J Montgomery Mrs Pitman example essay topic
Facts: Our client, Jenna Pitman, is seeking to file suit against J. Montgomery for a claim of racial discrimination under Title VII. The allegation stems from a denial of Mrs. Pitman's application for a promotion by J. Montgomery. The Application was submitted in response to a job announcement the company released on February 19, 2000 which read: "J. Montgomery seeks an energetic self-starter to fill the role of Senior Control Buyer in the Marketing Division located within our West Mifflin headquarters. The person hired should possess the requisite education and experience necessary to develop, articulate and carry out sound marketing initiatives on behalf of the company. This individual will have at least one year of experience as a control buyer, and two years's pecialized experience in retail catalog sales". J. Montgomery has employed Mrs. Pitman for seven years. Mrs. Pitman started out as a buyer trainee for the company, eventually moving her way up to associate buyer and finally to her current position of control buyer.
Since joining J. Montgomery, Mrs. Pitman has carried out many functions. Not only has she helped to train new buyers, but she has also been called upon to represent J. Montgomery at various national marketing conferences. In 1998, Mrs. Pitman received a special achievement award for her contribution to the positive profile of the company nationally. With these qualifications behind her Mrs. Pitman decided to apply for the position of senior control buyer within the Marketing Division. Consequently, Mrs. Pitman notified Mr. Brooks, the person in charge of hiring, she would apply and was permitted to fill out an application. Mr. Brooks was not encouraging, even after Mr. Lythcott, her boss, informed him of the good job Mrs. Pitman was doing.
Mrs. Pitman was rejected for the position in less than a week after applying. Prior to applying Mrs. Pitman discussed her desire to be promoted with Mr. Lythcott, he responded by telling her she more than qualified for the position, except one thing. He did not say what that "one thing" was, but Mrs. Pitman took it to mean the color of her skin. The person in charge of hiring for the position was Dave Brooks, Divisional Vice-President of the Marketing Division. Who when contacted by our firm stated that J. Montgomery "made one mistake too many with affirmative action", and he was "fed up" about it. When confronted by our client, Mrs. Pitman, Mr. Brooks stated that the individual hired was a better candidate based on her "broader-base" of experience.
He also stated "J. Montgomery can't be expected to survive just catering to a market that only wears denim, baggy jeans and oversized gold jewelry". The individual who was hired is Ms. Gloria DeLeon. She is a Cuban-American who has worked for the company for six months. Ms. DeLeon has a two-year associate's degree from Allegheny Community College. Ms. DeLeon worked as a purchasing agent for the federal government before joining J. Montgomery. Her experience there was in buying office furniture.
She has no experience in buying apparel or computers, nor does she have any experience as a buyer in the retail private sector. Equally important is the company profile of J. Montgomery. There are about fifty people in top management and white employees hold all these positions. In the headquarters, there are 450 senior control buyers and two of them are African American.
The company has 18,000 employees and 1,000 are minorities. Less than half of these minorities are African American. Many minorities that do hold supervisory positions are usually assigned minority employees to oversee. Most of the African Americans that work for J. Montgomery fill positions of lower level administrative support or warehouse jobs. J. Montgomery was recently sued for Age discrimination. In addition, Mrs. Pitman's claim of discrimination was denied by the EEOC. Despite this denial, the EEOC issued a standard right-to-sue letter.
The decision by the EEOC was on July 25,200, giving us 90 days from that date to proceed with a suit. These facts will be used in our evaluation of whether or not Mrs. Pitman has a discrimination case under Title VII. Discussion: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. SS 2000 e-2 (a) (1994). Jenna Pitman has a valid prima facie case of employment discrimination. The Supreme Court held that in order to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, one satisfy the McDonnell Douglass test.
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs vs. Joyce Ann Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). The McDonnell Douglass test requires that the plaintiff must show: (1) that he belongs to a protected class; (2) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that, despite being qualified, he was rejected; and (4) that, after the plaintiff's rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of comparable qualifications. Id at 254. Furthermore, Mrs. Pitman's case meets all four elements.
