Impression And The Idea example essay topic

Hume asked, 'what reason do we have in thinking the future will resemble the past?' It is reasonable to think that it will because there is no contradiction in supposing the future won't resemble the past. But it is also true that is possible for the world to change dramatically and our previous experience would be completely useless in judging future experience. We want to say that past experiences have been a good predictor. We are compelled to do so and it is almost as if we can't help ourselves. But we are merely stating that in the past, it has been a good predictor. Hume says we are begging the question.

We are still in the past if we say that past pasts were reliable predictors of past futures. So we see that the past really only tells us about the past. Our real problem is does anything about the past tell us anything about the future? Hume believes that in nature, it does.

He says that nature itself is uniform and constant in causing a particular effect and "no instance has ever yet been found of any failure or irregularity in the operation". But when it does fail, it is some secret cause in the particular parts. Since we are accustomed to transferring the past into the future, we feel compelled to make these secrets understandable in order to reconcile nature and mind. Hume told us we have no reason to expect the past to resemble he future because of these secret causes. We are preprogrammed psychologically to use induction to function in the world. But we are really not much different than a blind man who has learned to successfully work his way around his home.

It is not likely for us to stop using induction because it works in general. But we really have no real rational reason for relying on induction, even though it is psychologically natural. The blind man set out in the world is no longer able to function. He has no a priori connection in mind from two objects.

Hume asks us then to think about instead of looking at just any pair of objects (cause and effect) that we look at pairs in which one member is a mental event such as willing our feet to move in order to get 'over there'. We are simply considering outward events and expecting them to yield the same results as we have for induction to explain a "secret cause". It appears as though Hume believes that the inward actions contain these variables that we have yet to understand. As we are unable to define the anomaly that foots A to B, we are simply to view it as a secret cause. It is even less clear when both objects are inward like will and thought. What is the thing that glues the two together and are the two things even that well defined.

When A and B are one or both ambiguous, how clear can we make the connection? When we think about our inability to move all organs such as the heart with like ability as we did when we willed our foot to move, we simply must concede that there is no one action that causes both. We have again some secret unknown cause. We are faced with yet another opportunity for doubt when Hume's inductive skepticism is daunting for empiricism.

We explain things using causation, so what is causation? There is an idea that causation is a hidden connection between things. It is unobservable, yet essential in the operation of things. Hume justifies his account of necessary connection and causation by accounting for irregularities as secret unknown causes. His talk merely mirrors induction to justify itself. Hume, being a defender of empiricism has an account for the mind as well.

Hume looks at two competing ideas about interpretations of the force and vivacity of impressions of outward senses; the impression and the idea (a copy of the impression). He starts by telling us that our perceptions, not ideas are the basic units of our mental geography. For Hume, this means that there is no part of the mind that is not perception. A sensory perception is an impression (what we see, touch, feel) and a thought perception (thinking, imagining, expecting) is an idea. Hume believes our thoughts or ideas are weaker versions of our more lively impressions. Since a copy implies that the impression is the original, the original would be the more basic one.

Hume seems to imply that every impression would have a corresponding idea and every idea a corresponding impression. But this is troubling like induction because it is impossible to find a connection from every A to B and every B to A. We can see red and later be able to think about red, but how does one think of a vast ocean without having seen it? We in fact have an idea of many things we have not yet seen. Hume reconciles this by saying that, like our inexplicable will to move our foot and the foot moving, there is not simply one A to B. There is a multiplicity of events that cause the movement (muscles, tendons, nerves, etc.) and likewise with the idea that causes the impression. There simply are more complex ideas that are composed of simpler ideas, each of which are derived from corresponding impressions.

Hume asks us to then take this formula and try to contradict it. We cannot successfully come up with an idea that is not derived from either a corresponding impression or an idea that is not composed of simpler ideas which themselves are derived from corresponding impressions. Hume will himself take on this challenge. In his scenario of the "missing shade of blue" Hume believes that one could in fact have an impression of a particular shade he has never seen by seeing other shades and having understanding of the color spectrum and gain an idea of the missing shade without the corresponding idea. Hume states that the person's imagination is enough to provide the idea of the missing shade. He almost seems to have challenged the truth of his principle, yet this in and of itself is not an accurate counter example.

It is defensible that the idea of the color spectrum is enough to generate mathematical ideas and other such collective ideas that do in fact correspond to an impression that yields the shade. It is almost as if Hume's principle leaves open for infinite regression making it virtually impossible to not find a derivative for the idea.