General Strike Of 1926 example essay topic

Why did the General Strike of 1926 fail and what were the effects the strike had upon industrial relations in Britain? The General Strike of 1926 lasted only nine days and directly involved around 1.8 million workers. It was the short but ultimate outbreak of a much longer conflict in the mining industry, which lasted from the privatisation of the mines after the First World War until their renewed nationalisation after the Second. The roots of the General Strike in Britain, unlike in France or other continental countries, did not lie in ideological conceptions such as syndicalism but in the slowly changing character of trade union organisation and tactics. On the one hand, unskilled and other un apprenticed workers had been organised into national unions since the 1880's to combat sectionalism and to strengthen their bargaining power and the effectiveness of the strike weapon. On the other hand, at the same time and for the same reason trade unions had developed the tactic of industry-wide and 'sympathetic's trikes.

Later during the pre-war labour unrest these two forms of strike action, 'national' and 'sympathetic', were more often used together which in an extreme case could have meant a general strike. The symbol of this new strategy was the triple alliance, formed in 1914, which was a loose, informal agreement between railwaymen, transport workers and miners to support each other in case of industrial disputes and strikes. As G.A. Phillips summarise d: The General Strike was in origin, therefore, the tactical product of a pattern of in-dust rial conflict and union organisation which had developed over the past twenty-five years or so in industries where unionism had been introduced only with difficulty, among rapidly expanding labour forces traditionally resistant to organisation, or against strong opposition from employers. Therefore, a large majority of the British Labour movement saw a general strike along the traditional 'labour ist' view, which emphasised the separation of the political and the industrial sphere, as a purely industrial act. This notion was supported the developments in the 1920's when the depression and the employers offensive weakened the militant and revolutionary forces, whereas the success of the Labour Party and the re organisation of the TUC General Council further strengthened these 'labour ist' forces. The government's and the employer's view, of course, was a different one.

Since the French syndicalists in 1906 had drawn up the Charter of Amiens, reaffirming their belief in direct political action and the general strike as a means of overthrowing the Parliamentary system, governments and industrialists all over Europe saw a general strike as a revolutionary challenge for the constitution and the economic system. Although the British Labour movement had never been really committed to this idea, during the post-war boom when it was on the offensive, there were two examples of semi-syndicalist conceptions concerning the use of industrial action against the war and British intervention against the Soviet Republic. Government and employers were warned and did not hesitate to condemn every notion of nation wide industrial action as unconstitutional and revolutionary. The mining dispute which caused the General Strike emerged after the First World War when the triple alliance broke and the miners were left to fight alone against the government's plans to privatize the mines. As a result the mines suddenly returned to their private owners and the miners faced demands for very substantial wage cuts of up to 50 per cent. The dispute escalated because the crisis was seen by all the key players -the government, the em-players and the Trade Union Council (TUC) - as an example for future industrial relations in Britain.

The trade un-ion movement saw its opportunity to challenge the notion that wage reduction could solve Britain's economic diff i-cuties and decided therefore that a future united action in support of the miners would take the form of a general strike. But as Margaret Morris emphasised. 'It was the absence of any possibility of finding an agreed solution to the difficulties in the mining industry which made a confrontation on the lines of the General Strike almost in evita-be, not any generalised will to class conflict'. The Conservative government, however, saw its role as a neutral, standing between the contending parties and rep-resenting the British people as a whole. Its industrial policy included the application of the principle of co-partnership in industry, in the hope that workers and management would begin to see their interest as identical, a policy which was ultimately challenged by a general strike. The Government was completely aware that a trade union victory would have important political implications such as government intervention in the coal industry as well as encouraging further industrial action of a similar dimension.

Moreover, in 1926 the government was very well prepared for a major industrial dispute, whereas unemployment and uncertain economically circumstances forced the trade union movement in the defensive. Due to this, the scene was set for a nation-wide strike in May 1926, which was condemned to fail from the outset. After five years of struggle the miners could not accept any wage cuts while the mine owners did not see any poss i- of running the mines profitable without any. Furthermore, the owners' case was supported by the government, which did not want to interfere in industrial relations. Moreover, because the government saw the strike as a rev o- challenge to the constitution and the economic system it demanded unconditional surrender from the be-ginning. But in fact, as Margaret Morris emphasised, the General Strike was neither a revolutionary act nor an industrial dispute.

'Only if the Government had intervened by additional subsidies or by coercing the coal owners could the difficulties of the coal industry have been solved in some other way than at the expense of the miners. The General Strike, therefore was a political strike and needed to be pursued as such if it was to make any progress'. Therefore the General Council of the TUC, which always emphasised the industrial character of the dispute, by the very nature of the General Strike was not fighting the owners but the government, which was forced into taking part in negotiations and put this pressure on the owners. As the government refused to intervene and the TUC could not openly challenge the government there was no chance for a successful end and the TUC had to call off the strike. A general confusion on the side of the trade unions and a principal lack of communication between the different parties surrounded the circumstances of this surrender.

Sir Herbert Samuel lead the final negotiations based on his memorandum, but he did not have any authority from the government. The Negotiating Committee of the TUC was well aware of this fact but nonetheless it expected Samuel to provide an accurate reflection of what the gov- was prepared to do. However, the trade union side thought that the strike was in decline and was losing more and more of its faith in its success, and therefore accepted the Samuel Memorandum without the miners ac-, which, of course, would have been crucial for the signing of a final agreement. Therefore neither the government nor the miners, and of course, neither the employers were involved in the negotiations which the Neo-tia ting Committee thought to have turned in its favour. Only after they had called off the General S.