Launch Of Sputnik 1 Scientific Progress example essay topic

The launch of the Russian satellite Sputnik on October 4th, 1957 had a profound influence on both American and Russian culture, ranging from the inception of the space race to the mass hysteria the ensued in America afterwards. Sputnik was the product of massive amounts of money and research poured into a missile and satellite program by both the American and Soviet governments. Even though The soviet union might have been the first country to put a satellite into space, this does not necessarily mean that they were ahead in the overall space race, despite this, Sputnik was seen to Americans as an almost cretin symbol of doom and Soviet supremacy. To the American people science and technology has always been a symbol of democratic stability and military strength.

Knowledge is power. The forefathers of our country were almost entirely philosophers or scientists. Characters come to mind like John Quincy Adams and Thomas Jefferson, who where philosophers, and one of our strongest national figures, Benjamin Franklin, was an avid inventor. From the Inception of some of the first national universities to the launch of the Louis and Clark expedition, scientific progress is value imbedded in the national conciseness. (Killian, 1977, p. 45) Science has always been important to that American people, but it was the onset of both of the world wars that made it so ultimately important. In 1941 President Roosevelt approved the establishment of the National Defense Research Committee, and one year later he created the Office oh Scientific Research and development.

He was prompted to do this by the war looming in the nations future and the need to be prepared if the US would have to fight. (Killian, 1977, p. 47) In the spring of 1950, a group of American scientists led by James van Allen met in Silver Springs, Maryland to discuss the possibility of an international scientific program to study the upper atmosphere and outer space via sounding rockets, balloons, and ground observations. Strong support from Western European scientists allowed the idea to expand into a worldwide program timed to coincide with a period of intense solar activity, 1 July 1957 to 31 December 1958. The participants named this period the International Geophysical Year (IGY) and created the Comit'e speciale de l'ann " ee g'eophysique internationale (the 'Special Committee for the International Geophysical Year' or 'CSAGI') to establish an agenda for the program.

(Levine, 1994, p. 76) Soviet representatives, including Academy of Sciences Vice-President Academician Ivan P. Bard in, served on the Committee, but do not appear to have had any significant contribution to its proceedings. In fact, the May 1954 deadline for submissions for participation in the IGY passed without any word from Soviet authorities. At a subsequent meeting in Rome on the 4th of October 1954, Soviet scientists silently witnessed the approval of a historic U.S. -sponsored plan to orbit artificial satellites during the IGY. (Oberg, 1981, p. 38) The satellite proposal clearly surprised the Soviet delegation, and had repercussions within the USSR Academy of Sciences. In the fall of 1954, the Academy established the Interdepartmental Commission for the Coordination and Control of Work in the Field of Organization and Accomplishment of Interplanetary Communications, a typically longwinded title which obscured its primary role, a forum for Soviet scientists to discuss space exploration in abstract terms, both in secret and in public.

While this Commission had little real authority, its Chairman Sedov may have played a crucial role in connecting Korolev's satellite efforts with the International Geophysical Year. The chain of events was set off on July 29th, 1955 by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Press Secretary James C. Hagerty who announced at the White House that the United States would launch "small Earth-circling satellites" as part of its participation in the IGY (Levine, 1994, p. 215). It was at this same time that the International Astronautical Federation was holding its Sixth International Astronautical Congress at Copenhagen, Denmark. Heading the Soviet delegation was Sedov and Kirill F. Ogorodnikov, the editor of a respected astronomy journal in the USSR.

The two were called into action by an announcement on August 2nd by Fred C. Durant, the President of the Congress, who reported the Eisenhower Administration's intentions of launching a satellite during the IGY. (Levine, 1994, p. 65) Not to be outdone, Sedov convened a press conference the same day at the Soviet embassy in Copenhagen for about 50 journalists during which he announced "In my opinion, it will be possible to launch an artificial Earth satellite within the next two years". He added that "The realization of the Soviet project can be expected in the near future". (Oberg, 1981, p. 87) Technical work on the vehicle officially began on February 25th, 1956 with actual construction beginning on March 5th. Tikhonravov's group at the NII-4 and Korolev's Design Bureau at the NII-88 (meaning number 4 and 88) were the two most active participants in this process, but numerous other organizations provided various elements of the complete satellite. By 14 June, Korolev finalized the necessary changes to the basic version of the R-7, the most current rocket vehicle of that time, ICBM in order to use it for a satellite launch.

