Chinese The Soviets example essay topic

Causes and Elevation of the Sino-Soviet Schism 1927-1969 It can be argued that the most significant effect on foreign policy during the Cold War, besides the arms race, was the schism and eventually antagonism between the USSR and China. Some historians have argued that the schism between the USSR continued to elevate throughout the Cold War. Alvin Z. Rubenstien, in his book "Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II" makes the argument that "The Sino-Soviet rift is more complex today [Rubenstien wrote his book in 1985] than ever before". (Rubenstien, 148) Some historians argue that the schism has continued to grow long after the end of the 1960's. Other argue that the schism had reached its climax by 1965, when both nations almost completely broke off relations with one another. By 1965 the schism between the USSR and the Soviet Union was complete and it had become a policy between the two nations to pursue antagonistic policies against one another.

(Nogee, 256-61) After the end of the second World War it was a goal of Stalin and the Soviet Union to encourage, and even coordinate, the rise of communist regimes in other countries. (Salisbury, 33-7) But this was not the case in China, where the Soviets were not able to incite a communist revolution. Instead, Mao Zedong carried out a communist revolution that was independent of Soviet influence. (Nogee, 199) This, of course, irritated the Soviets and cause them to oppose the People's Republic of China for about the first fifteen years of its existence. Many historians feel that this was the first of the many Sino-Soviet disputes- the mere fact that China was able to engender a communist regime. (Simmons, 17) In 1927 the Soviets had unsuccessfully tried to incite a communist revolution i China, this attempt not only failed but brought the deaths of thousands of Chinese communists and the expulsion of Soviets from China.

After this failure the Soviets refused to invest anymore time into the Chinese cause. The Soviets even joined the United States in support of the nationalist (and anticommunist) government "in unifying their country [China], improving their military and economic conditions". (Warth, 56-9). Even after a Mao, a communist, had taken power Stalin seemed reluctant to cut ties with the head of the nationalist government, Chiang Kai-Shek. This reluctance of Stalin's led China to distrust the motives of the Soviet Union, espicially in the 1950's when the USSR asked China to help North Korea in the Korean War. (Westard, 36-7) Some historians claim that the roots of the hostility between the Russian and the Chinese an be traced back to the thirteenth and fourteenth century when Mongol Tartars conquered most of Russia.

During the nineteenth century Russian tsars conquered large parts of China and imposed unfair treaties on the Chinese empire. (Salisbury, 48-50) With this new information in mind, combined with the shaky start of Sino-Soviet relations, it become more understandable that two neighboring nations, both with similar ideologies, might not have completely affable relations... The first indication of cooperation between the USSR and communist China was in February 1950 when China and the Soviet Union negotiated the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance. A portion of this treaty dealt with a loan of 300 million dollars at one percent interest to the Chinese by the Soviets. This miserly loan left the Chinese resentful. Only a few months before the loan was made to the Chinese the Soviets had given a 450 million dollar loan to Poland at no interest.

Moreover, the Chinese needed the money to fight the Korean War, a conflict which Stalin had asked the Chinese to support. Mao did not have complete confidence in the North Korean cause but he finally consented his aid on behalf of Stalin and Kim Il Sung, the leaders of the North Korean Communists. The Chinese had felt that the Korean War was a common struggle with the Soviet Unions and the USSR's attempt to profit (the USSR had charged 1% interest on the loan) was uncalled for and an insult to the Chinese government. (Nogee, 261-5) There were a few reasons that the Soviet Union gave China such a scanty loan. In some ways the USSR was still unsure on where they stood in China because they had not engineered the rebellion there. This was also before China decided to help in the Korean War and the USSR was unsure of the motives of China.

They knew that they would not be able to control China like they controled countries in the East European Bloc. The schism between the USSR and China has occurred in three phases in the post- Stalin Cold War period. The first phase is roughly 1956 to 1960. In this period the Soviets and the Chinese were on relitivly good terms. Differences that arose between the two nations were expressed in an understanding and receptive manner, however these cordial relations began to deteriorate by the end of the 1950's. From 1960 to 1964 the disputes between the USSR and China escalated into a schism between the two countries.

In the final phase, which is 1964 onward, the two nations had split into separate "socialist systems". While the Chinese were never formally expelled from the world communist camp, they did not feel that they were allied with the Soviet socialist camp. By the end of the 1960's China and the USSR had become rivals in the global political struggle. (Westard, 51) The first real signs of Chinese dissatisfaction came early in the reign of the successor to Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev had condemned the actions of Stalin when he became the head of the Soviets state. China felt that this was damaging to the Chinese communist cause, for Mao was developing his own "cult of personality" and beginning to act in the manner that Stalin did.

