Liberal Direction In The Rlds Church example essay topic

Alan Goff Human. 417-The Emergence of the Modern Era Term Paper Hacking at the Leaves while Stumbling over the Roots: Modernity, Assimilation, and RLDS Mimicry of Oldline Decline Introduction As Western societies move from modern epistemologies to postmodern ones, it is worth reflecting what we are beyond if we live in a postmodern world. Modernity has endured pretty rough handling by postmodern thinkers, so we ought not to be na " ive in acquiescing to modern assertions. The Enlightenment version of modernity has taken the heaviest casualties in recent thought. The Enlightenment asserted several consistent propositions: (a) human reason is supreme over religion and tradition and is up to the task of understanding nature and guiding society, (b) human nature isn't fixed and depraved but is progressive and susceptible to education and improvement, (c) the most important unit in society isn't the family or the community but the individual (society exists to expand individual possibilities and actualities), and (d) science and the scientific method are tools to be used to reveal a world and society built on law while scientific understanding uncovers a world independent of the knower's intellectual horizon. Other features of the Enlightenment deserve treatment, but these seem a fair summary.

Each of these assertions has been trenchantly criticized by postmodernism. One of the best modern insights to emerge from the sociology of religion is the sect / church dialectic. When a new religious belief emerges, its leadership acts like a sect: it requires separation and purification of its members who must engage in unusual rituals, endure the scorn of their neighbors, sacrifice by contributing time and resources to the organization; they insist they have an exclusive truth that other religions have neglected or perverted. The ministry is often unpaid and uneducated.

Their membership is called apart to be peculiar and otherworldly. But over generations the membership often becomes more prosperous and educated. Its leaders, in particular, feel the pain of being odd, so they begin a concerted effort to raise the prestige of the sect. As it conforms to the society around it, the sect becomes a church or a denomination. Its ministry often becomes paid and professional, emphasizing educational degrees and professionalism as a sign of having finally arrived in society. The church no longer claims to have exclusive truth but is much more ecumenical.

It demands less of it members, believing sacrifice of the self isn't the purpose of religion but realizing the potential of the individual is; it would never dream of excommunicating members for engaging in sinful conduct and becomes much more likely to condone actions that it formerly condemned. It is less likely to dictate standards of conduct to its members and more likely to emphasize individualism. It becomes more and more this-worldly, valuing social and political activism rather than an other-worldly reward for its members. The most notable example of this dialectic is the rapid decline in church membership, contributions, numbers of congregations, and other measures of vitality in mainline American Protestant churches since the 1960's. As these churches (Presbyterian churches, American Baptist, Episcopal, Disciples of Christ, Evangelical Lutheran, United Church of Christ, and the Methodist churches) made their peace with modernity, they also swung from any remnant of sect-like behavior to perch on the far end of the sect-denomination continuum. Every historical example we examine of religions moving from sect to church also corresponds to a decline in standard measures of church vitality.

Such discussion is not only relevant but essential to dozens of related issues within the Mormon community. Within the Mormon tradition the two main branches exemplify the sect and denominational approaches. The LDS church has maintained its boundaries and distinctiveness. The RLDS church has assimilated to the Protestant mainstream, becoming much more denominational. Roger Launius has, in a series of articles, been the main voice asking questions about the impact of modernity and the sect / denomination dialectic in the Mormon tradition.

More thorough discussion of the issues and the ideological assumptions undergirding Launius's position holds the possibility of illuminating the place of religious belief in the world today. Philosophical Liberalism vs. Political Liberalism My focus is here on the impact of modernity upon religious belief. I have already narrowed modernity to its most notable position-the Enlightenment. To narrow even further, the most influential version of Enlightenment thought today is liberalism. To avoid potential confusion between the philosophical liberalism I will discuss and a concept frequently used today called political liberalism, let me make some distinctions. The autonomy of the individual is the paramount concern of a philosophical liberal.

When faced with a problematical political issue such as abortion, the philosophical liberal will come down on the side of freedom of choice for the woman rather than the potential life of the fetus. Besides individualism, equality is a shibboleth of liberalism. Hierarchy or inherited privilege is anathema to the liberal. Both contemporary political conservatism and political liberalism are deeply indebted to this philosophical liberalism. Political conservatives tend to favor the free-market-capitalism-with-minimal- governmental-interference aspect of philosophical liberalism. Political liberals tend to favor the autonomous individual who decides about sexuality, reproduction, career choice, or education without coercion from government or society; all choices become mere preferences subordinated to the reality that we freely choose our religions, our genders, our jobs, our homes, our families, and our friends.

I am not going to discuss political liberalism. To avoid confusion, I will use the term liberal modernity to refer to the philosophical concept I intend to discuss. Liberal modernity is the dominant ideology in our educational, government, and media institutions (including the periodical called Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought). It is so dominant that its adherents take for granted that is ought to be dominant and often feel no need to articulate a defense of its hegemony, aren't even aware of its hegemony because they regard it not as an ideology but as fundamental reality; this uncritical dogma needs to be demystified. Liberal modernity's concept of the free-floating subject has been devastatingly attacked by postmodern thinkers such as Foucault and Derrida.

Its notion of individual prerogatives always trumping communal ones has been taken on by communitarian thinkers. As James Madison recognized, the liberal order requires a specific notion of human nature, a notion that is almost always asserted without any need to defend the conception of human nature or society. Even that concept of human nature found in liberalism is largely derivative, pilfered from the biblical tradition. "At that point we become aware of the extent to which our liberal order had depended on a larger worldview whose demise it could not easily survive. We begin to understand that the crisis is not so much a crisis of liberal politics as it is a crisis of the philosophical assumptions that had made it principles appear so self-evident. The liberal superstructure has fallen because the moral and spiritual convictions on which it rested have been shaken.

"It is no longer possible to regard the liberal way as the invincibly right one for all mankind. Perhaps it is no longer even valid for us? Without the sense of an order beyond itself in terms of which its rightness can be seen, liberal democracy loses the landmarks that hold it fast. If it rests on nothing but itself, liberal order rests on nothing" (Walsh 81). So we face this odd situation: liberal modernity dominates our intellectual culture, but it is an increasingly incoherent and indefensible concept. What is left for defenders of liberalism is a recognition that its theoretical foundations are not only confused but also impossible to defend.

