Japanese Carriers With The Aleutian Force example essay topic

The Battle of Midway was the most decisive Pacific Battle during World War Two. It was also the largest battle in which aircraft carriers took place. The Americans assembled 3 carriers: the #, Hornet, and the Enterprise. The Japanese took the Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and the Hiryu. The question may be asked how a fleet of such size could be turned back by the meager force that the Americans were able to bring against it. The reason was the overconfidence of the Japanese.

Too many objectives had been undertaken, and too many assumptions had been made in their own favor. The submarine line was established too late, and the morning search on June 4 was inadequate. On the United States side, there were superior intelligence and good luck as well as the dive-bomber. This weapon, which the Americans had developed and the Japanese copied, settled the issue in five fateful minutes. Midway was such a decisive battle, that the Japanese Navy never gained the offensive again. Within hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor the Japanese struck at the Philippines and Malaya, and for the next five months success followed success.

By splendid preparation and planning the Japanese armed forces achieved their initial goals so Quickly that they soon were confronted with the problem of what to do next. The offensive had to be retained, and the choice made was an advance toward Australia. Since the Japanese Army, with an eye on a weakened Soviet Union, would not release sufficient troops for an invasion of Australia itself, the plan was to occupy New Guinea, New Caledonia, and Fiji. This South Pacific advance was getting started when the Doolittle raid took place. On April 18, 1942, 16 specially equipped B-25 AAF Bombers under Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle took off from the carrier Hornet, 650 miles east of the Japanese islands, and made a raid on Tokyo.

Most of the planes reached safety in China. Results were meager, but the Japanese believed that these aircraft had come from Midway. This atoll and the western Aleutians remaining in United States hands thus constituted a threat To the homeland, and the line of Japanese-held bases would have to be extended to include them. Yamamoto had always favored a campaign to the east, and he hoped by such a movement to bring out the remainder of the United States Pacific Fleet To battle. After his success at Pearl Harbor, the Navy General Staff could refuse him nothing, and despite the southern advance an order to capture Midway and occupy the Aleutians was issued on May 5. A force of 5 carriers and 11 battleships with 5,000 troops was to strike Midway on June 4, while another force (which included 2 carriers) was to support the Aleutian occupation.

A submarine line was to form west of the Hawaiian group on June 1 to report any approaching United States forces. Yamamoto believed that 2 United States carriers instead of 1 had been lost in the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 8, and he assumed that the 2 others were still in the South Pacific. He did not know that Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, who had relieved Kimmel, was reading his messages. The 3 United States carriers were recalled, the damaged Yorktown was quickly repaired, and by June 1 all of them were at sea beyond the Japanese submarine line. Rear Adm. Raymond A. Spruance commanded the Enterprise and Hornet group. Rear Adm. Frank J. Fletcher with the Yorktown group was in tactical command, but Nimitz at Pearl Harbor retained overall control.

On June 3, the Japanese carriers with the Aleutian force struck Dutch Harbor on Amaknak Island, and landings were made on Kaska and Attu on June 6-7. A cruiser-destroyer-submarine force sent by Nimitz to check this strike never made contact with the Japanese. The Japanese Midway force remained undetected until June 3, and its carrier group, which included the large carriers Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu and was still commanded by Nagumo, reached the launching point 240 miles northeast of Midway, at 4: 30 am on June 4. The first wave, composed of 108 planes, was reported by a United States patrol plane at 5: 45 a.m. At 6: 30 a. m., it struck Midway. Damage was heavy, but the group commander reported that another strike would be necessary.

The second wave had been readied for a carrier attack if any United States carriers were discovered. Nagumo had sent out only a 7-plane search that morning. Hearing nothing from it by 7: 15 a. m., he ordered the planes of the second wave to the hangar decks, where torpedoes would be exchanged for bombs while the first wave was being recovered. At 7: 23 a. m., a cruiser plane reported American ships and, at 8: 20 a. m., announced that one of them was a carrier.

Nagumo decided to recover his planes first and then launch a heavy strike against the carrier at 10: 30 a.m. The carrier sighted was the Yorktown; the faulty morning search left the Enterprise and the Hornet undiscovered by the Japanese all day. The American commanders had the reports of the patrol plane and the attack on Midway. Since the Yorktown was still recovering the planes of her morning search, Fletcher sent the other two carriers toward the enemy. Spruance decided to close in for an hour to bring the enemy well within his combat range and perhaps to catch him refueling.

At 7: 30 a. m., Spruance launched his planes, and the Yorktown air group followed at 8: 30 a.m. The Enterprise and Hornet air groups had difficulty in locating the enemy, and Hornet dive bombers missed the Japanese ships altogether. The remainder of the early launching reached the enemy at about the same time as the Yorktown planes. While the Japanese had no radar, from the number of planes reported Nagumo knew that more than one enemy carrier was present. The United States torpedo planes struck first, but they were slaughtered by enemy fighters without any of their torpedoes hitting; only 6 of the 41 torpedo planes returned to their carriers.

Their martyrdom was not in vain, for the Japanese fighters could not again gain altitude, and the carrier lookouts barely had time to scream "Helldivers' before the bombers struck and roared away. Between 10: 20 and 10: 25 a. m., three bombs hit Akagi, one exploding on the hangar deck; four hit Kaga, two on the hangar deck; and three hit Soryu, one on the hangar deck. Gasoline caught fire, bombs and torpedoes exploded, and within 20 minutes these carriers were burning wrecks. All were gone by the next morning. The rest was anticlimax.

Dive bombers from the Hiryu hit the Yorktown at 12: 20 p. m., and two torpedoes struck her at 2: 30 p.m. She was abandoned soon thereafter. The Hiryu herself was eliminated at 5 p.m. by dive bombers from the Enterprise. Yamamoto was still confident because he believed that the disabled American carrier was the only one present. He recalled the Aleutian carriers, and at 7: 15 p.m. ordered his surface force to move in for the kill. Two hours later, Nagumo enlightened him, and at 2: 55 a.m. on June 5 he reluctantly ordered a general retreat.

Shortly thereafter, the heavy cruisers Mogami and Mikuma collided while avoiding a United States submarine. Seriously damaged, they both fell behind. On the night of June 4, Spruance headed eastward to avoid enemy surface contact, and the next day his planes did not sight the enemy. On June 6, carrier planes finished off the Mikuma, but the battered Mogami returned safely to Truk in the Caroline's. The last casualty was the abandoned Yorktown, still afloat with a destroyer alongside. Both ships were sunk by a Japanese submarine..