Idea Of The Other And The Impression example essay topic

A Treatise of HUMAN NATURE: Being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. London: Printed for John-Noon, at the White Hart, near Mercer-Chapel, Cheapside, 1739. Vol. II. Octavo. Pages 475-318.

I Do not recollect any Writer in the English Language who has framed a System of human Nature, morally considered, upon the Principle of this Author, which is that of Necessity, in Opposition to Liberty or Freedom. The Truth of the Principle itself has been often and very carefully discussed. Some have endeavoured to prove even the Impossibility of Liberty, while others have asserted it to be an essential Property of human Nature, the Basis of all Morality, Religion and happiness, which can subsist upon no other Foundation, and are utterly subverted by the Denial of it. To form the clearest Ideas we can have upon this abstruse Subject, we should read some Letters that passed thereupon between those tow acute Reasoners, Mr. Locke and Mr. Limb orch, and the incomparable Dr. Clarke's Answers to several Pieces of Leibnitz and Collins. Our Author has sufficiently (he says) explained the Design of this Work of his in the Introduction.

Perhaps he expects we should understand it by the following Passages. It is evident, that all the sciences have Relation, greater or less, to human Nature; and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one Passage or another. Even Mathematicks, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in {354} some measure dependent on the Science of MAN; since they lie under the Cognizance of Men, and are judged of by their Powers and Faculties. It is impossible to tell what Changes and Improvements we might make in these Sciences, were we thoroughly acquainted with the Extent and Force of human Understanding, and could explain the Nature of the Ideas we employ, and of the Operations we perform in our Reasonings. And these improvements are the more to be hoped for in natural Religion, as it is not content with instructing us in the Nature of superior Powers but carries its Views farther, to their Disposition towards us and our Duties towards them, and consequently we ourselves are not only the Beings that reason, but also one of the Objects concerning which we reason. If therefore the Sciences of Mathematicks, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, have such a Dependence on the Knowledge of Man, what may be expected in the other Sciences whose Connexion with human Nature is more close and intimate?

The sole End of Logick is to explain the Principles and Operations of our reasoning Faculty, and the Nature of our Ideas: Morals and Criticism regard our Tastes and Sentiments; and Politicks consider Men as united in Society, and dependent on each other. In these four Sciences of Logick, Morals, Criticism and Politicks, is comprehended almost every thing which can any way import us to be acquainted with. -- Here then is the only Expedient from which we can hope for Success in our philosophical Researches, to leave the tedious lingering Method which we have hitherto followed; and instead of taking no and then a Castle or Village on the Frontier, to march directly to the Capital or Center {355} of these Sciences, to human Nature itself; which being once Masters of we may every where else hope for an easy Victory. -- There is no Question of Importance, whose Decision is not comprised in the Science of Man; and there is none which can be decided with any Certainty, before we become acquainted with that Science. In pretending therefore to explain the Principles of human Nature, we in effect propose a compleat System of the Sciences, built on a Foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any Security. And as the Science of Man is the only solid Foundation for the other Sciences, so the only solid Foundation we can give to this Science itself, must be laid on Experience and Observation.

-- For it seems evident, that the Essence of the Mind being equally unknown to us with that of external Bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any Notions of its Powers and Qualities, otherwise than from careful and exact Experiments, and the Observation of those particular Effects which result from its different Circumstances and Situations. -- Moral Philosophy has indeed this peculiar Disadvantage, which is not found in natural; that, in collecting its Experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with Premeditation, and after such a manner, as to satisfy itself concerning every particular Difficulty which may arise. When we are at a loss to know the Effects of one Body upon another, we need only put them in that Situation, and observe what results from it. But should we endeavour to clear up after the same manner any Doubt in moral Philosophy, by placing ourselves in the same Case with that which we consider, it is evident this Reflection and Premeditation would so disturb the Operation {356} of our natural Principles, as must render it impossible to form any just Conclusion from the Pho^. We must therefore glean up our Experiments in this Science from a cautious Observation of human Life, and take them as they appear in the common Course of the World, by Mens Behaviour in Company, in Affairs, and in their Pleasures.

Where Experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a Science, which will not be inferior in Certainty, and will be much superior in Utility, to any other of human Comprehension. Here the Reader has all that I can find in the Introduction to this Work, which can in the least give him any Idea of the Design of it: How far he will be thereby instructed in it, must be left to his own Judgment: I go on to set before him the several Topicks therein treated of. The Understanding is the Subject of the first Book, or Volume which is by much the largest. In the second Book, or Volume, the Passions are considered. The former of these Books is divided into four Parts. In the first, the Doctrine of Ideas is delivered; accounting for their Origin, and describing their Composition, Connexion and Abstraction.

I shall offer a short Hint of what he has said upon these different Heads. To trace the Origin of our Ideas, he resolves all the Perceptions of the human Mind into two Kinds, which may be called Impressions and Ideas, [2] He {357} makes the Difference betwixt these to consist in the Degrees and Force and Liveliness, with which they strike the perceiving Faculty. Those that enter with the most Violence, he calls Impressions; and under this Name he comprehends all our Sensations, Passions and Emotions, as they make their first Appearance in the Soul: By Ideas, he means the faint Images of these in Thinking and Reasoning. -- There is another Division of our Perceptions whereof he takes notice, and which extends itself both to our Impressions and Ideas: This is into simple and complex. Having by these Divisions given an Order and Arrangement to his Objects, (that is, I suppose, Ideas) we may now, he says, with the more Accuracy considered their Qualities and Relations.

The first Circumstance that strikes his Eye, [3] is the great Resemblance betwixt our Impressions and Ideas in every Particular, except their Degree of Force and Vivacity. When he shuts his Eyes and thinks of his Chamber, the Ideas he forms are exact Representations (he tells us) of the Impressions he felt. I fancy most other People have made the same Observations. However, this Circumstance seems to our Author remarkable, and engages his Attention for a Moment. Having finished his Meditations on this Point, and discovered this Relation between Impressions and Ideas, which, he says, requires no farther Examination, he is curious to find some other of their Qualities. He proceeds therefore to consider how they stand with regard to their existence, and which of the Impressions and Ideas are Causes, and {358} which Effects.

The full Examination of this Question is, he tells us, the Subject of this Performance of his; and therefore he here contents himself with establishing this one general Proposition, That all our simple Ideas in their first Appearance are derived from simple Impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent. When he has fixed this Assertion beyond Contradiction, he reflects on what he has done with great Satisfactions; saying, This then is the first Principle I establish in the Science of human Nature, nor ought we to despise it because of the Simplicity of its Appearance. For it is remarkable, that the present Question is the same with what has made so much Noise in the Terms, when it has been disputed whether there be any innate Ideas, or whether all Ideas be derived from Sensations and Reflexion. We may observe, that in order to prove the Ideas of Extension and Colour not to be innate, Philosophers do nothing but shew, that they are conveyed by our Senses.

