Nicholas II Left Russia example essay topic

1,730 words
Nicholas Romanov II The course of history has been significantly altered by the decisions and actions of state rulers. Following the assassination of successful Alexander, the humble, stubborn Nicholas Romanov II became Czar of Russia, continuing three hundred years of successful Romanov rule, and thus resulting in the bloody Russian revolution of 1917. Nicholas II can be held responsible for the revolution in that he chose to disregard the obvious signs of public discontent and poverty as well as ignoring underlying past issues, he lacked the necessary skills to rule autocratically, and he underestimated the will for reform by revolutionaries. In looking at revolution, it is important to understand the circumstances that occur before the actual violence erupts; in the case of the Russian revolution, the scope of what led to such a massive uproar was broad. Unfortunately for Nicholas II, the circumstances which made the time right for a revolution began three decades before any actual revolts. In 1861, Czar Alexander signed the Emancipation of the Serfs, which created a massive peasant population of eighty percent, and was said to be "The most important act of legislation in the entire history of Russia, but not being worth the paper it was written on" (Wood, 12).

This emancipation created a massive peasantry, who, although not being owned by the land, had nothing better to do than to stay on their seventeenth century farms, or move to the dangerous factories (Wood, 5). At the turn of the century, Nicholas II instituted a program of rapid industrialization, which quickly propelled Russia from having an obsolete industry, to being one of the top industrialized nations in Europe. As a result, a large number of people lived and worked in poverty stricken environments, and therefore reform became a major issue. Nicholas II showed no interest in helping the peasantry create a business class which would have greatly benefited the flailing economy and in turn the impoverished factory workers (Halliday, 10).

Russia has always been known for its military strength, and its power lay on the girth and might of the army. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the power of the military was greatly challenged due to the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, where Russia suffered devastating losses to the small Japanese army. The military losses were perhaps more notable during The Great War of 1914, where although entering with an excellent offensive, the army was pushed back by the enemies and forced to retreat. The Russian armies suffered terrible losses in both of these wars, which cut down their numbers and more particularly, morale. Nicholas II was blamed for the losses in that he was the sole military commander, but with no prior experience, he led the troops to disaster with his hazy concepts of military strengths and tactics (Halliday, 79). Nicholas II didn't realize the broad consequences of his actions at the war-front, which only convinced revolutionaries that he was an incompetent leader, and needed to be replaced with a more experienced one.

Nicholas II failed to comprehend the large scale repercussions of his actions and disregard for his people, and therefore contributed to the coming of a revolution where his life would be the eventual cost. One can be led to believe that Nicholas' rule was doomed from its very start. Due to the unexpected death of Czar Alexander in 1894, Nicholas II was thrown into czarism without notice, and therefore he was unable to create a practical administration, forcing him to pick and choose his adversaries as he went along. From modern prospective, cabinet ministers are an essential element to any government administration, and must be chosen carefully (Massie, 63). This initial challenge for Nicholas II early in his reign can be seen as the first of a string of damning events, which would eventually lead to revolution. Among Russian politicians and aristocrats, it was commonly believed that Nicholas had no will of his own, as he allowed himself to be heavily influenced by his mother, his Romanov uncles, and his childhood tutor (Massie, 63).

A ruler, such as Nicholas, who was thought to be without will or political agenda can easily become a target for a coup d'etat, or a revolution. On becoming Czar, Nicholas II stated that "I am not prepared to be Czar. I never wanted to become one. I know nothing of the business of ruling" (Walker, 59).

Nicholas believed in autocracy and absolutism, and although he did not feel as if he were prepared to take on such a monumental task, he did believe that it was his divine right to rule over Russia, and that he was obligated to protect the throne and one day pass it on to his own son (Hurst, 9). Following the coronation Nicholas II, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany is quoted as telling Nicholas that "I am delighted by your magnificent address. The principle of the monarchy must be maintained in all its strength" (Massie, 64). This praise from the Kaiser of Germany was encouraging for Nicholas II, as he then believed that he had Germany's military power on his side. He was unable to foresee however, that just fifteen years later, he would become the worst of enemies with his distant cousin in the savage World War I (Halliday, 49).

