Churchills Account Of Appeasement example essay topic

CRITICALLY ASSESS CHURCHILL'S ACCOUNT OF NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S POLICY OF APPEASEMENT IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. Churchill's account of Chamberlain's policy of appeasement in the Second World War, is and will be principally treated as a historic work. As such when critically assessing Churchill's account, motives, reliability, and accuracy must be taken into account. However what makes Churchill's The Second World War unique in some ways, is its heavily self-justificatory bias, which immediately calls into question its value as an account of appeasement. As part of Moshe's conclusion of Churchill's strategy and history, Moshe points out that '... Churchill always lived in fear of what he called 'the verdict of history'. (pg 329 Moshe) Furthermore Moshe notes that Lord Moran claimed that Churchill wrote The Second World War with the purpose of assuring his place in history, and in order to prove that his strategic positions had been justified amd his view of the Soviet Union far-sighted.

(1 o-pg 332 Moshe) It is therefore important to take into account the self-justificatory nature of the work and put that into context, that is the situation faced at the time political, social, economic, and international. As part of assessing Churchill's account notice too must be taken of the sources used. Frequent reference is made by Churchill of his 'secret's our ces, but, it can be seen that quite often Churchills information was at divergence with the official figures of the government. This study aims then, to evaluate Churchill's account in light of the above criteria? , throughout paying particular attention to Churchill's inna curacies, misrepresentations, but perhaps more fundamentally, his lack of understanding. The structure of this work is determined by the criticism and arguements put foward by Churchill in his account of Chamberlains policy of appeasement. It will be sown that the criticisms or alternatives put foward can be viewed either in terms of Churchill's ignorarance, or misrepresentation.

Whether Chamberlain's policy of appeasement is right or wrong in the face of the Nazi threat can then quickly become a moot point, and Churchill's account can then be judged more on its balanced approach, its appreciation of the circumstances. The principle period examined will be the premiership of Chamberlain, but reference will also be given to dates preceeding May 1937. This is due to the ongoing nature of appeasement, Chamberlain's claim to significant power and influence under Baldwin, and Churchill's claims to foreseen the trouble on the horizon. (qoutes?) Events addressed will be discussed within the context of Europe. this out of default given Churchill's account possessing this European bias, especially with regard to Germany. CHURCHILLS ACCOUNT OF APPEASEMENT Chamberlain's policy of appeasement must be addressed in terms of what it was and Churchill's interpretation of it, which was at times unclear. (Watt pg 199) It was neither the policy of weakness that Churchill represents it as, of men with a foolish love of peace.

But at the same time it was not a policy of strength, and when it did turn out to so, some historians consider this a mistake. It can be seen then, that Churchill fails to offer a clear cut definition, his approach is vague due to the policy and his opposition not always being clear cut. 1937 was to see ambiguities in his opposition, in relation to the clear opposition put across in his account of appeasement. Appeasement was in fact a policy that followed since 1919. Adam P. Adamthwaite provides a general definition, namely, '... the reconciliation of the four major European powers- Britain, France, Germany and Italy- leading ultimately to general. ' (Adamthwaite pg 61) But Anthony Eden points out that '... the dictionary offers a range of meaning, extending from the idea of making peace by inducing agreement to the idea of making peace by offering concessions. ' (pg 79 Mommsen).

Roy Douglas is of the opinion that appeasement was the first of Eden's suggestions. This can be contended, concessions were given to Germany and Italy- the offer of a colonial settlement to Germany in March 1938, and allowing Italy to pursue an expansionist policy in Abyssinia. In Churchill's eyes also the readiness to hand over a part of Czechoslovakia, a democratic nation, was indeed a concession, (?) without gaining any reciprocal advantage. Appeasement is difficult to pin down as a clear cut policy, unless perhaps when it is treated as policy of weakness rather than of equals as in Churchills account, though even this is sometimes vague, as it was not always a policy of weakness. However it can be seen as more of an ethos than a coherent policy, an ethos that was reinforced by the temperaments of the prime minister and the foreign secretary. Chamberlains direct intervention culminating in the Munich agreement, a move that Churchill is again vague about describing as it was more of a move of strength than Churchill would like to give credit for.