With the collapse of the philosophy, liberalism is left as a pragmatic social orientation, a series of practices that can survive quite well without theoretical justification (Walsh 46). The theoretical bankruptcy of liberalism does not entail abandonment of liberalism as a practice (Walsh 50), for many aspects of liberal modernity are worth resuscitating. That we no longer kill each other over religious or political differences is a beneficial consequence partially the result of liberalism's hegemony. Strict Churches and Denominational Strength It is illiberal to insist on strict standards of conduct for church members; it violates the notion that the individual is supreme. The LDS church and the RLDS church have taken two different paths when faced with modernity. They have also migrated two different directions on the sect / church continuum.

Worldwide, empirical examples demonstrate that religions conforming to modernity have lost their vitality, while "religious communities have survived and even flourished to the degree that they have not tried to adapt themselves to the alleged requirements of a secularized world. To put it simply, experiments with secularized religion have generally failed; religious movements with beliefs and practices dripping with reactionary supernaturalism (the kind utterly beyond the pale at self-respecting faculty parties) have widely succeeded" (Berger, "Desecularization" 4). On the other hand, "religious movements and institutions that have made great efforts to conform to a perceived modernity are almost everywhere on the decline" (Berger, "Desecularization" 6). I assert that these two issues are closely related and that they also explain why the RLDS church is in steep slide toward oblivion and the LDS church is vital and growing. Every church that has remade its foundations upon modern thought has declined; hence the RLDS church is similar to the mainline Protestantism it models itself upon. But modernity is too fragile and unstable to build a church upon.

Liberal modernity emphasizes individualism, which undermines the sacrifice of the self needed to make a church. The individualism of modernity saps the strength from the community and self-sacrifice necessary for religious belief; you can base Kiwanis clubs upon modernity, but churches need more substantial nutrition than modernity can provide. Dean Kelley's landmark study in 1972 should have provided a warning to RLDS church leaders. These leaders invested heavily in making their church into a denomination. But accepting modernity as your first religion and the restored gospel as a secondary commitment which must be adapted to the first makes for a fractious set of contradictions within a church: "At our civilized best, we rightly pride ourselves on being tolerant, open-minded, equalitarian, and respectful of individual differences, rights, convictions, and sensitivities. But there may be a basic and irreconcilable conflict between these valued qualities of civic life and imperious dynamics that create and sustain meaning" (Kelley, Why 154).

Recent work on the issue from within sociology of religion reaffirms the case Kelley made nearly three decades ago: "Religious organizations are stronger to the degree that they impose significant costs in terms of sacrifice and even stigma upon their members. Herein lies the key to the trends noted throughout this book. People tend to value religion on the basis of how costly it is to belong-the more one must sacrifice in order to be in good standing, the more valuable the religion" (Finke and Stark 238); modern churches make for weak ones. This insight reminds us of Joseph Smith's claim that that religion which doesn't require the sacrifice of all things doesn't have the power to lead to salvation. In this case, the self must be sacrificed in order to bring the person in tune with eternity, but liberal modernity's self is the centerpiece of its political project and sacrificing that would entail denying modernity. "Humans want their religion to be sufficiently potent, vivid, and compelling so that it can offer them rewards of great magnitude.

People seek a religion that is capable of miracles and that imparts order and sanity to the human condition. The religious organizations that maximize these aspects of religion, however, also demand the highest price in terms of what the individual must do to qualify for these rewards" (Finke and Stark 275). Those who work in the academic study of religion often come with presuppositions that hinder rather than help them understand the phenomenon. Reasons for the success or failure of religious ventures particularly are misunderstood. Kelley lists four areas in which religions are expected to conform to the expectations of modernity if they are to be considered safe and respectable. But "these expectations are a recipe for the failure of the religious enterprise" (Kelley, Why v.) and misunderstand what religion does: 1.

"It is generally assumed that religious enterprises, if they want to succeed, will be reasonable, rational, courteous, responsible, restrained, and receptive to outside criticism; that is, they will want to preserve a good image in the world (as the world defines all these terms). 2. It is expected, moreover, that they will be democratic and gentle in their internal affairs (again, as the outside world defines these qualities). 3.

They will be responsive to the needs of men (as currently conceived), and will want to work cooperatively with other groups to meet those needs. 4. They will not let dogmatism, judgmental moralist, or obsessions with cultic purity stand in the way of such cooperation and service". (Kelley, Why vii-v.) But note that each of these expectations is a modern standard. These are external demands placed on religion to subordinate it to a modern regime. These are ideological demands placed upon a competitor by a modernity that insists its subjects serve mammon, not God.

The RLDS church has adopted all four of these criteria; it has mixed and baked its "recipe for failure of the religious enterprise". When churches liberalize to become more participatory and pluralistic, they lose their vitality. "The quality that enables religious meanings to take hold is not their rationality, their logic, their surface credibility, but rather the demand they make upon their adherents and the degree to which that demand is met by commitment" (Kelley, Why 53). Kelley looked for two decades to find examples of leniency and strength coexisting in a church but found none (Kelley, Why 86-87). Not only are strict churches stronger than lax churches, but strictness is hard to maintain.

It is easier to lapse into leniency and very hard to move from leniency back to strictness (Kelley, Why 96). The RLDS decline is not only rapid but also probably irreversible; to roll it back would require a drastic change in policy and leadership. The current RLDS leadership adheres to a modern ideology that valorize's individualism and abhors the type of obedience and self-sacrifice that would be required to regain vitality: " 'Strictness is usually caricatured as invariably authoritarian, harsh, punitive, irrational, etc. We are all captives of our historical experience, and it is a pity that almost the only experiences of strictness in Western culture have been marked by heresy-trials, inquisitions, excommunications, auto-da-fe's, persecutions, crusades, and pogroms; and that the only content about which it is thought possible to be strict is some kind of fundamentalism", but Kelley notes, "That need not be the case" (Kelley, "Why" 171). The extent to which a church adapts to the modern notion that the individual is the measure of reality and truth is the extent to which the church declines. It is popular in liberal Christianity to emphasize religion as a personal quest for discovery rather than an expectation of truth and obedience of the adherent.

