Collective Security Of European Nato Members example essay topic

Since its establishment in 1949, NATO has been "the main institutional framework for the coordination of the foreign, security and defence policies of Western Europe and North America"1. During the Cold War NATO operated under a bipolar system dominated by intense global ideological and strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Most states fell under the sphere of influence of either superpower, ensuring cohesion, discipline and security stability within NATO and the Warsaw Pact regarding security issues due to common perceived security threats posed by opposing Cold War superpowers. NATO's central function was to ensure the collective security of European NATO members, established under Article 5 of NATO's constitution, through providing military deterrents against the security threat posed by the Warsaw Pact. However, the post-Cold war period provides alternative security dilemmas. The declined military and political threat posed by the former Soviet Union and the subsequent multi-dimensional nature of European security undermines the validity of sustaining NATO involvement in European security.

Those supporting detachment from NATO reliance argue that post-Cold War multi-dimensional security threats cannot be addressed by NATO, which relies upon military deterrence and collective defence, rather security actors should employ a multi-faceted approach to European security including economic and political security mechanisms to support military deterrence. Post-Cold war security dilemmas have eroded the cohesion and stability existent amongst NATO allies during the Cold war. Without the unifying effect of the Soviet threat the NATO coalition "may find it... difficult to develop concerted policies on security issues"2. The post-Cold war security arena requires NATO to adapt to new European security dilemmas to retain legitimacy particularly due to the threat posed by rival security organisations, such as the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), vying to assume NATO security responsibilities in a post-Cold war security environment marked by multi-dimensional security challenges rather than solely upon collective security against a singular common perceived security threat. NATO supporters argued that although the viability of NATO's core security objective of collective defence may be in doubt NATO fulfils "secondary functions" that are viable within the new security context. Such functions include continued engagement of the US in European security to provide security guarantees and the maximization of existing NATO military interoperability to respond to future, currently unidentified, multilateral security threats.

Diplomatic and political security initiatives, provided by European actors, are insufficient without military backing. NATO provides a military security guarantee that should be sustained rather than duplicated by potentially ineffective security actors. European security organisations, through the European Security and Defence Initiative (ESDI), should develop alongside existing NATO mechanisms through developing NATO Europe's security pillar and security "burden sharing" rather than autonomous European ESDI arrangements which undermine NATO security sovereignty. Nevertheless, NATO's core emphasis upon collective security policy has provided an adequate security guarantee against European "power politics" and the re-nationalisation of European defence policies, through maintaining inclusive security apparatus and decision-making.

Disengagement of such a security guarantee could undermine European democratic and economic integration and transitional processes of post communist nations. The fundamental intention of the June 1991 Copenhagen summit and the November 1991 Rome summit was to assert NATO's key role in European security. At Copenhagen the Bush administration acknowledged that NATO alone was insufficient to cater for European security, rather a system of interlocking institutions, with NATO at the helm, in which NATO European members increased there security responsibilities through developing a distinctive European security and defence ESDI within NATO was desirable. However, NATO's lack of clarity regarding its post-Cold War security role and European security burden sharing resulted in attempted development of separate European security identities and a rejection of NATO security sovereignty. NATO assumed the existence of a consensus within NATO Europe favouring the NATO led interlocking institutional model. Rather the models interpretation differed amongst NATO members and unintentionally indicated that NATO accepted partial European duplication of existing NATO security mechanisms.

For instance, in October 1991 German Chancellor Kohl and French President Mitterrand issued a joint letter proposing the development of a Franco-German Corps, rivalling NATO's ARRC, and suggested WEU enlargement to include non-NATO nations. Therefore at the Rome summit NATO sought to re-confirm security primacy and limit the threat of security duplication posed by EC security organisations. Although NATO provides secondary functions security organisations require clear definitions regarding security roles and areas of interest. Attempts to re-define NATO's security agenda emerged from the ambiguous objectives underlined under NATO's "New Security Concept" (NSC). The NSC acknowledged that European security threats were multi-faceted and multi-directional which required development of military and political security strategies. However, the NSC failed to re-appraise methods required to respond to new multi-dimensional security threats and remained embedded within military methods and collective territorial defence.

