East Wind Rain Message example essay topic
The Japanese goal was to destroy the ships on Battleship Row and the airplanes on the ground at the Naval Air Station, Wheeler, and Hickam Airfields. Because it was a Sunday morning, most of the 780 antiaircraft guns were not manned. Many military personnel were on shore for the weekend and hundreds of others were still asleep on their ships. Did the U.S. Government know about the attack beforehand? Why were the warning signs not more deeply investigated? The Naval Air Station, Wheeler, and Hickam Airfields were the first to be hit by the Japanese to ensure the US had no ability to fight back.
212 of the fleets grounded airplanes were hit, and the 53 that were able to take off were shot down in the attack. The U.S.S. Oklahoma, West Virginia, Arizona, California, and Nevada were five of the 19 sunken or damaged U.S. ships. In the midst of the attack, 2,403 American military personnel were killed; including the 1,177 forever entombed in the Arizona. Another 1,178 were wounded. The U.S. did not inflict much damage to the Japanese during the attack.
The Japanese only lost one midget submarine and 29 planes; 20 were kamikaze missions, 2 were mechanical malfunctions, and only 7 were shot down. December 8, the president of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, addressed Congress and the American people. 'Yesterday, December 7, a date which will live in infamy-the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by the naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan... ' Congress declared war on Japan, and the US was dragged into World War II (Thomas 5).
The warning signs of the attack were there, but weren't investigated. The 3 major warning signs that the Japanese were going to attack were the 'East Wind Rain' message, the unidentified submarine, and the radar signals. On the morning of Dec 4, 1941 Naval Officer Ralph T. Briggs was on watch at the Cheltenham, MD, intercept station, when he received the startling and unexpected 'East Wind Rain' message. 'We had been anticipating the tip-off code phrase for the impending Japanese diplomatic break with Great Britain including attacks on Thailand, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies,' Briggs said. 'Nishi no kate hare, meaning 'West Wind Clear,' There also was a possible 'North Wind Cloudy' message, which meant war with Russia. But I did a double take after I copied Higashi no kate ame, which means 'East Wind Rain' in Japanese.
This was their code that warned there would be a break with the United States. It was a war warning message' (Pearl Harbor: Legacy of Attack). A copy of the message was sent to the Naval Intelligence headquarters in Washington. The 'East Wind Rain' message was received in Washington's Navy Department by the watch officer, who immediately notified Lt. Comdr. A.D. Kramer, head of the translation section of the Navy's communication's intelligence (COMING) unit. When Kramer saw Brigg's message from Cheltenham, he leapt from his chair and rushed into Captain Laurence Safford's office with the news.
His hands shook as he threw the long yellow Teletype paper at Safford, exclaiming, 'This is it!' (Ellsworth 22). After Kramer handed Safford the message, he read the whole thing, more than 200 words of combined news and weather, with the 'East Wind Rain' message appearing right in the middle of the paper. Safford immediately sent the original Teletype containing a message to his superior officer, Rear Adm. Leigh Noyes, director of Naval Communications. A few moments later, Safford breathed a sigh of relief when verification of 'message received' came from Noyes. Happy with the success, Safford wired a message to his men: 'Well done! Discontinue coverage of the target.
' (Thomas 7). That was a far as the message got. After the attack, government officials went through the intercept stations records and concluded there was a final count of forty-three Japanese decoded messages that could all have been warning signs to the U.S. if they would have been looked at more closely by the right government officials. The 2nd major warning sign was the unidentified submarine. At 4: 00 AM an unidentified submarine was spotted at the mouth of the harbor. The U.S.S. Ward rushed to investigate.
When the Ward reached where the submarine had been, there was no trace of it anywhere. After much searching and no luck the U.S.S. Ward returned to dock and took post. Then at 6: 30 AM the submarine was spotted again. The U.S.S. Ward raced to the sighting spot, and this time they found it. They fired their #1 and #2 guns, but they were too close and shot high, so they dropped 2 depth charges, and sunk the sub. Later findings conclude the sub was 1 of 5 midgets subs, sent by the Japanese as yet another surprise to the U.S. to inflict more damage to our fleet.
Hauled in by 5 larger subs, the midget subs were equipped with a two-man crew and one specially modified armor-piercing torpedo. The 3rd warning sign of the attack came at 7: 22 AM, when radar at Pearl Harbor had picked up the incoming aircraft. Not knowing any different, personnel on duty that morning believed that it was just a fleet of B-17's arriving from the West Coast and ignored the last warning before the attack. Not yet knowing about the 'East Wind Rain' message, Rear Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, who was commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, the U.S. Army commander at Pearl Harbor, were cast as the disaster's principal scapegoat's.
In the eyes of many, these two were responsible for America's 2,403 dead, 1,178 wounded, 19 ships sunk or damaged, and 265 aircraft lost. Both Kimmel and Short, on recommendations from political and military leaders in Washington, were relieved of their commands and reduced in rank on charges of dereliction of duty and for 'making errors in judgement. ' Kimmel, under steady barrage of criticism by the public, the military, and the Washington bureaucracy, accepted the blame saying, 'I stand ready at any time to accept the consequences of my acts. ' (Ellsworth 22). Even though a court-martial was suggested, the Roosevelt administration wanted to avoid making a public spectacle at such a sensitive time. Kimmel, who had resolved to take the blame, completely changed his attitude however, when someone told him about the 'East Wind Rain' message.
Warned that people in Washington would destroy him if he sought to publicize the message, Kimball said: 'That's a chance I'll have to take. My mind is made up. ' (Ellsworth 23). Kimmel was later found innocent when 43 different decoded messages were found that could have easily been clues to the attack.
The 'East Wind Rain' message was never found though, it had disappeared from all government files. Did the U.S. ignore all the warning signs? Was this great loss of human life truly accidental or totally political? Ralph T. Briggs, who decoded the 'East Wind Rain' message said, 'I believe Roosevelt knew in advance about the attack. The trend in America was not to get involved. We even had the America first committee.
We had no incentive, no excuse to get involved overseas. We needed to be hit first. '.