Churchill's protrayal of appeasement and his alternative is not the black and white scenario he paints, where the differnece was between a policy of strength and one of weakness, or essentially between two individuals. Rather it can be seen that Churchill's recommendations at the time often coincided with that of the government. Donald Cameron Watt recognises the difficulty in debate over appeasement, which Churchill has historically monopolised in the past, by asking the question 'was it an aim, or merely a method?' To Neville Chamberlain and Stanley Baldwin, appeasement was part of the machinery of 'conflict avoidance and crisis management deemed necessary until Britain's rearmourment policy had produced a position where further unilateral action on the part of Hitler and his imitators would no longer seem worth risking. Whereas previously, from the 1920's onwards the appeasement of Europe was certainly seen as desirable aim in itself, linked with those other two uncritisable criteria, peace and disarmourment. ' There is increasing evidence to show that for Chamberlain 'appeasement was a means and not an end, though the avoidance of war had very high priority with him; though perhaps not so high an priority as that of reducing the number of Britain's potential enemies, an end he shared with Churchill. ' (Watt p 200).

Norman Rose points out that at the time Churchill's opinions often merged with that of the goverment, the Spanish civil war for example. 'In his memoirs Churchill leaves the impression that Britian and France had only to act to take back the Rhineland... ', here he explains was... ' lost irretrievably the last chance of arresting Hitlers ambitions about a serious war. ' (p 238 (15) Churchill recognised that Britain was not 'strong enough' to take on Italy in the summer of 1935 and even if practical according to his previous proclamation, Churchill made no no proposal to challenge Germany in 1936. Churchill's critique then is not based on the facts at the time, as Churchill like Neville Chamberlain gave little in the way of clear solutions. In fact it can be seen that chamberlains policy was the more practical in view of the considerations at the time which Churchill largely ignored. It is such misrepresentations about the policy of appeasement, and Churchill's pursuit of the 'Guilty Men', that take away much from Chuirchill's account of Neville Chamberlians policy of appeasement. Rather it can be seen that Churchill thrived on the ambiguity if the term, he himself was not the 'Messiah' he represented in the book, nor was he the 'war monger' represented by the politicians of the time.

It is important to recognise, that rather than being at odds with appeasement completely, Churchill shared the same motivation, and that was essentially yo appease Germany, a Germany whom he greatly admired in his account, indeed Churchill himself was appealing for peace in 1939 himself. It is perhaps important to remember that Churchill called it the 'unnecessary war'. (1248 words) Even on purley definitional terms Churchill's account is vague, but, it can be seen to go down further than that, at times Churchill's account can be purposefully misleading due to has stance at the time being inconsistent with what he wants in his account. Churchill's account, it can be seen, relies less on structured analysis than it does on recriminations and vindications, whereas periods such as 1937 are washed over to certain extent.

It is necessary therefore to come to grips with just why Churchill wrote what he did and then to apply that to a critical analysis of hi account. One reason for Churchill writing what he did was to look favourably upon himself. Ashley describes The Second World War as essentially and avowedly autobiographical. (p 159) Woods also comments that '... Churchill set out to write a personal view of events not a formal history'. (p 139 Woods) In Churhcills own words 'I do not describe it as an history, for that belongs to another generation. But I do claim in confidence that is a contribution to history which will be of service to the future. ' (preface vii Churchill) THIS IS MY CASE? One must therefore tread carefully when critically asses sign Churchill's account by distinguishing the facts from the distortion that comes from a bias viewpoint.

As Woods puts it 'He was a writer in whom the man, the life, the beliefs, the prejudices were of paramount importance; and one must treat his writing as oeuvres a' clef from which the truth cannot be found without first uncovering the motivation behind each one. ' (p 3 Woods) Woods goes further by saying that 'Whatever he wrote was written with a specific aim in view. ' (p 127 Woods) What then was this aim? On the face of it The Gathering Storm may be seen as an analysis of the origins of the second world war. (?) But, with regard to Churchill's account of appeasement Watt points out that the 'Churchillian critique has been seen out so often in the form of a purely English tragedy, as dialogue of the few who were right but not listened to and the all-powerful but pig ignorant Chamberlain (dismissed as a good Lord Major of Birmingham in a bad year). ' (p 202 Watt) It was to put in Churchillian terminology 'the unecassery war'. In light of this, it can be seen that Churchill's account was to be heavily justificatory in nature. Churchill wanted to vindicate his maverick, reactionary stance to show that he was right and the government, particularly with the victimisation of Chamberlain, wrong. The outbreak of war in 1939 is vindication enough for Churchill, who regularily points out the missed opportunities for peace throughout his account.