Individualism and social strength in churches do not go together. The more one is willing to adhere to discipline and sacrifice for the whole, the greater the social strength (Kelley, Why 85). Kelley notes that he didn't mean to so closely identify health of a church with increase in members, a simple matter of numbers. The publisher chose the title of the book, a title Kelley is at pains to distance himself from (Kelley, "Why" 167). Statistics don't necessarily measure the vitality of congregations: "Membership trends are seen as a crude but informative index of the vitality of a church (or other institution), particularly in a free-market competition among exclusivist rival faith-groups... church growth is not the point.

It is a by-product of a church that is vigorously meeting people's religious needs" (Kelley, "Why" 168). David Kelley's thesis has stood up well over the past few decades. Statistical and historical research finds continued declines in mainline churches (Episcopal and United Church of Christ are given as examples) and growth in "small sects" such as Mormons and Pentecostal groups. Even with this evidence, "many researchers question the causal role of strictness" (Iannaccone 1181).

Strictness is so anti-modern that those under its thrall must find other excuses for declines or deny the empirical evidence. Perhaps a third alternative is to accept the lapse in vitality and valorize feebleness. Evidence of Church Decline It isn't easy to sort through the numbers demonstrating the decline of the RLDS church. Different commentators give different statistics. Launius cites a figure between 25,000 and 50,000 lost members (Launius, "Reorganized" 53). Launius notes that RLDS membership reached a high point at 173,000 in 1982.

Every year since then has seen a decline. World membership stays steady at about 250,000. But the numbers don't convey the magnitude of the problem because many members' names are on the rolls although they have left the church over the changes wrought by church leadership. Church Historian Richard P. Howard estimates that 25,000 people have left the church because of their objections to the modern adaptations. Other church leaders say the number is closer to 50,000 (Launius, "Reorganized" 51-53). Other measures of vitality also show dramatic decline.

Reductions in contributions "have been dramatic... signaling a near collapse of the RLDS church during this period and portending catastrophe for the future" (Launius, "Reorganized" 53-54). Congregations have been closed (Launius, "Reorganized" 55). Christian Century figures claim that the RLDS church went from a high of 350,000 members in 1980 to less than 250,000 in 1996 ("Nonprophet" 786). Midgley notes the schism that has resulted from the commitment to a modern ideology by the RLDS leadership. Between 15,000 and 30,000 disaffected RLDS members meet in separate congregations that have withdrawn from the church. Some 200 groups have formed their own branches in the U.S., Canada, and Australia (Midgley, "Radical" 134 n.

4). Stack claims that RLDS membership has dramatically decreased: "In the last decade, membership has declined from 350,000 to 250,000 and operating expenses have outstretched income" (Stack). Compared to the oldline decline, the RLDS decline is much more dramatic and alarming. The oldline churches have seen the following declines in numbers and percentage between 1965 and 1985 (Coaster, Mulder and Weeks 19 and 226 n. 3; the figures come from the Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches): The two main Presbyterian churches lost 28 percent of their members (down from 4,254,460 to 3,048,235). The American Baptist church lost 37% (from 2,495,326 to 1,559,683 members).

The Disciples of Christ declined 42% (from 1,918,471 to 1,116,326). The Episcopal Church lost 20 percent (from 3,429,153 to 2,739,422 members). The Evangelical Lutheran Church lost 8 percent (from 5,705,954 to 5,250,368 members). The United Church of Christ lost 19% (from 2,070,413 to 1,683,777). The United Methodist Church shrunk 17% (from 11,067,497 to 9,191,172). Again, different analysts give slightly different figures for slightly different time frames.

Church membership in the oldline religions is way down from 1967 to 1984 (Sweet, "Modernization"): o Disciples of Christ, 40% decline o Presbyterian Church, 27% reduction o United Church of Christ, 17% o Episcopal Church, 19% o United Church of Christ, 17% o United Methodist Church, 16% o Lutheran Church, 8% Growth in oldline churches continued until the mid sixties. Overall Protestant and Catholic membership has remained stable since 1966, but gone down in relationship to the growing U.S. population. The liberal Protestant churches have seen membership losses every year since 1966 (Roozen and Carroll, "Recent" 22-25). Launius himself notes the parallels between the decline of mainline Protestantism and that of the RLDS church, an identity the church has attempted to cultivate during that period of decline (Launius, "Reorganized" 58). Launius notes the problem: the more the RLDS church is like other churches, the more reason it gives for its members to affiliate with other churches.

"If the Reorganized Church has nothing more to offer than the local Methodist or Presbyterian or Unitarian or other church, why should I drive long distances to worship in small groups struggling just to keep the doors open on Sunday morning? Why not go to any of the many other larger churches in my community where my spiritual needs could be met and my contributions valued?" (Launius, "Reorganized" 59). RLDS leadership has even trotted out many of the excuses that mainline church leaders use to explain declining commitment and membership: skepticism, opposition to authority figures, egalitarianism and individualism (Launius, "Reorganized"58). But such apologies fail to note that some churches have grown in those same years.

The excuse-making machinery of churches in decline is revealing of the RLDS decline. The mainlines reacted to the bad news by blaming it on secularization (without noting that only some churches-the most modernized-declined), by claiming that statistics on membership weren't important but commitment of those remaining members was what counted, or by calling for increasing modernization and liberalization (that regulating people's sexual and moral conduct was making people leave-this again ignores which churches were in decline and which were strong) (Finke and Stark 249). Luidens criticizes Kelley's thesis asserting that strong church groups are the result of strong church leadership, not of strictness or distinctiveness. He attempts to move the discussion away from statistics on membership and attendance and toward other, more useful, measures: per capita contribution rates (Luidens, "Numbering" 60-64). One gets the idea that Luidens is desperate to find some way to assert that decline in membership is irrelevant and the churches he favors are actually thriving. If the only measure on which the oldline churches exceeded growing churches were in number of tea rings left on the tablecloths at church socials, Luidens would seize on that statistic as the central indication of vitality.

