Peacekeeping Missions During The Cold War Period example essay topic

The Future of United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era By Michael Bassi k Introduction: The intense economic and diplomatic struggles that defined the Cold War greatly influenced United Nations peacekeeping tactics. From 1945 to 1991, the United Nations Security Council was constantly troubled by the lack of cooperation between the Council's permanent members, specifically the United States and the Soviet Union, whose constant political power struggle made collective security within the UN nearly impossible. When international security was threatened, the Security Council was often unable to deter security threats because the Soviet Union vetoed every action that remotely involved the United States, as did the United States to the Soviet Union. "Peacekeeping, therefore, emerged in response to the lack of Great Power co-operation and became successful, to a degree, in bringing atleast some order to the international system if not total peace".

Peacekeeping was adopted during theCold War period to take the place of the constant stalemate between the US and the USSR and it was utilized to serve as a substitute for collective security. i Oftentimes, necessary humanitarian aid would be denied to countries backed by opposing Cold War nations, even if it were not a matter of political concern. Conflicts between Cold War rivals in UN policy-making bodies instilled a real fear of a global nuclear holocaust into the international community as superpowers formed alliances with powerful nations across the globe 1. ii It became the role of UNpeacekeepers to deter conflicts at all costs in order to avoid United States and Soviet Union involvement in international peacekeeping endeavors. Not to the surprise of the internationalcommunity, the end of the Cold War symbolized an increase in the UN's active involvement in maintaining international peace and security. Events such as the Gulf War demonstrated the immense power of the United Nations when the SovietUnion and the United States joined forces to overcome Iraqi aggression. As U.S. troops were deployed to Iraq in early 1991, the world realized that a new era of global cooperation was eminent and the Cold War had finally ended. The new relationship between the world's superpowers allowed the UN to drastically increase its involvement in international conflicts.

By 1992, only one year after the official end to the Cold War, peacekeeping forces had been deployed to ten different crisis locations including missions in Cambodia, El Salvador, the Western Sahara, Cambodia, Iraq, Kuwait, and Angola. 1991 also saw the end to conflicts between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as conflicts between Iran and Iraq. Between 1988 and 1991, the most peaceful period of the Cold War, more peacekeeping missions had been established than during the rest of the Cold War. The end of the power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union signaled the beginning of a period where UN Peacekeeping forces could finally focus on their primary goals of peace preservation and conflict resolution.

Statement of the Issue: Although numerous political scientists have disproved Samuel Huntington's essay, "The Clash of Civilizations", one is forced to wonder why such an inaccurate testimony was examined so carefully. He expounds that with the end of the Cold War, the majority of conflicts will not be between different nations, but rather, between different civilizations. Huntington predicts conflicts will erupt between broad social groups such as the Western Christians and the Orthodox Christians (these two, he says, divide Central Europe from Eastern Europe), not between nations like the U.S. and Russia. The reason his thesis drew so much attention is because it was the first educated hypothesis addressing the new global threat following the end of the Cold War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the constant power struggle that dominated politics since 1945 ceased to exist. Huntington posed a logical answer toa question on every world leader's mind: Who, or rather, what will be the new world threat.

When the Cold War ended, it took along with it many conflicts between countries, and from this time period emerged new and different intra-national conflicts that have marked the remainder of the 20th century. As the Soviet Union eased its control over Eastern Europe, wars erupted between ideologically different groups within these individual countries. The UN signaled its commitment to preventing internal conflicts in volatile nations such as Cambodia, Namibia and El Salvador by providing peacekeepers to not only quell conflicts but to enforce democracy by assisting in local elections and reconstructing weak governments. Missions were not deployed to merely end conflicts; but to regain order and democracy in societies ridden with corruption and economic failure.

With this new breed of peacekeeping, a new sense of optimism seemed to sweep the international community. However, this new breed of peacekeeping began to crumble as narrowly tailored political interests regained control of Security Council initiatives. The short period of peacekeeping success "was to be seriously questioned by the humanitarian failures of the international community" namely in nations such as Rwanda and Somalia. Although international peacekeeping has come a long way since the end of the Cold War, there remains much ground to be covered. The following analysis will attempt to show why the UN missions during the Cold War were, for the most part, successful, and why the early 90's experienced peacekeeping success that surpassed theCold War achievements. The bulk of the analysis, however, will explore why the post-Cold War mentality was abandoned in 1992 and what the future of UN Peacekeeping will bring.