To prove the Ideas of Passion and Desire not to be innate, they observe that we have a preceding Experience of these Emotions in ourselves. Now if we carefully examine these Arguments, we shall find that they prove nothing, but that Ideas are preceded by other more lively Perceptions from which they are derived, and which they represent. ' See what an extraordinary Light our Author, by tow or three Arguments, has cast upon a Point, which cost Mr. Locke, and some other eminent Philosophers, no little Pains in settling. Accordingly he hopes his clear stating of the Question will remove all Disputes concerning it, and will render the above said Principle of more use in our Reasonings, than it seems hitherto to have been. {359} And now having made it appear, that our simple Impressions are prior to their correspondent Ideas, a very few Instances excepted, Method seems, our author says, to require we should examine our Impressions, before we consider our Ideas. But after informing us that Impressions may be divided into two kinds, those of Sensation and those of Reflexion, and briefly illustrating both sorts, he gives us to understand, that it will be necessary to reverse that Method, which at first Sight seems most natural; and, in order to explain the Nature and Principles of the human Mind, give a particular Account of Ideas, before we proceed to Impressions.

In Pursuance of this Resolution, he goes on: First, to describe and distinguish the Ideas of the Memory and Imagination: Secondly, to explain the Connexion or Association of Ideas: Thirdly, to assign their several other Relations: Fourthly, to define and fix the true Essence of Modes and Substances: And Fifthly, to determine the Nature of abstract Ideas. On all these heads, a Man, who has never had the Pleasure of reading Mr. Locke's incomparable Essay, will peruse our Author with much less Disgust, than those can who have been used to the irresistible Reasoning and wonderful Perspicuity of that admirable Writer. To pass over the other Topicks, let us transiently view our Author's Discourse on abstracted Ideas, which fills up the seventh Section of the first Part of his Work. He begins, A very material Question has been started concerning abstract or general Ideas, whether they be general or particular in the Mind's Conception of them. ' [4] Then he tells us {360} that Dr. Berkeley has disputed the received Opinion in this Particular, and has asserted, that all general Ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain Term, which gives them a more extensive Signification, and makes them recall upon Occasion other individuals which are similar to them. This, agreeable to his Sagacity, he looks upon as one of the greatest and most valuable Discoveries that has been made of late Years in the Republick of Letters; and so he sets himself to confirm it by some Arguments, which, in his Apprehension, will put it beyond all Doubt and Controversy.

It is above twenty Years since I looked over that Piece of Dr. Berkeley's, which contains this most precious Discovery, and, if I remember right, that Gentleman himself boasts of some might Advantages that would accrue from it to the Commonwealth of Learning: The Acquisition of Science was to become exceeding easy, and several Difficulties, that were used grievously to perplex Mathematicians and Metaphysicians, were to sink before it: In short, it was to do such Feats in behalf of Knowledge, as no Principle beside was able to perform. But notwithstanding all these Benefits that were to accompany it, I do not find it has met with any favourable Reception among the Literati; or that many Persons of Ability and Penetration are become Disciples: Its Fortune may now perhaps be more prosperous under the Auspices of its new Patron, who, we see, undertakes to raise it above all Opposition. It is evident, he says, that in forming most of our general Ideas, if not all of them, we abstract from every particular Degree of Quantity and Quality, and that an Object ceases not to be of any particular Species on account of every small Alteration in its Extension, Duration, and other Properties. It may therefore be thought, that {361} here is a plain Dilemma that decides concerning the Nature of those abstract Ideas which have afforded so much Speculation to Philosophers. The abstract Idea of a Man represents Men of all Sizes and all Qualities; which it is concluded it cannot do, but either by representing at once all possible Sizes and all possible Qualities, or by representing no particular one at all. Now it having been esteemed absurd to defend the former Proposition, as implying an infinite Capacity in the Mind, it has been commonly infer'd in favour of the latter.

Here is the Dilemma with which we are perplexed on this Subject, and from which the superior Capacity of our Author is to deliver us. The latter Inference he utterly destroys. And this he does, first, by proving that it is utterly impossible to conceive any Quantity or Quality, without forming a precise Notion of its Degrees. And secondly, by shewing, that though the Capacity of the Mind be not infinite, yet we can at once form a Notion of all possible Degrees of Quantity and Quality, in such a Manner at least, as, however imperfect, may serve all the Purposes of Reflection and Conversation.

Thus I have told the Reader what our Author has done. I cannot so compleat ly shew him how he has done it; for at the most, I must set down only the Heads of those Arguments whereby he demonstrates the two foregoing Propositions. The first, asserting the Impossibility of conceiving any Quantity or Quality, without forming a precise Notion of its Degrees, he proves by these three: First, whatever Objects are distinguishable are separable by the Thought and Imagination, and vice versa. Secondly, it is confessed, that no Object can appear to the Senses, or, in other Words, that no Impression {362} can become present to the Mind, without being determined in its Degrees both of Quantity and Quality: to affirm otherwise, implies that it is possible for the same Thing to be and not to be. Thirdly, it is a Principle in Philosophy, that every thing in Nature is individual, and that it is utterly absurd to suppose a Triangle really existent, which has no precise Proportion of Sides and Angles. If this therefore be absurd in Fact and Reality, it must also be lo in Idea; since nothing of which we can form a clear and distinct Idea is absurd and impossible.

[5] But to form an Idea simply, is the same Thing; the Reference of the Idea to an Object being an extraneous Denomination, of which, in itself, it bears no Mark or Character. When our Author, by what he says upon these Heads, has convinced us of his first Proposition, he proceeds to confirm the second, relating to the Capacity of the Mind, for forming at once a Notion of all possible Degrees of Quantity and Quality. He tells us, when we have found a Resemblance among several Objects, we apply the same Name to all of them, whatever Differences may appear among them. When we have acquired a Custom of this kind, the hearing of that Name revives the Idea of one of these Objects, with all its particular Circumstances. But as the same Word has been frequently {363} applied to other Individuals, different in many Respects from that Idea which is immediately present to the Mind; the Mind not being able to revive the Idea of all the Individuals, only revives that Custom which we have acquired by surveying them. They are not really and in fact present to the Mind, but only in Power; nor do we draw them all out distinctly in the Imagination, but keep ourselves in a Readiness to survey any of them, as we may be prompted by a present Design or Necessity.

