Ho Chi Minh's Communistic Aspirations example essay topic

The seeds of the Vietnam War were sown two decades prior to the conflict. Following the Second World War the United States adopted two foreign policies, which seemed to coexist peacefully for a time. The policies: anti-colonialism (policy against colonization of small nations) and anti-communism. Little did the United States know that the coexistence of these two policies would soon become a great paradox.

Indochina had been a colony of France since the middle of the nineteenth century, within its parameter Indochina contained three nations: Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. At the conclusion of WWII these nations were seeking independence from the colonial rule of its motherland, France. On the heels of the war the U. S was primarily occupied with assisting Europe recover economically and escape communist domination (Pentagon Papers A-2). Confronted with these problems of what then seemed to be a larger scale the U. S considered the fate of Vietnamese 'nationalism' relatively insignificant. In fact Indochina appeared to be a region in the post-war world in which the U. S need not involve itself (P. Papers A-2). Tides quickly shifted, however, when the problem was brought to President Roosevelt's attention by Premier Ramadi er of France.

Following his policy of anti-colonialism, Roosevelt advocated the independence of all Indochinese nations. France, unwilling to give up colonial rule continued to occupy Indochina. Meanwhile, a man by the name of Nguyen Ai Quoc, who later came to be known as Ho Chi Minh, formed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) as well as an army of Vietnamese freedom fighters called the Viet Minh. Finally on December 19, 1946 the Vietnamese troops attacked French troops stationed on the outskirts of Hanoi. This began the start of the eight year Franco-Viet Minh War. Shortly prior to this conflict President Roosevelt had died, fanning the flame of anti-colonialism and leaving the official policy of the U. S toward the Franco-Vietnam war as neutral.

Due to the neutrality of the United States during the first four years of the Franco-Viet Minh War, the Vietnam War became, inevitably, the destiny of the United States. This paper will explain three major points and how they laid the foundation for the Vietnam War. These points include: 1) reasons for U.S. neutrality, 2) how this neutrality allowed Communism to blossom in Vietnam, and 3) how this blossoming Commun sim made the Vietnam War inevitable. One of the main reasons for this lack of action on the part of the U. S was the ignorance of Ho Chi Minh's communist affiliations and the facade of nationalism which he donned (P. Papers A-30). At the time the United States promoted the nationalistic outlook of small nations such as Vietnam and due to this ignorance, they viewed it as nothing less than the true spirit of nationalism which it appeared to be. No one, however, knew better than Ho Chi Minh that the struggle for independence could not be conducted under the flag of Communism (P. Papers C-23).

As a result of this belief, Ho Chi Minh removed several communists from the DRV cabinet and tried to exhibit an impression of Democracy. He also pressed for the adoption of a constitution, quite similar to that of the United States, as a strictly strategical maneuver. Ho was undoubtedly a communist. He had spent twenty five years, prior to becoming the President of the DRV, embracing Communist doctrine and fighting for the Communist cause in France and Vietnam. There, in reality, should have been little doubt of Soviet imperialistic influence of Ho Chi Minh's motives. Had President Truman paid more careful attention to developments in Vietnam he would have no doubt joined the conflict as a French ally in order to propagate the U.S. anti-communist policy.

The fact that Ho Chi Minh was a communist was clear to numerous masses of people including the U. S State department. In early 1948, the State Department issued an appraisal of Ho Chi Minh stating:' Depts. Info indicates that Ho Chi Minh is Communist. His long and well-known record in Comintern during the twenties and thirties, continuous support by French Communist newspaper Humanity since 1945, praise given him by radio Moscow, and (the) fact that he has been called 'leading communist' by recent Russian publications as well as Daily Worker makes any other conclusion appear to be wishful thinking. ' (P. Papers A-5) The lack of action by President Truman even when presented with information such as this halted U.S. intervention in the Franco-Viet Minh War until it was too late. The saying 'ignorance is bliss' did not apply to this situation.

It was ignorance that proved to be the root cause of the great American Conflict, Vietnam. Aside from the ignorance of these signals there were a couple of other reasons for U. S neutrality during this conflict. One of these factors was that in 1946 France and Britain were moving towards an anti-Soviet alliance in Europe, and the U. S was afraid to stir up any commotion through pressing a divisive policy in the Indochina affair (P. Papers A-4). Indochina was also viewed as a strictly French affair and any interference could result in a conflict of bigger proportions than the U. S was ready for. European Politics along with the U.S.'s failure to identify the potent communist strategy in Vietnam were the reasons for U. S abstention for the early part of the war. The lack of U. S military support of France in the Franco-Viet Minh War allowed Ho Chi Minh to establish a firm foundation for a communist regime in Vietnam.