Modernity as the Cause of Church Decline The mainline Protestant denominations have reduced their sizes so dramatically since the 1960's that many commentators no longer call them "mainline", which implies they are the standard by which the rest of American religion ought to be measured. Launius cites Stark and Finke's The Churching of America (Launius, "Reorganized" 59). What he doesn't do is tell his readers how these two sociologists trace the decline of oldline churches to their accommodation to modernity. Such a reference would inform the reader that modernity is the problem, not the solution, to church decline. If Launius's proposed solutions are to have any effect, they must address the poison of modernity the RLDS church has ingested.

Launius posits that frank discussion of RLDS decline is rare. One can understand this because frank engagement with the issues doesn't even occur in Launius's article which urges such discussion. Modernity is the root of the problem and Launius's commitment to modernity isn't much different in kind or range from that of his church leaders. Launius refers to a story about a trip to the Abilene which nobody wants to go on but they do so thinking the others do.

Each error and mistake is compounded to make the trip worse, each decision increases the difficulty rather than solving it. He compares that to the experiment in liberalism the RLDS church has tried during the last quarter century. The experiment with liberalism is the problem, not the solution. If the RLDS church is in crisis and in imminent danger of collapse, Launius himself is proposing an Abilene paradox that would compound the problem rather than solve it.

The RLDS church leadership is committed to individualism, egalitarianism (as long as such participatory involvement doesn't threaten its own policies or monopoly on power), and political activism in liberal causes. They are, frankly, this-worldly. Speaking of the tremendous growth in church membership in the United States since 1776, Finke and Stark note that not all churches shared this participation and strength equally: "to the degree that denominations rejected traditional doctrines and ceased to make serious demands on their followers, they ceased to prosper. The churching of America was accomplished by aggressive churches committed to vivid otherworldliness" (Finke and Stark 1). Launius's critique of his own church leadership can't be effective because his ideological commitments are the same as theirs, and he is unwilling to submit that ideology to critique.

Sociologists of religion often make the point: "As denominations have modernized their doctrines and embraced temporal values, they have gone into decline" (Finke and Stark 18). American historians of religion often miss an accurate history of their subject by being distracted by their own ideological commitments to modernity. They see the history of a church in terms of the gradual Whiggish progress toward the liberalism. This liberalism prefers religions that have been tamed, "shorn of mystery, miracle, and mysticism-when an active supernatural realm is replaced by abstractions concerning virtue". Finke and Stark see church strength directly correlated to their rejection of modernity and its tendency to theologize and professionalize; "theological refinement is the kind of progress that results in organizational bankruptcy" (Finke and Stark 5). If you know the history of the RLDS church, you know that over the past thirty years the denomination has de emphasized any distinctively Mormon attributes of its history and doctrine.

It has instead mimicked the Protestant oldline. It has professionalized its ministry and maintained tight ideological control over church leadership. It has become increasingly involved in ecumenical dialogue and a social gospel. In all of these, the RLDS church follows the pattern set by the Protestant mainline.

Many religious bodies go through the sect-church pattern. They begin having exclusivist claims to truth and a high degree of tension between their members and the world. But over time they transform into churches; they shift to becoming more ecumenical, more this-worldly, more comfortable with the modern world. Often members of such denominations who desire a high tension between church and world will rebel and either fight the changes or split off (Finke and Stark 42). Both the Baptists and the Methodists began as radical churches, quite far outside the mainstream of American religion: the equivalent of the hippies of their day. But as most religions do, Baptists and Methodists became more comfortable with this world.

One sign of the change was the increasing expectation that the clergy would have degrees in higher education. The clergy shifts from a "message of conversion" to a "message of erudition" as the clergy shifts from lay ministry to professional ministry. But it isn't the education itself that causes the decline; it is the this-worldly aspect of the expectation, as "the message becomes more worldly, [it] is held with less certainty, as religion becomes the focus of scholarly critique and attention" (Finke and Stark 84). Launius's brief history of the RLDS Church parallels closely the larger pattern of how Stark and Finke describe the decline of mainline denominations: "Successful sect movements develop strong internal pressures to lower their tension with the surrounding culture.

These pressures come from having an increasingly affluent membership and from an increasingly 'professionalized' clergy. Together, the privileged laity and the 'well-trained' clergy begin to lift restrictions on behavior and to soften doctrines that had served to set the sect apart from its social environment-a process known as sect transformation or secularization" (Finke and Stark 150). Stark and Finke's discussion of the transformation of the Methodist church from sect to denomination is broadly similar to that of the RLDS Church. In the 1850's the Methodists began quarreling over adaptation to modernity.

The New School Methodists flaunted their affluence with expensive clothes and fancy additions to their churches. The Old School Methodists, who wanted to remain more Spartan and more otherworldly, were kicked out by church leaders who preferred to rent pews to rich parishioners and acclimate to social and political power (Finke and Stark 150-53). Some fifty years later the unpaid or low-paid circuit riders had been replaced by a professional and sedentary clergy. Local churches were placed under centralized episcopal control so new modes could be forced on local, and often reluctant, congregations. Congregations had to be merged in order to make the paid clergy economical (Finke and Stark 153-54). Methodists began opening seminaries to train the clergy in 1947; desiring the prestige of Congregationalist, Episcopalian, and Presbyterian churches, Methodists began requiring that their clergy have the same educational qualifications other churches required.

Increasing salaries for the clergy were a point of pride for the modernizers. Aggressive revivals and missionary work, watering down of doctrine, restraint on emotional display were all the result of this emphasis on a professional clergy. "Religious doctrine often seems to be become accommodated and secularized whenever it is delivered into the control of intellectuals" (Finke and Stark 158) as students in the seminaries are indoctrinated to their new professionalized and modernized stance. Methodists became more prosperous and liked to display that wealth publicly as with the long-sought and withheld respectability of church members of more established churches. As they became more like their neighbors, the Methodists distanced themselves from rigorous enforcement of moral and behavioral standards that had always been their identifying trademark (Finke and Stark 159-63). "Thus we see the Methodists as they were transformed from sect to church.