Analysis I (Cold War 1992): Peacekeeping missions during the Cold War period were almost all successful. Their goals were not lofty and the missions were well executed, each with the four necessary components to successful peacekeeping intact. The peacekeepers were all familiar with proper military tactics, they all sought out the trust of the warring parties so they would not see UN intervention as a threat, they remained in the conflict area after agreements were reached to ensure their implementation, and lastly, the missions meet all of the following criteria: they had proper funding, international support, permission from the host state to intervene, and lastly, they had the political cooperation of both warring parties. These standards, designed by Alan James, enabled even the first peacekeeping mission (UN Special Commission on the Balkans, UNSCOM, 1947-1951) to be successful. Barring the UN Yemen Observation Mission (UN YOM) and the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUCA), the other 11 UN missions during the Cold War were a true testament to the organization's commitment to successful observer and peacekeeping missions. As the mid-1980's approached, the international community was astounded by what seemed to be the start of a slow end to the Cold War.

When Mikhail Gorbachev became the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1985, thoughts of a decentralized and democratized Soviet Union eased tension between the Communist nation and the United States. Although his tenure led to the downfall of communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990 for ending the Soviet Union's Cold War domination of Eastern Europe. Both the United States, under Presidents Reagan and Bush, and the Soviet Union, under Gorbachev", spurred on by domestic financial problems", put a halt on "overtly expensive support for regimes in areas of the world which they no longer deemed to be in their nation interests". For the first time since the mid-1970's, it appeared as though the UN was back on track to preventing international conflicts with a renewed cooperation from the two largest superpowers in the world.

Within six years of Gorbachev's election, the United Nations placed ten new peacekeeping missions around the globe. These missions symbolized an end to the Cold War and a new beginning of international cooperation. The first mission that was a direct result of Security Council cooperation from both the USSR and the US was the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP). This mission's goal was to enforce the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan, also referred to as the Geneva Accords. The Accords called for Pakistan and Afghanistan to form a mutually beneficial relationship. It also called for a "bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the voluntary return of refugees".

Both the United States and The SovietUnion signed the Accords. This peacekeeping mission implanted hopes in the international community that the world's superpowers could forever corroborate on UN related endeavors. The most remarkable aspect of UNGOMAP was that the Geneva Accords also "contained provisions for the timetable and modalities of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan". Before Gorbachev, agreements such as these would have been impossible, for never would the USSR withdraw troops from a nation during the Cold War.

It was this mission that paved the way for General Assembly resolution 48/208 (1993) and that helped Afghanistan get UN support for "rapprochement and reconstruction" of its failing economy and government less than two years after UNGOMAP. The moral of the peacekeepers was still very high by the end of 1991, and the United Nations was finally regaining the confidence of the international community as an organization entirely devoted to international peace and well being. UNGOMAP was the UN's first new mission since 1975 and its success was unmatched. UNAVEM (UN Angolan Verification Mission), which was commissioned with monitoring Cuban withdrawal of troops from Angola, managed to end its mission two months ahead of schedule. UNAVEM "demonstrated just what can be achieved by a UN peacekeeping operation when it receives the full co-operation of the parties concerned". One other example of the success of the first ten missions immediately following the Cold War is that of ONUCA (UN Observer Group in Central America), the first mission in the Western hemisphere.

ONUCA enforced cease-fire during an election period in Nicaragua and later helped with the new government's transition of power. It was also the UN's first experience with physical disarmament. By Early 1992, the United Nations upheld the impeccable image as the enforcer of world peace. The United Nations was unified and goal oriented as demonstrated by the fact that it was almost three years since a Security Council nation vetoed a proposal. For the first time in history, the UN exercised Chapter VII of the UN Charter during the Gulf War to implement economic sanctions on aggressor nations. By July of 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali had prepared his "An Agenda for Peace", which called for new and more effective conflict resolution tactics.

The Agenda seemed to be a true indicator thatthe UN was on a different route than the one taken during the Cold War. In spite of all of these achievements, as the peacekeeping missions increased the UN's presence around the globe, administrators failed to properly examine the eminent problems surrounding the logistics of its missions. Suddenly, the future of the United Nations did not look so bright. "Less than ten months [after 1991] the UN had realised that its resources for planning, deploying and maintaining operations in the field were totally inadequate for the number, size and complexity of the operation which the international community had called upon it to conduct". After the costly and unsuccessful mission to reform and reconstruct the failing state of Cambodia (UNTAC) and the even more unsuccessful follow-up mission to UNTAC, the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIR), extremely crucial missions such as the United Nations Operation in Somalia and the UN Protection Force in the Rwanda failed miserably and placed a large clout of insecurity over the future of UN peacekeeping. Analysis II (1992-1995): With the increase in intra-state conflicts since the late 1980's, there has been an increase in the demand for United Nations humanitarian aid assistance in nations such as Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia...