The new booster would incorporate a number of major changes including the use of updated main engines and a new payload fairing replacing the old one used for a nuclear warhead. A month later, on July 24th 1956, Korolev formally approved the initial Draft Plan for the Object D, one of the code names for the sputnik projects. The document was co-signed by his senior associates Tikhonravov, Konstantin D. Bushuyev, Sergey O. Okhapkin, and Leonid A. Voskresenskiy. (Vassilivev, 1958, p. 132) By mid-1956 the Object D project was beginning to fall significantly behind schedule. Some subcontractors were particularly lackadaisical in their assignments, and parts were often delivered which did not fit the original specifications. (Killian, 1977, p. 187) One of the most important and vocal leaders on the Sputnik project was a Russian scientist named Korolev, he and and another man named Keldysh were almost single handedly responsible for launching sputnik at such an early date.

On September 14th, Mr. Keldysh made a personal plea at a meeting of the Academy of Sciences Presidium for speeding up work, invoking a threat all would understand: "we all want our satellite to fly earlier than the Americans". Events in the satellite program took an abrupt turn in the waning months of 1956. Actual test models of the Object D, expected to be ready by October, remained unfinished (Oberg, 1981, p. 169). By the end of November, Korolev began to suffer from great anxiety, no doubt compounded by his extraordinarily busy plans, traveling from Kaliningrad to Kapustin Yar to Tyra-Tam to Molotov sk and back several times to oversee various projects. Part of this anxiety was due to serious concerns that his project would be suddenly preempted with a satellite launch from the United States. He had been informed of a September 1956 launch of a missile from Patrick Air Force Base at Cape Canaveral, Florida, which according to his erroneous information, was a failed attempt to launch a satellite into orbit.

A second concern were the results of static testing of the R-7 engines on the ground. Instead of the projected specific impulse of 309-310 seconds, the R-7 engines would not produce more than 304 seconds, too low for the heavy Object D satellite. He realized that perhaps he was making this effort too complicated. Why not attempt to launch something simpler on the first orbital attempt instead of a sophisticated one-and-a-half-ton scientific observatory? (Killian, 1977, p. 215) The R-7 was transported and installed on the launch pad in the early morning of October 3rd escorted on foot by Korolev, Ryabikov, and other members of the State Commission.

Fueling began early the following morning at 0545 hours local time. Korolev, under a great amount of pressure, remained cautious throughout the proceedings. He told his engineers, "Nobody will hurry us. If you have even the tiniest doubt, we will stop the testing and make the corrections on the satellite. There is still time... ".

Most of the engineers, understandably enough, did not have time to ponder over the historical value or importance of the upcoming event. PS-1's deputy designer Ivanovskiy recalled. ".. Nobody back then was thinking about the magnitude of what was going on: everyone did his own job, living through its disappointments and joys". (Levine, 1994, p. 74) On the night of the 4th, the anniversary of the death of one of Russia's most famous rocketry pioneers, huge flood lights illuminated the launch pad as the engineers in their blockhouse checked off all the systems. In the command bunker accompanying Korolev were some of the senior members of the State Commission.

All launch operations for Sputnik were handled by two men, a civilian and a military officer. Representing the civilians was Korolev's deputy Leonid A. Voskresenskiy, one of the most colorful characters in the history of the Soviet space program. A daredevil motorcyclist with a legendary penchant for taking risks, he had been with the program since the early days in 1945 when the Soviets had scoured Germany for the remains of the A-4 missile. Lt. -Col. Aleksandr I. Nosov represented the military.

Both men were 44 years old at the time. (Vassilivev, 1958, p. 151) The actual command for launch was entrusted to the hands of Boris S. Chekunov, a young artillery forces lieutenant. He later recalled the final moments as the clock ticked past midnight local time: "When only a few minutes remained until lift-off, Korolev nodded to his deputy Voskresenskiy. The operators froze, awaiting the final order. Nosov, the chief of the launch control team, stood at the periscope. He could see the whole pad.