The fundamental objectives of the NSC emphasised the replacement of NATO's large military capacity with flexible and mobile Rapid Reaction Forces RRF. Development of NATO RRF, such as the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), encouraged NATO defence spending reduction and provided security mechanisms capable of reacting to diverse, small scale post-Cold War military contingencies. However, deployment of RRF requires development of multilateral "coalitions" of NATO states willing contribute forces to areas of NATO security responsibilities as defined in the NSC, being humanitarian aid, peace-keeping and peace-enforcing. Such willing coalitions were difficult to secure through NATO given the lack of a common security threat posed upon NATO collective security. NATO couldn't initiate out-of-area operations unless the NATO Council concurred, yet the unanimity required amongst NATO members to respond to multi-dimensional threats or to develop NATO's role in arbitrating non-Article 5 operations, appeared non-existent. Furthermore, NATO's emphasis upon burden sharing through the European Security Identity (ESI), the failure to clarify areas of interest and security roles, to formulate wider security agendas or enhance political components necessary to stabilise "fledgling democracies and the free markets of Eastern Europe"3, and continued reliance upon collective defence initiated a period of uncertainty regarding NATO's perceived role which permitted organisations to development security manifestos that potentially duplicated and invalidated NATO security protocol.

Current consensus amongst NATO allies advocates that an ESDI can only be established within NATO through NATO support of WEU led operations, yet European NATO members, particularly France, have attempted to foster European autonomy in security resolution and decision-making. The primary intention was to develop a European non-NATO affiliated ESDI through developing the Western European Union's (WEU) role as a distinctively EU affiliated defence and security actor capable of undertaking multilateral security operations on behalf of EU actors. The Copenhagen and Rome summits attempted to re-iterate NATO's primacy, even in the context of emerging ESDI initiatives, and that "only NATO because of its membership and capabilities, could perform... core security functions"4. Although the summits re-iterated NATO's commitment to "core security functions" they failed to clarify NATO's role beyond collective defence, such as out-of-area crisis management and peace operations. Therefore leading to EU attempts to develop capabilities in undertaking non-Article 5 security operations outside NATO's specified security mandate. Hence, the June 1992 Petersburg Declaration of the WEU's Council of Ministers underlined that the WEU could be employed, to undertake humanitarian, peace-keeping, peace-enforcing and military tasks, under NATO or EU mandate.

The Petersburg Declaration initiated a debate within NATO as to whether the WEU should represent a security and defence actor under NATO or EU mandate. France argued that NATO responsibilities be limited to collective defence under Article 5 while ESDI assumed legitimate responsibility for more probable non-Article 5 crisis management contingencies and peace operations. NATO members, including the UK, argued that such a division labour was unattainable as non-Article 5 tasks could eventually become Article 5 contingencies and that division of labour could produce security operational overlaps that undermine NATO cohesion in responding to crisis situations. To avoid such overlaps WEU operations should be conducted within NATO command structures, not through separate or parallel autonomous European structures. Although NATO supported the increasing of NATO's security capacity, nations such as France, promoted increased EU security capabilities even if these undermined or duplicated existing NATO security functions. There are difficulties in developing a post-Cold War ESDI separate from NATO or US involvement that is capable of undertaking non-Article 5 operations.

The political willingness to develop an autonomous ESDI is undermined by practical realities inhibiting departure from NATO reliance. Firstly, various NATO European members are unwilling to spend resources necessary to acquire and develop military assets and capabilities which would enable Europe to assume NATO security responsibilities. Secondly, internal disagreements regarding the purpose and development of an ESDI, including decision making regarding the implementation and defining of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the relationship between EU security structures and other organisations including NATO, dilemmas regarding inclusion of neutral states in decision making and arguments regarding command structures during crisis situations would be magnified within ESDI security structures which must consolidate the diverse interests of various members. Cohesive decision-making and policy implementation would be difficult to achieve in a system encompassing such a diverse and potentially conflictual membership, in which the absence of defined security threats encourage members to project individual rather than collective foreign policy interests. Fundamental impracticalities of developing an ESDI capable of undertaking non-Article 5 operations include the lack of current EU military capabilities and levels of defence expenditure. NATO Europe's military capabilities in undertaking out-of-area operations are insufficient as Cold War European NATO military strategy emphasised collective defence rather than out-of-area power projection.