In the time between 1992 and 1995, UN peacekeepers found themselves assisting in the return of millions of refugees, restoring functioning governments capable of enforcing law and order, and providing medical to victims of civil wars and natural disasters. However, with the increase in the demand for humanitarian aid came an onslaught of unforeseen problems for the United Nations. Peacekeepers found themselves taking sides in regional conflicts, a direct violation of Chapter VI ofthe UN charter, and contradicting their own presupposed goals by preventing their enemies to access food and supplies. As the UN increased its involvement in areas such as Somalia and Rwanda, local groups saw the involvement as a threat and the peacekeepers were often forced to defend themselves against those they were trying to protect. Crisis in Somalia: Internal problems plagued the efforts of United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) from the missions inception.

The mission was created to aid Somali citizens who were left without food and medical attention during a devastating civil war. UNOSOM I was also commissioned with ending the civil unrest and restoring order and leadership in the nation. But just before peacekeeping forces were to arrive in Somalia, on June 23, 1992, Mohammed Aideed, one of the rebel Somali leaders in Mogadishu, withdrew his invitation for UN assistance. The soldiers were merely going to Somalia to assist with protecting UN personal who were delivering humanitarian aid to innocent victims of the civil war, but Aideed was angered when he saw a Russian plane overhead delivering supplies to enemy forces. So angered by the disposition, even one of the mission's leaders, Mohammed Sha noun, called Aideed's actions "understandable" due to the "lack of vigilance" on behalf of the United Nations and Russia. Without sufficient protection for the UN aid forces, the UN was forced to hire local soldiers as protection from the ongoing civil uprisings.

Finally, on August 28, 1992, 3,500 UN peacekeepers had managed to infiltrate the borders of Mogadishu and began enforcing its original mission, formed inSecurity Council resolution 751. Just as it seemed as though the peacekeepers could begin to focus on their mission, the SecurityCouncil passed resolution 775 which called for increases in personnel and a disarmament program, both of which were never approved by Aideed. Growing frustrated with failed United Nations attempts, Aideed viewed resolution 775 as a UN threat, and security issues in Somalia deteriorated worse than had anticipated. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's "An Agenda for Peace" had clearly outlined ways in which to increase the efficiency of UN peacekeeping, however, by November 1992 it seemed as though his suggestions had been ignored.

Without proper funding and lacking the necessary pre-planning procedures, the UN was burdened with unsuccessful peacekeeping missions and the deteriorating image of the organization as a whole. The mission's failure to preserve peace and provide sufficient aid to a distraught Somalia proved to be an unfortunate indicator of the future of new peacekeeping missions. UNOSOM I transformed into UNITAF on in March of 1993. Security was still an issue in Somalia andthe nation still lacked a proper functioning government, an organized civilian police force and a disciplined national army. Later in 1993 UNITAF transformed into UNISOM II with the new initiatives that would remedy the failures under UNOSOM I. Security Council document S/25168 established the following steps for UNOSOM II's military actions: 1. the transition of operational control from UNITAF, with continuing military support to relief activities and the disarming of factions; 2. the effective deployment and consolidation of the UN operational control throughout Somalia and the border regions; 3. the reduction of UNOSOM II military activity, and assistance to civil authorities in exercising greater responsibility 4. the establishment the Somali national police force as an operational task force; 5. the redeployment or reduction of UNOSOM II forces.

Even with new leadership and new goals established, the UNOSOM II mission still failed miserably. The lack of knowledge UN peacekeepers had of the traditional clan society in Somalia damaged hopes of an early cease-fire. One misunderstanding of the clan society is exemplified by the United Nations ignorance in forgetting to invite Somali intellectuals and village elders to conferences between the fourteen battling warlords. The UN further dampened the peace process when in July of 1993 peacekeepers attacked the suspected headquarters of Mohammed Aideed, killing 50 Somalis, injuring 170 more.

