Foreign Ministers Aehrenthal And Izvolski example essay topic

UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT Course: History 326 PAPER Toward World War I Count Aehrenthal and the Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 by Sven-Ole Andersen (student) In October 1908 the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy proclaimed the annexation of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, Bulgaria declared its independence of the Ottoman Empire. Both actions involved no change in either the territorial or the political arrangements of the Balkan peninsula. Austria-Hungary had occupied and administered the two provinces for thirty years, and the Sultan of Turkey had never exercised the slightest control over the autonomous principality of Bulgaria set up in 1878. However, the policy and action taken by the two governments constitute violations of the Treaty of Berlin because other signatories were not consulted. As a result, a diplomatic crisis followed the events of October 1908.

Moreover, memories of what happened between October 1908 and April 1909 were not without bearing on the events of July 1914, when Austria-Hungry declared war on Serbia which ultimately ended in the outbreak of World War I (Schmitt Preface). The architects of the plan for annexation, and the following crisis also, were the Russian foreign minister Alexander Petrovic Izvolsky and the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister Alois Lexa Graf von Aehrenthal. The latter was the most intriguing and most crucial figure of both. Alloys Leopold Johann Baptist Graf Lexa von Aehrenthal was born on 27 September 1854, at Gross-Skal in Bohemia. He began his career in 1877 as an attach'e in Paris in the foreign service of the k. u. k. Monarchy.

After that, he became the diplomatic counselor to Russia (1888), ambassador to Bucharest (1895), and Austria's ambassador to St. Petersburg (1899). In 1906, Baron (later Count) Aehrenthal replaced Graf Goluchowski as foreign minister. His intention was to revive the foreign policy of Austria-Hungry and to ensure a more active role of the Monarchy in Europe. He was a Bohemian-German who had been brought up in the Clerical and bureaucratic school of ambassador Count Gustav Ka lnoky (Wank XV ). Henry Wickham Steed calls him "a man of few words, to each of which he gave a special meaning". Aehrenthal on one side, was a hard-working foreign minister.

Due to the "special meanings" of his words, however, a lot of ambassadors who negotiated with him complained within a few months that it was not easy to work with him and to rely on his words. He, who came from St. Petersburg, had the reputation for Russophilism, which means that his reputation was valuable to a diplomat in Russia but embarrassing to a diplomat in Austria, due to his sometimes harsh attitudes. In addition to that, he was accused of being servile to Germany. Aehrenthal surveyed European politics from a Russian reactionary angle of vision - he distrusted Liberal States. Germany, however, he respected for its "Realpolitik". On the other hand, his attitudes towards England and France were that of distrustful contempt qualified by ignorance because both countries were members of another Entente.

As the foreign minister of the monarchy, he wanted to restore a greater measure of diplomatic independence of the Habsburg Monarchy. "The League of Three Emperors", as Steed put it, was intended to defend conservatism and monarchical principals (Steed 228). In order to understand the development toward the Bosnia Crisis of 1908 as a whole, one has to look at the inner problems of the Habsburg Monarchy during the course of time. Since its constitution upheld a dual monarchy, Austria-Hungary had to deal with inner struggles and problems of nationalities.

Here, a distinction can be made between nations that existed entirely within the boundaries of the monarchy and nations that existed in parts within the borders, but had their larger parts outside of Austria-Hungary. In case of the latter, another distinction must be made between minorities who wanted an independent national state - as Italians, Serbs, and Rumanians for example - and nations that had no state of their own, as was the case of Poles and Ukrainians. However, German Austrians or Austrian Germans cannot be put in one of these categories. Their situation is partly comparable to that of Italians or Serbs.

