Objections To Self Ownership example essay topic

Thanks to Paul Torek for some thought-provoking comments, to which shall reply in two parts. Firstly, I should like to comment o nhis intriguing suggestion on how Rawls might react to my hypothetical. Second, I'd like to make some comments on Torek's own criticisms. 1.

Rawls and the Hypothetical There is the interesting side-issue that I cannot help but stray into. Namely: how would a Rawls ian reply to my thought experiment I had considered Torek's suggestion during the original writing, but I thought I'd leave it to come out in the discussion. Now at first glance, it appears that Torek is completely correct: for if Rawls' first principle of justice, giving priority to liberty means anything, it means that slavery is impermissible. Redistribution comes into its own only after there are some re-distributable goods, at which point the second principle (the Difference principle) make operate without violating the priority of the first principle.

But I seriously doubt that Rawls would consider this a correct application of his principles. It is quite clear that he does not think that coercive paternalism violates his first principle: The problem of paternalism deserves some discussion here, since it has been mentioned in the argument for equal liberty, and concerns a lesser freedom. In the original position the parties assume that in society they are rational and able to manage their own affairs... But once the ideal conception is chosen, they will want to insure themselves against the possibility that their powers are undeveloped and they cannot rationally advanced their interests... [Mention of children and the mentally disturbed as prime examples, but continues as follows] It is also rational for them to protect themselves against their own irrational inclinations by consenting to a scheme of penalties that may give them a sufficient motive to avoid foolish actions and by accepting certain impositions designed to undo the unfortunate consequences of their imprudent behavior. (section 39, pp. 248-249) And when Rawls describes what he has in mind with the first principle, the right of self-ownership does not seem to be quite what he h asin mind: The basic liberties of citizens are, roughly speaking, political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office) together with freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience together with freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law. (section 11, pp. 61) (One might argue that the right of self-ownership is in that list somewhere, but it hardly seems like that is what Rawls is saying; rather, he has very much the civil libertarians' narrow view of liberty even leaving aside mention of private property). And finally, I would point out Rawls' many denials of the claim that individuals have deserve their natural talents.

To take only one example: Perhaps some will think that the person with greater natural endowments deserves those assets and the superior character that made their development possible. Because he is more worthy in this sense, he deserves the greater advantages that he could achieve with them. This view, however, is surely incorrect. It seems to be one of the fixed points of our considered judgments that no one deserves his place in the distribution of natural endowments, any more than one deserves one's initial starting place in society...

Thus the more advantaged representative man cannot say that he deserves and therefore has a right to a scheme of cooperation in which he is permitted to acquire benefits in ways that do not contribute to the welfare of others. (section 17, pp. 104-105) If this doesn't seem to be an affirmation of the propriety of redistribution even in the pure service economy, I don't know whatis! Basically, a common sense reading of Rawls' principles makes it seem that Rawls would answer as Torek says he would. But Rawls actually gives such a qualified and tortured interpretation of his principles that I have to wonder if he would shrink from redistribution in my hypothetical. My bet is that he would happily impose a "tax" such that every hour of paid medical care imposes an obligation to provide e.g. twenty minutes of unpaid care to the poor; and then he would rationalize this by saying that this isn't really coercive, since the surgeon could pick how many hours to work (and plus he doesn't deserve his natural assets anyway... ) 2. Torek and the Hypothetical Well, first of all, I did give a few transition stages, and I'mcurious about your reaction to those.

For example, I considered slight modification where we add money ("labor notes") to the pure service economy. Do you still agree that redistribution is impermissible then Now Torek was quite right to point out Nozick's objection to the " labor mixing" formula. But I didn't advocate that view, an din fact did deny the deductibility of homesteading from self-ownership. Rather, I was considering the similarities of some of the negative arguments against private property, and showing that they also apply to self-ownership, too. This wasn't meant to defend property rights in objects, except insofar as refuting objections to something constitutes a defense. Now I'm trying to get a clear grip on your point that private property prima facie seems to restrict liberty.

As far as I can tell, I agree with your conclusion. Namely, we must first establish ownership in order to say that inferring with continued possession reduces liberty; and once we establish that someone owns something, then itno longer makes sense to claim that their action reduces liberty. Again, I think the parallel between self-ownership and ownership of objects is quite good: for just as a woman's refusal to have sex with a man does not constitute "reducing his liberty", (since shejustly owns her body), the same woman's refusal to take the main as a free tenant in her home "reduces her liberty" iff shejustly owns the home. (In a parallel fashion, the rapist might deny that the woman justly owns her body.) Just to take a stab at the underlying question: what justification could be given for ownership of things I make no attempt to "deduce " it from self-ownership. Rather, I think that it just a second, almost as plausible principle that a person who produces something from previously unowned materials is entitled to own it.

I do however think that once you accept the idea of self-ownership, thatthe homesteading principle is likely to seem plausible as well. In particular, if you consider my hypothetical and find that the objections to self-ownership don't convince you, then you may find that they aren't very good arguments against property in things either. At least, the seemingly overriding importance of care forthe poor, equality, etc. will be considerably devalued.