Their clergy were increasingly willing to condone the pleasures of this world and to de emphasize sin, hellfire, and damnation; this lenience struck highly responsive chords in an increasingly affluent, influential, and privileged membership. This is, of course, the fundamental dynamic by which sects are transformed into churches, thereby losing the vigor and the high octane faith that caused them to succeed in the first place" (Finke and Stark 163). Too late, not until the twentieth-century, did Methodist Episcopal Church leaders begin to realize their strength and growth were beginning to decline. A series of excuses and inverted claims of success were advanced by apologists: the church was much more respectable now, the new de emphasis of conversion and emphasis on social service was needed, the decline was just a result of local churches purging their rolls and keeping their books in good order (Finke and Stark 166-67).

You hear much the same discussion coming from demoralized RLDS church leaders who aren't willing to take responsibility for the consequences of the changes they have wrought. Note that conversion from an other-worldly church to a this-worldly church comes from the church leaders and is imposed by that elite on the church members. "The underlying dynamic of sect-church theory is that social forces tend to influence the preferences of people vis-'a-vis religion: that as the general affluence and social standing of a group rises, otherworldliness-as expressed through tension with the environment-becomes perceived as increasingly costly. For the clergy, the costs of remaining a high-tension sect are especially high. They often receive less pay and community respect than their counterparts in 'mainline' denominations, even though they face more stringent demands on their belief and behavior. The result: the well-educated clergy and affluent membership are often the first to support a lowering of the tension with the surrounding culture" (Finke and Stark 170), so when paid clergy gain access to the levers of power in the organization they tend to transform the church rapidly.

Southern Baptists were able to resist the modernizing moves of their church leadership partially: they acquired seminaries and a professional clergy but they had several resources that mitigated the move to denomination twice, including local autonomy of congregations. The clergy graduated as liberals from the seminaries but could be fired or not hired by local congregations without being dictated to by a central hierarchy so the ministers had to conceal or change their liberal orientation (Finke and Stark 170-77). Current controversies swirl around in Dialogue and Sunstone about similar issues. LDS church leaders are criticized for maintaining tight control over BYU. A more moderate stance toward homosexuality is urged on the LDS church. A less hierarchical ecclesiastical structure is prescribed.

Openness toward the ordination of women is urged. All of these are modernizing influenced advocated by intellectual elites within the tradition and outside observers. Kelley notes that the decline of oldline churches is probably too far advanced to be stanched. We can, however, see the reasons for that decline and urge churches that haven't adapted so thoroughly to modernity not to do so, for that is what caused the decline in the first place.

The modernizers urge Southern Baptists, Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and others to become more laid back about moral judgments, more tolerant of heretical opinions and teachers in their colleges, more free about sexual concerns; yet Kelley notes that these very changes urged upon less modernized religions are the very ones that led to the drastic ill health of the oldline churches (Kelley, Why vs. ). Kelley notes that he uses the word dying to describe the feebleness of oldline churches because the process probably isn't reversible. "Having once succumbed to debility, a church is unlikely to recover, not because the measures leading to recovery could not be prescribed and instituted (some are suggested in what follows), but because the persons who now occupy positions of leadership and follower ship in the church will not find them congenial and will not want to institute them. They prefer a church which is not too strenuous or demanding-a church, in fact, which is dying" (Kelley, Why ix-x). This perspective from the sociology of religion needs to be considered before the demands of the liberalizes are acted upon by those in either the LDS or the RLDS churches. Two basic explanations are often advanced to explain why an organization declines: (1) the times change or (2) the failure is in the organization itself which refuses to develop the competence necessary to compete.

If you blame the times for the death of a church, then you absolve the leaders, and you might even claim that the church needs a greater dose of modernity, not less. But if the leaders are to change with the times the church may emphasize doctrine and history less and broad moral principles more; this would move the focus of the church away from its other-worldly past emphasis and more on a social gospel. You would give up on saying that some people are saved and others excluded from divine rewards. "For such a tolerant, reasonable, and relevant religion modern man might perhaps be able to find a place in his brave new world. He might even admit a sufficiently chastened, nonexclusive, and un censorious church" (Kelley, Why 17-20). Explanations that blame church decline on the times don't recognize that only some churches are dying and others are vibrant and growing.

Kelley lists the declining churches: the oldline Protestant churches (he mentions also the Catholic church elsewhere: 32-35). Those growing, renewing, and retaining vitality are Southern Baptists, Assemblies of God and Pentecostal churches, Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, and Black Muslims (Kelley, Why 21). Membership decline, ecumenism, and leniency are not causes of weaknesses in churches but are symptoms of more fundamental problems. Simple explanations are deceptive precisely because they are simple. Entropy is a factor in all organizations and institutions founded to advance a certain cause are often converted to quite other pursuits (Kelley, Why 97-99).

Decline or increase in membership isn't the only way to measure the health of a church. But other measures also demonstrate a reduction of vitality in oldline American Protestantism. Attendance, contributions, Sunday school enrollment: all such measures combine to demonstrate decline among the mainlines (Michael sen and Roof 7). Luidens blames the decline in oldline church membership on demographic changes: "Our culture's seismic shift in family patterns (delayed marriage, later childbearing and fewer children) has had a devastating effect on this historic source of church growth". Increased mobility and individualism also come in for their share of blame, for "it would be virtually impossible for the mainline (or any group) to unilaterally counteract the cultural pluralism, the capitalism-driven mobility or the underlying individualism which characterize recent American experience" (Luidens, "Fighting" 1077). Of course, such claims don't really address the relevant problem because all churches don't face decline.

If the problems were caused by cultural changes, one would expect all churches within that culture to experience the impact in similar ways. But because some churches are growing, the sources of the decline must lie at least in part in the churches themselves. Luidens notes that explanations of oldline decline other than the ones he supports are often used to advance "particular theological or political agendas" (Luidens, "Fighting" 1078), without noting that his position is open to the same charge. His is a position which supports the shift toward a modern ideology in the oldline churches, a shift toward this-worldliness, toward ecumenism and the social gospel. Luidens opposes an emphasis on returning to orthodox theology and activity as the cure for this decline. He finds fault with those who equate numbers with church health.

He proposes more a greater dose of the chemical which is making modernist churches sick: more social activity, more historical-critical approaches to scripture, more liberation theology, more experimentation in liturgy, more ecumenism, more "tolerance" (Luidens, "Fighting" 1078-79). Luidens just reasserts the correctness of the conversion to modernity that distinguishes the oldline churches. His prescription ignores the social scientific data and insists that health of churches ought to be measured in more idiosyncratic ways than we are accustomed to measuring with. Unfortunately, Luidens gives little support that his measures (outside his own personal experience) are better than those he dismisses.

