Inherent Weaknesses Of The League Of Nations example essay topic

1,083 words
What were the inherent weaknesses of the League of Nations? How critical were these weaknesses in the ultimate failure of the League in the 1930's? Whilst the internationalist ideals behind the League of Nations were strong, several practical inherent weaknesses would ultimately lead to its downfall. The greatest weakness inherent within the League was the fact that three of the world's major powers, the USA, Russia and Germany, were not part of the League in its creation. Consequently, economic sanctions that the League imposed upon infringing, aggressive powers would prove ineffective. This is evident in both the Manchuria crisis and the Ethiopian crisis.

Contributing factors into its ultimate failure included the fact that the League had no armed forces, and consequently aggressive national states were able to ignore the League, Additionally Britain and France, the two leading nations within the League, both had vested interests in regards to the League. The absence of the United States was one of the greatest weaknesses inherent within the League of Nations. The USA never joined the League of Nations, as a result of a domestic political issue, (in which President Wilson failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles through the Senate) and consequently the League lost the wide acceptance and credibility that it would have had with American membership. As Germany and Russia were also excluded from the League, and were not admitted into the league until 1926 and 1934 respectively, this contributed to the lack of power and influence the League would ultimately possess. Most importantly the absence of these nations greatly reduced the effectiveness of economic sanctions that were to be placed upon aggressive powers that were to disrupt the 'collective security' of the world. The reason being that such nations would still be free to trade with the major powers of the world, effectively nullifying the economic sanctions the League tried to establish.

The ineffectiveness of these sanctions is indeed evident in the Manchurian crisis. In September 1931, the Japanese army invaded the Chinese province of Manchuria and set up a puppet state called Manchukuo, under Japanese control. As the league had no armed force of its own, it could do little to stop one of its own members from an act of aggression, apart from moral pressure and the threat of economic sanctions. As Overy states in regards to these sanctions: .".. they were difficult to impose not only because they excluded the United States, but because major League powers were worried bout the effect they would have on Asian trade and Far East security in general".

The latter fragment of this sentence indicates that England and France both had vested trade interests in these areas that they were not willing to sacrifice on the basis of the ideals of the League. These vested interests were further highlighted in 1935, when under Mussolini, Italian troops invaded Ethiopia. Whilst the League condemned this invasion and rallied to Ethiopia's support, they had minimal effect in controlling Italy's aggressive actions. The League took eight months to discuss the matter, and then concluded that Italy could have control of some parts of Ethiopia (as Italy had roots in Ethiopia), however Mussolini rejected this offer.

The vested interests of the major powers within the league, Britain and France, became evident when they refused to refrain from trading oil with Italy as it would have a detrimental effect on their own economies. Additionally they refused to shut the Suez Canal, the route Italy used to transport goods to Ethiopia, because they were afraid of war with Italy, and they wanted to remain on favourable terms with Mussolini, as Italy was seen as an important ally as Hitler's Germany grew stronger. Prior to the invasion, Mussolini had secretly made an agreement with French Prime Minister Pierre Laval, whereby Laval agreed not to intervene. By securing this agreement, Mussolini also hoped that France could restrain Britain if they were averse to Italy's invasion.

Failing that, Mussolini had another card up his sleep, with the Italian armies in Libya posing a threat towards English interest within Egypt. The book Evidence of War states that. ".. the league was based on the ideals of internationalism at a time of powerful nationalist sentiments and the dominance of national sovereignty". The evidence above does indeed confirm this statement, as the practicalities of the situation along with the vested interests of Britain and France overcame the ideals of internationalism in the name of national sovereignty. Economic sanctions were to prove ineffective when applied to Italy as the United States and Germany could not be prevented from trading with Italy. Britain and France did not want German trade with Italy, as this would promote the possibility of the two countries becoming allies.

As Overy puts it, "The self-interest of the major powers prevailed over the collective anxieties of the smaller nations of the League. This statement is true because the major powers were not a part of the League, and this was a crucial weakness inherent within the League that was to lead to its ultimate failure in the 1930's. Idealistically, the greatest strength of the League of Nations was that it was based upon the ideals of internationalism, set forward by American President Wilson. Ironically, this was also its greatest weakness, and was to prove crucial in the ultimate failure of the League, as these ideals were up against the dominance of nationalist sentiment and sovereignty that was to prove too strong. The absence of the USA, Russia and Germany from the League was to prove a great weakness, as resultant economic sanctions imposed upon infringing, aggressive powers would prove ineffective, as outlined in both the Manchuria and Ethiopian crises. The fact that the two major powers of the League, Britain and France, had vested interests in regards to the league was to prove a major weakness inherent within the League, and as discussed in regards to the Ethiopian crises, proved crucial in the ultimate failure of the League.

Finally, the League of Nations did not have a collective military force to impose its rulings, and relied on collective security, goodwill of nations and economic sanctions to succeed, all of which have been proven to be ineffective measures against the overpowering nationalistic ideals of the time. Word Count: 1042.

Bibliography

1. Failure of the League of Nations, Overy. 2. Evidence of War: The Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations 3. Diplomacy: The New Face of Diplomacy, H. Kis anger 4. web.