The Word raises up an individual Idea, along with a certain Custom, and that Custom produces any other individual one for which we may have Occasion. But as the Production of all Ideas to which the Name may be applied, is in most Cases impossible, we abridge that Work by a more partial Consideration, and find but few Inconveniences to arise in Reasoning from that Abridgment. When he has said this, and a good deal more, for the Explication of this Point, he tells us, the only Difficulty that can remain relating thereto is, to account for that Custom which so readily recalls every particular Idea for which we may have Occasion. The Method he takes for giving us a satisfactory Notion of it is, 'by producing other Instances which are analogous to it, and other Principles which facilitate its Operation. ' His Observations for this Purpose are four, and it is evident he has a very good Opinion of them; for thus he says, Perhaps these four Reflections may help to remove all Difficulties to the Hypothesis I have proposed concerning abstract Ideas, so contrary to that which has hitherto prevailed in Philosophy. But, to tell the Truth, I place my chief Confidence in what I have proved concerning the Impossibility of general Ideas, according to the common Method of explaining them.

We must {364} certainly seek some new System upon this Head, and there plainly is none beside what I have proposed. Before he leaves this Subject, he deduces from the foregoing Principles an Explanation of that Distinction of Reason, (as he phrases it) which is so much talked of, and so little understood, in the Schools We have gone thorough the first Part of this Book. In the second Part we find our Author's Notions of the infinite Divisibility, and other Qualities, of our ideas of Space and Time; [6] with divers Objections that may be made thereunto, and his Answers. He introduces this Chapter with an indirect Compliment upon himself; after which he repeats, in his own Way, a great many odd Fancies relating to this Topicks, that have often made their Appearance in the Writings of other minute Philosophers.

Of these I shall give the Reader a Taste, by the Recital of two or three in their Order. Thus he says, It is certain that the Imagination [7] reaches a Minimum, and may raise up to itself an Idea, of which it cannot conceive any Sub-division, and which cannot be diminished without a total Annihilation. When you tell me of the thousandth and ten-thousandth Part of a Grain of Sand, I have a distinct Idea of these Numbers, {365} and of their different Proportions; but the Images which I form in my Mind to represent the Things themselves, are nothing different from each other, nor inferior to that Image by which I represent the Grain of Sand itself, which is supposed so vastly to exceed them. What consists of Parts is distinguishable into them, and what is distinguishable is separable. [8] But whatever we may imagine, the Idea of a Grain of Sand is not distinguishable, nor separable into 20, much less into 1000, 10000, or an infinite Number of different Ideas.

In a Paragraph or two after, our Author is certain again, That we can form Ideas which shall be no greater than the smallest Atom of the animal Spirits of an Insect a thousand times less than a Mite; and we ought rather to conclude, that the Difficulty lies in enlarging our Conceptions so much as to form a just Notion of a Mite. [9] For, in order to form a just Notion of these Animals, we must have a distinct Idea representing every Part of them; which, according to the System of infinite Divisibility, is utterly impossible; and, according to that of indivisible Parts or Atoms, is extremely {366} difficult, by reason of the vast Number and Multiplicity of these Parts. [10] When our Author has ran through the Arguments he had picked up against the infinite Divisibility of Space, he tells us, it is true Mathematicians are wont to say, that there are equally strong Arguments on the other Side of the Question; and then he adds, Before I examine these Arguments and Objections in Detail, I will here take them in a Body, and endeavour, by a short and decisive Reason, to prove at once that it is utterly impossible they can have any just Foundation. ' What an effectual Method has this Gentleman contrived of destroying his Antagonists! He first slays them all in a Body, and kills them one by one afterwards. I shall not say a Syllable of his particular Executions, but give the Reader a Sight only of that dreadful Instrument, whereby at a single Blow he takes away the Lives of all his Opposers.

It is an established Maxim (says he) in Metaphysicks, that whatever the Mind clearly conceives includes the Idea of possible Existence; or, in other Words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. We can form no Idea of a Mountain without a Valley, and therefore regard it as impossible. Now it is certain we have an idea of extension; for otherwise, shy do we talk or reason concerning it? It is likewise certain that this Idea, as conceived by the Imagination, though divisible into Parts, or inferior Ideas, is not infinitely divisible, nor consists of an infinite Number {367} of Parts: For that exceeds the Comprehension of our limited Capacities. Here then is an Idea of Extension, which consists of Parts, or inferior Ideas, that are perfectly indivisible; consequently this Idea implies no Contradiction; consequently it is impossible for Extension really to exist conformable to it; and consequently all the Arguments employed against the Possibility of mathematical Points are scholastic k Quibbles, and unworthy of our Attention.

These Consequences we may carry one Step farther, and conclude that all the pretended Demonstrations for the infinite Divisibility of Extension are equally sophistical, since it is certain these Demonstrations cannot be just, without proving the Impossibility of mathematical Points; which it is an evident Absurdity to pretend to. There is not, I am persuaded, any Reader hardy enough to withstand such Reasoning as this is. And I hope no one will be so ill-natur'd, as to refuse joining with the Author of it in a Compliment which he passes on himself, at the very Entrance of the third Section immediately following, wherein he considers the other Qualities of our Ideas of Time and Space. No Discovery (says he there) could have been made more happily for deciding all Controversies concerning Ideas, than that with which I at first set out, viz. That Impressions always take the Precedency of them, and that every Idea with which the imagination is furnished, first makes its Appearance in a correspondent Impression. By the Application of this fortunate Principle, he proceeds to penetrate still farther into the Nature of our Ideas of Space and Time.

What a vast Progress he has made in this Science, may be easily guess'd, by my here marking the very first Step he has therein taken: Upon {368} opening my Eyes, says he, and turning them to the surrounding Objects, I perceive many visible Bodies; and upon shutting them again, and considering the Distance betwixt these Bodies, I acquire the Idea of Extension. This is indeed a new Method of gaining it, entirely of our Author's Invention; but we shall see a little lower, that this reiterated Action of the Eye is not always necessary for that Purpose, but that the Idea of Extension may be had, at least without closing the Eye-lids. For thus he goes on, full as wisely as he begun. As every Idea is derived from some Impression, which is exactly similar to it, the Impression similar to this Idea of Extension, must either be some Sensations derived from the Sight, or some internal Impressions arising from these Sensations.

Our internal Impressions are our Passions; none of which, I believe, will ever be asserted to be the Model, from which the Idea of Space is derived. There remains therefore nothing but the Senses, which can convey to us this original Impression. Now what Impression do our Senses here convey to us? This is the principal Question, and decides without Appeal concerning the Nature of the Idea. And now follows his Answer, by the first Sentence of which we shall perceive, as I have said above, that this extraordinary Philosopher does not always need both to open and shut his Eyes, in order to acquire the simple Idea of Extension. The Table before me, says he, is alone sufficient by its View, to give me an Idea of Extension.