Some of those Germans were disappointed with their political situation, but, only by remaining in the monarchy, these German Austrians could continue to control other groups, which were economically weaker than themselves. The German Austrians, however, had to recognize the equal rights guaranteed to the Hungarians in a compromise, negotiated in 1867. Together about twenty-two million people, the Germans and the Magyars were inferior in number to twenty-four million Slavs. Among others, the controversies between Magyars and Croats were dangerous for the monarchy because they opened the "Yugoslav question"; a Yugoslav unity or "separation". Although there were old rivalries that separated Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs, the movement toward a Yugoslav unity was in progress. But, some of the Yugoslavs were under Austria and, therewith, had to face either German or Italian antagonism in at least five different provinces.

To solve the problems, politicians even tried to give Yugoslavia a status that would equal that of Austria and Hungary. This, however, was unacceptable for the Germans and Czechs (B'erenger 248,249). At the beginning of the twentieth century, two big political powers existed in Europe. Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy formed the Triple Alliance (B'erenger 218). The countries agreed to support each other if attacked either by France or Russia. France, on the other hand, felt threatened by the Alliance; Britain feared the growth of the German Army.

As a result, in 1904 both countries signed a contract known as the Entente Cordiale. Three years later, Russia joined both countries and, subsequently, the Triple Entente was formed (Carlgren 24). Politically, Count Aehrenthal always wanted to extend Austria's control over the Serbs in the Balkans. Three main events lead to the crisis of 1908. A new King had ascended the throne in Serbia. This King had an anti-Austrian attitude.

Moreover, he wanted a unification with his fellow nationals in Bosnia. Also, Russia's defeats in the Far East had turned its attention back to the Balkans. The most important event that led to the crisis, however, was the Turkish revolution in 1908. The government of Turkey was an obsolete and tyranny one. Sultan Abdul Hamid had maintained himself in power and preserved his empire by making humiliating deals with foreign powers. The country was run as a Muslim theocracy and, additionally, the Sultan held the position of a Caliph.

The position of a Caliph is comparable to that of the Pope in the Roman Church. This revolution was called "Young Turk Revolution". The Young Turks were liberal reformers and army officers. Their outlook was very modern and all were enthusiastic. They, as nationalists, demanded that the Sultan grant a parliament and a modern constitution. Furthermore, they wanted the Sultan to liberalize his despotism.

In the rebellion of July 1908, the Young Turks threatened to march on Constantinople. Sultan Abdul Hamid finally agreed to restore a constitution. In the course of the years, the Young Turks, however, lost their illusions and later their hopes. After other crises, wrong diplomatic maneuvers and military conflicts, Turkey lost power in the course of World War I (Steed 238,239). After the Young Turk Revolution, the Turkish Government remained weak and inefficient. The constitutional reforms announced by the Young Turks required that Turkey grant a degree of autonomy to the provinces and representation in the Turkish Parliament.

At this time, Ferdinand of Bulgaria took advantage of the weak Turkish government and of the situation in the Ottoman Empire. On October 6, 1908, Bulgaria claimed its independence (Schmitt 30-33). Austria wanted to take advantage of this chaotic situation. Aehrenthal already had the annexation of Bosnia in mind. In September 1908, the foreign ministers Aehrenthal and Izvolski met secretly and made an agreement. Izvolski promised that Russia would not oppose Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and even reaffirmed Tsar Alexander's recognition of Austria's right to the territories without calling a Great Powers Conference.

Aehrenthal wanted full control of Bosnia-Herzegovina because he thought that Turkey could possibly recover from the revolution of 1908. In return, he promised that Austria-Hungary would not oppose Russia's effort to open the Dardanelles to Russian ships. Izvolski gave his affirmation. The Dardanelles were controlled by Turkey.

The Ottoman Empire would not allow warships from other countries to pass to or from the Black Sea. It was Izvolsky's intention to change this and allow Russian warships to pass through the straits. As a result, Russia would have a Mediterranean presence. Furthermore, the Russians would better recover the bitter defeat by Japan (Molden 61-66). Aehrenthal and Izvolsky met each other on September 15 and 16, in the Castle of the ambassador Count Berchthold in Buchlau. Later, Izvolsky made the attempt to describe this meeting as a private one on which both talked about the political situation in Europe and, marginally, about annexation.