Churchill in defending himself from a 'distorted' version of the truth delivered by Ribbentrop on trial for his life bears the tone of justification. 'What I set down about what it is what I should have said had I been called. ' (p 175 una) Churchill's arguement is pervasive as A.J.P. Taylor commented. The fact that Churchill was prime minister '... automatically gave the work an authority and weightiness that tended to obscure the fact that it still represented only one mans view. ' (p 139 Woods) Churchill did give warnings of international de stabilisation paticularily with regard to Germany after the first world war. 'His opposition to Nazism was virtually his entire political raison d'etre during the thirties, and (at least partly) because of his tenacity he was politically ostracized during these years. ' (p 89 Woods) Churchill's political ostracism can explain some of his motivation for writing a self-justifactory work. From 1929 Churchill entered into a period that has been described as the 'wilderness years. ' (Charmley) Partly the reason for this can be seen to be Churhill's attacks on the government during the ten years in wilderness.

In this light Churchill's account takes the form of him being correct and the government being wrong. Perhaps significantly the writing of The Gathering Storm coincides with Churchill's electoral defeat in 1945. In light of this electoral defeat Churchill may have seen the need to get in his version of the second world war ahead of anyone else. Indeed it has been commented by historians (include. Woods and Moshe) that Churchill pursued events with half an eye on how it would look in his 'history'. Woods gives the example of sending planes to France for purley cosmetic reasons.

Churchill it is noticeable, neglects to mention just why these are wilderness years for him. Charmley points out that Churchill's lack of party loyalty contributed. But also it was the sheer disturbance that Churchill would cause in office, for which he was notorious. 'When Chamberlain had been considering whether to invite Churchill into the Cabinet in April 1939, one of his reasons for hesitating had been the fear that he would " wear me out resisting rash suggestions. ' ' (p 372 Charmley-Neville to Hilda Chamberlain 15 April 1939) Whilst being self justificatory, it cannot be denied that Churchill did point ou the dangers of the German threat consistently, a point discussed later. Whilst it is recognised that no historian can be wholly objective by definition it must be remembered that Churchill is different 'Given that Churchill regarded his books as weapons ' (p 4 Woods) Having established that Churchill wanted to be seen in a vindicated light claim to be able to have prevented the second world war is indeed an admirable claim that has pervaded for a long time. But it can be seen that the historical facts as they are now known through many years of research and debate (see Finney), call into question such claims leading to revisionists such as David Dicks to question what could have been done, if anything, to prevent the second world war.

Certainly Churhcill's reference to 'Mein Kampf' and Hitlers 'plan', is misleading and somewhat contrary to his claim. While it would be wrong to assert that Churchill's political arguements about the unecessay war are invalidated by the historical facts, they do certainly modify his account of events as an accurate historical narrative. (rephrase) Certainly Churchill's account was persuasive, Moshe comments that '... the strength of The Second World War also lies in its arrangement: at appropriate points throughout the work, numerous documents are reproduced in support of the arguements advanced. ' ' Also that '... the reader is virtually crushed by the weight of documents and tomes. But, for all their abundance, the documents provide a portrait that is only partial and distorted. ' ' This leads to the point of information, and it is on this that much of Churchill's case resides. This is especially the case with the debate over air parity with the Germans and the threat of the 'knock out blow' and the general question of armour ments.

This then is essentially an insight into the reliability of the information upon which Churchill rely's to form his judgements that were portrayed in his account. Christopher Andrew comments that 'unlike any previous prime minister, Churchill was sometimes in danger of showing too much enthusiasm of secret intelligence and too much hastiness in using it. ' ' (192) To put it another way, that although Churchill's assertions may have sometimes been correct, he often had very little grounds for claiming such things. It is a fact that '... the intelligence services and intelligence assessment remained poorly co-ordinated throughout the inter-war period. ' ' (190 An rew, Christopher) Hins key points out that 'By the beginning of 1938 the War Office was regularily complaining that the SIS was failing to meet its increasingly urgent need for factual information about Germany's military capacity, equipment, preperations and movements... ' ' while the Air Ministry '... dismissed the SIS intelligence of this kind (low grade Sigint about the GAF) as being 'normally 80% inna curate.