This Idea, then, is borrowed from, and represents some Impression, which this Moment appears to the Senses. But my Senses convey to me only the Impressions of coloured Points, disposed in a certain manner. If the Eye is sensible of any thing farther, I desire it may be pointed {369} out to me. But if it is impossible to shew any Thing further, we may conclude with Certainty, that the Idea of Extension is nothing but a Copy of these coloured points, and of the Manner of their Appearance.

So much for the Extension of Space. Not that our Author has here quitted it. He wades still farther therein, through several Pages, mixing Time alone with it, and viewing both in a Variety of Lights. Some of these are too dazzling for my weak Sight.

I must therefore shun them; only telling the Reader, whose Eyes are strong enough for such Views, where he is to look for them. And besides the Sequel of the third Section, from the former Part of which we have had the three last Citations, there is the fourth Section, wherein divers of them are to be found, under the Title of Answers to the Objections, whereby Metaphysicians, Mathematicians, &c. have conspired to destroy our Author's Doctrine of indivisible Atoms. When he begins to deal with the Geometricians, he says, at first Sight their Science seems favourable to his Thesis; and if it be contrary in its Demonstrations, 'tis perfectly conformable in its Definitions; his present Business then, as he adds, must be to defend the Definitions, and refute the Demonstrations. I will have nothing to do in the Quarrel; if they cannot maintain their Demonstrations against his Attacks, they may even perish. In the fifth Section, which is filled up likewise with Objections and Replies, he encounters the Naturalists, who hold the Reality of an absolute Vacuum. The Dispute upon this Head including divers subtle Speculations, interests the Metaphysicians also.

The preceding Section was ushered in with a very brief Recapitulation of his System concerning Space and Time, which consists, as he tells us, of {370} two Parts. The first depends on this Chain of Reasoning. The Capacity of the Mind is not infinite; consequently no Idea of Extension or Duration, includes an infinite Number of Parts or inferior Ideas, but of a finite Number, and these simple and indivisible. The second is a Consequence of the former, which implies, that the Parts into which the Ideas of Space and Time resolve themselves, become at last indivisible; and these indivisible Parts, being nothing in themselves, are inconceivable, when not filled with something real and existent. The Ideas of Space and Time are therefore no separate or distinct Ideas, but merely those of the Manner or Order, in which Objects exist; Or, in other Words, 'tis impossible to conceive either a Vacuum and Extension without Matter, or a Time, when there was no Succession or Change in any real Existence. The first half of this System he has incontestably proved in the foregoing Pages of this Work; and I have given my Readers a slight Taste of his Demonstrations; the second Part of it is the Basis of the fifth Section, wherein he delivers his Sentiments of a Vacuum; for therefrom, he says, it follows, 'that we can form no Idea of a Vacuum, or Space, where there is nothing visible or tangible.

' This gives Rise (and will it may) to three Objections; which he most intelligibly tells us, he shall examine together, because the Answer he shall give to one is a Consequence of that which he shall make use of for the others. One might from these Answers collect many Passages, which would give us a high Conceit of the Author's Sagacity. Let us pick out only two or three for a Sample. Thus, he has discover'd that a Man, who enjoys his Sight, receives no other Perception from turning his Eyes on every Side, when entirely deprived of Light, than what is {371} common to him with one born blind; and 'tis certain, he adds, such a one has no Idea either of Light or Darkness.

A Page or tow after, where he is shewing, that Motion does not presuppose a Vacuum, he says, admirably to that Purpose, suppose a Man to be supported in the Air, and to be softly conveyed along by some invisible Power; 'tis evident he is sensible of nothing, and never receives the Idea of Extension, nor indeed any Idea, from this invariable Motion. Even suppose, he moves his Limbs too and fro, this cannot convey to him that Idea. He feels in that Case a certain Sensation or Impression, the Parts of which are successive to each other, and may give him the Idea of Time, but certainly are not disposed in such a Manner, as is necessary to convey the Idea of Space or Extension. Again, his Argument leading him to inquire, whether the Sight can convey the Impression and Idea of a Vacuum?

To determine that it cannot, among other Considerations he puts a Case of two luminous Bodies appearing at some Distance from one another, upon a Field (if I may so express it) of absolute Darkness. Now as the Distance between these Objects is not any thing coloured or visible, it may be thought, he says, that there is here a Vacuum or pure Extension, not only intelligible to the Mind, but obvious to the very Senses. This, he owns, is our natural and most familiar Way of thinking; but he evinces it to be a wrong one: For since this Distance causes no Perception different from what a blind Man receives from his Eyes, or what is convey'd to us in the darkest Night, it must partake of the same Properties; and as Blindness and Darkness afford us no Ideas of Extension, it is impossible, that the dark and undistinguishable Distance {372} between two Bodies can ever produce that Idea. Again, His Subject leading him to observe, as a general Maxim in the Science of human Nature, that where-ever there is a close Relation betwixt two Ideas, the Mind is very apt in all its Discourses and Reasonings to use the one for the other; he undertakes to assign the Causes of this Phenomenon (as he calls it.) Accordingly he remarks, that as the Mind is endowed with a Power of exciting any Idea it pleases; whenever it dispatches the Spirits into that Region of the Brain, in which the Idea is placed, these Spirits always excite the Idea, when they run precisely into the proper Traces, and rummage that Cell which belongs to the Idea.

But as this Motion is seldom direct, and Naturally turns a little to the one Side or the other; for this Reason the animal Spirits, falling into contiguous Traces, present the related Ideas in lieu of that, which the Mind desired at first to survey. This Change we are not always sensible of; but continuing still the same Train of Thought, make use of the related Idea, which is presented to us, and employed in our Reasoning, as if it were the same with what we demanded. What could Cartes ius or Male branch have said more a propos upon this Head! How admirably does this account for the Mistakes and Sophisms so frequent and so fatal in Philosophy. I said at the Head of these Citations, that I should extract them from our Author's Reply to certain Objections, and I verily thought I had done so, when reading farther, I was a little staggered, at the Top of a Paragraph, with the Sentence, After this Chain of Reasoning and Explication of my Principles, I am now prepared to answer all the Objections that have been offered, whether {373} deriv'd from Motor Mechanicks. I was just resolving to look back, to see how I came to be so mistaken, when I made myself easy, by reflecting on the Genius of my Author, who often affects to startle or perplex his Readers: And indeed as I went forward, I found nothing to alter my Opinion of what was past, or to answer the Expectation that might naturally be raise'd by the above Declaration.

