Mao And The Korean War example essay topic

The Dragon Enters the Warn June 1950, a few months after the announcement of the Beijing-Moscow alliance, the Korean crisis erupted. Early in October, shortly after the South Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel, the CCP made a final decision to enter the Korean War to fight the American-led international forces. What precipitated Beijing's decision to invade Korea? What were the CCP's motives and objectives in taking part in the Korean conflict? What kind of role did the newly established Sino-Soviet alliance play in Beijing's decision to cross the Yalu River?

This paper tries to answer those questions. The Chinese ideogram for crisis is a combination of the ideograms for danger and opportunity. To the leaders of the People's Republic of China, the Korean War was both. As the UN forces advanced north toward the Yalu, Beijing prepared for war.

Mao still found the decision to go to war a difficult one, however, despite the pressure to intervene. Following the Inchon landings, Kim Il Sung had dispatched two of his top aides to Beijing and asked Mao for emergency help, but the Chinese were not ready to make any firm commitment. Stalin, following the landings, also pleaded with the Chinese to go to the aid of the North Koreans. According to Chinese sources, the Soviet leader promised to provide air cover for the Chinese troops and to send Russian troops in the event the Chinese army faltered. Still, Mao hesitated. Most disturbing to Mao, if the Chinese armies intervened and were pushed back would Stalin really send troops as promised in order to save China?

Also of concern, if China became involved in a war with the United States, China's dependence on Stalin would inevitably grow, an unsavory thought to Mao. Finally, all hope of conquering Taiwan would vanish indefinitely. Despite his hesitance, step-by-step Mao moved closer to intervention. On October 1, Stalin telegraphed Mao and encouraged him to send "volunteer" Chinese soldiers into North Korea for the purpose of defending the area north of the 38th Parallel. On October 2, Mao directed the Chinese Politburo to pass a resolution to send these Chinese troops into North Korea, beginning on October 15. The same day, Mao cabled Stalin of China's decision to send volunteers into Korea to "fight the United States and its lackey Syngman Rhee".

Although Chinese preparations for war accelerated, Mao refused to give the green light, perhaps held back by the reservations expressed by some of the other members of the Politburo. As Mao pondered his options, however, he concluded the reasons for entering the war outweighed the reasons for entering the war outweighed the reasons for remaining neutral. Profoundly distrustful of the United States, Mao believed that after a victorious war in Korea the Americans would attempt to make China their next victim. Already U.S. naval action had effectively blocked the conquest of Taiwan, which for Mao was itself a sufficient cause for war.

The Soviet presence and the Sino-Soviet alliance, Mao believed, would keep the war limited on non-nuclear, and the U.S. involvement in Europe would prevent the Americans from making a total commitment to a war in Korea. William Stuck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton Univ. Press, 1995), 94. Khrushchev, Nikita S. "Truth About the Korean War". Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow) 1 (1990), 28. Goncharov, Sergei N., John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai.

Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War. Stanford, Calif. : Stanford Univ. Press, 1993,173. Shen, Zhihua. "China Sends Troops to Korea: Beijing's Policy-Making Process".

China and the United States: A New Cold War History, ed. Xiaobing Li and Hongshan Li. Lanham, Md. : Univ. Press of America, 1998, 27. Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue Litai, 177.

Zhihua Shen, 28. Xiaobing Li, "Making of Mao's Cold War: The Taiwan Straits Crises Revised", in China and the United States: A New Cold War History, ed. Xiaobing Li and Hongshan Li (Lanham, Md. : Univ. Press of America, 1998), 51.