Hoge, Johnson and Luidens recount the main explanations for church decline. They divide the theories into three categories then further subdivide those factors (Hoge, Johnson, and Luidens 12-19): Cultural Factors: Increased liberal education: in most religious institutions, the higher the education level, the lower the activity level. Liberal education is taken to be a causal factor in these explanations. Increased pluralism: now aware of many cultures, Americans are more willing to countenance other meaning systems other than traditional religions. Increased individualism: every person does what is right in his or her own eyes rather than adhering to communal norms. Increased privat ism: retreat from public involvement.

Increased opposition to institutions: rebellion against authority typical of Baby Boomers. Social Structural Factors: Decreased influence of communities: people feel less constrained by the expectations of their neighbors. Conversions in family roles and the roles of women: the common pattern of young people rebelling against their faith was always followed by a return in later life. The generations since the 1960's have not demonstrated the return pattern. Delayed childbirth, women's emphasis on career, higher divorce rates, fewer childbirths, increased cohabitation, all make people feel uncomfortable returning to the church fold. With more women devoted to careers, time for volunteer work has decreased.

Feminism has also challenged the authority and structure of most churches. Decreased switching from other denominations: liberal churches with a full-fledged commitment to modernity have declined in their ability to benefit from migration between denominations. Institutional Factors: Lack of institutional relevance: churches need to be more relevant to attract young people. More involvement in civil rights, poverty, warfare and similar issues will provide such attraction. Increased social activism: the opposite of the previous explanation, this one posits that when churches lose their other-worldly focus to concentrate on social activism, they lose their appeal.

Failed leadership: church leaders are out of touch with their members or have designed bad programs that don't inspire loyalty. Decreased internal strength (the Kelley thesis): still the dominant explanation, Kelley's thesis is that when churches no longer police their boundaries and clearly set this church off from others by adherence to fully articulated beliefs and requiring sacrifice from their members, they begin to decline. Weak churches have given way to pluralism, relativism, and individualism. The three writers say the data doesn't support the idea that counterculture ethics from the 1960's were the cause of oldline decline. The use of drugs, the anti-authoritarianism, and rebellion aren't directly the cause the decline. But the attitudes may have an indirect influence on decline by undermining mores about respect for authority.

They also urge the abandonment of three institutional theories: that churches used the wrong public presentations, that churches were too irrelevant, that churches were too socially involved; the decline is a long-term trend that isn't caused by such short-term issues. Additionally, few lapsed church members cited these as causes of their withdrawal from church activity. The problems of decline have little to do with culture clash between liberals and conservatives but is instead a matter of spiritual decline. "They have lost members because, over the years, beliefs have been changing" (Hoge, Johnson, and Luidens 176-78).

The Kelley thesis says that those churches defining their boundaries, mobilizing their members' commitments, and providing firm beliefs are those that are strong. Strong churches require strictness and sacrifice. Weak churches have a muddled message and truth claim because they are too accepting of divergence and indecisiveness. They don't impose standards of conduct on members and value individualism. "Individualism, relativism in matters of faith, a diversity of viewpoints on many issues and openness to alternative perspectives all make for weak religious organizations" factors (Hoge, Johnson, and Luidens 180-184). People who belong to liberal churches, such as the Presbyterian Church, have little discernible difference between themselves and people not actively involved in religious institutions but who still describe themselves as religious (Hoge, Johnson, and Luidens 185).

There are two ways churches can reinvigorate their communions, according to the Kelley thesis: (1) hold periodical revivals or (2) institute "a strong system of authority with a vested interest in enforcing them" as the Catholic Church has; but the results of Vatican II have largely dissipated this authoritarian model and the church has since weakened (Hoge, Johnson, and Luidens 186-87). Churches can react to that lost strength in one of two ways: (1) reconciling themselves to it and accepting the individualism, relativism, and pluralism or (2) resisting those modern impulses. Resisting might require that church members stop assimilating to modern culture by sending children to religious schools, stop endorsing scriptural historical criticism, take steps to encourage endogamous marriage, pull back from ecumenism, take a more literalistic approach to biblical criticism. The three authors don't see this as real alternative; it requires a reversal of a century's change in the oldline church policies (Hoge, Johnson, and Luidens 1206-208). The old version of authority no longer seems a plausible alternative to liberals. To settle on a single cause of these declines in oldline church membership is to be simplistic.

Both decline and growth are complex trends with many contributing factors (Roozen and Carroll 39). However, certain trends are consistent enough to pose serious problems to the defenders of liberal modernity. Hoge and Roozen attribute the declines in oldline membership to national and trans denominational factors. The larger social context has changed attitudes to be more individualistic, more affluent, more assimilationist; these are the factors that are the major causes of these changes, especially in churches with cosmopolitan, educated, middle-class memberships (churches less able to retain their youth than others) (Hoge and Roozen 328).

Such explanations don't, however, explain how some churches are affected more by these value shifts than others. Kelley notes that many of the contributors of the book Understanding Church Growth and Decline don't face up to the question of why some churches decline and some don't. This is usually because, he says, the commentators just don't understand and don't want to understand the types of churches that are still growing: Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Seventh-Day Adventists, Pentecostals. "I'm not sure I do either, but I am proposing that 'mainline' readers entertain the notion that such groups may be doing something right" (Kelley, "Is" 335). More conservative churches are still experiencing growth. Such denominations include Southern Baptists, Seventh Day Adventists, Nazarene's (Reeves 32).

Typical excuses and justifications for decline in oldline churches include the idea that only the least committed are dropping out, leaving a more committed core to do God's work (Reeves 28). Many reasons are offered for oldline decline. Conservatives blame the reductions on the leftward tilt of church leadership since the 1960's. Others claim that the church is the victim of forces beyond its control: demographic, political, educational, economic (Reeves 30-31). The fact that some churches are in decline doesn't ask the right question about church membership; the right question is "why are some churches more susceptible to cultural assimilation than others?" Even to explain decline in terms of culture is to settle on an answer too easily.