If what I have been mentioning in some Measure puzzled me, I was no less charmed at an Instance of our Author's superlative Modesty, which appears a Page or two after. For there, when he is returning as it were from the utter Overthrow of his Opposers, his Stile is so unlike that of a Conqueror, that it would rather induce one to think he had been defeated. Thus, says he, I seem to have answer'd the three Objections above-mentioned; tho' at the same time I am sensible, that few will be satisfied with these Answers, but will immediately propose new Objections and Difficulties. One of these he guesses at, and tells us, 'Twill probably be said, that his Reasoning makes nothing to the Matter in hand, and that he explains only the Manner in which Objects affect the Senses, without endeavouring to account for their real Nature and Operations. To this Objection, he very candidly says, he answers, by pleading guilty, and by confessing that his Intention never was to penetrate into the Nature of Bodies, or explain the secret Causes of their Operations. -- As to those who attempt to do so, he cannot approve of their Ambition, till he sees, in some one Instance at least, that they have met with Success.

He contents himself with knowing perfectly the Manner in which Objects affect his Senses, and their Connexions with each other, as far as Experience informs {374} him of them. This suffices for the Conduct of Life; and this suffices also for his Philosophy, which pretends only to explain the Nature an Causes of our Perceptions, or Impressions and Ideas. I cannot say what will suffice for his Philosophy, but I will venture to affirm his Philosophy will never suffice to acquaint us with either the Nature or Causes of our Perceptions; any farther than any Man's Consciousness will do, without it. In the next Paragraph he assumes the Air of a Sphinx, only not attended with the horrible Cruelty of that Monster. He advances a Paradox at least as obscure as the other's Enigma; notwithstanding he is pleased to assert it will easily be explain'd from the foregoing Reasoning. The ensuing is an exact transcript of it.

I shall (says he) conclude this Subject of Extension, with a Paradox. -- This Paradox is, that if you are pleased to give to invisible and intangible Distance, or in other Words, to the Capacity of becoming a visible and tangible Distance, the Name of a Vacuum, Extension and Matter are the same, and yet there is a Vacuum. If you will not give it that Name, Motion is possible in a Plenum, without any Impulse in infinitum without returning in a Circle, and without Penetration. ' This dark Saying brings us very near to the End of a fifth Section, which closes with proving Time to be nothing but the Manner in which some real Object exists.

The sixth (which is the last) Section of the second Part of this Work, treats of the Ideas of Existence, and of external Existence. As our Author handles these abstruse Points more fully hereafter, I shall take no notice of what he has said here, where he has only hinted his Sentiments concerning them. {375} I proceed now therefore to the third Part of this Treatise, where the Author has descanted very largely on two very curious Topicks, Knowledge and Probability. Were I to make a methodical Abstract of the several Sections into which his Discourse on these Heads is divided, it would carry me far beyond the Space I ought to allow this Article; I must therefore follow the Course I have hitherto gone in, contenting myself with only selecting here and there an extraordinary Passage, for the Readers Information and Entertainment. The first Section of this Part opens with an Enumeration of the different Kinds of philosophical Relation. They are seven, viz.

Resemblance, Identity, Relations of Time and Place, Proportion in Quantity or Number, Degrees in any Quality, Contrariety, and Causation. Our Author afterwards tells us, that only four of these can be the Objects of Knowledge and Certainty. These four are Resemblance, Contrariety, Degrees in Quality, and Proportions in Quantity or Number. The three first, he says, are discoverable at first Sight, and fall more properly under the Province of Intuition than Demonstration: Which last is chiefly concerned in fixing the Proportions of Quantity or Number. Here he takes Occasion of passing a Verdict on Geometry, very different from that of the more unthinking Bulk of Mankind, who are apt to entertain I know not what Prejudices in its Favour. It is, he tells us, the Art, by which we fix the Proportions of Figures; but which, tho' it much excels, both in Universality and Exactness, the loose Judgments of the Senses and Imagination, yet never attains a perfect Precision and Exactness.

Its first Principles are still drawn from the general Appearance of the Objects; and that Appearance can never afford us any Security, when we examine the prodigious Minuteness of {376} which Nature is susceptible. Our Ideas seem to give a perfect Assurance, that no two right Lines can have a common Segment; but if we consider these Ideas, we shall find, that they always suppose a sensible Inclination of the two Lines, and that where the Angle they form is extremely small, we have no Standard of a right Line so precise as to assure us of the Truth of this Proposition. ' The Geometricians, who would consult their own Edification, may, in the Original, whence I have extracted this Passage, meet with others on the same Head, which discover the Depth of this great Mathematician's Erudition. One thing pleases me vastly, which is the Impartiality where-with he checks the Boastings of some of his scientific Brethren. 'Tis usual, says he, with Mathematicians, to pretend that those Ideas, which are their Objects, are of so ref in'd and spiritual a Nature, that they fall not under the Conception of the Fancy, but must be comprehended by a pure and intellectual View, of which the superior Faculties of the Soul are alone capable. ' This, he affirms, is all an Artifice; and to destroy it we need only, as he says, reflect on that Principle (of his) so oft insisted on, that all our Ideas are copied from our Impressions.

I have afore hinted the mighty Value of this Discovery, the Honour of which is inti rely due to our Author, but it cannot be too often inculcated. I verily think, if it were closely pursued, it would lead us to several inestimable Desiderata, such as the perpetual Motion, the grand Elixir, a Dissolvent of the Stone, &c. Many Wonders have been done in the Republick of Letters by a single and very simple Principle; tho' I question if any may compare with the above-mentioned, except that of M. Leibnitz. Every one has heard, what an immense Field of Knowledge he opened by his Sufficient Reason, and how much {377} wiser the World is by it, at this Day. Such Benefactors to Mankind will always be the Admiration of Posterity. I proceed to say a Word or two of the second and third Sections.

In the former we have somewhat about Probability, and the Idea of Cause and Effect. In the latter we are told, Why a Cause is always necessary. All manner of Persons, that have any Antipathy to the Argument a Priori for the Existence of God, may repair to this latter Section, where they will have the Satisfaction of seeing it utterly demolished. This Writer has here destroy'd the Foundation of it, and so there's an End of the whole Fabric.