One element that Mrs. Pitman easily meets is that of belonging to a protected class. The court has established that for one to be considered a member of a protected class one must belong to a class protected by Title VII. Diaz vs. AT&T, 752 F. 2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985). Title VII defines protected class as those individuals belonging to a particular race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Mrs. Pitman's status as an African American qualifies her as a member of a protected class.
Although she is a female, discrimination based on her sex is not being debated. Another element easily satisfied is that plaintiff is qualified for the employment. The court has ruled that the plaintiff must show that he was qualified for the job. Bennett vs. VAMC 721 F. Supp. 723 (E.D. Penn, 1998). In the Burdine case the court ruled that the plaintiff need not prove he was more qualified than the person who the position was given to but that he was equally qualified.
The job announcement stated that the company was looking for an individual with the requisite education and experience necessary to develop, articulate and carry out sound marketing initiatives on behalf of the company. The announcement also stated that the individual will have at least one year of experience as a control buyer, and two years specialized experience in retail catalog sales. Mrs. Pitman has a double major with a degree in marketing and management from Bryn Mawr College, an elite liberal arts college. J. Montgomery recruited Mrs. Pitman in her senior year. Since joining J. Montgomery Mrs. Pitman has moved from buyer trainee to associate buyer to control buyer. She has also trained new buyers who have all been promoted to associate buyer. Mrs. Pitman frequently represents J. Montgomery at various national marketing conferences, where she has spoken on the company's marketing philosophy.
Mrs. Pitman more than meets the requirements for the first element. Mrs. Pitman's case equally satisfies another element, which requires that despite qualifications the applicant was rejected. In Diaz, Bennett, and Burdine, the applicants were qualified and rejected. In both Bennett and Diaz the court ruled that despite being qualified the plaintiff was not selected.
This element was satisfied when Mrs. Pitman's application was rejected in less than a week. The last element that Mrs. Pitman's case meets requires that the position remained open or was filled by someone else. Someone else in this instance means someone who is a member of another race was given the job. Gunby, Jr. vs. Pennsylvania Electric Company, 840 F. 2d 1115 (3rd Cir. 1988). It is also stated in Diaz that this element "is met whenever the employer continues to consider other applicants whose qualifications are comparable to the plaintiffs after refusing to consider or rejecting the plaintiff".
Diaz at 1359. This is satisfied because Ms. DeLeon although a member of a protected class is not African American. Furthermore, the court has found that even if the person filling the position is from a or the same protected class as the plaintiff it does not stop the plaintiff from establishing a prima facie case. 1985). The court in Diaz stated that the requirement that the person selected to fill the challenged position not be a member of the plaintiffs protected class "adds a gloss that is absent from McDonnell Douglass". Id at The Court went on to state that replacing the plaintiff with another of the same protected class may sometimes be used as a pre textual device and does not preclude finding an inference of discrimination sufficient to satisfy the fourth element of McDonnell Douglas.
Moreover, alternative ways of proving discrimination have been established. One of these alternatives is statistical evidence and this rule arises out of the Diaz case, in which a plaintiff might be able to establish a prima facie case without satisfying the McDonnell Douglass test by presenting statistical evidence of discrimination. The Court held that statistical evidence is unquestionably relevant in a Title VII disparate treatment case. The Court went on to say "statistical information is relevant because it can be used to establish a general discriminatory pattern in an employer's hiring or promotion practices. Such a discriminatory pattern is probative of motive and can therefore create an inference of discriminatory intent with respect to the individual employment decision at issue".
In addition, in Lowe vs. City of Monrovia, 775 F. 2d 998, (9th Cir. 1985), the court supported the idea of statistical evidence and stated that "when evidence is presented to a fact-finder at trial, the McDonnell-Burdine presumption drops from the case, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity". Id at 1006. Another alternative arising out of Lowe is other evidence of discriminatory attitudes.
