to compare Raul Castro's treatment of thepeasants with his brothers. Raul had a much more democratic attitude, he let peasants rise up as far in the rebel officer ranks as they could, where Fidel had no officer peasants. However this democratic attitude was not only for thepeasants, Raul also encouraged agricultural workers and miners in the area to join his forces. This resulted in much popular support for Raul in the surrounding area. Thus, during the summer of 1957 up to April 1958 the revolution was growing in the Sierra Maestra, in military numbers, and on two new fronts. However, as Che Guevara stated in November 1957, they were still awaiting the general strike.

The Sierra Maestra is arriving at the end of its fortress commitment, and is getting ready to launch its legions of combatants across the plains (Lavan, 1967, p. 37). Victory was professed on two things, Che stated, the burning of cane fields and the general strike which will be the final blow. The general strike is the definitive weapon (Lavan, 1967, p. 37). At this point the insurrection was still no more of a peasant revolution then it was when the Granma went ashore.

The revolution still consisted of rural guerrillas dependent on the urban underground for troops, supplies, and ultimately, a general strike among the workers and organized by the urban underground made it possible for them to move from the hills. The peasants had influence only in the lesser of the two fronts, and even there, it was shared withthe working class. The general strike was finally planned by Castro for April 1958. The reasons for its dramatic failure are controversial, but a few facts which emerge point toward a reasonable explanation. Fidel called the strike and, against the advice of the M-26-7 who felt they were not ready, forced the revolutionary leaders to comply. Then he did not deliver the arms he had promised them and without which the strike was impossible.

It was such a disaster that any plan for future strikes was hopeless. It appears that Castro intended for the strike to be a failure in order to completely consolidate his power at the head of the revolution. His power had grown to the point that he felt hecould defeat Batista, and he needed to eliminate the chance that the urban revolutionaries would steal his power. Thiswas later confirmed at the May third meeting, which Guevara claimed as the official shifting of all power to the countryside, that is, to Castro (Bonachea & San Martin, 1974, p. 215). The other strategic benefit which Castro obtained from the strikes failure was to force Batista into confrontation.

Castro had firm control over the Sierra Maestra, but he could not fight Batista's army away fromthe re. He needed Batista to send his troops up to the Sierra Maestra, where his guerrilla tactics could win. This plan worked, as Batista's officers, encouraged by the failed strike, forced Batista to attack the Sierra Maestra and bring an end to the revolution. On June 28, after heavy recruiting, Batista's summer offensive began.

The ironic element of thiswas that most of his recruits were peasants, many from the Oriente province (Bonachea & San Martin, 1974, p. 29). However, the Sierra was not the only place where battles had begun, on April 16, Batista declared a state of emergency, and began the most brutal crackdown of his regime. Partly in protest of this and partly in support of Castro, the urban revolution escalated, turning the cities into virtual battlegrounds. Due to the very efficient organization which he had developed, Castro was victorious against Batista's campaign. This was a morale boost to the revolutionaries everywhere. Units grew in all sectors, the five to six thousand urban revolutionaries fighting during the summer grew more numerous, and opposition in the armed forces increased (Bonachea & San Martin, 1974, p. 263).

Castro's rebels then left the Sierra and headed west, capturing city after city and culminating with Santa Clara. During this time, the urban revolutionaries was essential to the rebel victories. The rebels numbered no more than two hundred and fifty, and Batista's army was still in the tens of thousands (Huberman & Sweezy, 1961, p. 69). However, in each town, the Batistian army's morale had been lowered so much by the urban revolutionaries that the rebels rarely needed to fire a shot to obtain victory. Another probable cause of the army's lack of motivation was Batista's cruelty. The soldiers had no desire to fight for a man that persecuted their friends and families.

One last reason could be the reputation of Castro and his rebels, their great, bloody victory over the regular army was well-known, and few of the poorly trained troops wanted to challenge them. Although the rebels succeeded without the general strike itself, through the urban revolutionaries and the troops lack of morale, the same ending was reached and the rebels took over urban Cuba despite their lesser numbers. So the guerrillas took over Cuba and declared it a peasant revolution. However, it seems clear that, no matter how it is judged, the revolution was certainly not characterized by the peasantry.