'One minute to go!' he called. The seconds counted down to zero and Nosov shouted the command for lift-off. Chekunov immediately pressed the lift-off button. At exactly 2228 hours 34 seconds Moscow Time on 4 October, the engines ignited and the 272,830 kilogram booster lifted off the pad in a blaze of light and smoke. The five engines of the R-7 generated about 398 tons of thrust at launch. Although the rocket lifted off gracefully, there were problems.

Delays in the firing of several engines almost resulted in a launch abort. The System for the Simultaneous Emptying of the Tanks (SOB IS) failed, which resulted in higher than normal kerosene consumption. A turbine failure due to this resulted in main engine cut-off one second prior to the planned moment. Separation from the core stage, however, occurred successfully, and the 184 pound PS-1 successfully flew into a free-fall elliptical trajectory. The first human-made object entered orbit around the Earth inaugurating a new era in exploration.

(Vassilivev, 1958, p. 154) Within hour's radio operators in the U.S., Japan, Canada and Great Britain began to pick up the satellite's telltale sounds on prescribed frequencies. Although 76 groups of amateur U.S. "moon watchers" rushed to their posts on Saturday before dawn, they failed to make any sure sightings. This was explained when scientists computed the satellite's apparent orbit from its radio signals (Levine, 1994, p. 126). The satellite, while regularly crossing all parts of the earth north of Cape Horn and south of Nome, Alaska, would not be above the U.S. at dawn or dusk until late October - and at no other time of day, thanks to the blotting-out effect of the sun, could it be seen anywhere. It would remain in Orbit for almost 3 months when it eventually burned up in the atmosphere in late 1957. The American reaction was and still is the most interesting part of the entire sputnik ordeal.

It is that this 184 pound piece of tin doing nothing put merely orbiting around the earth and beeping was a certain sign of doom for the free world. Another interesting thing about this is not that the panic was limited to solely the ignorant American public, but some of the highest ranked Military leaders and Government officials lost there heads out of fear of a red future. One of the most accurate ways to accurately depict the mentality of a country as a whole is to explain the reactions of the countries most hard minded and informed men and women. Who, in the case of Sputnik, reacted to a lesser degree like the rest of the public, but still with a feeling of urgency and impending doom. Some saw these events only as a sign of the eventual rule of the Russian Empire, while at the same time others met it with great political opportunism. Senator Stuart Sym ington of Missouri, a future advocate of government stated that "unless our defense policies are promptly changed, the Soviets will move from Superiority to supremacy.

If that happens, our position will become imposable". Another leader, Congresswomen Clare Booth Luce said that the constant beeping of Sputnik "is an intercontinental outer-space raspberry to a decade of American of American way of life and was a gilt edged guarantee of our national superiority". (Oberg, 1981, p. 70) This was the prevailing attitude among most of the politicians of that time. The Senate majority leader of that time, Lyndon Johnson gave a speech saying, "The Roman Empire controlled the world because it could build roads. Later-when moved to sea-the British Empire was Dominant because it had shops.

In the air age, we were powerful because we had airplanes. Now the Communists have established a foothold in outer space". Johnson realized something had to be done about this problem. He opened hearings by a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on 25 November 1957 to review the whole spectrum of American defense and space programs in the wake of the Sputnik crisis. This group found serious under funding and incomprehensible organization for the conduct of space activities. It blamed the president and the Republican Party.

One of Johnson's aides, George E. Reedy, summarized the feelings of many Americans: "the simple fact is that we can no longer consider the Russians to be behind us in technology. It took them four years to catch up to our atomic bomb and nine months to catch up to our hydrogen bomb. Now we are trying to catch up to their satellite". (Levine, 1994, p. 47) Without de-emphasizing the legitimacy of Johnson's concern, certainly he also recognized and exploited the political opportunity of the Sputnik crisis. The Republicans had been an opposition party in the early years of the Cold War, and had drummed on the head of President Harry S. Truman in 1949 for the ouster of Chiang Chai Shek in Nationalist China and his replacement by a communist government under Mao Zedong and again in 1950 for the invasion and near capitulation of South Korea to communist forces. (Oberg, 1981, p. 123) Wisconsin Republican senator Joseph McCarthy had used these events, as well as others of both serious and ridiculous nature, to lambaste the Democrats as soft on communism and essentially of allowing the "Red Menace" to conquer the world.