During the attack, clan leaders and important religious figureheads were also injured. It seemed as though UN presence in Mogadishu was achieving the exact opposite of what it had set out to accomplish. By November 1992, the Security Council decided, by means of ruling out all other possible options, to enforce Chapter VII of the UN Constitution, which deals with "action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. The United States lead 28,000 US troops and 2,000 UN (UNITAF) troops to Somalia under the joint command of President George Bush and UN leaders.

However, the United Nation and the United States had very different views as to the level of involvement and the overall goals of the mission. While the Security Council wanted to see UNITAF provide humanitarian relief for the Somali people, disarm Somali rebels, diffuse land mines throughout the country, set up a functional government, and train their police force, the US was only dedicated to creating "security conditions which will permit the feeding of the starving Somali people and [then] allow the transfer of this security function to the UN peacekeeping force". By the time the Clinton administration was prepared to hand over the mission back to UN control in 1994, it seemed as though the US had exaggerated the extent of their success. However, Clinton was not about to stand by and watch US soldiers die for a lost cause.

His final decision to withdraw troops came after the sixth attempt to overthrow Aideed, in which 18 US soldiers were killed, 78 were injured, and one Nigerian peacekeeper was abducted. The United States left UNISOM II with the tremendous task of establishing law and order, a functional economy, and a viable health care system, with a mere 2,000 peacekeepers. In short, UNISOM I, UNITAF and UNISOM II were complete failures. Although food supplies did reach the Somali victims, the UN's original goals established in Security Council 751 (1992) were not carried out. Upon leaving Somalia in March of 1995, the nation was still a political and economic wreck.

In "Somalia: from humanitarian intervention to military offensive", S.M. Mahinda sites the gap between what was desired by the Security Council and what was possible, the problems created by UNOSOM II's command and control structure, the multiple divisions among the different nations that contributed to the peacekeeping force, and the lack of trust and respect from the Somali warlords, equally contributed to a joint United Nations / United States failed mission. Although the joint US / UN mission was commendable on both sides for its efforts, the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping, and the future Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, stated that "the decision to leave Somalia", a mission that cost over $1.5 billion, "had been deliberate and painful. TheSecurity Council felt compelled to let the protagonists know that there was a limit to the internationalcommunity's patience and resources". Lack of support from warring factions in Somalia was the main downfall of the mission. The option for political compromise and national reconciliation was overturned the second UN peacekeepers took sides in the mission. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, reporting to the Security Council in March of 1995 noted that there were important lessons for future missions to be learned from such a failure.

He stated thatthe lesson learned is in the "theory and practice of multifunctional peace-keeping operations in conditions of civil war and chaos and especially about the clear line that needs to be drawn between peace-keeping and enforcement actions". Jonathan T. Howe, the secretary-general's special representative to the mission in Somalia described the mission complete failure. "U.N. peacekeeping soldiers went to starving Somalia on what was billed as a humanitarian-relief / nation -building mission and came away bloodied. If we are going to persist in peace-enforcement operations in broke countries, we need to field forces mandated and prepared to withstand armed opposition, even as they restore order". Crisis in Rwanda: In the early 1950's, Rwanda, a Belgian colony, was inhabited by three different ethnic groups: theHutus, the Tutsi and the Twa. Because the groups shared the same language and customs, there were never many disagreements among them.

However, around 1955, the Belgian government required that members of all groups carry personal identification cards indicating to which group they belonged. Once the identification system was in place, a silent battle evolved between the groups as social categories and discrimination developed based upon the group to which you belonged. Although they only constituted 14% of the entire population, the Tutsi dominated the next four years. However, in 1959, the Hutus' "social revolution" ended Tutsi rule and left Rwanda in a state of economic turmoil and constant ethnic violence. From 1959 until 1967 there were ten documented attempts to destroy theHutus rule by the Tutsi.

In 1973, Major-General Juv nal Habyarimana took control of the government through a violent takeover, and installed programs to "ethnically balance" the nation through continued violence. However, in 1990, President Habyarimana announced that Rwanda was to be transformed into a multi-party democracy. A mere ten months after the announcement, a Tutsi terrorist group (Rwandese Patriotic Front - RPF) based in Uganda (Rwanda's neighbor to the north) launched attacks across the Uganda-Rwanda border in protest of the governmental changes. In response to the attack, Habyarimana labeled all Tutsi living in Rwanda accomplices to RPF, and a civil war broke out inRwanda and over the Uganda-Rwanda border. Although a number of cease-fire resolutions had been established between 1990 and 1992, the violence continued. Finally, on February 22, 1993, leaders in Rwanda and Uganda petitioned the United Nations for help in settling the dispute.

