New Joint Personnel Recovery Coordination Center example essay topic

This article from the September 2003 issue of Armed Forces Journal addresses the advantages possibly gained from creating a new Joint Personnel Recovery Coordination Center (JPRCC). This new JPRCC would replace the current Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC). Since JPRCC's commander would report directly to the joint forces commander, this change would not only be in name but in function as well. Currently, the joint search and rescue operation is delegated to a single component, usually the United States Air Force (USAF).

This typical assignment forces the air component's rescue coordination commander to be dual-hatted, acting as the JSRC commander and as the air component search and rescue commander. As described by the authors, Staff Sgt. Eric Barry and Senior Airman George Torres, in this journal article, the new JPRCC would be a good example of cross-functional team that definitely did things - personnel recovery. Each service component would provide member (s) to this joint team. Like a good self-managing team, the JPRCC would be empowered to make decisions about planning, evaluating alternatives and conducting the actual operation.

The only caveat would be the requirement for final approval from the joint forces commander prior to conducting the personnel recovery operation. This approval requirement is designed for cases where the global political ramification may be involved such as personnel-recovery operations in hostile countries. The authors' justifications for establishing this new joint center are based on: the elimination of dual-hatted commander; new requirements such as the ability to coordinate with nontraditional military forces; a shift in the makeup of the personnel to be recovered; and lessons learn from recent military operations such as repatriation. While this joint team may not look like the traditional corporate team, all of the reasons cited by the two authors for standing up this new joint team parallels the typical justifications used by corporations for establishing an integrated product team (IPT). Once problems are recognized, a problem-solving team like an IPT would be assigned for the resolution of these conflicts.

The new JPRCC would serve the same function in a military environment. The usual procedure of dual-hatting the air component's rescue coordination commander to act as the joint search and rescue commander may lead to several types of conflicts. This dual-hatting increases the likelihood of emotional conflict among the different service components assigned to the joint search and rescue command. Feelings of mistrust as well as resentment are fostered by this action since one service component will have more leverage on the decision-making process over other service components. In addition, for the air component rescue coordination commander, he / she is more likely to suffer from intra personal conflicts. The joint search and rescue commander may receive requirements from the joint forces commander providing a direct conflict between the joint service's need over the USAF's.

In addition, the joint search and rescue commander may experience job overload due to excessive expectations; he / she is attempting to perform two functions at once. By creating a separate position for the JPRCC commander, the conflicts created by the dual-hatting the air component's rescue coordination commander would be eliminated. The addition of new requirements to an existing entity such as the joint search and rescue center without the unit's expansion both in its role and resources may lead to several basic team conflicts. The new requirement to coordinate with nontraditional military forces such as the diplomatic arms of U.S. and non-profit organizations (Red Cross for example) places additional burdens on the JSRC. This new requirement on a unit without proper augmentation leads to role conflict within the team. Without proper personnel to address this new need, the JSRC cannot properly accomplish its newly assigned mission.

This is a good example of the joint forces commander expecting excessive team output considering the inadequate resources currently given to the JSRC. Without the proper personnel to deal with these organizations, these nontraditional military forces such as the United Nations representative or other countries' diplomatic arms may misunderstand the intentions of a JSRC's operation. Like rival companies these nontraditional military forces may see JSRC's operations as an intrusion into their territory or in extreme cases incorrectly decipher JSRC's actions as military aggression. The usual assignment of the air component's rescue coordination commander to be the JSRC commander is based upon much historical underpinning. Historically, the typical personnel to be recovered by JSRC were downed aircrew. In recent conflicts, the makeup of the personnel to be recovered has drastically changed.

As the U.S. relies more on special operation forces, the need to recover these personnel have become more frequent. In addition, one of the major drawbacks with fast-moving ground operations is the increased likelihood of the ground forces being encircled or captured by enemy forces. These two major changes in how U.S. utilizes its military force require a change in how we approach personnel recovery. It is no longer just the aircrew that needs to be rescued. Along similar lines, the recovery of ground forces by USAF personnel has shown the obvious deficiency in current rescue methodology, the repatriation process for ground forces. Without the proper augmentation of JSRC, these problems have caused two types of conflicts within JSRC team: 1) domain ambiguities and 2) resource scarcity.

Jurisdiction or scope of authority problems has occurred when a service component had to rescue a member from a different service component. In addition, having one-service component rescue members from another service component placed a strain on the rescuing service's resources. The establishment of this new joint team would eliminate both the domain ambiguities as well as resource scarcity since all personnel recovery operation will be placed under a single joint umbrella. It would be the joint personnel recovery center's resources rescuing the encircled ground force not the USAF's resources. The two authors make an excellent case for the establishment of the new joint personnel recovery team. This new joint team, JPRCC, would be an expansion of the existing JSRC while creating a new joint team leader.

This expansion is needed since new requirements such as the ability to coordinate with nontraditional military forces have been placed upon the joint personnel recovery team. In addition, the establishment of a new joint personnel recovery team is needed to address the change in the team's mission, recovery of all service component personnel and not just downed aircrew. By having this new joint team leader answer only to the joint forces commander eliminates the common procedure of dual-hatting. The standing up of this new joint team would remove many current internal team conflicts within the JSRC.