Sustained US military investment during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods produced a gulf between the US and Europe in the procurement of military assets required for large-scale multilateral non-Article 5 operations. Significant collective investment is required should the EU wish to duplicate US "strategic mobility" capabilities essential to undertake crisis management operations. Although France supported the development of an exclusively European ESDI, the UK opposed the development of ESDI outside NATO whereas German involvement was inhibited by constitutional constraints. Such a lack of cohesion undermines cohesive decision-making regarding command structures, deployment of forces, attainment of willing coalitions in joint operations and harmonisation of defence spending levels. I shall now analyse EC attempts to develop an alternative security organisation to NATO through the CFSP. The 1986 Single European Act (SEA) empowered the EC with political and economic aspects of security therefore the CFSP represents an attempt to include security within the EU's mandate.

The fundamental principles and areas of security interest of CFSP are documented within Title V, Article J of the 1991 Maastrict Treaty specifying that CFSP should include all questions of foreign and security policy with the eventual framing of a common security policy which "might lead" to a common defence policy, that the WEU would implement common defence decisions and that CFSP mutual security decisions take place only on a basis of unanimity. The lack of clarity within the Maastrict Declaration demonstrates disparities amongst EC members regarding the development and intended role of CFSP. Whereas France, Germany and Italy support the development of a European CFSP the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands insisted that CFSP would entail a "needless and wasteful duplication of institutional functions"5, undertaken by NATO. Article J. 4 of the Maastrict Treaty, declaring that CFSP should include "the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might... lead to a common defence"6, represents a compromise between those favouring and those opposed to the CFSP. Nevertheless the benefits of developing a CFSP are considerable.

Firstly, CFSP would provide a security guarantee to promote continued political and economic integration within the EU. Secondly, CFSP would accommodate a re-unified Germany's foreign policy interests within new European security apparatus. Thirdly, CFSP would develop non-military aspects of security as security evolves from military conception to a wider scope. Non-military security underlines the link between security and economic stability, which is particularly salient in consolidating democracy, economic stability and subsequently security integration in Eastern Europe, hence promoting general European security through consolidating economic and political integration. However, the assumption that CFSP can sustain post-Cold War European security through solely non-military methods is optimistic.

Political and economic methods are useful in responding to post-Cold War security dilemmas requiring non-militaristic methods. Yet, the WEU, as the EU's principle security organisation, failed to avert or resolve the Bosnian conflict which, eventually required NATO military involvement through Operation Deliberate Force in 1995 to impose the Dayton Accord. The EU's inability to address the conflict through non-military means indicated that military methods were necessary to complement non-military methods. The WEU, lacked the military capacity, command and control structure or decision-making cohesion should crisis management resolution require peace-keeping and peace-enforcing operations. To develop a military capacity comparable with NATO the EU had to overcome fundamental problems. Firstly, CFSP depends upon the success of economic and political integration and the formation of a European Single Market (ESM) rather than purely upon security considerations.

Hence, German economic decline, due to re-unification, hindered European economic integration and subsequently C SFP development. Secondly, the Maastrict Treaty emphasises that CFSP security decision-making requires unanimity. Gaining a unanimous consensus in decision-making is difficult to achieve given the wide range of diverse foreign and security within the EC. Finally, the CFSP fails to address problems regarding the integration and incorporation of non-EC nations into decision-making.