In reality, the deal was nearly made perfect in advance. The negotiations in Buchlau lasted six hours. Shortly after, a declaration was made: "Die zu Buchlau stattgehabte Begegnung des Herr n Iswolski mit Baron Aehrenthal hat den beiden Staatsmaennern Gelegenheit ge geben, sich nicht nur ueber die allgemeine Lage in Europa, sondern hauptsaechlich ueber die Angelegenheiten der Tuerkei miteinander auszusprechen, wo seit dem letzten Sommer eine durchgreifende Veraenderung der Verhaeltnisse statt gefunden hat. Auf Grund dieses Gedankenaustausches waren die beiden Minister in der Lage, vollkommene Uebereinstimmung ihrer Anschauung en ueber die Lage in der Tuerkei zu konstatieren.

Die dies falls allgemein akzeptierte Parole ist, dem neuen Regime in derTtuerkei gegen ueber eine wohlwollende und zuwartende Halting einzunehmen, von der Hoff nung ausgehend, dass diesel be sich konsolidiere und zu einem Element des Fri edens in Europa were". (Molden 60) The declaration, written in "Old German Language", does not mention parts of the real negotiations at all. Its content admits only that the political situation in Turkey was a part of the talks and that both ministers met in a friendly atmosphere. As Molden mentions in his book, if ever a report was reporting nothing, then it was exactly this one (Molden 60). The two diplomats then began to implement their agreement. However, the Austro-Hungarian minister also agreed to consider certain rectifications of Article 29 of the Treaty of Berlin affecting Montenegro which were suggested by Russia (Schmitt 231).

The Article number 25 of the Treaty of Berlin gave Austria-Hungary the right to "occupy and administer" Bosnia-Herzegovina. Conveniently, the Government of the Monarchy, under the leadership of Count Aehrenthal, found in the Turkish revolution of 1908 the opportunity for annexation. Austria-Hungary claimed that the Turkish revolution made it necessary to define the Monarchy's position in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Anderson 53). Minister Izvolsky returned to St. Petersburg and began immediately to work on the plans to open the straits of the Dardanelles for Russian warships.

His major problem, however, was that Aehrenthal had not signed any contract to support Russia in case of opposition of another Great Power. Vienna was probably determined on an early annexation after the revolt broke out in Turkey in July. This is stated in a letter by Aehrenthal to Francis Ferdinand. In 1908, on September 26, the foreign minister wrote: Eure Kaiserliche Hoheit, [... ] Die Verhandlungen mit den beiden Ministerpraesidenten betreff end die Annexin sind nahezu abgeschlossen. Ich here die Zuversicht, dass eine Formulierung getroffen werden wird, die uns das gibt, was wir brauch en, das ist die volle Souveraenitaet Seiner Majest aet ueber die beiden Provinzen, ohne die Zukunft zu praejudizieren.

- Dem hoechst en Auftrage entsprechend, habe ich verfuegt, dass Euer Kaiserlichen Hoheit der Entwurf eines Schreiben's an Koenig Karl von Rumaenien unterbreitet wird. Ich darf wohl an nehmen, dass der Entwurf in die Hrende Euer Kaiserlichen Hoheit gelangt sein wird. In tiefster Ehrfurcht Aehrenthal (Wank 465) In this letter, Aehrenthal admits that he has already negotiated with other foreign ministers. Though Izvolsky was told that the act would take place with warning and at a "favorable moment", Russia was not notified until October 3. Moreover, the other powers were not informed until October 6.

The diplomacy of Count Aehrenthal was perplexingly intricate. He moved faster than his Russian counterpart. On October 6 a circular note to the powers announced the evacuation of the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, and the grant of constitutional autonomy to Bosnia-Herzegovina. One day later, on October 7, the Emperor-King announced to the inhabitants of the provinces his reasons for annexation. One of the reasons was that the people in the annexed provinces could enjoy the benefits of the Monarchy as a reward for economic advancement (Molden 67-69).