The Court in Lowe stated that all that is needed to establish a prima facie case is evidence that suggests that the employment decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the Civil Rights Act. Furthermore, this was explained when the court stated "a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of desperate treatment by satisfying the McDonnell Douglass four-part test, or by presenting actual evidence, direct or circumstantial, of the employer's discriminatory motive". Id at 1009. This discriminatory attitude can be found in the conduct of Dave Brooks, Vice-president of the Marketing Division. As you stated when you called Mr. Brooks he said "J. Montgomery had made one mistake too many with affirmative action" and he is "fed up". Noted that Mr. Brooks was in charge of hiring for this position and his comments lead me to believe that bias was at work when he reviewed Mrs. Pitman's application.
Mr. Brooks also stated that Mrs. Pitman's experience was tailored to catering those who wear denim, baggy jeans and oversized gold jewelry. This is a derogatory statement. When confronted by Mrs. Pitman, Mr. Brooks said that Ms. DeLeon had a "broader-base" of experience. Ms. Deleon's background contradicts this statement. Her only experience is in buying office furniture and she has no experience in buying apparel or computers, nor does she have experience in the retail private sector. All this leads to reject Mr. Brook's assessment of Ms. DeLeon's broad base of experience.
It is clear that Mrs. Pitman is equally if not more qualified than Ms. DeLeon for the position. The burden of proving such discrimination is on the plaintiff. The Court in Burdine cited the basic allocation of burdens and the order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case. First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection".
Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. Id at 253. The most important rule of this case is that the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. When the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant has the burden of clearly explaining the nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. J. Montgomery's defense claim of a nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring Mrs. Pitman can be challenged. In Bennett vs. VAMC 721 F. Supp. 723 (E.D. Penn, 1998), the court stated "when the evaluation is based on subjective impressions and the evaluators are not themselves of the protected class, the legitimacy and nondiscriminatory basis of the articulated reason for the decision may be subject to particularly close scrutiny".
Id at 730. Furthermore, in proving that the defendants reason was pre textual (fabricated justification for discriminatory conduct), the court in Gunby, Jr. vs. Pennsylvania Electric Company, 840 F. 2d 1108, 1116 (3rd Cir. 1988), stated that "The plaintiff may meet the burden of proving pretext either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence". The court in Bennett ruled in favor of the plaintiff when it was concluded that the explanations given for the selection of the person hired over the plaintiff were not the real or true reasons and the determinative factor was race. Id at 731. The court has held that the issue as to whether the defendant's explanation for the employment decision is pre textual can be supported by the plaintiff's statistical evidence.
Diaz vs. AT&T, 752 F. 2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1985). The court has also ruled that the evidence be substantial. Reeves vs. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000).
This court also held that "evidence from which a rational fact finder could conclude that the employer's proffered explanation for its actions were false is enough to establish a prima facie case". Id at 40. Conclusion: Mrs. Pitman has a case for racial discrimination under Title VII because she can establish a prima facie case in three different ways. First she is able to meet each of the four elements of the test set out in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs vs. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
This test earlier stated as the McDonnell Douglass test is met when Mrs. Pitman shows that: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she applied and was qualified for the job; (3) despite her being qualified she was rejected; (4) after the rejection the position remained open and employer continued to seek applicants. In addition, Mrs. Pitman is able to provide statistical evidence of discrimination on the background make-up and hiring practices of J. Montgomery. Furthermore, she has evidence of discriminatory attitudes. This attitude is expressed by Mr. Brooks, the man in charge of hiring for the position.
In addition, I would also like to ask Mr. Lythcott what he meant by saying that she was "more than qualified to be a top manager at J. Montgomery, except for one thing". We should investigate what that one thing was. We should also find out why the EEOC denied Mrs. Pitman's claim and find further information on the recent suit brought against J. Montgomery.