Dr. Clarke, and one John Lock, Esq; whom he particularly names, two of the most superficial Reasoners, were, as well as many others, so weak as to fancy, that whatever begins to exist, must have a Cause of Existence; nay, Hobbes himself, as much an Atheist as we believe him, was of this Opinion: Every one knows, how he, and the greater Men afore named, pretended to evince the Proposition; but our Author pronounces all they produced for that Purpose fallacious, sophistical, and frivolous; and he really thinks it unnecessary to employ many Words in shewing the Weakness of their Arguments. But, tho' our Author has quite erased the Argument a Priori for the Divine Existence, I would willingly hope, he has no Intention of weakening this fundamental Truth, that there is some one necessary, eternal, independent Being; nor does he directly assert a Thing may come into Being without a Cause; only he will have Experience to be the sole Road by which we can arrive at the Certainty of this Thesis, Whatever has began to exist, must have had a Cause of its Existence. And that Experience will lead us thereunto, is what, I fancy, our Author aims at proving, in some ensuing Sections. I would be {378} more positive upon this Point if I could; but having run over the Sections refer'd to (13 in Number) in order to know whether this were the real Scope of them, I acknowledge I cannot understand them enough to pronounce dogmatically: Nor is it to be wonder'd at, if I am at a Loss in this Matter, seeing any Man must be so, who is not bless'd with an extraordinary Penetration; according to our Author's own Acknowledgement of the relative Obscurity of this Part of his Argument. For about the Middle of the twelfth Section he very well says, I am sensible how abstruse all this Reasoning must appear to the generality of Readers, who not being accustomed to such profound Reflections on the intellectual Faculties of the Mind, will be apt to reject as chimerical whatever strikes not in with the common received Notions, and with the easiest and most obvious Principles of Philosophy. And no doubt there are some Pains required to enter into these Arguments; tho' perhaps very little are necessary to perceive the Imperfection of every vulgar Hypothesis on this Subject, and the little Light, which Philosophy can yet afford us in such sublime and such curious Speculations.

And again, in the XIV th Section, after some farther refined Speculations, he thinks it proper to give Warning, that he has just now examined one of the most sublime Questions in Philosophy, viz. that concerning the Power and Efficacy of Causes; where all the Sciences seem so much interested. And the Reason of this Warning partakes of the Excellency of its Subject: For he adds, Such a Warning will naturally route up the Attention of the Reader, and make him desire a more full Account of his Doctrine, as well as of the Arguments on which it is founded. A noble issue indeed, and most graciously encouraged, for thus he treats it: This Request, says {379} he, is so reasonable, that I cannot refuse complying with it; especially as I am hopeful, that the Principles I proceed on, the more they are examined, will acquire the more Force and Evidence. Undoubtedly. That I was right in my Conjecture, as to the real Purport of the afore-named Sections, appears with great Probability from the ensuing Passages, which occur toward the latter End of them; and which I do not vainly quote as Testimonies of my Sagacity in guessing, but to instruct the Reader in a Question of the highest Dignity in Metaphysicks; that is, in our Author's own Stile, Why a Cause is always necessary? or, in vulgar Phrase, Why the Mind conceives a Cause necessary to the Existence of every thing that has a Beginning? He says, The Idea of Necessity arises from some impression.

There is no Impression conveyed by our Senses which can give Rise to that Idea. It must therefore be derived from some internal Impression, or Impression of Reflection. There is no internal Impression which has any Relation to the present Business, but that Propensity which Custom produces to pass from an Object to the Idea of its usual Attendant. This therefore is the Essence of Necessity.

Upon the whole, Necessity is something that exists in the Mind, not in Objects; nor is it possible for us ever to form the most distant Idea of it, considered as a Quality of Bodies. Either we have no Idea of Necessity, or Necessity is nothing but that Determination of the Thought to pass from Causes to Effects, and from Effects to Causes, according to their experienced Union. Thus as the Necessity which makes two times two equal to four, or three Angles of a Triangle equal to two right ones, lies only in the Act of the Understanding, by which we consider and {380} compare these Ideas; in like manner the Necessity of Power, which unites Causes and Effects, lies in the Determination of the Mind to pass from the one to the other. The Efficacy or Energy of Causes is neither placed in the Causes themselves, nor in the Deity, nor in the Concurrence of these two Principles; but belongs entirely to the Soul, which considers the Union of two or more Objects in all past Instances. It is here that the real Power of Causes is placed along with their Connexion and Necessity. A most wonderful Doctrine, I protest, and such our Author acknowledges it to be; for he immediately subjoins, I am sensible, that of all the Paradoxes which I have had, or shall have Occasion to advance in the Course of this Treatise, the present one is the most violent, and that it is merely by Dint of solid Proof and Reasoning I can ever hope it will have admission, and overcome the inveterate Prejudices of Mankind.

-- There is commonly an Astonishment attending every thing extraordinary; and this Astonishment changes immediately into the highest Degree of Esteem or Contempt, according as we approve or disapprove of the Subject. I am much afraid that though the foregoing Reason appears to me the shortest and most decisive imaginable; yet with the generality of Readers the Bias of the Mind will prevail, and give them a Prejudice against the present Doctrine. -- The contrary Notion is so riveted in the Mind from the Principles above-mentioned, that I doubt not but my Sentiments will be treated by many as extravagant and ridiculous. Likely enough, truly; for any one who reads these Passages must be convinced, that some Men are very strange and uncouth Animals. Our admirable Author must expect to be nibbled at, as all great Genius's have been, by {381} a Parcel of stupid Impertinent's, for whom he has generously framed a compleat Set of Objections: What! the Efficacy of Causes lie in the Determination of the Mind! As if Causes did not operate entirely independent of the Mind, and would not continue their Operation, even though there was no Mind existent to contemplate them, or reason concerning them.

Thought may well depend on Causes for its Operation, but not Causes on Thought. This is to reverse the Order of Nature. To every Operation there is a Power proportioned; and this Power must be placed on the Body that operates. If we remove the Power from one Cause, we must ascribe it to another: But to remove it from all Causes, and bestow it on a Being that is no ways related to the Cause or Effect by perceiving them, is contrary to the most certain Principles of human Reason. Let these Simpletons talk thus if they please, our Author despises their Attacks as he ought: He only replies to all these Arguments (as he vouchsafes to call them) That the Case is here much the same, as if a blind Man should pretend to find a great many Absurdities in the Supposition, that the Colour of Scarlet is not the same with the Sound of a Trumpet, nor Light the same with Solidity. A Page or two after this notable Sentence, he begins to think it is Time to collect all the different Parts of his Reasoning, (in which he acknowledges he has, though on justifiable Motives, advanced in a seemingly preposterous Manner) and by joining them together, form an exact Distinction of the Relation of Cause and Effect, which makes the Subject of the present Inquiry.