The guerrilla-peasant union was one of convenience, the peasants were simply the instrument in which the guerrillas were forced to operate. They never spoke of any special connection with the peasants until well after the revolution, let alone assist or trust the many more then they needed to reach their own goals. And in return, the guerrillas never received mass support fromthe peasants; they would still join Batista's army with the same enthusiasm as they always had. Even the spearhead ofthe revolution, agrarian reform, was begun by the guerrillas, and there is much debate as to whether the peasants actually cared about getting land at all. The beginning of the Land Reform Law stated that its purpose was to diversify the Cuban economy and help the industrialization of the country (Goldenberg, 1966, p. 218).

Beyond their excellent service as watchmen the peasants had almost no role in the revolution. The urban revolutionaries, however, did play a major, yet forgotten role. At every step of the revolution, their help was vital to the guerrillas, and at the time, up until April of 1958, the guerrillas recognized this. Afterwards, the assistance continued to be necessary, but i twas taken in under Castro's peasant revolution. The question can now be asked: why did the revolutionaries, after their victory, try so hard to establish their revolution as a peasant revolution This answer is found in Cuba's unusual class structure at the time of therevolution. Cuba was not a typical Latin American nation; first, its population was 57% urban and 43% rural, as opposed to the rural nature of the rest of Latin America (Draper, 1962, p. 21).

It had one of the highest standards of living in Latin America, and it was also one of the most middle class: figures range from 22% up to 33% of the population being middle class (Thomas, 1977, p. 328). This middle class was also strange because it was a frustrated class repressed by the economic stagnation that hindered their professional and financial advancement. Although Huberman and Sweezy claim that the peasantry was the most revolutionary of classes, as it was the most marginalized (1961, p. 80), by other standards the middle class would seem the most revolutionary, as it was a clear candidate for a rebellion of rising anticipation. This seems to be the case, since most of the urban revolutionaries were and guerrillas were of this middle class. Batista's power was founded with these people, hence he could have handled a true peasant revolt because the peasantry was not strong enough. However, a middle class revolution could have been his downfall.

The constituency of the Cuban revolution was made up of the middle class, it derived its support from the middle class by promising to honor the constitution of 1940 with its liberal reforms, and it succeeded without the significant worker or peasant support. After the strike of April 1958 the revolution, previously a revolt of the middle-class intellectuals, became Castro's own revolution. He made the strike fail to consolidate his power, regardless of the bloodshed it caused his fellow revolutionaries. This would appear to be one of the reasons why he termed it a peasant revolution. He reversed cause and effect to justify what happened. He claimed that the victory was the victory of a peasants revolution, of which he was merely a figurehead, swept into the class consciousness of the peasantry.

Instead he had swept the urban leaders off the stage, and in order to hide the fact that it was actually he and his own officers who had seized the government, he created the peasant nature of the revolution. Then, following up on this lead, once he was i npower he changed the agrarian reform law by adding socialist co-operatives before it was signed, thus driving away liberal middle class in the name of the peasant revolution (Draper, 1962, p. 24). He was so popular at that point that hecould pull such a maneuver without a struggle, so he consolidated his power and based it, unlike his revolution, onthe peasantry and the workers. The final reason why it seems that he constructed the peasant nature of the revolution was to give therevolution the popular support it needed to be accepted in the rest of Latin America.

Our revolution has set an example for the every other country in Latin America (Lavan, 1967, p. 13), said Che Guevara. As mentioned before, Cuba was far ahead of most of Latin America economically, and so most of the rest of the continent had the potential for a genuine peasant revolt. The success of this strategy is evident in the massive popularity of Castro among peasant movements in Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru (Goldenberg, 1966, p. 313). When he finally took power, Castro did effect many social changes to improve the peasant conditions. Indeed, it does not seem that he went through so many transformations just to achieve total personal power, but tha the was looking ultimately to effect radical social change as well. That the way to these two goals, along with the distress of foreign policy, all coincided was advantageous.

That his fellow middle class urban revolutionaries had tobe removed was merely a clever necessity But no matter what the country may look like now, or what the leaders have said concerning the revolution, it still remains that while the urban revolutionaries probably could not have defeated Batista without Castro, it is certain that Castro could not have defeated Batista without the urban revolutionaries. 310.