The situation was badly complicated by the circumstance that Izvolsky and Aehrenthal were each challenging the good faith of the other (Schmitt 35); Izvolsky felt himself betrayed by his Austro-Hungarian counterpart. Moreover, the Great Powers reacted with indignation. The German Emperor, the King of England and France complained that they had not been informed ahead of time. Germany, which first took the Turkish side, later took the Austrian side. The Austrian action, however, was most unwelcome to the British government. British opinion had been distinctly hostile to Turkey because of Sultan Abdul Hamid's tyranny.

But the Young Turkish revolution of July had changed the perspective of the British government completely. Great Britain - "the home of constitutional government" - became very popular in Turkey. The new ambassador to Turkey, Sir Gerald Lowther, arrived only a few days after the revolution in the country. He was celebrated there, even in the streets of Constantinople. The British foreign office, however, was aware of pitfalls and dangers (Schmitt 37). The attitude of Italy concerning the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was less clear.

The Italian government, when informed by Aehrenthal and Izvolsky of what was impending, asked the Austro-Hungarian minister not to change the status quo without a previous understanding with Germany, Italy and Russia. As Aehrenthal refused to suspend his action, the Italian government attempted to save its position by promising not to oppose the annexation. Unfortunately, the public opinion in Italy was greatly excited by the announcement of the annexation. Foreign minister Tit toni found his political position shaken. His only chance to escape from this dilemma was to espouse the suggestion of a conference. This, he announced, would be the only solution.

But his subsequent conduct leaves little doubt that he had no positive policy in reality (Schmitt 43-44). Due to the negotiations of its foreign minister Izvolsky, however, Russia should have known the upcoming events and their possible repercussions. Surprisingly, the news of the annexation aroused great indignation, for nothing was known of Izvolsky's negotiations with Aehrenthal. The Russian public even demanded his political head.

The Turkish government received the note by Austria-Hungary with protest. Grand Vizier Kamil Pasha declared that Turkey could not recognize the annexation. Turkish foreign minister Te wik Pasha reminded the Austro-Hungarian government that according to the declaration of 1878 the occupation was to be considered provisional. The greatest excitement in any country, however, was produced in Serbia. Crowds filled the streets of Belgrade yelling "Down with Austria!" . In early November, the Serbian army was mobilized, which meant a step towards war.

About 120,000 men served in the first reserve. Concerning subsequent history, the most important incident of these days was the establishment of a society called Narodna Odb rana (National Defence) which aimed to protect and promote the interests of the annexed provinces. The Austro-Hungarian government ascribed the revolutionary ferment in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the alleged activities of this society, which served as the basis for the ultimatum of 23 July 1914. The Austro-Hungarian government refused to receive a protest note by the Serbian government because Serbia was not a signatory of the Treaty of Berlin. Even the German foreign minister declared that he could not see the special interests and rights of Serbia that had been injured by the annexation (Schmitt 44-47). Russian foreign minister Izvolsky, who felt betrayed by Aehrenthal, wanted a coalition of Russia and Serbia to show solidarity.

Serbia demanded the intervention of Russia. Then, Izvolsky announced his plans for a free passage of Russian warships through the Dardanelles. Russia had to face the reaction of the other signatory parties of the Treaty of Berlin, though Britain especially considered opening up the straits for all warships, not just Russian ones. Russia wanted to support Serbia, but the country, was not yet ready to fight a war against Germany and Austria, who were allied in the Triple Alliance. Izvolsky told the Serbian minister in Paris, Ves nich, that Russia was not able to fight a war and argued that the evacuation of the Sandjak signified a positive gain for Serbia. The evacuation, according to Izvolsky, opened up the prospect of a common frontier between Serbia and Montenegro.