There may, he tells us, two Definitions be given of this Relation, which are different, only by their presenting a different View of the same Object, and making us consider {382} it either as a philosophical or as a natural Relation. We may define a CAUSE to be An Object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the Objects resembling the former are placed in like Relations of Precedency and Contiguity to those Objects that resemble the latter. This Definition lies far out of the Reach of my Capacity, and I am indeed in some Doubt whether it be intelligible to any but Men of our Author's Ability. His second Definition is a little more comprehensible, and is designed for the Satisfaction of such as may esteem the former defective, because drawn from Objects, as he says, foreign to the C? [11] It is this, A CAUSE is an Object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the Mind to form the Idea of the other, and the Impression of the one to form a more lively Idea of the other. Should this Definition be rejected for the same Reason as the foregoing, he knows no other Remedy, than that the Persons who express this Delicacy, should substitute a juster Definition in its Place.

But for his Part, he honestly owns his Incapacity for such an Undertaking. For when he examines with the utmost Accuracy those Objects, which are commonly denominated Causes and Effects, he finds, in considering a single Instance, that the one Object is precedent and contiguous to the other; and in enlarging his View to consider several Instances, he finds only, that like Objects are constantly placed in like Relations of Succession and Contiguity. Again, when he considers the Influence of this constant Conjunction, he perceives, that such a Relation can never be an Object of Reasoning, and can never operate upon the Mind but by means of Custom, which determines the Imagination to make a Transition from the Idea of one Object to that {383} of its usual Attendant, and from the Impression of one to a more lively Idea of the other. However extraordinary these Sentiments may appear, [I use this incomparable Arguer's own Words] he thinks it fruitless to trouble himself with any further Inquiry or Reasoning upon the Subject, but shall repose himself on them as on established Maxims. Amen.

But though he has thus taken Leave of his Subject, with respect to Inquiring and Reasoning, he does not part with it for-good-and all, till he has drawn some Corollaries from it; by which he very kindly undertakes to remove several Prejudices and popular Errors that have very much prevailed in Philosophy. They that will see these Curiosities must go to the Original; for I cannot in this Abstract insert Examples of every thing therein remarkable. I proceed to the fifteenth Section of the first Book, where eight Rules are laid down, by which to judge of Causes and Effects. The Reader may look at them if he pleases, when he goes to view the above-mentioned Corollaries. All I shall take notice of here, is a Passage ushering them in, and another that follows them: And really they are both admirable in their several Ways. In the first, our Author says, that according to the Doctrine he has been establishing, any thing may produce any thing.

Creation, Annihilation, Motion, Reason, Volition; all these may arise from one another, or from any other Object we can imagine. A most charming System indeed! one can hardly conceive the Uses it may be put to, and the different Purposes it will serve: It is to be hoped, the inimitable Inventor will one Day give us a large and ample Account of them. I cannot help violating a rash Engagement. I said I would take no notice of the Rules above {384} spoken of. But, casting my Eye on the last of them, it was impossible not to admire the beautiful Example therein exhibited of the Justness of our Author's Principles. This Rule is, That an Object which exists for any Time in its full Perfection without any Effect, is not the sole Cause of that Effect, but requires to be assisted by some other Principle which may forward its Influence and Operation.

Now here the Reader, as I say, may see an Exemplification of our Author's Doctrine, 'That any thing may produce any thing. ' Among which any Things he reckons Annihilation and Creation; or, in other Terms, he asserts, something may arise from, or be produced by, nothing. And so it is in the above Rule, where we find without any Effect, i.e. nothing, turned, in the Twinkling of an Eye, into that Effect, which is something. When he has led us thorough this fine Train of Argument concerning Cause and Effect, he tells us, Here is all the Logic he thinks proper to employ in his Reasoning; and perhaps even this was not very necessary, but might have been supplied by the natural Principles of our Understanding. Our scholastic k Head-pieces and Logicians shew no such Superiority above the mere Vulgar in their Reason and Ability, as to give us any Inclination to imitate them in delivering a long System of Rules and Precepts to direct our Judgment in Philosophy. In the sixteenth Section, which finishes the third Part of the first Book, we meet with certain Reflections on the Reasons of Animals.

These are calculated for confirming the foregoing Doctrine about Cause and Effect, how remote soever they may seem from such a Purpose; and yet so effectually they answer it, as almost intuitively, he tells us, to evince the Truth of his System. {385} We come now to the fourth Part of this Volume, of which we shall not offer to make any exact Analysis, only select a few curious Passages, such as we think most conducive to the Reader's Pleasure and Edification. In this Part our Author treats of the sceptical and other Systems of Philosophy; and he sets out like himself, advancing and descanting upon Propositions that never enter into the Heads of ordinary Writers. Thus in the very first Paragraph he shews there is no such Thing as Science, strictly speaking, but that all Knowledge degenerates into Probability; and this Probability is greater or less, according to our Experience of the Veracity or Deceitfulness of our Understanding, and according to the Simplicity or Intricacy of the Question. And his second paragraph assures us, there is no Algebraist nor Mathematician that places entire Confidence in any Truth immediately upon his Discovery of it, or regards it as any thing but a mere Probability. Every Time he runs over he Proofs, his Confidence increases; but still more by the Approbation of his Friends; and is raised to its utmost Perfection by the universal Assent and Applauses of the learned World.

After this he proceeds thorough five Pages in the Language of a Sceptic; and then he informs us of the Design he had in view by so doing, which was to render us sensible of the Truth of his Hypothesis, viz. That all our Reasonings concerning Causes and Effects are derived from nothing but Custom; and that Belief is more properly and Act of the sensitive, than part of the cogitative Part of our Natures. That Sequel of this Section is employed in guarding what he has advanced upon this Head, from some Objections to which it might unwarily be thought liable. In the second Section he considers Scepticism with regard to the Senses.

And here he inquires {386} into the Causes which induce us to believe in the Existence of Body: And his Reasonings on this Point he begins with a Distinction which will contribute, he assures us, very much to the perfect understanding of what follows. We ought, as he says, to examine apart those two Questions, which are commonly confounded together, viz. Why we attribute a CONTINUED Existence to Objects, even when they are not present to the Senses? and why we suppose them to have an Existence DISTINCT from the Mind and Perception. Upon a very careful Scrutiny, he rejects what has commonly been offered for the Solution of these Queries, and proposes one of his own; which, as he apprehends, very clearly and satisfactorily accounts for what is contained in them. Glad would I be, could I present my Readers with the Sentiments of so profound and accurate a Genius as we are now dealing with, upon one of the most abstruse and perplexing Topicks in all Metaphysicks; but alas! they are of too wide an Extent for the Compass of this Article: However, we will endeavour to introduce some Specimens thereof, whereby we shall at least see how happy a Talent he has for surmounting those Difficulties, which have proved the ne plus ultra of many others. After a little Examination we shall, he says, find, that all those Objects to which we attribute a continued Existence, have a peculiar Constancy which distinguishes them from the Impressions, whose Existence depends upon our Perception.