The Republicans had turned these issues into political capital that had swept Dwight D. Eisenhower into the presidency in 1952 along with a host of Republican members of Congress. Now the shoe was on the other foot and the possibility existed to defeat the Republicans on the very same issues that they had used so effectively against the Democrats, the Cold War rivalry of the Soviet Union. Even if Sputnik did not pose an extremely large threat, it should have still warranted at least a minor call to action and concern among government representatives. Ironically some of the people who should be the most concerned with satellite and missile situation were the least concerned. The outgoing secretary of state Charles Wilson flippantly called Sputnik "a nice little trick". This demonstrated Wilson's ignorance on the Russian and even the American technical goals and achievements in the space program, and his limited knowledge of research and development.

At the same time Sherman Adams compared the entire sputnik operation as an outer space basketball game. (Oberg, 1981, p. 169) If one true thing can be said it is that ignorance fans the flames of fear in relation to the American Public. As today, most of the technological achievements and accomplishments of the American government were kept shrouded in secrecy. Most Americans knew almost nothing about the space program at the time, and they certainly weren't aware of the progression of achievements in both countries. IF Americans had been informed on progress they would have realized that America was at least at the same technological level as the Russians, if not superior, it was just that the American scientists at that time didn't feel the need to launch a satellite as urgently as the Soviets did (Oberg, 1981, p 123). The problem was that the most Americans did not know this, so the launch of a major milestone, such as a satellite, sent ripples of fear throughout the nation.

American fear and ignorance is one of the main reasons that Dwight Eisenhower drew so much political fire at that time. He was much better informed then almost all members of the public and most of the people in power at that time. His reactions were neither immediate nor rash; something the American people wanted at that time, fast, dramatic results. He did not take these actions because he knew that Sputnik was merely orbiting the earth and emitting a beeping signal, while many in the public thought that Sputnik had the potential to harm them. Eisenhower had become used to a level of public acceptance and agreement with his statements and decisions that has been almost been unparalleled in his this century. Eisenhower was riding the crest of the victory during WWII (Levine, 1994, p. 112).

The country was celebrating it's freedom and enjoying the first economic prosperity that it had seen in almost 30 years so when an interloper like Sputnik entered the American scene, This was the first time that Eisenhower had ever really found disagreements with his decisions. So in a way, Eisenhower was reeling from the shock of public disapproval, and his knowledge of the situation, so that his reactions to Sputnik weren't immediate. This prompted the public to see Eisenhower as a smiling-incompetent and was commonly referred to as "the golfer" because of the amount of time he spent on the links. In the time leading up to the Launch of Sputnik, there was fair warning that the public's reaction would be harsh. Despite Eisenhower's felling that the US had, 'No need to compete in this area [satellites]", the public did not feel this way. In early 1955 Nelson Rockefeller published a paper to the Operations Coordinating board predicting the shock that a Russian satellite would have on the American people.

Even earlier then those researchers at the Office of Navel Research pursued funding for a satellite with the sole reason of calming the American reaction to a eventual Soviet spacecraft. The funding was denied. (Oberg, 1981, p. 227) American insecurity ranged from a mild concern to things as extreme as suicide the only appropriate characterization that begins to capture the mood on October 5th involves the use of the word hysteria. A collective mental turmoil and soul-searching followed, as American society thrashed around for the answers to Hagen's questions. Almost immediately, two phrases entered the American lexicon to define time, "pre-Sputnik" and "post-Sputnik". The other phrase that soon replaced earlier definitions of time was "Space Age".