(Halle, 127-131) But these minor disagreements were not enough to end the cordial relations of between Mao and Khrushchev. In November 1957 the Soviets agreed to help the Chinese in making a nuclear bomb. (Arab tov, 68-71) Relations bewteen China and Russia began to improve as both nations began to trust one another again. But events of 1958 soon strained relations between the USSR and China.

In the fall of 1958 the Chinese began to bombard the Nationalist held island of Quemoy. The Americans, who supported the Chinese Nationalists, said that they would protect the island of Quemoy with air and naval forces in the Pacific if the Chinese did not cease their bombardment of the island. (Griffith, 61-2) The Soviets did give their verbal agreement to back China against the United States but were very cautious. The Soviets had also promised in 1957, with the development of the first Soviets ICBM (a missile that carries nuclear warheads) and the launch of the Soviet satellite, Sputnik, the global balance of power had shifted to favor the Soviets. Before the Chinese had began their bombardment of Quemoy, they were convinced that the Soviets would be able to defend them. But the Soviets soon caved in to American demands and withdrew their support.

The Chinese were infuriated. They were convinced that if the Soviets were more firm in their stance against the Americans, the US would retreat. The Soviets had caused the Chinese to end their bombardment of the island of Quemoy and give in to "capitalist" demands from the United States and the Chinese Nationalists. (Simmons, 52-5) The bombardment of Quemoy is seen as the first of many stumbling blocks in Sino-Soviet relations.

If the Chinese thought that the Soviets were too conservative, the Soviets considered the Chinese far too hasty. In May 1958, the Chinese proposed a plan called "The Great Leap Forward" which claimed that they had a formula to be the first nation to ever to be fully communist. They decided that they would substitute mass enthusiasm and total mobilization for the lack of material and technical resources. The Soviets felt that the Chinese were far too hasty and the full "communization" of a nation took a long time.

But what the Soviets were even more afraid of was that the Great Leap Forward would be a great success and that the Chinese would overtake the Soviets. (Griffith, 98-101) The Soviets' lack of support in the Great Leap Forward left the Chinese disappointed and angry. They felt that they had been very loyal to the Soviets, espicially in the Korean War, and they Soviets had reaped their kindness by supporting the Americans and scoffing that Chinese ambitions. A further straining of relations came in 1959 when the Chinese outlined their future objectives. The Chinese had laid claim to the Nationalist island of Formosa, they wanted to conquer Tibet and adjust the Sino-Indian border their favor. The USSR also had a few objectives in mind- they wanted to equal the United States as a world power and avoid a possible conflict with the Americans.

The Soviets visited China and asked the Chinese to accept the "Two Chinas" formula, which basically said that the Chinese communists should not try to conquer the lands of the American-supported Nationalists, even though the Nationalists were very weak. Khrushchev also wanted to court India as an ally, and when the Chinese tried to gain land along the Sino-Indian border, Khrushchev chose to desert China and declare neutrality on the issue. (Simmons 62-7) The Chinese were outraged. They felt that the Soviets, the so-called leaders of the communist movement, had betrayed them again. The Soviets had supported democratic countries twice- once in the bombardment of Quemoy and now in Sino-Indian border disputes. Tensions became even more heated in late 1959 when the USSR suddenly refused to give the Chinese data for the construction of an atomic bomb, which was promised in 1957.

Then, in the summer of 1960, some three thousand Soviet specialists left China and destroyed all the blueprints of their projects. The Chinese claimed that these incidents were evidence of bad faith on the part of the Soviets. (Westard, 86-9) The Chinese had their revenge in April 1960, when the Russians held a celebration for the 90th anniversary of the birth of Lenin. Prior to the celebration the Chinese wrote a lengthy critique of the Russians called "Long Live Leninism". In this critique they claimed that they were the ones that truly followed Lenin's communist tradition and the Soviets had strayed from it. At the celebration, a debate over the critique quickly became a heated argument and the communist parties gathered there were forced to take sides.

While only a dozen of the 81 parties took the side of the Chinese, the USSR was embarassed by the incident. (Griffith, 115-8) "Long Live Leninism" set off a series of public battles between China and the USSR. Good faith quickly soured and the spilt between the two nations deepened. Sino-Soviet relations took a nose-dive from 1960 to 1963. During this time many attacks from both sides came in the form of conferences, the press, radio, and letters. Albania, the only Chinese ally in Europe received harsh criticism from Khrushchev during the Twenty-second Congress of the Soviet Party.