Perhaps churches have been leading cultural relativism and individuality rather than following (Kelley, "Is" 337). The large gap in political advocacy between church leadership and its laity has widened since the 1960's. Instead of confrontation, though, the church membership chose instead to leave their churches. "All in all, what has happened here is a particularly striking verification of one of W.R. Inge's nastier dicta: 'He who marries the spirit of the age soon finds himself a widower'; it holds important lessons for all religious liberals who believe that institutional survival depends on accommodation to the Zeitgeist (Berger, "American" 25). The Protestant oldline denominations and the RLDS church haven't been the only ones experiencing this decline. The American Catholic church has been "Protestanized" in that when the leadership of the Catholic and Methodist churches release statements on political activism, one finds it hard to distinguish between the political positions of the two.

The bureaucracy of the Catholic church holds similar social positions and the case of both Catholicism and Protestantism this has caused many members to abandon the church (Berger, "American" 30-31). Demographic trends bring to relief to the membership drought of the oldline churches. Its members are older, have fewer children, and they doesn't benefit anymore from church-switching members. Natural growth rates, then, portend decline.

All these factors are beyond the control of church leaders. Elements of decline that might be within the range of influence of leadership include the reversing of secular drift. This would require the church to surrender its over-emphasis on individualism. Another solution would be to move from passive to active in recruiting new members. McKinney and Roof advocate this proposition, declining to support another proposed solution: a shift away from liberal political causes and its language of toleration and pluralism (McKinney and Roof 48-50). The disestablishment of American Protestantism has largely occurred against the backdrop of modernity.

Liberal Protestantism has reacted by accepting and accommodating modernity. Conservative Protestantism has reacted by ignoring modernity. The oldline churches made their peace with modernity and were "captured" by a liberal leadership. "Their leaders, colleges, seminaries, publications, and a great many of their clergy toed the liberal line. They accommodated by their concern for social ministry, their willingness to cooperate across denominational lines, and their openness to 'higher criticism' of the Bible" (Hammond 54).

Launius has suggested one reaction to RLDS church decline: fire the current church leaders. The compromises and reforms instigated by the church leaders have not worked, in fact have caused the current crisis. According to a study of baby boomers published in First Things "the only solid predictor of adult church participation seemed to be 'orthodox Christian belief, and especially the teaching that a person can be saved only through Jesus Christ. ' " Doctrinal compromise and fuzziness is a recipe for church decline (Neff 17). By accepting modernity so unambiguously, liberal Christian churches have succeeded in making themselves dispensable. By claiming no special insight into truth, by investing in this-worldly rewards, "Liberal Protestantism, in its determined policy of accommodation with the secular world, has succeeded in making itself dispensable" (Reeves 171-73).

The pattern of debility the RLDS church is enduring is well established and evident in plenty of time for its leaders to have taken action a few decades ago. "Looking at American history, Finke and Stark have described an 'endless cycle' in which sects become churches, churches grow increasingly secular and lose their organizational vigor, and new sects are founded to restore a supernatural faith. The losers in this cycle are those ecclesiastical bodies that have grown worldly, failing to satisfy members most in need of the sacred. In short, Finke and Stark contend that when a church becomes mainline body, it begins to wilt. And out of secularism comes revival. The 'Seven Sisters' of today's mainline Protestantism are thus, in this provocative view of things, on the inevitable road to oblivion.

It is the price they must pay for failing to resist the world, one of Christianity's sternest commands" (Reeves 174). Perhaps Launius is right that firing church leaders is the appropriate response just based on pragmatic grounds that theirs is a failed and predictable policy. The Dominance and Weakness of Liberal Modernity Keep in mind that orthodox Mormon belief is likely to be caricatured when described by advocates of liberal modernity. It isn't though one side is neutral and objective while the other is biased and polemical. One must expect ideologically-advantageous descriptions from all the participants in the discussion. Berkowitz speaks of the "infirmities of academic liberalism": "the uncritical self-assurance of its own essential correctness; a pride in its own tolerance that is often manifested in sanctimonious and unyielding condescension toward opposing viewpoints; and a narrow and intense concentration on principles and their implications for public and private law accompanied by a disregard for the impact of the actualization of those principles on citizens' character" (Berkowitz 52).

In advocates of toleration and pluralism, one shouldn't be surprised to find intolerance and dogmatism. Launius notes what he calls the "overbearing rigidity" of the LDS church (Launius, "Reorganized"58). Keep in mind that any call to obedience is likely to be viewed as overbearingly rigid to a proponent of liberal modernity. If I use the vocabulary and perspective of one side in a debate, the other side is likely to look ridiculous. Liberalism has collapsed as an ideology and political philosophy. It was the product of contingent historical conditions that now are outdated.

Philosophers more frequently note the lack of credibility of liberalism, that "we cannot rely on any core liberal conviction to sustain a public order. We are thrown back upon the continuity of social conventions and the enclaves of traditional communities as the only solidifies that remain. The universalism of liberalism as an ideology is abandoned, and we acknowledge the extent to which it has been tied to the peculiar historical conditions of its genesis and development. Philosophy is replaced by history". Liberalism relies upon a circularity that first must assert its claims about liberty before demonstrating that as the highest goal of a society (Walsh 44). Liberalism does its ideological work most effectively as long as everyone agrees not to ask about its own status as an ideology.

If everyone within the debate agrees that liberalism sets the horizon of the debate, the supremacy of liberal modernity is never likely to be considered. Liberal modernity is increasingly attenuated today and no longer can take for granted its status as neutral and objective arbitrator of modern culture. It still dominates our universities and media as an unquestioned and uncritical assumption, but it is rapidly losing that function because its weaknesses have been exposed by critics. Liberal modernity has maintained particular scorn for religious belief because the latter has been one of the few ideological positions capable of challenging the loyalty of subjects in liberal culture. Liberalism attempted to drive religion from the public square as a respectable position, but now liberal modernity itself has begun its long withdrawing roar down the strand as seas of faith renew themselves and contend for a place within society. Liberal Coercion Although pluralism and tolerance are explicit priorities within liberal modernity, they are qualities sadly lacking when modernity engages its own opponents.

