Effect Of Gorbachevs Reforms On The Gdr example essay topic

Which Major Domestic And International Factors Made German Unification Possible There were four major groups which played a large role in the unification of Germany in 1990 and whose actions made this unification a possibility. The first of these was the Soviet Union. and in particular President Gorbachev, whose actions in the USSR set the scene for the end of the Cold War and made reunification a possibility. Second, the SED, the communist government in the GDR, which essentially failed to react to Gorbachevs reforms. Third, the people of the GDR, who became increasingly dissatisfied with the lack of reform in the SED and soon began to act of themselves. Fourthly, there was the government of the FRG, under Helmut Kohl, which reacted to the changes in the GDR in such a way as to bring about speedy reunification. To begin, then, the role of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev was vital in resolving many of the international difficulties inherent in German reunification.

Prior to Gorbachevs reforms in the USSR, the western powers and the FRG were unwilling to consider repeated Soviet offers to allow the reunification of a neutral Germany. The reasons for this refusal are obvious. The two German states formed the frontline between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the west was not prepared to contemplate the formation of a Germany which was not actively involved in NATO. Furthermore, the FRG was committed to the European Union, and this commitment meant a westward orientation which a neutral Germany would not be able to pursue. Gorbachev changed this international situation by his policies of glasnost, or openness, and perestroika, restructuring. His aim was to reform the government of the USSR, but in so doing he relaxed the grip which the Soviets had on Eastern Europe As a direct result of these policies and reforms, the Soviet block in Eastern Europe began to demand greater independence, and the Warsaw Pact began to crumble, but there was a more immediate effect on the GDR.

Eastern European countries, particularly Hungary, began to relax their border controls, and suddenly Germans were able to move through eastern Europe and into the FRG. This resulted in a mass exodus and a general weakening of the GDR. For example, between the 10th September, when Hungary opened its western borders, and the end of the month, when the GDR stopped issuing travel permits to those wishing to enter Hungary, 25,000 people left East Germany. The effect of Gorbachevs reforms on the GDR was not limited to this emigration.

Another important element of perestroika was that Gorbachev was unwilling to use Soviet force to support the ailing socialist regimes of eastern Europe. This became vital as the protest movement within the GDR grew, leaving the people of the GDR with only their own government and their own governments repressive forces to deal with, rather than those of a world superpower. However, this was not the most important effect of Gorbachevs reforms. Rather, perestroika struck at the heart of the SED government, and their reaction to it was all important in the reunification process.

The raison detr e of the GDR was monolithic socialism. Without the single party, Stalinist political system, there was no justification for the existence of a separate East Germany, and if the GDR were to move, following Gorbachev, away from this system, there could be no realistic alternative to unification with West Germany [1]. The SED realised this, and consequently refused to tread the path of perestroika. The SED, under its leader Honecker, did make some concessions to reform. Cultural ties with the FRG were strengthened, and more and more people were allowed to visit the west - 1,000,000 in 1987 as opposed to 50,000 in 1985. However, people trying to escape over the wall were still shot on sight, and the Wall was still in place.

The reforms that were made were essentially cosmetic. The failure of Honecker to recognise the need for change earned him a rebuke from Gorbachev (He who comes late gets punished by life), who could see that the SED would have to become a reforming party if it was to retain control. It also lost him the party chairmanship, as he was ousted by his colleagues. Removing Honecker was not enough to recover the peoples confidence in the SED, however. Between September 1989 and February 1990, membership fell from 2,300,000 to just 890,000.

Furthermore, the limited reforms the SED had made, and the speeches made by Gorbachev, encouraged the reform movement in East Germany, and led to the formation of the numerous opposition groups which eventually led to the end of the GDR. There can be no doubt that the ordinary people of the GDR played a highly significant role in making the unification process possible. It was large scale demonstrations by East Germans during October 1989, and especially the November rally which drew over a million people, which led to the resignation of the Politburo in November. It was opposition groups like New Forum which participated in the round table arrangement and helped to arrange the first free elections.

Thus, it was the people of the GDR who brought down the communists, a necessary precondition for unification. However, the role of the people and the opposition groups representing them did not end with bringing down the SED. In late November 1989, the first rallies were held demonstrating not just for a reform of the GDR, but for unification with the FRG. The chant of the demonstrators changed from we are the people to we are one people. This change in goals was doubtless precipitated by the fact that many of the East Germans had by this point been able to visit the West, and had seen how backward the GDR was.

However, the bravery of the protestors in continuing to take to the streets even when there was the threat of being shot by their own military was certainly a factor in the unification process. These protests, as has already been said, led to free elections being held in March 1990. This election was perhaps the most important factor in preparing the way for unification, since at least some of the parties running for office were not committed to unification, but were in favour of maintaining the status quo. From the beginning of the election campaign, the former SED, newly renamed as the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), was ahead of the reform groups, such as New Forum, in the polls. It is very likely that the PDS would have won a substantial number of seats if pitted only against these small groups, simply because the reformers were so divided. It is at this point that the intervention of the FRG government becomes essential.

If a serious challenge was to be mounted to the dominance of the PDS in East Germany, it would be necessary to have organised parties in the elections. The East German Social Democratic Party (SDP) had already re-formed, having been banned in the 1940's, and was soon co-operating with the SPD in West Germany, until they became one party. This meant that there was a strong opposition to the PDS in the running for the election, but it is not at all clear that the SPD would have been in favour of rapid unification. Although the leadership of the Eastern branch of the party was certainly looking to join the FRG at the soonest possible opportunity, Oskar Lafontaine, the SPD chancellor candidate in the West, favoured a different scheme which would see the two Germany slowly growing together. An SPD victory could potentially have set back unification by years. Fortunately for Germany, a third alternative was offered.

The CDU had always existed in the GDR, but had been subordinate to the SED. Now, the old leadership was expelled, and the eastern CDU was united with its western counterpart. Helmut Kohl, the CDU chancellor of the FRG, organised an alliance of democratic parties, including the CDU and the free democrats, to stand in the eastern elections, and in the end this alliance won enough votes to be able to form the first democratically elected government of the GDR. In this, it was the unification issue which was most important. The voters knew that Kohl stood for rapid unification under a capitalist economic system, and decided that this was the way they wanted to go. Kohl and his government continued to have a large role in the unification process.

They had reacted successfully to the emergence of democracy in the GDR; now they reacted with equal success to the request of Lothar de Mazier e, the first CDU chancellor of the GDR, for entry of the east German states into the FRG. Arguably, had an SPD government been in power in Bonn, unification would not have occurred, since Lafontaine was committed to a go slow approach to the issue. Indeed, it is likely that the majority of politicians, CDU or otherwise, would not have handled unification in the way Kohl did, since it was he who took the risk of allowing economic union to precede political union. While many believed that this course of action would lead to people simply taking their Deutschmarks and ignoring the issue of political unification, Kohl recognised that economic union was needed immediately to attempt to turn around the economic crisis that was occurring in the GDR. Thus, the vision and courage of Kohl were essential to the unification process. In conclusion, three things were needed in order to make unification a possibility.

Firstly, the relaxation of Soviet control, which was granted by Gorbachev, perhaps by accident, through his programmes of glasnost and perestroika. Secondly, the overthrow of the SED in East Germany, which was achieved by a combination of the party leaderships own ineptitude and the demonstrations of the people of the GDR. Thirdly, it was essential that there be a pro-unification government and chancellor in Bonn, with the vision to undertake the unification process. Such a man was provided in the form of Helmut Kohl.

[1] The German Polity, David Conrad t, 6th Edition, p 24.