As Austria threatened to publish the details of the agreement between Aehrenthal and Izvolsky, Russia was forced to back away. In March 1909, the Russian foreign minister Izvolsky informed Germany that his Country would accept the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary (Schmitt 48). Earlier, at the outbreak of the crisis, Izvolsky was the chief proponent of a European conference. His principle motive for making concessions in Asia during the negotiation of the Anglo-Russian agreement had been to secure the goodwill of Britain concerning the opening of the straits of the Dardanelles for Russian warships. In October 1908, however, he did not inform the British government of his negotiations with Austria-Hungary, either before or after the meeting with Aehrenthal at Buchlau.

The British government was committed to discuss the question of the straits, but it sought, as Schmitt puts it, "the movement very inopportune" because they had not been informed of the meetings with Aehrenthal (Schmitt 50). In a memorandum, the British government declared that the opening of the Straits would be fair but the passage has to be provided on terms of perfect equality for all. This means that the straits should be opened for all ships with Turkish consent. Izvolsky agreed to accept this, although it was not his original intention. From this time on nothing more was heard of the question of the Straits.

The Russian foreign minister also assured the German and Austrian ambassadors in London of his desire for a satisfactory settlement. Foreign minister Aehrenthal, was encouraged by William II., who said that a conference must exclude any discussion of Bosnia. To accomplish this, Aehrenthal informed Izvolsky that he would not oppose a European conference but Turkey should recognize the annexation in advance (Schmitt 60). Francis Ferdinand sent Aehrenthal a letter with congratulations and expressed his wish that a European conference would not take place.

In this letter, Francis Ferdinand writes that such a conference would be foolish (dump) and malicious (boshaft). Lieber Baron Aehrenthal! Nach dem die ersten Tage der Aufregung vor bei sind, draengt es mich, Ihnen von Herzen meine waermsten Glueckwuensche zu der vorzueglichen Durchfuehrung der Annexionsangelegenheit auszusprechen. Es ist ihr Ver dienst, dass wir wieder einmal Europa gezeigt haben, dass wir doch noch eine Gross macht sind! Sehr gut! Sie mu essen selbst eine wahre Freud e und Genugtuung emp finden, dass Ihr Werk so gelungen ist.

Nur so weiter und sich von nieman dem etwas gef allen lassen. Hoffentlich kommt es nicht zu diesem ganz dum men d. h. eigentlich sehr boshaft ausgedachten Kong ress. [... ] Euer Exellent aufrichtiger Eh. Franz (Wank 624) The conference should merely take account of the agreement without a debate. After all, the Russian foreign minister was indeed a beaten man (Schmitt 60).

In the end, a European conference was abandoned. The attitude of Germany and the retreat of Russia, Serbia and Montenegro were one of the reasons. The German government supported Austria-Hungary and insisted that the annexation be excluded from a discussion. Moreover, no compensation should be given to Serbia and Montenegro without the consent of Austria. In March 1909, Germany announced that it would stand by its allies and in case of war would support Austria.

Finally, even Russia recognized the annexation (Schmitt 79 ff). At the beginning of 1909, Austria-Hungary demanded the categorical renunciation of all Serbian claims. To support its demands, the Monarchy mobilized three army corps and its Danube flotilla. Due to the fact that Russia had withdrawn its support in March, Serbia renounced its opposition to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, Serbia promised to reduce its army to the status of the year before (Schmitt 208,227). Prior to the annexation, Aehrenthal expected that Turkey would not be able to offer effective resistance.

But, as Schmitt writes, the Turkish government would have had to renounce a most venerable tradition if it had not taken advantage of the rift between Aehrenthal and Izvolsky to drive a hard bargain with Austria-Hungary (Schmitt 100). Financial interest, however, was of secondary interest. What the Turkish government needed was a territorial guarantee and protection against Bulgaria. The Turks started negotiations with the Austro-Hungarian ambassador.

According to Schmitt, Aehrenthal asked his ambassador whether the Turkish government would accept lb T 2,500,000 as compensation for the crown lands in Bosnia. The offer was also transmitted to the Great powers. The British government expressed its satisfaction with the Austrian proposal. The Turkish government accepted the offer on condition that no counter-claims would be made for damages that resulted from the boycott.

