Nuclear Weapons And Other Mass Destruction Weapons example essay topic

... 13 21: 40: 32 1996 IST): Why is India spending so much on its Defences. It's not as if we want to the reason is we are worried about those nonsensical people sitting across the borders who will be using arms supplied by Washington. michael, your observation about 20 kilo tons fission weapons is a very thought-provoking one. would the nuclear weapon powers be willing to accept this as the bottom-line in some agreed upon time-frame and then give up thermo-nuclear weapons in the first instance? this could be the first step towards 'rolling back' the imposing nuclear arsenals of the PN- 5 or is it the operative 3? (Tue Aug 13 21: 40: 43 1996 IST): amber ish (Tue Aug 13 21: 43: 13 1996 IST): Mr Krepon, why can't the US go even a little way in disarming itself and its allies, especially Britain and France who today have little use for their weapons. this would in turn weaken India's stanceStarWar (Tue Aug 13 21: 47: 12 1996 IST): Uday, aren't testing and dismantle two different issues? Everybody knows the chances of a conjunctive treaty, of this proportion, are slim. Was this not considered.

What is your justification? Krepon (Tue Aug 13 21: 48: 24 1996 IST): Nikhil: I see that I made a spelling error in my last transmission: The CTBT would not preclude an Indian fission nuclear option, but would preclude an Indian fusion nuclear option. You ask why a deadline for nuclear disarmament would not work in the NWS. Take the US, for example. The declarations that you most wish to hear and the commitments that you seek are absolute poison in US domestic politics. Any President that declared fealty to a time-bound frae work for complete nuclear disarmament would open himself to charges of weak-headedness by the political opposition, congressional resolutions of opposition, and a storm of protest by very powerful constituencies.

As a mental exercise put yourself in the shoes of a US president. If you declare for a timetable, you gain support from third world nations, and you invite big problems with the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, the weapons labs, the military industrial complex, your own party in congress, the political opposition, editorial writers, etc. What would you choose to do? Ronald Reagan could talk about eliminating nukes without penalty because he was so hawkish, because he did not set deadlines, and because no-one took his vision seriously -- not even the disarmament community here.

I see no other political figure here who could afford to do this. Thus, I believe that the best strategy to adopt to devalue nuclear weapons is to maintain an absolute ban on testing, and to continue the practice of non-use, now 51 years in the making. Visualize a world in which nuclear weapons are not tested for the next fifty years. Visualize a world in which the practice of non-use continues for another fifty years. How valuable will nuclear weapons be then? How large will stockpiles be?

This is why it is so important to conclude the CTBT and have it enter into force. [pra fula nd a chin] (Tue Aug 13 21: 50: 01 1996 IST): how can India be let off the hook with regard to the EIF which is un fare and destructive of the treaty? (Tue Aug 13 21: 52: 16 1996 IST): star war - this is u day. yes, testing and dismantling are two different issues. my observation was apropos michael's point about the adequacy of 20 kilo-ton fission weapons. but while on this subject, i would argue that the indian stand perceived the ct bt as apart of a larger package towards disarmament. in that sense, the spirit to my mind would take testing and dismantling under the same umbrella. it is raining here in this part of delhi. where are you star war? amber ish (Tue Aug 13 21: 56: 07 1996 IST): Michael, the idea of world where weapons are not tested for the next 50 years is wonderful, but perhaps utopian. Because in the absence of a definite method to resolve outstanding disputes, the temptation to go to war, and to use one's total arsenal, remains. Can we be sure that the NWS would never use their weapons, especially when there is no fear of a counter-attack?

Krepon (Tue Aug 13 21: 56: 12 1996 IST): Uday and Raja: Good to hear from you, albeit at a distance. Will be in Delhi in September -- maybe we can get together again then. You ask about the Republican Party's opposition to the CTBT in it's platform. This, frankly, came as a shock, as there were no prior statements against the CTBT or for a resumption of testing by key party figures. But this goes to show you how captured the Republican Party has become to ideologues. How serious a problem is this?

Hard to say. Dole and Kemp are both claiming not to have read the platform, and I doubt that nuclear testing will figure prominently in the election. But Dole's departure from the Senate will hurt ratification chances, for sure. Lesser folks are in key leadership positions, and may well take blocking action -- assuming the Treaty makes it out of Geneva. Several have asked why the Treaty has been saddled with such a lousy entry-into-force provision. The simple reason is that a number of countries really don't want the CTBT to enter into force, and are using this procedural device to leave the nuclear option open.