' ' Not only were governmental resources poor because '... financial stringency impaired the ability of the SIS to obtain reliable information... ' ' (51 Hensley) but also Churchill's figures were highly problematic 'Churchill was privy to the widest spectrum of information, much of it culled from official channels, but some of it highly dubious. Dissenters on the Air Staff, Vansittart and Ralph W ingram from the Foreign Office, Desmond Morton, head of the Industrial Intelligence Centre (an offshoot of the Committee of Imperial Defence), Regularily leaked to him up-to-date intelligence data. Sir Henry Strokosch, the finaciar was another source, as were businessmen visiting Germany, British expatriates, plain tourists, and the inevitable crank who al believed that Churchill was the proper recipient of their impressions. ' ' (39) p 224/225 Rose) The definition of Parity, on which Churchill puts so much focus on in his account can be seen in the loosest of terms. As Rose puts it 'Did it mean the full " establishment' of the air force?

Or its total first-line complement? Or its 'strength', the number of machines actually available for service... ' ' this and many other questions over definition can be asked, and none were answered by Churchill. (p 224 Rose) (+Goering's figs!! !) Churchill's assumptions of air parity and overall strength of the respective air forces can be seen to have very little solid foundations, which does not reflect well on his account of appeasement. More fundamentally this affects the value of any conclusions that Churchill made in his account. Indeed it can be seen that he deliberately over played the threat that came from bombers from Germany or otherwise conquered territory, for example Belgium. (Moshe) Churchill's account in this light is coloured and presumptuous to say the least, only vindicated by the similarily unreliable figures banded about in contradiction, Ashley points out that indeed even Baldwin was decieved by Hitler as to the correct estimates of the German Air Force.

'Churchill himself had contributed to this fear of war. In consequence it did not look as if it would be a simple police operation to expel the Germans from the Rhineland. As we now know, from information that has become available since Churchill wrote the first volume of The Second World War, he was in fact exaggerating the military strength of the Germans. In a debate in the House of Commons in November 1934, Stanley Baldwin, answering Churchill, maintained that the German air force had not yet attained fifty per cent of the front strength of the British air force. Subsequently Hitler himself told Eden in April 1935 that parity had in fact already been reached and on 22 May Baldwin 'confessed' in the Commons that he had made a mistake.

In fact no mistake had been made at all. ' ' (p 163 Ashley) Hitler was lying. 'It is difficult for Churchill to argue at one and the same time that the Germans were bluffing in 1936-as Taylor believes they were bluffing throughout-and that their air strength was then substantially greater than ours. ' ' (p 164 Ashley) DISTORTIONS? Besides all this Charmley points ou that Churchill's rearmourment programme would have left the British air force out of date by 1939. Added to this is the question of the adequacy of the RAF at the time of going to war, it was at the time to be at full productive capacity, enought to overtake the Germans even who had already reached their peak. (FIGS?) In looking at Churchill's account in a self-jusstifacory light, it is more clear to the reader that misrepresentations are indeed commonplace, and sometimes stand out by being direct contradictions to his own arguement. Misrepresentation can in part be attributable to his writing style, which never claimed at being truly representative as it was highly personalised.

Also Woods notes that 'Churchill however, had not lost his propensity for wholesale revision. ' ' In fact the whole process of writing or manufacturing Churchill's histories was an exhuastive process conducive to honing the arguement to Churchill's satisfaction. As Woods recalls '... while working for Cassell during the period, meeting a senior editor laboring upstairs carrying a pile of paper o foot high. Asked if it was the text for volume II, he replied ruefully, 'no its more corrections for volume I. ' ' (p 178 Woods) Why then the endless revision? Perhaps it was as mentioned earlier a problem with Churchills position. 'In sharp contrast with still commonly held beliefs, Churchill was appealing for peaceful negotiations as late as August, 1939; It could be said with some truth, indeed, that in his own way he went almost as far towards appeasment as Neville Chamberlain.

' ' (86 Woods) It can be seen therefore that Churchill was trying to distinguish his position from a government through which he was officiated as a member, to one in which he opposed through the power of foresight. Norman Rose makes a similar point when he points out that Churchill's policy positions sometimes coincided with that of the government who in his post was account he has made out to oppose, for example in the Rhineland and obviously Churchill's neutral stance in Spain. All the while it is noticeable that Churchill, in his account, is trying to reconcile his hindsight with loyalty to the party, the result is inevitably on the individuals rather than party ideology. However it can be seen that cChurchill's assertions cannot sometimes be reconciled with the facts, either as a result of Churchills intentional misinterpretations or through a simple lack of understanding at the time. With regard to rearmourment Charmley makes the point that Churchill's proposals would have left Britain bankrupt-which would hardly have deterred Hitler. (pre xv Charmley) R.A.C. Parker names three factors that determined British armed strength in the 1930's.