In 1947 French representatives approached the former emperor of Vietnam, Bao Dai, with aspirations of forming a new Vietnamese government as an alternative to the DRV. Bao Dai agreed. This strategic move by the French government came to be known as the Bao Dai Solution. It wasn't until 1950 that the U. S finally realized that the Vietnamese government under Bao Dai was a puppet government used to propagate conciliatory feelings between the French and the Viet Minh (d'Amitie 9). By 1949 France itself had admitted that it did not have a strong enough army to su press the Viet Minh forces (P. Papers 43). France was not a weaker force than the Viet Minh but the French fought using old-fashioned military tactics which showed to be all but useless while waging a war against the Viet Minh who used elusive guerilla warfare techniques.

These techniques were ones originally pioneered by Chiang Kai-she (Mecklin 9). Ho Chi Minh's facade of nationalism spread throughout Vietnam like wildfire to the point where even anti-communists wanted to see Ho Chi Minh win independence for the people of Vietnam. At the time even Senator John F. Kennedy said:' I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military assistance in Indo-China can conquer an enemy which is everywhere and at the same time nowhere, 'an enemy of the people' which has the sympathy and covert support of the people. ' (P. Papers C-18) These weaknesses of the French army allowed the war to continue for eight years and end in the Geneva Accord which only solidified the communist goal of Ho Chi Minh. The U.S. only started to provide aid in 1950, and even then it was mostly monetary relief and little military. However, even this monetary aid was hard to initiate because it was not until the U. S Secretary of State Dean Acheson made a public statement announcing that the Kremlin had admitted of Ho Chi Minh's communistic aspirations, that the money began to flow (P. Papers A-7). By 1950 the French colonialists had made several paper concessions (written concessions i.e. treaties) to the Vietnamese but never put them into practice, thus angering the Viet Minh forces.

Inevitably the war ended as a military disaster for France and political collapse quickly followed. This drawn out fighting put the French in the hands of the Viet Minh, by 1950 the French had realized that the only way to end the conflict was with a peace agreement containing several concessions to the Viet Minh. By 1954 the one billion dollars of American aid had proven fruitless and the Geneva Conference (which will be discussed later in the paper), however bi-partisan it may have appeared, provided a land- slide victory for the communists. As a final valiant effort the French attempted to use Ngo Dinh Diem as a puppet to become Premier and promise 'real' independence to the people of Vietnam (Mecklin 10). When Diem discovered the true French motive he refused, consequently the French attempted to oust Diem from Vietnam but failed. By 1954 it was crystal clear that, as one man put it: 'Nationalism in Indochina is a means, the end (of which) is Soviet imperialism. ' (P. Papers A-34) In March of 1954 Viet Minh forces under the command of General Gap began their attack on Dien Bien Phu.

A defeat of French forces there would have been catastrophic due to the upcoming Geneva Conference. The Viet Minh knew that a victory directly before the conference would give them the upper hand at the bargaining table. When Viet Minh forces surrounded Dien Bien Phu it had become clear in the words of the U. S Ambassador to France that, 'the fate of Southeast Asia now rested on Dien Bien Phu. ' Even to this immediate threat the United States hesitated by negotiating and debating all options. It had become apparent to the U.S. knew that nothing short of a military victory could draw the Indochina conflict to an end that was amenable to the interests of the free world. What the U. S simply failed to recognize was that time was of the essence.

As a result the U. S did not provide military assistance to the French as Dien Bien Phu fell in late April of 1954. Now the Viet Minh entered into the Geneva Conference with an upper hand which would prove to be fatal to American interests in Southeast Asia. With this in mind the U. S was resentful to any agreements that would or could be made in the conference and some have gone as far as to say that there was a covert attempt at sabotage of the conference by the U.S. (P. Papers A-1). The U. S realized that any settlement made at the conference would be contrary to U. S interests because they knew from experience, gained during the Korean War, that any substantial compromise with the Communists was impossible. Therefore the U. S threatened to dissociate itself from the conference if the results were not in the interest of the U.S. Finally, in May of 1954 the U.S. agreed to participate in the conference under the condition that France would not negotiate the surrender of Indochina.

