Locke's View On The Identity Of Persons example essay topic

In order to form an opinion on what Locke would do in the case of the 80 year old man who has been charged with war crimes that he genuinely does not remember one has to analyse the complex definitions surrounding identities. This essay will look into Locke's thoughts and theories and by process of elimination speculate on how Locke would have evaluated the claim. Why the necessity to fully analyse the definition of identity? Locke believed that the identity of things was not always as readily discernable as what first meets the eye and as a consequence set about defining the identity of all things from physical objects, the identity of living entities and ultimately the identity of man and the identity of person. Locke viewed the identity of physical objects based on "perfect continued existence of the material body" (Emerson, 1997: 1). An object will remain the same object if it has all the same physical components.

The arrangement of the physical particles is irrelevant. Locke used the example of simple and compound substances, involving atoms (Wanderer, 2005: 59). However, a simpler example would be a book on a shelf. If the book remained untouched in perpetuity, then the identity of the book would remain unchanged. But if pages were torn out of the book, Locke's view would be that it is not the same book anymore - there ceases to be a perfect continued existence of material body (Emerson, 1997: 1) Locke viewed the identity of living entities in a different light. Above, change in mass constituted a change in identity.

But, in living entities a change in mass does not affect the identity of the object. Locke uses the example of the oak tree. It starts off as a sapling and grows into a huge oak tree, with a massive change in mass. That oak tree could be subjected to the cutting of branches, and the winter fall of leaves, however it still remains an oak tree because it continues the life of a tree. It maintains the same functional arrangements of components (Blackburn, 1999: 125-126). An interesting example is raised by Blackburn in assessing "how much change to tolerate while still regarding it as the same 'thing' " (Blackburn, 1999: 127).

'Theseus's hip' is used to illustrate this. The ship goes on a long voyage and is in need of constant repair and maintenance. By the end of the voyage, all the components of the ship have been changed. The question arises, is this still the same ship? To take matters to an extreme, if somebody along the way collected all the discarded, broken bits, repaired them and reassembled the ship, is this now two ships with the same identity? Or are they two different ships with different identities?

In this case, the assembled ship assumes the physical identity whereas the repaired ship assumes a functional identity (Blackburn, 1999: 127). And what is so important in this analysis, is that in Locke's view this applies to animals, machines, and 'man. ' At this stage it would be fairly straightforward to say that the 80 year old criminal (assuming that he was guilty of war crimes) should be charged because he was the same man as he was when he committed the crime, and this is largely what happens in the courts today. However, Locke has a very different and interesting twist on which I shall now elaborate. Locke asks the question, is the man the same as the person? This is extremely profound.

Understanding the difference between what Locke terms a 'man' and a 'person,' is fundamental in formulating a decision regarding the plight of the 80 year old, as determined by Locke. Very similar to his views regarding animals and machines, Locke shows that the identity of the 'same man' deals with the physical aspect of a being: all parts that constitute recognition of people such as bodily looks, character, your name and memory (to a lesser extent) (Dabbs, 2001: 1). These are evidence of "the man" or "the vehicle" (the working parts of the body: arms, legs, face etc.) but do not constitute personal identity. In Locke's words: "same man consists in, namely: a participation in the same continued life by constantly fleeting particles of matter that are successfully, vitally united to the same organised body.

If you place the identity of man in anything but this, you will find it hard to make an embryo or an adult the same man" (Wanderer, 2005: 60). Locke's view on the identity of persons is: "a thinking, intelligent being who has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing at different times and places" (Wanderer, 2005: 60). In his definition of same person, Locke emphasizes the importance of consciousness which he perceives to be inseparable from thinking. In order to perfect personal identity there needs to be continuity of consciousness, memory and rational life (Dabbs, 2001: 2). We are now in the realm as Blackburn puts it, of an "immaterial substance - the mysterious, simple soul of Me" (Blackburn, 1999: 128). Locke believes that the tenure of "personal identity" is constrained or limited by ones memory for his definition insists upon continuous memory.

The instance of a loss of memory results in the end of one personal identity and the start of another (Dabbs, 2001: 2). To illustrate this, I quote the metaphor Locke uses: "consciousness functions in very much the same way as the thread connects the beads on a necklace. Just as the thread is what makes the beads into one necklace by running through all of them, so consciousness, by linking together a number of actions, events, feelings, and so on, makes these into one person" (Dabbs, 2001: 2). Relating this back to the 80 year old war criminal, because he cannot remember the crime committed in his twenties, he is not the same person (according to Locke) as he is today. And therefore, should not be punished for crimes he cannot remember committing. There is no question that he is the same man who committed the crime, but there is serious doubt as to whether he is the same person.

Locke believes that it is a different person. However, there are other philosophers who have a different view. Reid thinks that Locke's account violates transitivity (Blackburn, 1999: 134). According to transitivity, A = B, B = C, therefore A = C. In other words, the man in his twenties is logically the 80 year old man and should be responsible for his actions (Blackburn, 1999: 134). In the event of eye witnesses verifying the 80 year olds guilt, he should be punished. This is Reid's view and is supported by Jenkins who states: "In this case, human courts would justly punish the man and not the person" (Dabbs, 2001: 3).

To sum this up, Locke would not hold the 80 year old man responsible for his actions in his twenties which he cannot remember because this lacks continuity of memory, and therefore, the young man is a different to the old man (Blackburn, 1999: 133). The young person would be guilty of the crime, not the old person. Whilst enjoying the debate and on an intellectual level, being largely persuaded by Locke's argument, it is almost impossible to state hypothetically what my response would be. My initial thoughts would be that the man should be charged because I had no concept of the difference between 'same man' and 'same person. ' Now that I do, it is intellectually appealing to support Locke. However, there is no doubt that emotions and the desire for revenge would play a role in my decision.

This can only be tested in reality. Locke's view on personal identity as it relates to accountability and responsibility is a bit extreme. I align myself more easily with the thoughts of Reid whose view is that as long as the young man can remember his middle age and his youth, even though not specifically the war crime, he is the same person and the same man and therefore accountable. Agreeing with Reid, "all that is needed to retain personal identity is some link of continuity" (Sparknotes, 2005: 1) In conclusion, Locke distinguishes between 'same man' and 'same person. ' In order for the 80 year old man to be responsible for the crime he committed in his twenties, there needs to be not only flow from one psychological state to another, but also continuity of content.

Locke would believe it to be unfair if the old man was punished for something he can't remember doing because when people can't remember, they become someone else. Word Count: 1436

Bibliography

1. Blackburn, S. 1999.
Think. Oxford University Press. 2. Dabbs, J. 2001.
Locke on Personal Identity. [Online]. Available: web (Dabbs). html (2005, May 1) 3.
Emerson, B. 1997.
On personal Identity. [Online]. Available: web (2005, May 1).
4. Locke, J. 1690. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Wanderer, J. 2005.
Introduction to Philosophy. Content Solutions. 5. Sparknotes Staff. 2005.