'First, Great Britain began to prepare for war later than Germany (a point made by Churchill who made reference to the two year advantage of Fascist powers over the democracies Moshe! !) Second, the population and industrial resources of the United Kingdom were less than Germany's and, thirdly, a smaller proportion of British resources were devoted to rearmourment. (another point made by Churchill) (p 272 RAC) 'One set of figures demonstrates the advantage of starting early. In that year 1936, Germany produced 5112 aircraft, the United Kingdom 1877. Only in 1940 did British air craft production with the highest priority, overtake Germany. ' ' (RAC 272) The assumption that Britain by rearming as quickly as the Germans, could have had a deterrnet effect and ultimately have led to his overthrow by dissident element's in the government presupposes that firstly, that these elements were strong enough and secondly that if not then Hitler himself may have backed down, this will be addressed later.

Population size and industrial capacity set the limit to British military strength. It is Charmey's point that Churchill's foreign policy rested on misconceptions of the British Empires power, which had unto then relied on 'bluff'. Churchill it can be seen also underestimated the influence of the Dominions on the policy of appeasement, and perhaps even that of the press, who, incidentally played up the fear of an air attack along with Churchill. Moshe points out the Churchill contradicted himself in this light. The total population of Germany in 1935 was about 67 million, while in 1938, German Austrians amd German Czechoslvaks added another 10 million; the United Kingdom contained about 47 million. In 1938 capital goods production in Germany exceeded that of Britain and France combined.

(272 RAC) The difference may be attributable to the difference between the totalitarian ragimes and the democracies in the mobilistaion of people. What Churchill failed to mention in his account was that democracies put more importance to the value of peoples opinions, added to that totalitarian ragimes can control the people in way that is far more effective than that of a democracy, which rely's on consensus. Morris points out, that in terms of the press, which may be considered an accurate reflection of the will of the people, it was overwhelmingly in favour of appeasement and pacifistic. Carr also points to a political climate at the time which regarded war as an unnecessary evil, being predominantly liberal and idealistic. Chamberlains strong political standing owed much to his '... respectable, liberal views... ' ' which were most likely to appeal to he centre. (326 Parker) Indeed Churchill was seen as a reactionary figure at the time, but this could owe as much to his reputation as to the overall climate.

None of this is refered to in Churchill's account which of course ahs the benefit of hindsight, which may explain Churchill's acceptance of war as a natural phenomena (Moshe) to a certain degree. It is ironic also that Churchill's exagerration of the air threat, should be mentioned by Morris as the main determinant for appeasment, at least for the press. (181 Morris) It was instead decided by the government that preperations for war must not interfere with ordinary production. In determining in actual fact whether or not Britian could have afforded to rearm in light of both economic and political circumstances, it is necessary to note that Churchill's account is devoid of figures for even GNP for example, even when suggesting a Ministry for Supply. The navy was allowed as many warships as it could procure and man, the needs of the air force should be met, but most of te requirement for the army were to be deferred. There should be as little interference as possible with civilian production.

The Cabinet approved on 25 Febuary 1936. Donald Cameron Watt notes that 'On armaments, the British government was confronted in 1934 by the report of its official commitee on Britain's defence requirements. (4) This report saw Nazi Germany as the single greatest threat to British security, rewriting in the process of its declaration the terms of reference that had made Japan the most probable enemy. The shopping lists of the three services, however, e visaged different wars against different enemies, and together involved public expenditure greatly in excess of the surplus predicted by the Treasury. ' ' (p 202 Watt) Scott Newton describes that 'Between 1921 and 1940 the formulation of economic policy was dominated by the concerns of the Treasury, tha Bank of England and the City of London.