The Soviets soon broke relations with the Albanians just to spite the Chinese. The Chinese openly criticized Khrushchev's surrender to the United States during the Cuban missile crisis. China was also very angry over the USSR's tacit support of India during the Sino-Indian War. After a failure to resolve differences in 1963 the Chinese wrote a scathing attack on Soviet foreign policy. Soon the focus of criticism shifted from foreign policy to internal regimes.

The Chinese claimed that the USSR was turning into a imperial and capitalistic society and the Russians claimed that China was turning into a military dictatorship. (Westard, 103-9) In some ways, the Chinese began to criticize the Soviet policy because the Soviets regarded the Great Leap Forward in the utmost contempt. Relations bewteen the two nations were strained to the point of colla spe and any real cooperation bewteen the two nations was unimaginable. The Soviets also criticized the territorial ambitions of the Chinese. The Chinese had many disputes over borders especially with India, Hong Kong, and Macao. They asked the USSR why they were allowing these countries to stay in capitalist and imperialist hands.

The USSR responded by saying "The artificial creation of any territorial problems in our times... would be tantamount to embarking on a very dangerous path". The two countries also accused each other of inciting border incidents. In the early 1960's China accused the Soviets of conducting "large-scale subversive activities" in the Chinese province of Sinkiang. This is the province that borders the Soviet republics of Tadjikistan, Kirghizia and Kazakhstan.

The Chinese claimed that the Soviets coerced ten of thousands of people into fleeing to the USSR. The Soviets in turn accused the Chinese of persecuting Kazakhs and causing some 50,000 Kazakhs to seek refuge in the Soviet Union. These sorts of unwarranted accusations caused great strife between the two nations. (Nogee, 270-5) Many historians agree that it is difficult to pinpoint the exact time when each country decided that the other constituted the greatest threat to it, but most historians feel that the point was reached sometime in the mid 1960's. Khrushchev began to plan for a showdown with China very early in his regime, he had said in 1957 that "Conflict with China is inevitable". Had Khrushchev remained in power the Chinese would have been expelled from the world communist movement as early as 1965, but Khrushchev's overthrow prevented him from taking action against the Chinese.

In 1966 the Chinese named the Soviet Union as their number one threat. (Salisbury, 85-9) In March of that year the Chinese boycotted the Twenty-third Party Congress, the first time that they had ever done so. The Chinese put out this statement concerning the boycott. "Russia... used to be the center of the international working-class movement. Now however, the leadership of China has become the centre of modern revisionism". (Nogee, 278) Now the schism bewteen the Soviet Union and China was complete.

Both nations severed ties with one another and cooperation in the near future was not a likely possibility. However, this did not mean that the USSR and China did not have disagreements. The two nations continued to have disagreements and even confrontations until the end of the Cold War, but this animosity was merely an extension of the hostility caused by the Sino-Soviet rift. For example, in 1967 China jailed a Soviet officer who refused to wear a badge bearing Mao's portrait. The officer was put in an open truck and paraded around in Being until the Soviets wrote a formal letter asking the Chinese to return the officer to the USSR. Another tense confrontation came in 1969 when Chinese troops attacked Soviet troops on the small island of Daman sky.

The Soviets relatiated by invading a province of China, where they met heavy Chinese resistance. Both sided in cured heavy losses. These events may seem as if they were an escalation of the Sino-Soviet schism, but in reality they were merely events that occured because of the schism between China and the USSR. By 1965 the schism between China and the USSR had become complete.

After 1965 both nations continued to shape their foreign policies o wards each other in an antagonistic manner. Disagreements and confrontations between the two nations were merely events that were following the trend that was layed out in the late 1950's and early 1960's. The Chinese and the USSR pursued antagonistic policies towards one another, a trend that was already set by 1965.1. Arabatov, George ii The War of Ideas In Contemporary International Relations Moscow, Progress Publishers (1973) 2. Griffith, William The Sino-Soviet Rift Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press (1964) 3. Halle, Louis J. The Cold War as History New York, NY Batnam Row Publishers (1971) 4.

Nogee, Joseph L. Soviet Forgien Policy Since World War II Pergamon Press (1981) 5. Rubinstein, Alvin Z., Soviet Forgien Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global Cambridge, MA Winthrop Publishers (1981) 6. Salisbury, Harrison E. War Between Russia and China New York, Batnam Books (1970) 7. Simmons, Robert R. The Strained Alliance: Peking, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean War New York, NY New York Free Press (1975) 8. Warth, Robert D. Soviet Russia in World Politics New York NY, T wayne Publishers (1973) 9.

Westard, Odd arne Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance 1945-1963 Stanford University Press, (1991).