Austria-Hungary and Turkey, finally, signed an agreement. In summary, this agreement contained the following points: 1. Renunciation by Austria-Hungary of all rights in the Sandjak of Novi Bazar 2. Formal consent to the economic concessions offered 3. Assurance of full religious freedom and equality for the Moslem population of Bosnia-Herzegovina 4. A declaration by Austria-Hungary of readiness to negotiate concerning the protectorate over the Catholics of Albania 5.

Payment by the Monarchy of lb T 2,500,000 for the crown lands in the provinces 6. Recognition of the annexation by Turkey Moreover, Aehrenthal approved the plan to help the Turkish government negotiate with Bulgaria. In the end, the Turkish government got nearly everything that it desired (Schmitt 117-119). All together, Austria-Hungary lost money and reputation.

The government had to pay lb T 2,500,000 to Turkey and had trade losses by the Turkish boycott. The mobilization of its army cost lb 14,000,000 alone. In addition, most of the powers were alienated by Austrian policy and Austria-Hungary had a heavy obligation to Germany. The whole episode, as Anderson calls the events of the crisis in his book, became the starting point for a series of events that filled the years 1908 to 1914 and led directly to World War I (Anderson 97). The two principal players in the crisis, Aehrenthal and Izvolsky, had both miscalculated badly.

Aehrenthal had expected to impose the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina without compensation. Austria-Hungary had to pay a substantial sum in cash to Turkey, he was forced to wait nearly six months before he could extort from Serbia a reluctant submission to the "fait accompli", and he had to "give up" Bulgaria to the Russians. His counterpart Izvolsky found the British and French government hostile to his plans to sacrifice Serbia to Austria in order to secure the opening of the Straits for Russia's warships. Even the winning over Bulgaria cost a lot of money. Both foreign ministers destroyed the Austro-Russian relationship which had preserved a kind of balance in the Balkan region, established a hostile relationship between their countries and their future policies were made in bitter personal antagonism (Schmitt 244).

Epilogue In his last years, foreign minister Aehrenthal was seriously ill. Emperor Francis Joseph wanted to visit him at his deathbed, but his advisors did not want to let the 82-year old Monarch visit his foreign minister, because they thought it could be detrimental to the Emperor's health. Instead, Aehrenthal received the honor of the "Brillianten zum Gross kreuz des Stephansordens" and a handwritten letter by Francis Joseph: Lieber Graf Aehrenthal! In Wuerdigung des Umstandes, dass Ruecksichten auf ihren Gesundheitszustand Sie zu Meinem lebhaften Bedauern veranlassen, die Enthebung vom Am te des Ministers Meines Houses und des Aeussern zu er bitten, genehmige Ich in Gna den die von Ihnen erbetene Enthebung. Bei diesem An lasse finde Ich Mich bestimmt, Sie Meines ungeschmaelerten Vertrauens nicht nur in Ihre Person, sondern auch in die Politik zu versi chern, die Sie unter schwierige n Verhaeltnissen mit umsichtiger Initiative verfolgt haben und die Ihnen eine bleiben de e hrende Erinnerung sicher t. Zu gleich sprache ich Ihnen fuer die treten ausgezeichneten Dienst e, die Sie Mir, Meinem Hause und der Monarchies in aufopfernder Weise geleistet haben, Meine volle Anerkennung und Meinen waermsten Dank aus.

Als Zeichen Meiner fortdauernden Gewogenheit verleihe Ich Ihnen die Brillianten zum Grosskreutze Meines Sankt Stephansordens. Wien, am 17. Februar 1912. Francis Joseph. (Molden 234) The letter states that Emperor Francis Joseph "allows" Count Aehrenthal to step back from his office, thanks him for loyal service and therefore decorates him the "Diamonds to the Great Cross of the Stephansordens". Count Aehrenthal died in February 1912 in Vienna.

Two years later, World War One broke out.

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