India has risen to the bait, and now, I fear, the Treaty will remain in limbo for many, many years. Surely, this is a great shame. [ and a chin]: (Tue Aug 13 21: 57: 59 1996 IST): what is missing from the Indian debate is that the draft provides for a future conference that can alter the EIF provision. Nikhil Lakshman (Tue Aug 13 21: 58: 00 1996 IST): Thank you, Mr Krepon. But the situation in India is about the same.

No Indian prime minister could afford to sign the CTBT. It would be the chalice of hemlock for him. Just as a declaration that we seek from the US would be to an American president. Star War (Tue Aug 13 22: 00: 19 1996 IST): Uday, I am in Los Angeles, CA Peace (Tue Aug 13 22: 02: 38 1996 IST): Why is the American government so condescending towards the third world countries? [ and a chin]: (Tue Aug 13 22: 03: 09 1996 IST): the Indian demand for 'time bound' link to ct bt is an utterly unconvincing cover for its own duplicity and its obsession wit keeping the nuclear weapon's option including the fusion option indefinitely open.

Krepon (Tue Aug 13 22: 04: 06 1996 IST): Amberish: The idea of non-testing and non-use for the next fifty years may well be utopian, but this would be an easier task than phased reductions to zero. Actually, I propose to pursue both simultaneously, although not with the deadlines that India and other states demand. To me, a CD negotiations on deadlines for disarmament is a recipe for stalemate. Worse, it would let the US & Russia off the hook for START, IV, & V. (Sorry for the fishing metaphors -- have just spent a few days with friends dropping lines in the water.) Actually, the least difficult strategy is to demand no more tests and no more use. This is the most direct approach to devaluation. Star War (Tue Aug 13 22: 07: 10 1996 IST): Raja Mohan, when was India responsible for an imbroglio concerning nuclear issue?

Any precedence. If so, is there a learning piece from that experience that you (India Ministry) are not employing to execute the CTBT successfully. [ and a chin] (Tue Aug 13 22: 07: 49 1996 IST): Nikhil: you can always create a situation throw media manipulation where a consensus is manufactured and then say that you sign a ct bt etc. the same govt signs unequal; l treaties e.g. gatt but refuses to sign a nondiscriminatory ct bt. Let's be precise. NPT is but a CTBT can at best be claimed to be discriminatory -- depending upon your interpretation of various provisions. New Delhi's stand is unconvincing and inconsistent.

(Tue Aug 13 22: 08: 24 1996 IST): This is raj. Achin and Praful seem to think only India has motivations in its approach to the ct bt. What about the US? Why has the US been so enthusiastic about the ct bt after so many years?

It is worth asking this question. Many US officials are on record saying that the principal gain -- for the US -- from the ct bt is that it will freeze the nuclear capabilities of all others. That the UsS will gain much less from additional testing than the threshold states. The CTBt is part of a larger arms control strategy of the US where it wants to retain its primacy in the international system. Why do and a chin love the US hegemony so much? amber ish (Tue Aug 13 22: 11: 10 1996 IST): Michael, thanks. No more tests and no more use.

Here comes one tricky part, how do we ensure that those with nuke weapons won't use them or blackmail others with them (precisely India's fears vis-a-vis China, and definitely Pakistan's fear against a nuke India). So what can be done to have some surety at this stage that signing a CTBT is not India's death warrant? Krepon (Tue Aug 13 22: 12: 12 1996 IST): Praful & Achin: Thank you for joining us. I am at a loss to figure out how to mend the EIF problem at this late date. China, Russia, Egypt, Pakistan, Iran, and perhaps other countries have indicated that they cannot accept a less inclusive list of states that must sign, ratify without disabling conditions, and deposit ratifications before the CTBT's entry into force. Given the difficulties involved in getting 44 countries to take such action, it is mystifying why New Delhi has declared that it will block transmittal of treaty text from Geneva to New York.