The chances of many Central and Eastern European CEE nations meeting strict economic criteria for membership of the ESM appear minimal. Hence, incorporating CEE security interests appears difficult. Events in the former Yugoslavia, during the early 1990's, obligated NATO to evolve new policies and institutions to address multi-dimensional security threats posed by the modern security environment. The EU's failure to deal with the Bosnian crisis or develop security mechanisms supported by a military capacity and the effectiveness of NATO's military involvement and leadership in Bosnia, through initiatives such as Operation Deliberate Force (ODF), provided the catalyst for NATO's re-engagement and re-appraisal of security responsibilities through adapting to new security contingencies and stretching the concept of Article 5 collective security to involve indirect threats to Article 5 posed by non-Article 5 operations. In 1991 NATO re-affirmed its adherence to Article 5 responsibilities claiming that the Bosnia crisis, although indirectly threatening Article 5, exceeded NATO's mandate and should be addressed by EU security mechanisms.

In 1992 NATO assumed supportive peace-keeping and sanction enforcement responsibilities in Bosnia, such as joint NATO / WEU enforcement of economic sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro, arms embargos on Yugoslavia, monitoring UN no fly zones above Bosnia and the use of NATO command structures by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Such initiatives underlined tentative attempts by NATO of re-engagement in assuming subsidiary non-militaristic roles under WEU or UN mandate. The summer of 1995 marked a change in NATO's security policy regarding the Bosnia conflict. NATO assumed direct involvement and leadership in the enforcement of no fly zones and embargos and with ODF and the deployment of NATO peace-enforcing troops under the Implementation Force (IFOR), assumed, for the first time, responsibility for military contingencies within non-Article 5 operations. ODF and the subsequent Dayton Agreements relied upon deployment of NATO military assets. NATO deployment of troops under IFOR and the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in December 1996, established NATO's mandate to undertake similar out-of-area non-Article 5 peace-enforcing and peace-keeping operations, after the Bosnian conflict.

NATO intervention in Bosnia and subsequent re-engagement in European security occurred due to two dilemmas. Firstly, to end the conflict, which if unresolved could encourage the development of similar security crises in post-Cold War Europe. This led NATO to realise that European security required affective military crisis management mechanisms. Secondly, the failure of NATO to directly engage in such a non-Article 5 situation as Bosnia could discredit NATO as a viable security option. NATO's acknowledged that "failure to contain the conflict would undermine the credibility of the Alliance"7.

By 1995 EU attempts at crisis resolution required military intervention to support political and diplomatic security methods, particularly as UN attempts to enforce "safe areas" in Bosnia, such as Srebrenica, were proving impossible to sustain without a military deterrence to curb Serb transgressions. NATO's military capacity provided the only viable alternative to resolve the conflict and was obligated to do so or risk discrediting itself. Bosnia demonstrated a typical potential post-Cold War contingency, thus failure to undertake direct and affective military action in Bosnia risked undermining NATO's credibility as a post-Cold War military orientated security organisation and to encourage similar crisis situations to escalate in Europe. NATO's successful military deployment in Bosnia provided NATO an opportunity to adopt wider security responsibilities on the premise of addressing indirect out-of-area threats to core Article 5 responsibilities. In adapting NATO to address multi-dimensional modern post-Cold War contingencies NATO re-asserted its position as the primary European security order capable of successfully undertaking crisis management operations due to its military capacity, in contrast to the inadequacies demonstrated by EC institutions in crisis management. NATO underlined the intention to re-engage and re-assert its post-Cold War European security role at the 1994 Brussels NATO summit.

The two primary initiatives arising from the summit were Partnership for Peace PfP and the Combined Joint Task Force CJTF which addressed indirect threats to Article 5 interests posed by potential out-of-area contingencies that required a more cohesive, inclusive, broad and coherent security system than that offered by EU security systems. NATO acknowledged that attempts to broaden their security agenda and consolidate security on NATO's periphery through integrating non-NATO members into decision-making and operations posed significant dilemmas. NATO acknowledged that both post-communist CEE and Russian foreign and security policy interests must be incorporated into common security agendas to consolidate economic and democratic stability in CEE nations and avoid similar security crises as demonstrated in the former Yugoslavia. NATO had to incorporate CEE security interests and provide a security guarantee whilst avoiding the potential Russian backlash and subsequent security dilemmas resultant from formal NATO expansion to CEE states. The PfP compromise permitted partners emergency consultation powers with NATO in circumstances where partners perceive a threat to national security.

