Foreign Policies Of Austria Hungary example essay topic
By 1910, Germany produced three times as much iron as France, four times as much steel and seven times as much coal. This threatened France, who had been humiliated by the Germans in 1870 and were keen to seek revenge, while also regaining the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine that they had lost to the Germans. Prior to 1890, it could be argued that the foreign policies of the European nations, especially those of Germany were not conducive to the outbreak of war. The German Chancellor, Bismarck, had created a Europe that could exist peacefully. Through a series of alliances, Bismarck was able to isolate France, as he sought to secure peace and stability in Europe.
"In the short term he was successful, but his policies had long term repercussions which helped to undermine the post 1871 peace settlements he had done so much to establish". Bismarck's system was very fragile, and when he was removed by the new German Kaiser in 1890, it began to fall apart leaving a Europe that was deeply divided and ripe for conflict. The fragility of the settlement became evident almost immediately after Bismarck had been removed. The reinsurance treaty with Russia was not renewed, leaving Germany open to attack from both the eastern and western fronts.
Additionally, the German agreements with Austria-Hungary "could be used by a declining Austria-Hungary to drag Germany into the southeast European minefield, and to force her to agree to military assistance against the Russians". The balance of power in Europe, carefully created by Bismarck was being disrupted as Germany attempted to become a major power, one that could rival Britain. Germany forged new goals in their foreign policy than had been evident under Bismarck, they "wanted to enhance the prestige of the government and undermine support for its enemies by conducting a strong forward policy". This included rivaling Britain's superiority among colonial empires, through the process of Weltpolitik. The Germans also wanted to build up a navy that would rival that of Britain, and this aim was instituted in 1901 by Admiral Alfred Peter Friedrich von Tirpitz, and was a "significant challenge to the dominant position of the British navy on the seas of Europe and of the world".
This policy was completely misconceived and aroused intense antagonism from the British as well as strengthening the focus of opposition to German ambitions in Europe. The foreign policies of Austria-Hungary are even more conducive to the outbreak of war than those of Germany. Rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans was very evident, and could escalate into large conflict easily. The breakup of the Ottoman Empire led to both Russia and Austria-Hungary seeking to profit through expansion. The Russians wished to gain unlimited access to the Dardanelles, through which most of their grain exports passed while the Austro-Hungarians wanted to contain Russian expansion. Importantly the break-up of the Ottoman Empire led to the creation many small Slavic states such as Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Romania.
The Balkan wars of 1912-3 was not only a disaster form the Ottomans, who were virtually driven completely out of Europe by the Balkans league; but was also a disaster for the Austrians as enemies such as Serbia had raised an army of 200,000. Serbia desired to unite all Serbs and Croats in a greater-Serbia, and include the 7.3 million Serbs who lived in Austria-Hungary with the 3.3 million within the boundaries of Serbia. The Serbs had the support of the Russians, who looked towards a policy of pan-Slavism, under which all Slavic people could unite and not live under the oppression of empires such as Austria-Hungary. The Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 "not only enraged Serbia; it ended the era of Austro-Russian collaboration and abstention, and opened a new era of opposition, suspicion and antagonism". Their foreign policies in the Balkans had brought conflict with both small Balkan nations such as Serbia, but also with large empires such as Russia. Austro-Hungarian foreign policy was very conducive to the outbreak of war.
Russian foreign policy was based around their notion of pan-Slavism, and Russia's role as the protector of all Slavic people. The Russians had plenty to gain from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, but were also on a collision course with other European powers if they chose to exploit the Ottomans. Russia also had colonial ambitions in Asia, which conflicted with those of the British and could have led to conflict between those two nations. However, the Franco-Russian agreement of 1894 was extended to include the British in August 1907, which resulted in the Triple Entente. Russian foreign policy was conducive to the outbreak of war as it provided Serbia with the necessary support that it required attempting to create a greater-Serbia. French foreign policy was largely determined by the humiliation that it had suffered in the 1870 Franco-Prussian war.
The territories of Alsace and Lorraine had been taken by the Germans, which had prompted the French to seek revenge if ever it was possible. France's traditional colonial rivalry threatened to erupt in 1905 because of the impending hostilities between Japan and Russia, allies of Britain and France respectively. However the hostilities led to an agreement between the two that they would not end up fighting against each other; this led to the Anglo-French Entente, which was primarily a colonial agreement. The Entente brought yet another European power into the network of alliances, and it meant for Germany that Austria-Hungary, possibly the weakest of the five great powers, remained as their only ally. The Franco-Russian agreement held potentially dangerous consequences for Germany, as it now seemed inevitable that if war broke out, they would have to fight on two fronts. This led to another piece of foreign policy, one that resulted in full European participation in the war, the Schlieffen Plan.
Through the Schlieffen plan Germany would attack the French through Belgium, and then defeat them quickly enough to attack the Russians before they were able to mobilise. The Schlieffen plan inevitably meant that any attack from Germany would result in France and Russia entering a war. Through Britain's guarantee of Belgian neutrality, the potential that all five European powers would become involved in a war. British could possibly be described as the only nation not to have a foreign policy conducive to the outbreak of war. The British sought to create a balance of power in Europe, and were more concerned about maintaining their colonial empire than involving themselves in a British conflict. However, the challenge to naval supremacy by the Germans, and Germany's colonial ambitions certainly brought about criticism from the British.
The guarantee of Belgian neutrality was what eventually what brought Britain into the war, but it could hardly be seen as a policy conducive to the outbreak of war, in fact the opposite could easily be argued. The respective foreign policies of the European powers before 1914 were certainly conducive to the outbreak of war. The build-up of the two power blocs, and the general distrust among nations led to the creation of a situation that needed just a spark to produce an explosion into war. Michael Howard is quite correct in stating that "from 1911 onwards it is hard to find any military leader suggesting that war could or should any longer be avoided". The respective foreign polices of European nations had led to an inevitable decline into war that the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand only accelerated. He nig, Ruth.
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Friedrich von Holstein: Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and Wilhelm II, London, 1965. White, John Albert. Transition to Global Rivalry, Cambridge, 1995. Wilson, Keith. 'European Diplomacy 1871-1914' in Martin Pugh (ed.) A Companion to Modern European History, Oxford, 1997..