Those Mountains, and Houses, and Trees, which lie at present under my Eye, have always appeared to me in the same Order; it is so also with my Bed and Table, my Books and Papers; and when I lose Sight of them by shutting my Eyes, or moving my Head, I soon after find {387} them recur upon me without the least Alteration. This is the Case with all the Impressions, whose Objects are supposed to have an external Existence; and is the Case with no other Impression, whether gentle or violent, voluntary or involuntary. This Constancy, however, is not so perfect as not to admit of very considerable Exception. Bodies often change their Position and Qualities, and after a little Absence or Interruption may become hardly knowable. But in these Changes they preserve a Coherence, and have a regular Dependence on each other, which produces, very reasonably, the Opinion of their continued Existence.

-- This Coherence therefore in their Changes, is one of the Characteristics of external Objects, as well as their Constancy. When our Author has shewn that the Opinion of the continued Existence of Body depends on the COHERENCE and CONSTANCY of certain Impressions, he proceeds to examine after what Manner these Qualities give rise to so extraordinary a Judgment. He begins with the Coherence, which he considers very minutely, in order to discover its whole Efficacy this way; the Consequence of which is, that he is afraid, whatever Force we may ascribe to this Principle, 'tis too weak to support alone so vast an Edifice, as is that of the continued Existence of all external Bodies; and that we must join the Constancy of their Appearance to the Coherence, to give a satisfactory Account of that Opinion. How pertinent is this Conclusion, when our Author has afore expressly grounded the Opinion here spoken of, on the Constancy of Appearance, and brought in the Coherence only as a Sort of Succedaneum! Besides that, his Business here, as may be supposed from the fourth Line of this Paragraph, is not to say what the Effect of these Properties {388} is, but to instruct us in the Modus of their Operation. However, we must follow him in his own Way.

Accordingly, Having taken a strict Survey of the Power of Coherence, and seen what it will, and what it will not do in the Case before us, he takes Constancy to task in much the same manner. But, as the Explication of this, he says, will lead him into a considerable Compass of very profound Reasoning, he thinks it proper, to avoid Confusion, to give a short Sketch or Abridgment of his System, and afterwards draw out all its Parts in their full Compass. As for his System in Miniature, there are four Things, he tells us, requisite to justify it. I shall take notice only of the first, which is, to explain the Principium individuation is, or Principle of Identity.

Concerning this most curious Point, he observes, That the View of any one Object is not sufficient to convey the Idea of Identity. For in that Proposition, an Object is the same with itself, if the Idea express'd by the Word, Object, were no ways distinguished from that meant by itself; we really should mean nothing, nor would the Proposition contain a Predicate and a Subject, which however are implied in this Affirmation. One single Object conveys the Idea of Unity, not that of Identity. On the other hand, a Multiplicity of Objects can never convey this Idea, however resembling they may be supposed.

The Mind always pronounces the one not to be the other. -- Since then both Number and Unity are incompatible with the Relation of Identity, it must lie in something that is neither of them. But to tell the Truth, at first Sight this seems utterly impossible. Betwixt Unity and Number there can be no Medium; no more than between Existence and Non-existence. -- {389} Very true. But now let us see how dexterously our most ingenious Author gets rid of this seemingly inextricable Difficulty.

For this Purpose he needs only have recourse to the Idea of Time or Duration. He has already remark'd, [12] That Time, in a strict Sense, implies Succession, and that when we apply its Idea to any unchangeable Object, 'tis only by a Fiction of the Imagination, by which the unchangeable Object is supposed to participate of the Changes of the coexistent Objects, and in particular of that of our Perceptions. This Fiction of the Imagination almost universally takes place; and 'tis by means of it, that a single Object, placed before us, and survey'd for any Time without our discovering in it any Interruption or Variation, is able to give us a Notion of Identity. For when we consider any two Points of this Time, we may place them in different Lights: We may either survey them at the very same instant; in which Case they give us the Idea of Number, both by themselves and by the Object; which must be multiplied, in order to be conceived at once, as existent in these two different Points of Time: Or on the other hand, we may trace a Succession of Time by a like Succession of Ideas, and conceiving first one Moment, along with the Object then existent, imagine afterwards a Change in the Time without any Variation or Interruption in the Object; in which Case it gives us the Idea of Unity. Here then, our Author says, is an Idea, which is a Medium betwixt Unity and Number; or more properly speaking, is either of them, according to the View in which we take it: And this Idea we {390} call that of Identity. Thus, as he adds a little after, the Principle of Individuation is nothing but the Invariableness and Uninterrupted ness of any Object, through a supposed Variation of Time, by which the Mind can trace it in the different Periods of its Existence, without any Break of the View, and without being obliged to form the Idea of Multiplicity or Number.

Those Readers, who know all the Mr. Lock and his Corrector Dr. Butler have wrote upon this puzzling Subject, without being fully satisfied therewith, will certainly be pleas'd to find all their Difficulties vanish upon the Perusal of these few Paragraphs relating to it. Where our Author's little System ends, and his great and extensive one begins, I have not been able, notwithstanding I have search'd very diligently, to perceive; I am apt to think they insensibly run into, and incorporate with one another. Perhaps the larger System is no other but the Explication of those four Things which he proposed to consider, as requisite for the Justification of the lesser. I must leave that Point undetermined.

{391} [To be continued.] A Continuation of the Twenty-sixth Article. THERE are many curious Particulars in the Section I am now upon, besides those I have mentioned; but without stretching my Account of this Work into a Volume, there is no insisting upon them as they deserve; I shall therefore drop them all, excepting one little Passage, which merits a peculiar Attention, and that is his Definition of the human Mind: What we call a Mind, says our Author, is nothing but a Heap or Collection of different Perceptions united together by certain Relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect Simplicity and Identity. In the third Section we meet with some very profound Reflections on the ancient Philosophy. Our Author is persuaded there might be several useful Discoveries made from a Criticism of the {392} Fictions of it, concerning Substances and substantial Forms, Accidents and occult Qualities; which, however unreasonable and capricious, have, he says, a very intimate Connexion with the Principles of human Nature. In the Sequel of this Section he has obliged us with an inductive Proof of this Position. That which follows contains a Set of Observations on the modern Philosophy.

This, he tells us, pretends to subsist on a Basis very different from that of the forego in.