Although PfP's consultative provision is informal rather than formal, not requiring mandatory collective NATO action, PfP permits military and security integration and expression of foreign policy interests by non-NATO nations within NATO operations and decision-making. While not constituting a formal Article 5, collective defence, or an Article 4 consultative obligation PfP "constitutes a strategic assurance and crucially, approximates a deterrent"8 against similar transgressions upon member states as demonstrated during the Bosnia crisis. PfP incorporates non-NATO nations within the NATO security framework, which potentially grants security guarantees, similar to Article 5, necessary to foster economic and political stability with CEE states, whilst avoiding formal NATO enlargement. Furthermore, the PfP consultative function acts as an early warning system for NATO regarding possible future contingencies permitting pro-active deployment of peace-keeping, peace-enforcing, civil emergency and humanitarian assistance under NATO mandate. Additional benefits derived from PfP are worth underlining. Firstly, PfP provides a method to achieve the necessary consensus and "coalitions of the willing" to contribute and participate in NATO collective defence and crisis management contingencies.

Secondly, PfP secures the participation of non-NATO nations in NATO security systems whereas as EU security mechanisms, which require strict adherence to economic and political membership criteria, exclude many non-NATO states. Finally, PfP, through increasing NATO's collective security scope whilst avoiding NATO expansion, harmonises the geographical buffer zone between NATO and Russia, promotes interstate co-operation in military and political security initiatives and consolidates democratic and economic institutions which prepares aspirants nations for full NATO membership. Because "virtually all the CEE former Soviet and European... states have become... members"9, PfP provides a security guarantee that, although not formal, uniquely incorporates CEE security interests and safeguards the integrity, political independence, and security of its membership. However, PfP doesn't represent full NATO membership and subsequently doesn't provide formal security guarantees. PfP fails to address the processes that aspirant states should take for full NATO membership.

Non-NATO PfP partners felt that PfP's consultative function, which replicated Article 4, could trigger a "backdoor" entitlement to NATO Article 5 security guarantees. NATO's obligations and willingness to abide by PfP guarantees could entail the granting of collective security measures should a partner utilise its consultative powers in a potential crisis situation. Nevertheless, NATO's ability to support the consultative powers granted under PfP with collective security out-of-area initiatives in Eastern Europe are questionable. Although countries like Moldova, Azerbaijan and the Ukraine are PfP members NATO is unable to exercise military operations in potential conflicts involving these countries. NATO's initial failure to address the process of formal enlargement potentially made affiliation to EU security organisations more attractive than NATO. The Clinton administration highlighted the CJTF concept as an integral part of NATO's military structure in addressing post-Cold War multi-dimensional threats.

The CJTF constitutes a practical response to the EU's failure to undertake affective crisis management contingencies, which indirectly threaten Article 5 collective security, while re-asserting NATO pre-dominance in European security by providing a mechanism that deters EU duplication of NATO security roles. Through CJTF, NATO endorsed limited autonomous EU operations within ESDI in return for an overall acceptance that such operations occur within NATO security frameworks. CJTF improves NATO's collective capacity to participate in peace-keeping operations and facilitates closer cooperation between NATO and the WEU, through making NATO assets and command structures available for security operations under NATO or EU / WEU mandate, following NATO consultation and endorsement. CJTF provides the military capacity necessary for the EU to undertake autonomous operations whilst avoiding EU duplication of NATO military assets which would undermine NATO's security mandate. In 1996 NATO established precise conditions for the implementation of CJTF which permitted non-NATO states to participate in NATO / WEU operations. Hence, NATO has incorporated more states and security interests within NATO decision-making processes, thus widening the scope of NATO post-Cold War contingencies beyond Article 5 collective security responsibilities.