This 'core Institutioanl nexu' was committed to the defence of free enterprise and the limited state against the internal threat of socialism and the external menace of Bolshevism. ' ' (p 294 Finney) 'By the tie Neville Chamberlain became Prime minister in early 1937 it was clear that the future of orthodox strategy for recovery turned on relations between London and Berlin. The self-interest boat of the financial and the industrial community-key members of the dominant alliance-dictated close Anglo-German co-operation. In more general terms, detente was a structure; imperative, given the need for a liberal system of international trade and payments and the politico-economic consequences of conflict. ' ' (296 Finney) In short, 'The City's interest in keeping on the right side of the Nazi regime stemmed from it financial commitments there. ' ' (296 Finney) It is clear then, that when Chamberlain's policy of appeasement is analysed properly, and it cannot be dealt with proper justice here, there a many inter sets Chamberlain had to balance out and consider. Therefore far from it being the simple choice between a more aggressive policy advocated by Churchill and appeasement to prevent war, the choice is now focussed on the most practicable option.

Similarily in a historical context, interpretation has moved on from the superficial view of A.J.P. Taylor, that Germany was bluffing all along, to more balanced viewpoints where there is no right or wrong decision as such. Donald Cameron Watt writes as the third proposition of Churchill '... that a grand coalition would have deterred him (Hitler) or led to has overthrow', (p 202 Watt) or '... perhaps have enabled the miliary leaders of Germany to control his violent acts. ' ' (p 93 una) THEME: It is unfortunate for the credibility of the Churchillian critique of appeasment that there is no evidence of serious dissidence among the conservative opposition to Hitler, military or civilian, before 1938. ' ' (212 Watt) Donald Cameron Watt writes as the third proportion of Churchill's critique pf appeasement '... that a grand coalition would ahve deterred him (Hitler) or led to his overthrow... ' ' or, '... perhaps would have enabled the military leaders of Germany to control his violent acts. ' ' (147 una?) In light of this claim it seems necessary to see just how probable it is. Churchill seems to have turned to the idea of alliance initially in the aftermath of the Rhineland crisis, where his concern lay with Frances inn action. 'But force, according to the principles which they served, could only be used on the initiative and under the authority of the League of Nations.

' ' (147 una) As Rose puts it 'In March 1936 Churchill set out the principles of his foreign policy, a classic exposition of the 'balance of power' doctrine: 'to oppose the strongest most aggressive, most dominating power on the Continent, and particularly to prevent the Low Countries falling into the hands of such a Power. ' ' (254 Rose) An 'armed league of all the nations, with Britain and France [in alliance] as the core of it' was his diplomatic formula. (234 162-165 una!) Aside from Churchill in his account claiming to have followed this policy '... for many years and follow still. ' ' (162 una) It is clear that at the time his motives were rather more in line with that of the government. While his claim is true to certain extent- Churchill's conception of foreign policy did involve a European balance of power from collective security (Moshe+Rose) his means were not always as constant as that referred to in the book. Rose points out that Churhill did not want 'appeasement for appeasement's sake' indeed, this can also be said to be true of Chamberlain.

(Blake and Louis) Churchill's policy though, does flicker through the grey areas of any definitional policy of appeasement, preferring instead to associate this policy with weakness rather than on any structured analysis. (ref. Churchill's account is often vague) In late 1937 he returned to the theme of conciliation pursued in 1935. 'If sacrifices are to be made to lay the ghost of hatreds arising out of the late war: he told the house, they should be made all round, and all powers who profited in territory during the Great War should be prepared to share in and contribute 'to any measure of appeasement to those who were defeated. ' ' (see Churchills speeches under R. R James (ed.) VI, 5908) He was referring as much to the vexed question of Britain handing back to Germany her ex colonies, as to the readjustment of the so-called 'lost provinces' in central and eastern Europe, now integrated into Poland and Czechoslovakia. ' ' (235 Rose) Churchill then, was quite willing to negotiate with the Germans at the time, showing that he was not the persistent appeaser that he makes himself out to be. Churchill argued that the best way to deter Germany was to encircle it completely using the League of Nations. He welcomed the Soviet Unions inclusion in 1934, the Soviet Union proving to be of particular importance to any such plan.

Churchill's calls to establish a 'grand alliance' and a military alliance with France, increased the more the European situation worsened and Germany's strength mounted. However Churchill recalls in his account (?) that Chamberlain and his Cabinet colleges considered that any such arrangement would only incite Hitler's anger and frustrate their intentions for coming to a diplomatic agreement with him. (Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 20 March 1938, CV 5/3 pp. 952-953) As Adamthwaite puts it 'In Chamberlain's view Britain's allies were no armour against the dictators. France was deemed politically and militarily unreliable. ' ' This from (Cabinet Papers (Public Record Office, London) CAB 23/90 A-Doc 44. The British Cabinet review its foreign and defence policies, 8 December 1937. pp 176-179) 'France was our most important friend. though she was strong defensively (a misconception shared) and possessed a powerful army, the French Air Force was far from satisfactory.

