Nato Enlargement With Majority Support example essay topic

So far, these countries have been most successful in preparing small units assigned to NATO missions. In effect, one could argue that each Central European ally has "two militaries" - the small, better equipped and NATO compatible force, and the bulk of the armed forces that have some way to go to meet NATO standards. This imbalance needs to be corrected through the greater allocation of resources and through a personnel policy that would rotate officers and NCOs with experience in NATO-compatible units and in NATO missions to posts in the main armed forces. The Central Europeans could also consider further reductions in the size of their armed forces beyond what is currently being proposed.

The goal should be to free additional resources in the inadequate defense budgets for reinvestment in their modernization programs, thereby, increasing the overall spending per soldier. Poland's target for its armed forces is 150,000 personnel; Hungary plans reductions to 37,500 personnel; the Czech Republic envisions an army of approximately 40,000. These numbers could be drawn down further with commensurate increase in quality. For example, in the Polish case, it might be advisable to consider an army of 100,000, with a commensurate increase in training and readiness levels. The military modernization programs of the new allies need more focus in three areas: personnel policy, hardware modernization, and defense industry reform. In order to accelerate the incorporation of NATO standards, the Central Europeans should more aggressively seek to rotate officers trained in the West, or with Andrew Michta is the Martie Willi gar Buckman Professor of International Studies at Rhodes College, TN, and a Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar.

Dr. Michta spoke together with Jeffrey Simon, Stephen Blank, and Sean Kay at an EES seminar on "NATO Membership Action Plan: A Journey to Where?" held on January 17, 2001. The following is a summary of Dr. Michta's presentation. Not for citation or quotation without the consent of the author. As NATO considers its future course of action in anticipation of the 2002 MAP decision, the performance of the three 1999 entrants, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, will be an important factor in tailoring allied policy. The broad question today is whether the new members have been producers or consumers of security, and to what extent and under what conditions they are likely to contribute to the Alliance in the future. Three areas deserve special emphasis: (1) the extent to which military reform and modernization has moved forward after 1999, (2) how the three new allies performed during the Kosovo campaign and its aftermath, and (3) what are the attitudes to NATO among those countries today.

Military Modernization Programs Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have considerable achievements in reforming their defense institutions. Much has been done in terms of institutional restructuring, civil-military relations, and NATO compatibility. Still, military modernization in Central Europe remains a work in progress. These countries could complete the key elements of their military modernization programs no sooner than 2005-2007; in The broad question today is whether the new members have been consumers or producers of security, and to what extent and under what conditions they are likely to contribute to the Alliance in the future.

17 NATO ENLARGEMENT AND PEACEKEEPING: JOURNEYS TO WHERE? experience serving in the Balkans, throughout their militaries. This is especially important in cases of younger officers, trained in the West, who are not always assigned to positions that would take the maximum advantage of their skills. The second, urgent priority is to increase defense spending on hardware modernization and readiness, and commit to long-term spending levels to make long-term modernization plans sustainable. Though it is a difficult political issue for the governments in Central Europe, as they grapple with ongoing post communist restructuring, they need to commit to expenditures above 2 percent of the GDP and focus on core weapons programs. Until the 1999 enlargement, only Poland maintained defense spending at such levels; lately, even Poland dropped to approximately 1.9 percent for its 2001 GDP. The structure of hardware purchases from the budgets is entangled in defense industry reform in Central Europe.

Plans to restructure domestic defense industries are an explosive political issue, touching on a myriad of problems, from employment to the marginal competitiveness of some defense plants. The two countries most affected by defense industry reform and / or conversion problems are the Czech Republic and Poland. The Czechs have selected to spend a substantial portion of their budget resources on a domestically-manufactured support aircraft. Until recently, the Poles have deferred some key decisions on restructuring their defense industry. The Kosovo Operation The strictly military contribution of the Central Europeans during the Kosovo operation had to be marginal, but their overall performance was highly symbolic. It was their first test as NATO allies.

The results have been mixed. Poland performed very well, demonstrating strong political support at the level of the government as well as overall public opinion support. Hungary was less forthcoming in its political support, in part because of the immediate geographic proximity to the conflict area and concerns over territorial security. Still, Hungary allowed NATO to use its air bases, demonstrating the requisite degree of NATO compatibility of its air traffic control and air sovereignty systems. Also, during the standoff with Russia after the air campaign over Russian participation in KFOR, Hungary denied the Russians permission to fly through its air space. In contrast to Poland and Hungary, the Czech Republic failed in its first test as a NATO ally, both in the area of political leadership and in its public opinion support.

Polling data at the time of the Kosovo campaign showed that public support was as low as 35 percent. At the level of the government, President Vaclav Havel often seemed like a lonely voice of support for NATO's Kosovo operations. When it came to support for a putative ground force operation in Kosovo, the Poles were ahead of the other two nations. A small Polish contingent was deployed in Albania during the air campaign, and a Polish airborne infantry battalion has joined the KFOR in the U.S. sector. Also, a Hungarian combat service unit has been assigned to KFOR, though Budapest argued... each Central European ally has "two militaries" - the small, better equipped and NATO compatible force, and the bulk of the armed forces that have some way to go to meet NATO standards.