Hell: The Republican Party seems to have decided to take cary of India's problem. That India should have adopted such an extreme position is rather extraordinary. What is the matter of principle or sovereignty that is so great as to disallow other countries from signing the CTBT? Krepon (Tue Aug 13 22: 14: 42 1996 IST): Nikhil: This is our sad lot: The political arguments that 'work' in India are hemlock in the US; the arguments that 'work' for a CTBT here (such as 'stockpile ') reinforce worst fears in India. [ and a chin] (Tue Aug 13 22: 15: 30 1996 IST): Raj: we will not descend to the gutter level. We have been consistently critical of the US and all other nuclear weapon states, more so than you and others who are prepared even to compromise on the NPT. Our opposition to the not let's remind you, is a) more accurate b 0 more comprehensive c) more consistent than yours, Subramanian, etc.

We do question US motives. But we are not so stupid as to argue that the motives determine the objective outcomes of all treaties or that motives should primarily decide whether India sign the CTBT. Nikhil Lakshman (Tue Aug 13 22: 15: 50 1996 IST): Mr Krepon, do you think (Tue Aug 13 22: 18: 52 1996 IST): Mr Krepon: Do you think it is fair for America to arm twist the other countries into signing the CTBT in fact even talk about it, after they have perfected their Nuclear capacities and built up their arsenal as well as become A one stop shop for terrorists and warring nationsKrepon (Tue Aug 13 22: 22: 04 1996 IST): Amberish: You and Raja mohan and many other thoughtful and intelligent Indians talk about the coercive power of nuclear weapons -- even though they may no longer be used, they still have political utility. This notion may have been true in the past, but is it true today? How 'useful' were nukes in the Vietnam War? Or the Suez Crisis?

When the US recently threatened Libya, elliptically, over the CW facility under construction, which country was more damaged -- the US or Libya? Why continue to foster the myth that nukes provide political utility or coercive power? What power resides in a weapon that cannot be used? The real instrument of coercion today is economic power, not nukes. Stop repeating arguments that no longer make sense! Nikhil Lakshman (Tue Aug 13 22: 27: 08 1996 IST): Mr Krepon, you mentioned a little while ago that the CTBT will be in limbo for many years.

Does that mean the treaty is brain dead, and that the CD in Geneva will end in a stalemate? Is there hope for the treaty to be revived? And what will it take for that to happen? (Tue Aug 13 22: 29: 05 1996 IST): michael, this is raj. i dont have to tell you that the US has drawn profound lessons from the gulf war. that nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons can be used to consta in US conventional superiority in regional conflicts. Both the US nuclear posture and the counter proliferation doctrine have reemphasized the utility of nuclear weapons. Can we really deny that?

I think the US is being prudent. why dont you give the same benefit of doubt to India? amber ish (Tue Aug 13 22: 30: 00 1996 IST): Michael, there is no doubt that economic power means a lot more than weapons in the armour y. Which is why Japan is a power today, and India is not (nor for that matter suspected nuclear states like Pakistan, Israel, N Korea). But Japan is protected by being close to US and is part of US economic ties. Regarding the use of N-arms, that is precisely the fear: that the only time they were used was against a country that did not posses them (Japan, August 1945), and never again when there was a threat (howsoever remote) of retaliation - Vietnam and Suez had at least covert Soviet backing.

In fact, other opposing powers kept a check, and today it is this very system of checks and balances that is missing. and which must be redressed, in part, by the US. Nikhil Lakshman (Tue Aug 13 22: 31: 12 1996 IST): Mr Krepon, have you been in touch with the Pakistanis? Do you sense a weakening of their resolve? (Tue Aug 13 22: 33: 39 1996 IST): michael, this is raj. i dont have to tell you that the US has drawn profound lessons from the gulf war. that nuclear weapons and other mass destruction weapons can be used to consta in US conventional superiority in regional conflicts. Can we really deny that? I think the US is being prudent. why dont you give the same benefit of doubt to India?

Star War (Tue Aug 13 22: 36: 11 1996 IST): Michael Krepon, If today's coercion is economic bigg y, why not legislate the 'treaty pass' in U. N as majority & not unanimous. This was incidentally suggested by Jaap Ra maker of Netherlands. Secondly, if China, Russia, Britain and France opt to wait till India, Pak and Israel ratify your goddamn treaty, comments like the four B's are hiding behind Indian sari may not be very diplomatic. Capitol Hill has a reputation, you know.

Krepon (Tue Aug 13 22: 36: 13 1996 IST): Raja: You have become quite adept at putting those who disagree with your perspective on the defensive -- but I miss your analytical talents. You ask why the US has all of a sudden become so supportive of the CTBT. Surely there must be some nefarious ulterior motives, such as putting India into a strait jacket..