"Pluralism is by nature exclusionary" (Abraham 28), and since one can't be consistently tolerant and pluralistic when it comes to your opponents, liberal modernity holds religious positions to a higher standard that it itself is able to muster. It would be contradictory and hypocritical to find liberals being coercive and dominating when it comes to opposing positions because liberalism is committed to a free a full discussion of the issues free of violence and coercion. "Pluralists readily desert their pluralism in their vehement opposition to certain kinds of classical and conservative theology" (Abraham 28). Some of these same struggles have occurred in the culture wars inside other Christian denominations. United Methodism, no longer so united nor so methodical, is divided into three groups: (1) the radicals or revisionists who see in any traditional belief nothing but exclusion, patriarchy, and oppression, (2) liberals who have made their peace with modernity and have adapted Christianity to the imperatives of the Enlightenment, and (3) the classical adherents who desire a return to some orthodox form of Christianity (Abraham). The three groups can no longer maintain a united front, for their ultimate goals work against the other groups' interests.

The RLDS Church is largely committed to the modern notion that truth is relative and uncertain to discern, but they have attempted to suppress positions that assert the truth and antiquity of the Book of Mormon. So that seems to be at least one point position about which they seem to be certain. The leadership silenced and removed a pastor who invited Book of Mormon believers to discuss the antiquity of the book to his branch members and silenced the Foundation for Research on Ancient America, an organization advancing the idea that the book is what it claims to be (Midgley, "Radical" 147-150). For a church committed to liberal and open inquiry, these are hardly liberal and open acts. They instead smack of coercion and power. One is less surprised to see LDS church leaders firing BYU professors or excommunicating critics; they are committed to some firm notion of truth and revelation, violation of which is to transgress boundaries that need to be maintained W. Grant McMurray, current RLDS president, is attempting to convert the RLDS Church into what he calls "a nonprophet organization", which includes a "participatory management" model, appointments to church hierarchy that don't reflect the mind and will of God but McMurray's best judgment of the heart, and the changes in the church not be considered scriptural or canonical ("Nonprophet" 787).

It is hard to maintain such pluralism and democracy in the face of determined opposition to the reforms liberals are committed to. The liberal faction within the RLDS church won struggle to decide the orientation of the church, a struggle ongoing since the 1970's (Launius, "RLDS" 47). For example, section 156 of the RLDS Doctrine and Covenants became canonical in 1984. It was a compromise work, attempting to bring the conservative and liberal elements in the church into some workable compromise. Launius calls it both "Machiavellian and authoritarian". Liberals received an important change: the ordination to women to the priesthood.

The liberal church leadership obtained more appointment power over its ministers to coerce them to accept the dictates of the central bureaucracy. So ironically a church leadership promoting pluralism, democracy and openness was centralizing and forcing its church members to accept its ideological position. The conservative faction of the church received permission to build a temple in Independence, a long-sought prerogative. For Launius, section 156 represents an unworkable compromise between the two factions, its inability to decide if it is Protestant or Mormon (Launius, "RLDS" 50-51). Dissidents from the liberal direction in the RLDS church have been puzzled by the selective attack on Mormon scripture. Modern approaches to biblical criticism were applied to the Bible and the Book of Mormon.

But no such approaches were applied to the Doctrine and Covenants, at least through the 1970's. But there was a Machiavellian reason such analysis wasn't supported and advanced by the church hierarchy. Surely the liberals "should regard the revelations of the Doctrine and Covenants as products of Smith's environment, but the power to bring revelations to the church gives the Reorganization prophet a tremendous weapon for settling matters of church policy" (Russell 325). Not believing that God spoke to prophets in the past, the leadership was unwilling to say so in a way that would undermine its own ability to impose its agenda on its church members. Liberals are willing to abandon even their most cherished principles when their own authority is challenged. Committed to pluralism and tolerance, the RLDS church leadership when faced with dissent has practiced neither.

When Richard Price began to publish critiques of the liberal movement in the church, the church threatened legal action, shut down symposia critical of its position, withdrew Price's priesthood license, and finally excommunicated him (Russell 327-36). Ecumenism and Separation Strict churches maintain firm boundaries between their members and outsiders. Making members a peculiar, unique people is necessary to establishing vital churches. Ecumenical activity undermines this cohesion. If the RLDS church is to regain some momentum and life, it must define the boundaries that separate it from other churches; it has done this by denying all that is distinctively Mormon, but that only serves to distinguish it from the LDS church. Somehow boundaries must be maintained between the RLDS church and Protestantism.

"Every faith-group considers itself the One True Faith and all others imposters: sects, cults, conventicles, apostasies, heresies, or idolatries. To the degree that it comes to think of itself as one among many similar and equally meritorious others, it has already begun to lose its appeal" (Kelley, Why xii). Ecumenism, which most often emerges from modernity's emphasis on pluralism and reluctance to pass judgment on others, undermines the identity necessary to create a church. "The more vehemently [a religion] insists that it is not just another mere religious institution, the more effective it is likely to be in performing the religious function for its members!" (Kelley, Why xii).

The insistence by the LDS church that it is the only true church seems to the most likely policy contributing to continued health. The RLDS insistence that no organization has a privileged access to the truth of God and humanity seems a policy certain to contribute to a muddled message and, consequentially, decline. Other churches, Protestant and Catholic, have experienced the same decline. Since Vatican Council II the Roman Catholic Church has in some ways moved from the sect category to the ecumenical category of churches.

Dropping its reluctance to sanction mixed marriages, moving away from Latin masses, no longer insisting on meatless Fridays, the church has rapidly adopted aggiornamento as its policy. Since its adaptation to modernity, the Catholic church has experienced massive increases in clergy defections and high instances of membership loss in the United States. These and other measures show the dramatic effects of liberalization and modernization on the church (Kelley, Why 32-35). This is not to imply that the LDS church is immune from modern influences. Certainly the church has accommodated to the scientific and technological aspects of modernity. I think Armand Mauss is fundamentally mistaken in some ways, but that difference belongs to another essay.

Mauss asserts that Mormons had been successful at assimilating to American society by mid-century then began the process of becoming more sect-like, to de-assimilate (Mauss x). Theology can't be relied upon to differentiate between Mormons and other Americans because contemporaries are largely indifferent to the.