The U.S. went into the conference knowing that any significant cession to the Viet Minh would produce 'serious strategic harm to the U.S. ' However pessimistic the U.S. had seemed going into the conference the outcome was better than expected. The official U.S. position on the outcome was that 'it was the best that could be obtained from a bad situation (P. P apres D-14). ' France regained a significant part of Indochina including South Vietnam. The DRV was also satisfied with the outcome, they gained full control of Vietnamese territory north of the 17th parallel (Josse 1). This gave the Viet Minh a big enough foothold to keep their communistic goal alive. Whatever the losses were for the Viet Minh, China and the Soviet Union came out of the conference viewing the communist takeover of Southeast Asia as inevitable.

According to the Geneva agreement general elections were to be held in Vietnam two years following the conference and a communist outcome seemed all but certain. Though the Geneva Accords appeared to be a great compromise the United States failed to see the duplicitous nature of the outcome. For the time the DRV seemed to be in a corner but the stage was set for complete communist domination of Southeast Asia. For the next decade Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh planted seeds of communism throughout Southeast Asia, within a decade these seeds blossomed into the Vietnam War. Communism in Southeast Asia was always viewed as dangerous, according to Secretary of State John Dulles:' If the Communist forces were to win uncontested control over Indo-China or any substantial part thereof, they would surely resume the same pattern of aggression against the other free peoples in the area. ' (P. Papers B-20) As a response to post-Geneva communist achievements in Indochina, the Manila Conference was held during the latter part of 1954. Its goal was to establish a defense arrangement for Southeast Asia.

The result was the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The United States viewed SEATO as an anti-Communist agreement, which would react to and only to a communist threat. This concerted effort, however, did not put and end to the growing bubble of communism to which Ho Chi Minh was giving breath. In 1955, even though it was considerably weak, Secretary of State Dulles pressed the Unites States government to financially aid the Diem regime in South Vietnam. For the next ten years supported Diem, this was not due to any stability of government Diem had attained but due to the lack of any other available leader of non-communist aspirations. In 1959, the bubble burst, Ho Chi Minh was ready to fight once again, this time for the reunification of Vietnam under communist control (Mecklin 13).

The Diem regime was never up to a challenge of such grandiose proportions and several coup d'etats were attempted by his own paratroopers. Diem in effect had become an American puppet and had lost any power that he had by 1963. In October of 1961 President Kennedy ordered an increase of American military support in Vietnam from 600 in 1961 to 23 thousand in 1965. By 1967 all out war against Ho Chi Minh was an inevitable step if the U.S. wanted to save free world interests through the containment of Communism.

In the words of President Eisenhower:' If I may refer again to history; we failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini, and Hitler by not acting in unit and in TIME. That marked the beginning of many years of stark tragedy and desperate peril. May it not be that our nations have learned something from that lesson? ... ' (P. Papers B-21) Indeed, there was little learned. Time, indeed, had been the key to the Vietnam conflict. The failure of the United States to realize the importance of it during the beginning of the Franco-Viet Minh War truly did develop into an American tragedy.

Vietnam, like many other great conflicts in American history, was easily avoidable. The saying that history repeats itself rings true in this situation. Although it is hard to predict when a small conflict, like that of French, can escalate into one with great ramifications and derived consequences as that of Vietnam. The Franco-Viet Minh War, as minuscule a peril as it may have seemed at the time, was the groundwork for later U.S. tragedy. This laziness to consider the consequences allowed the conflict in Indochina to magnify itself into a beast, which devoured the hearts of many an American family in the 1960's.

Had the U.S. realized the urgency of the matter it would have joined the French cause and suppressed the then small forces of Ho Chi Minh, little expenditure on any level would have been required. This, however, was not to be. Due to U.S. action and policy, or lack thereof, the U.S. was placed on the fast track to, in the words of President Eisenhower, 'desperate peril. '

Bibliography

Association D'ami tie; Chronology of the Vietnam War Association d'Amitie, 1975;
Paris, France Kah in, George; The United States in Vietnam Library of Congress, 1963;
Washington D. C Mecklin, John; Mission in Torment Doubleday & Co., 1965;
Garden City, NYU.S. Dept. of Defense; Pentagon Papers: Vol. I U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1971;
Washington D. C web Feb. 7, 2001 web;
Josse, M.R. ; 'The Vietnam / American War' Article, May 10, 2000.