On September 5, 1913, Nicholas II proved his ineptitude for leadership when he dismissed his cousin the Grande Duke Nicholas Nicholaicivich from the supreme command of the army and personally assumed the role (Radzinsky, 91). This was seen to be the biggest fault in Nicholas' reign, as it left his wife Alexandra in complete control of the home front. Russian citizens felt a bitter dislike of Alexandra because of her German background, and her power over the civil administration caused a stream of government resignations, causing the loss of many talented and wise administrators. (Walker, 101). During a time of constant revolution in Europe, strong leadership was imperative to a successful reign. In lacking leadership qualities and making poor decisions, Nicholas II heavily contributed to the coming of the Russian revolution.

The will for reform in Russia during the winter of 1917 was at its peak. In minus thirty-five degree weather on February 23, 1917, the women of Petrograd formed a demonstration, angered that after waiting in line for hours for bread, they were sent away because there was simply none left (Halliday, 12). Shouting slogans like "We want bread!" the women were able to spark a riot amongst their male counterparts, resulting in a massive labour strike two-hundred thousand people strong by March 9, 1917. This riot, through violence, would turn to revolt and eventually to the long-awaited revolution (Newman, 387). When Nicholas II's adversary Sir George Buchanan warned him of the demonstrations and riots in Petrograd, "I consider the state of the country to have become more critical and menacing than ever. The spirit of all the people is such that the gravest upheavals may be expected.

All Russia is unanimous in claiming a change of government and the appointment of a responsible premier invested with the confidence of the nation" (Massie, 374). Nicholas II was seemingly uninterested, claiming that if he gave way during a time of war, it would be taken as a sign of personal weakness and would only accelerate the revolutionary hopes (Massie, 374). In March 1917, Nicholas II left Russia to go to the war-front where he believed he would be of better assistance, and needed the most. His absence during the revolt at Petrograd helped to create unanimity amongst the Russians that the Czar must go (Walker, 132).

At this point, Nicholas remained unconcerned, although his position of authority was in grave danger. His disinterest in the demonstrations at Petrograd and his unwillingness to give his people a long-awaited constitution added to the will for revolution and change. The population of peasants in the newly industrialized Russia was eighty percent; this allowed for a enormous foundation for disorder and a great means by which the public could influence those in power. By March 9, 1917, the streets were filled with two-hundred thousand striking workers, which forced the local authorities into calling the Russian Cossacks (Halliday, 10). The Cossacks were specifically trained in punishing troublesome citizens and putting down civil disturbances. It soon became obvious that the Cossacks were going to be useless, as they committed an astonishing act of mutiny.

It has been documented that the Cossacks were unusually careful with their sabres, and were very careful not to wound any of the demonstrators (Halliday, 13). When the situation lost all control, the local authorities called on the army to stop the mayhem, but they were said to be more inclined than the Cossacks in aiding the peoples' cause, as most of the soldiers were unwillingly conscripted. The mutiny committed by the Cossacks and the army was a deciding factor in the success of the revolution, as the demonstrators gained a considerable force on their side and were therefore able to create a power much stronger than that wielded by the Czar (Halliday, 13). Since his coronation, there were many revolutionaries who spoke publicly against Nicholas II. Vladimir Lenin for example, published a pamphlet, What Is To Be Done? where he argued that a party of professional revolutionaries should come together and overthrow the Czar (Halliday, 96).

Another revolutionary who spoke out against Nicholas II was Alexander Kerensky, who publicly called for Nicholas' removal from power. Alexandra wrote her husband insisting that Kerensky be hung as a traitor, but Nicholas II took no heed, unbeknownst to him that Kerensky would be the man to run the first Provisional Government after his fall from power. (Radzinsky, 326) Nicholas never paid any attention to those who threatened to depose him, and as such, he left himself susceptible to being overthrown or forced into abdication, which would soon become his fate. In his apathy towards the will of revolutionaries around him, Nicholas II seemingly sat back and watched the revolution take place.