With the launch of Sputnik 1, the Space Age had been born and the world would be different ever after (Oberg, 1981, p 165). Jim Dawson, science writer for the Star Tribune, wrote about how his third grade teacher was very nervous at the time. His school at Omaha, Neb., was just a few miles from the Air Force's Strategic Air Command headquarters. A fleet of F-100 fighters appeared in the sky coming right for the school.

"MiGs!" the teacher shrieked. "MiGs!" She ran, hysterical, from the classroom, convinced they were about to be nuked by Russian fighter jets. The kids, mostly Air Force officers' children, ran to the windows to admire the F-100's, the coolest jet of its day (Levine, 1994,128). One of the areas of American life that Sputnik still has a great influence on is the Arena of education. In pre-sputnik America education was based mainly upon the arts and Literature. As a whole education was more passive with an easy curriculum, and the entire education principal was more of teaching about the past.

After the launch of sputnik the nation collectively agreed that the United State's children were going to be there future weapons against the soviets, so curriculum was based more heavily upon progressive scientific ad mathematical accomplishments. This is an influence that can still be felt to this day. The pandemonium and fear associated with Sputnik was not limited to the American front alone. Many countries around the world, which saw the United States as the stronghold for democracy and technological development became concerned that the US was falling behind. In early November Prime Minister Harold Macmillan that, "The American People are no longer confident that even there great country can do everything itself...

I say this with great hesitation and without excuse that this is a real turning point in history. Never has the threat of Soviet communism been so great". Soviet reaction was as could have been expected. There was great celebration and chaos in the streets now that the Soviet empire was technologically on top of the world. This prompted the beginning of the cold war in their eyes as well (Levine, 1994, p. 74). Along with the launch of Sputnik came an increased sense of Russian nationalism, one Muscovite scientist was quoted as boasting, "Americans design better automobile tail fins, but we design the best intercontinental ballistic missiles and earth satellites".

From the launch of Sputnik 1 scientific progress took leaps and bounds in the fields of missile and space development. Sputnik 1 was not the last of the Sputniks, Sputnik 2 followed suit on November 3, 1957, carrying a dog named Laika ensconced in a pressurized compartment. Laika survived for one week in space, the rhythmic beating of her monitored heart proving that animals could survive the launch. Laika led the way for human exploration of space by disproving prevailing scientific wisdom that space flight would have been injurious to vital internal organs. Laiki did not survive the space flight though.

It was the original intent to retrieve the dog after Sputnik 2 entered the atmosphere, but most of the insulation in the satellite and Laiki died from the excessive temperature in the craft. It is also rumored that Sputnik @ was built in under 1 month by the same team that built the original Sputnik In May 1958 Sputnik 3, weighing nearly 1,360 kilograms (2,400 pounds), was launched. It was not until 1967 that the basic Soviet launch vehicle was displayed. It was a 2 1/2-stage vehicle of the "A" series: two stages with four drop-away booster pods.

Each booster pod contained four rocket engines (totaling 16) with propellant tankage, and the central core had four engines. Propellants were conventional liquid oxygen and kerosene (Oberg, 1981, p 142). The United States would continue to launch more satellites into space in an effort to keep up with the Russians. The US Vanguard was launched on January 31, 1958. The Vanguard was only about the size of a grapefruit and paled in comparison to the Soviet achievements. It is know as one of the most successful orbits to date.

Even though Vanguard has run out of batteries and can no longer transmit a signal, it is still in orbit and will probably remain in outer space for several hundred years to come. (Oberg, 1981, p. 237) The Jupiter-C was also launched later that year. The Americans may have been comfortable in there achievements; the first 4 U.S. satellites combined didn't equal the Weight of Sputnik 1. Weight being one of the most important factors in the satellite race in that it eventually rockets could carry nuclear warheads, and the larger the weight, the bigger the warhead (Levine, 1994, p. 69). Sputnik still remains one of the most influential pieces of technology in the 20th century. It may not have had the capability to do much beyond transmit a signal, but the signal was interpreted differently across the world.

To the citizens of the Soviet Union the beeping was a victorious battle hymn. To the Citizens of the United States it was a hammering thud signaling the end of their way of life. No mater how the mere "beep" was meet; it did signify the end of an era and the beginning of the Arms and space race.