Part Of Track II The Cia example essay topic

The election gambit was known as Track I. In case the staged elections failed the back-up plan for a military coup was called Track II. The CIA inducements to Frei included offering substantial sums of money to his re- election campaign, bribing other Christian Democrats outright, and organizing visits and calls from respected leaders abroad. To influence Frei through his wife, the CIA instigated the wiring of telegrams to Mrs. Frei from womens groups in other Latin American nations. Other mailings to Frei included CIA-planted news articles from around the world about Chiles peril. The articles were part of a covert black propaganda campaign, which, resulted in at least 726 stories, broadcasts and editorials against Allendes presidency. Despite these efforts, the Frei re-election gambit failed, as Frei refused to have the Christian Democrats block Allendes ratification.

Frei did manage to confide to several top-ranking military officers that he would not oppose a coup, with a guarded implication he might even welcome one, (CIA, Operating Guidance Cable on Coup Plotting, 1970) Helms reported to Kissinger. However, Frei moved quickly away from the issue when right-wing coup plotters assassinated Gen. Schneider on October. 22, 1970. Schneider had insisted that the military accept the will of the people and respect the Chilean constitution. The U.S. involvement in Schneider murder has always been a touchy point for Nixon's senior administration officials. Kissinger went to great lengths to distance himself from the assassination, both in testimony to Congress and in his memoirs.

Kissinger claimed that CIA coup plotting was turned off at a meeting on October 15, a week before Schneider was murdered. As part of Track II the CIA secretly conspired with top ranking Chilean military officials. CIA deputy director of plans Thomas Karamessines carried from his October 15 meeting with me an instruction to turn off General Roberto Viauxs coup plot and a general mandate to preserve our assets in Chile in the clearly remote chance that some other opportunity might develop, (CIA, Operating Guidance Cable on Coup Plotting, 1970). However, a declassified top-secret memorandum of that October 15 meeting contradicted Kissingers account. At the meeting with Karamessines and Gen. Alexander Haig, Kissinger was quoted as demanding that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight now... and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given. Kissinger also demanded tight secrecy around the coup plotting.

Dr. Kissinger discussed his desire that the word of our encouragement to the Chilean military in recent weeks be kept as secret as possible, the memo said. Mr. Karamessines stated emphatically that we had been doing everything possible in this connection, including the use of false flag officers, car meetings, and every conceivable precaution.) CIA, Cable Transmissions on Coup Plotting, 1970) The next day, a secret eyes only cable from CIA headquarters to Henry Heck sher, CIA station chief in Santiago, revealed that Kissingers marching orders were relayed to the field. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup... prior to October 24, the cable read. But efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date. We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource... It is imperative that these actions be implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG (U.S. government) and American hand be well hidden, the cable continued.

Please review all your present and possibly new activities to include propaganda, black operations, surfacing of intelligence or disinformation, personal contacts, or anything else your imagination can conjure which will permit you to continue to press forward toward our objective. 8 While undercutting Kissinger, the records back the 1975 testimony of the Cia Karamessines. He told a congressional investigation that Track II was never really ended and that what they were told to do was to continue their efforts, stay alert, and do what they could to contribute to the eventual achievement of the objectives and purposes of Track II. After Allendes inauguration on November 3, the CIA continued working toward a military coup. A CIA note, in which the mentality of this agency and the U.S. government is clearly shown, states, Dr. Salvador Allende became the first democratically-elected Marxist head of state in the history of Latin America despite the opposition of the U.S. Government. As a result, U.S. prestige and interests... are being affected materially at a time when the U.S. can ill afford problems in an area that has been traditionally accepted as the U.S. backyard.

(CIA, Briefing by Richard Helms for the National Security Council, 1970) Covert funds were passed into Chilean congressional campaigns; CIA agents stayed close to displeased Chilean military officers; to keep the military on edge, the CIA planted false propaganda suggesting that the Chilean left planned to take control of the armed forces. The CIA also secretly spent $1.5 million as bribes into one of Chiles leading newspapers, El Mercurio. Nevertheless, the CIA covert operation was only one part of what U.S. officials called a triad of actions toward Chile. A second leg was correct but cool diplomatic pressure and a third leg was the invisible blockade of loans and credits to Chile. For years, historians have debated if such a blockade existed, or whether Allendes socialist economic policies led to the loss of economic credit. However, the new National Security Council (NSC) records show conclusively that the Nixon administration moved quickly and quietly to shut down foreign aid to Chile.

At the Inter-American Development Bank, the NSC simply informed the U.S. representative that he did not have authority to vote for loans to Chile. A secret report prepared for Kissinger several weeks after Allendes inauguration said, the U.S. Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank understands that he will remain uninstructed until further notice on pending loans to Chile. As... an affirmative vote by the U.S. is required for loan approval, this will effectively bar approval of the loans. (CIA, Report of CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 1970) At the World Bank, U.S. officials worked behind the scenes to ensure that Chile would be disqualified for a pending $21 million livestock improvement credit as well as future loans. In addition, the president of the Export-Import Bank agreed to help fully with Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles Meyer on the discontinuation of new credits and guarantees to Chile..