Andrew Michta 18 EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES against using Hungary for a staging area for a ground operation against Serbia. The Czechs moderated some of the impression of political failure by deploying a field hospital to support the air operation and then sending a reconnaissance company for KFOR into the British Sector. Attitudes Toward NATO A year after joining the Alliance, the Center for Public Opinion Research in Warsaw (CBOS), the Institute for Public Opinion Research in Prague (IV VM), and the Center for Information Technology and Public Opinion Research in Budapest (TRK I) conducted a joint public opinion poll on attitudes toward NATO. The study was a follow-up to an earlier survey conducted in 1999, on the eve of NATO membership. The levels of support for the Alliance among the Central Europeans a year after joining NATO remained largely unchanged. In 1999, 60 percent of the Poles were in favor of NATO membership.

The numbers were 11 percent lower in the Czech Republic, with 49 percent supporting NATO, and comparable in Hungary with 61 percent in favor of the Alliance (though in the Czech case, strong support was low - 22 percent in 1999, and only 18 percent in 2000). In 1999, opposition to membership was 11 percent in Poland, 22 percent in the Czech Republic, and 11 percent in Hungary; in 2000, in Poland, opposition stood at 12 percent, in the Czech Republic at 26 percent, in Hungary at 10 percent. As in 1999, in 2000, the Czechs were less in favor of NATO membership and its actions than the Poles and the Hungarians. This was a reflection of the overall perceptions of security threats facing each of the three countries.

The polls revealed an interesting distinction between how the Poles versus the Hungarians and Czechs perceived the impact of NATO on their sovereignty. The Poles are clearly the greatest supporters of NATO because they see it as the guarantor of their sovereignty; the Czechs and Hungarians tend to be polarized between the view that membership guarantees their sovereignty and the view that it subordinates their national interests to an outside superpower. The Czechs in particular demonstrated a fear that NATO membership could get them entangled in a military conflict (in 1999, 36 percent held this belief; in 2000 in the aftermath of the Kosovo operation, 40 percent voiced this opinion). In 2000, Poland and Hungary believed that NATO membership contributed to their standing in the international system (60 percent in Poland, 62 percent in Hungary); in the Czech Republic, 42 percent saw NATO membership as enhancing their international position - an increase from 1999 where it stood at 38 percent. The Poles view Russia as the principal threat to their security. The majority of the Poles have come to believe that Russia will try to rebuild its influence in the region.

In 1993, 39 percent of the Poles held this belief; in 2000, this number increased to 60 percent. The Hungarians and the Czechs take a more low-key position on the potential resurgence of the Russian threat. Poland is the greatest proponent of further NATO enlargement, with over 50 percent of the population in favor of bringing the Baltics, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine into NATO. The greatest support in Poland is for Slovakia (three-fourth of the population) and the Baltics (two-third); the lowest is for Romania. Interestingly, there appears to be more support in Poland for bringing Finland into NATO (69 percent) than the Baltics (65 percent for Lithuania, 63 percent for Latvia, and 61 percent for Estonia). The Hungarians are also in favor of enlarging NATO, but the levels of popular support are lower than in Poland.

The weakest support base in Hungary is for bringing in Romania and Ukraine. The Central European NATO members remain, predominantly, consumers of security. Their long-term potential to contribute varies, with Poland clearly ahead and with the capacity to become a key contributor from the region. 19 NATO ENLARGEMENT AND PEACEKEEPING: JOURNEYS TO WHERE? be useful for NATO to consider an approach to enlargement that mixes the post-communist states with the former neutrals of Sweden, Austria, or Finland. These are states that have developed economies and modern military establishments, and would quickly become meaningful contributors.

Such a shift in approach to NATO enlargement might make it more acceptable domestically in the U.S. and among the European allies, deflecting criticism that by moving ahead in 2002, we would assume further responsibilities with only limited contribution to allied security. The Czechs appear the most reluctant about further NATO enlargement, with majority support apparent only for Slovakia. The second place in the overall level of support in the Czech Republic, though not a majority, goes for the Baltics and Bulgaria. The Balance Sheet The Central European NATO members remain, predominantly, consumers of security.

The most important goal at present for the Central Europeans should be the completion of military reform and modernization. They have done a lot in terms of institutional reorganization, but the core task of making these armies capable of participating on a larger scale in NATO missions has yet to be accomplished. First and foremost is the need to improve these countries' equipment and readiness levels. Public support in Central Europe for NATO and for further enlargement has not substantially changed. The greatest interest seems to be focused on the geo strategic region, especially on Slovakia and the Baltics. The apparent preference among the Central Europeans for different candidates reflects their historical experience and their present perception of the overall security situation.

The overall record of the new entrants suggests both the need for additional resources to complete the modernization programs, and a possible modification of NATO's approach to enlargement. Considering the limited capabilities of the Central Europeans and the time needed to modernize their armed forces, it might Martin Sletzinger, Jeffrey Simon, Andrew Michta.