CJTF complements PfP in providing a security guarantee which incorporates non-NATO security interests, unrepresented by EU security systems, without requiring formal NATO enlargement. Furthermore, CJTF provides a cost effective means of strengthening NATO's European pillar and allowing the expression of European CFSP, but not at the expense of NATO sovereignty which may occur with the development of duplicate EU security mechanisms. The requirement of NATO endorsement for the use of CJTF maintains NATO sovereignty, avoids potential overlaps of NATO and US foreign and security policy interests and affectively grants NATO "first refusal" in participating in security operations. The CJTF's primary function was to develop an ESDI structure within a NATO framework. The CJTF provides the military capacity required for the expression of autonomous EU foreign and security interests, including potential contingencies in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, and US interests, including out-of-area contingencies on Europe's periphery, through NATO rather than rival security organisations. Hence, CJTF allows the US to "drift away from secondary European security problems... leaving that responsibility to NATO Europe"10.

CJTF permits the EU to undertake independent operations outside of US or NATO interests, whilst NATO Europe remains a staging post and legitimising actor for US out-of-area foreign policy operations. Hence CJTF addresses EU demands for a stronger ESDI, promoting European security burden sharing within particular operations, which lessens the US / NATO security burden and allows the US to concentrate resources upon US specific security objectives. Making NATO command structures and military assets more flexible permits European security actors to consolidate "coalitions of the willing" through integrating non-NATO nations into WEU-led operations. CJTF provides a multi-faceted security mechanism that maintains US engagement and serves mutual security interests of the US, NATO and the EU whilst maintaining NATO sovereignty and the role of NATO Europe as a legitimising actor for US security initiatives. However, the NATO security guarantee afforded to Europe under CJTF relies upon NATO Europe's continued support of US foreign and security initiatives. Disparities between EU nations regarding US and NATO security involvement may undermine NATO's engagement within European security.

Nevertheless, at present the EU's inadequate military capabilities requires NATO support through CJTF, yet future development of EU military capabilities could undermine NATO's continued presence as a security component in Europe. The failure of EU security apparatus and NATO's delayed but successful military involvement during the Bosnia crisis provided an opportunity for NATO to re-define its security role and re-engage into European security. The 1994 Brussels summit acknowledged that the multi-dimensional security threats of the modern European security environment require NATO's considerable military capacity but that security mechanisms diversify from Article 5 collective security and incorporate a wider more flexible range of tasks over a wider geographical scope. PfP and CJTF contributed to NATO's re-appraisal of security objectives allowing the "transformation of NATO from an organisation focused on collective defence... to one focused on new security challenges beyond it's borders"11. NATO's new security architecture fulfils security objectives such as, the integration of a reunified Germany and non-NATO CEE states into common security systems, provides security guarantees promoting political, economic and security stability and integration, appeases Russian security and foreign policy interests, permits ESDI within a NATO framework, addresses a wide range of out-of-area crisis management situations including peace-enforcing and peace-keeping, maintains collective defence obligations, incorporates disperse NATO European security interests in the absence of a common threat, promotes burden sharing of NATO tasks through facilitating economically efficient means to strengthen NATO's European pillar whilst avoiding security duplication. NATO provides a flexible military security guarantee which, by 1996, through was more inclusive of disperse European security interests than EU security systems.

The unique NATO security guarantee under PfP and CJTF provides a stable environment for CEE economies and democratic structures to develop. This subsequently stabilizes security tensions amongst CEE states and compounds NATO's primary as the only viable overarching and inclusive security alternative. NATO's security guarantee also facilitates the economic and political stability which would allow the EU to develop a CFSP within NATO structures. The Bosnia crisis and the EU's inadequacies in crisis management permitted NATO to legitimately assume responsibility for probable non-Article 5 post-Cold War operations rather than reliance upon improbable Article 5 scenarios and hence retain its validity as the primary European security organisation. Notes: 1, Cottey, in Park & Rees, 1998.2, ibid. 3, Duke, 1994.4, Yost, 1999.5, Duke, ibid.

6, Extract from Article J. 4 of the 1991 Maastrict Treaty in Duke, ibid. 7, Wyllie, 1997.8, Yost, ibid. 9, Yost, ibid. 10, Cottey, in Park and Rees, ibid.

11, Cottey, in Park and Rees, ibid.

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