During the Anglo-French visit, M Chau temps had admitted to an output of aircraft that was only one fif the (60/300) of our own. The power that had the greatest strength was the United States of America, but he would be a rash man who based his calculations on help from that quarter. ' ' (Adamthwaite p 177) However such an assessment has to be taken in the context of Chamberlain's 'Cabinets thinly veiled contempt."Whose refusal to hold staff talks strengthened the hand of those Frenchmen who wanted to withdraw from Eastern Europe". (Feiling, Neville Chamberlain, p 323; Middle mass, op. cit., p 55 p 69 Adamthwaite) But as Adamthwaite describes and Churchill highlights in his account "both countries had common interests and ideas and a full partnership might have solved their dilemmas. Anglo-French co-operation, though exiguous before March 1939, could produce decisive results". (p 69 Adamthwaite) With regard to the Soviet Union, predictions are more uncertain. "The purge of the Soviet High Command in June 1937 severely shook his (Churchill's) belief in Soviet strength.

But with the annexation of Austria in March 1938, and the opening of the crisis over Czechoslovakia, Churchill returned to the theme. (?) However the Soviet Unions intentions as of yet were unclear, there was certainly suspicion of their actions in political circles. However Chamberlains intense distrust of the Soviet Union is apparent "the Russians are stealthily and cunningly pulling all the strings behind the scenes to get us involved in war with Germany". Chamberlain later says, "as a matter of fact, the plan of the 'Grand Alliance', as Winston calls it, had occured to me long before he mentioned it... I talked about it to Halifax, and we submitted it to the Chiefs of Staff and the F.O. experts. It is a very attractive idea; indeed, there is almost everything to be said for it until you come down to examine its practicality.

From that moment its attraction vanishes. You have only to look at the map to see that nothing that France or we could do could possibly save Czechoslovakia from being over un by the Germans, if they wanted to do it. The Austrian frontier is practically open; the great Skoda munitions works are within easy distance of the German aerodromes, the railways all pass through German territory, Russia is 100 miles away". (From Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London, Macmillan, 1946, pp 347-8 p 183 Adamthwaite) The tactical importance of Poland can also be added to that with regard to the Soviet Union. It was on this pretext that Chamberlain would not give a guarentee to Czechoslovakia of the French in connection wiht her obligations to that country. Churchill's plan then, can be seen as unrealistic.

Indeed, this was shown further to some extent by Stalin's decision in 1939 to accept the German option of a strategic alliance rather than an allied. Churchill makes much play in his account that this was due to the dithering of Chamberlain. However Donald Cameron Watt comments that in 1936 Churchill "fell into the clutches of Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador in London". (p 205 Watt) Maisky's ulterior motive may have been to gain Soviet influence in the bAlkans, certainly as Charmly points out that for many Conservatives there was deep suspicion of the relation between the two. (p 316) Besides which Stalin's decision to side with Germany "probably arose from his realization that in a western alliance intended as a deterrent to Hitler the Soviet Union would be shouldering the burden of the war agian st Germany if it failed without any commensurate reward should it succeed; such pragmatic calculation does cast a little doubt on the sincerity of the Soviet desire to pursue an anti-Fascist front in 1938, or the scale of effectiveness of the Soviet military action which might have followed". (206-207 Watt) Speculation is dangerous however. On top of this Charmly asks the question "was it likely that Germany would, after the experience of 1914 simply sit still and let herself be encircled?" (Charmley 316) "For all his protestations that he did not regard a war against Germany as inevitable, his course of action was likely to make it just that. Moreover, he had not stopped to weigh up either the probability of his 'grand alliance' being formed, or its likely military effectiveness".

(Charmley 317) However such speculation as to the effectiveness of such a pain as the 'Grand Alliance', reflects the problems in trying to come to a conclusion as to the sucess of such a plan. It is therefore to do as Churchill has done and produce a conclusion purely on a personalised justification deriving from a particular view of history that is in some ways outmoded.