After surveying the situation in Rwanda, as mandated in SecurityCouncil resolution 812 (1993), the Security Council formed the United Nations Observer Mission for Uganda and Rwanda (UNOMUR) on June 22, 1993, with resolution 846. The mission faced problems from its inception. UNOMUR's first task, monitoring the smuggling of arms across the Rwandan-Uganda border by RPF forces, was marred by the RPF's refusal to allow peacekeepers to establish a base on the Rwandan side of the border. However, by December 1993, the RPF allowed peacekeepers to be stationed in Uganda, Rwanda, and along the border. By August 1993, it seemed as though both sides were committed to settling the dispute and they both allowed fromthe UN to establish UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) which was delegated the responsibility of overseeing peace talks between both sides and enforcing resolutions that we reestablished at the Arusha Accords. UNAMIR was also commissioned to "monitor the observance ofthe cease-fire agreement" signed at the Arusha Accord, assist in the removal of land mines from the area, investigate all those responsible for not upholding the Arusha Accord, "monitor the repatriation of Rwandan refugees" and "assist in the co-ordination of investigating incidents regarding the activities ofthe police".

UNAMIR was also in charge of coordinating a transitional government in Rwanda. Just as both sides seemed to be close to ending the battles that began three decades ago, tensions reached an all-time high when the Cabinet Ministers in Burundi (Rwanda's neighbor to the south) were shot and killed in October of 1993 by RPF forces due to their support of President Habyarimana. After the assassinations more than 500,000 refugees left Rwanda and Burundi and inundated that border territories of Tanzania and Zaire (Rwanda's neighbors to the east and west, respectively). Sanitation conditions in areas settled by misplaced refugees were so horrible that a new disease epidemic broke in Rwanda and its border countries.

As if the constant warfare was not enough for UNPeacekeepers to be occupied with, now more peacekeepers were needed in the area to provide humanitarian aid. Fighting had slowed down and mortality rates among the two warring sides had decreased, but this temporary slowing-down period quickly came to an end as RPF Tutsi rebels shot down a plane that was transporting Rwandan President Habyarimana and Burundi President Cyprien Ntaryamira to Kigali airport. In response to the shootings, members of rebel Hutu tribes opened fire on Rwandan and UN officials, claiming the lives of one Rwandan leader and eleven peacekeepers. After long and drawn out debates within the Security Council it was decided that the mission was entirely unsuccessful and there was not much 2,500 soldiers could do to prevent further violence throughout the area.

With estimates as high as 500,000 Rwandans killed since 1990, the SecurityCouncil believed the only way to regain control of the land was through peace talks. Resolution 912 was passed on April 21, 1994 which allowed from the evacuation of UN peacekeepers from the area, and a new set of 270 new peacekeepers and negotiators were sent into the area. Without the full cooperation of Rwandan officials and the RPF, negotiators and peacekeepers had noting to do but reiterate the importance of the Arusha Accord. Under pressure from African nations and Non-Governmental Organizations, the UN decided it was necessary to become more involved in the peace process in Rwanda. So, on May 19, 1994, theSecurity Council formed UNAMIR II with resolution 918. This force would "support and provide safe conditions for displaced persons and other groups in Rwanda" while providing "assistance to humanitarian organisations and monitoring protected areas along the Rwandan border".

However, without sufficient support from the United States, the deployment of UNAMIR II was delayed until mid-June. Once in Rwanda, peacekeepers, composed of 800 troops from Ghana, Ethiopia, and Senegal were still unable to accomplish the goals of resolution 918 without the full support of the United States. When the US finally conceded to allow the troops to carry out their mission, the Security Council passed resolution 919 to combine the goals outlined in 918 to make up for the time lost. But, much tothe surprise of UN officials, Ghanaian officials removed 300 troops from their arsenal, leaving the mission with a mere 500 peacekeepers.

Fearing a complete RPF takeover of the Rwandan government, the Security Council passed aUS-backed French initiative to deploy 5,500 troops to Rwanda to protect refugees and prevent the progress of RPF forces. The Security Council also called for "temporary multinational operations aimed at contributing to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk inRwanda" acting under the auspices of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. But the plan was implemented too late and on July 14, 1994, RPF forces took full control of Rwanda, excluding the "safe-zone " inhabited by the 5,500 peacekeepers. With two million refugees protected by the "safe-zone", French President Mitterrand pulled out 1,200 of its soldiers, against the wishes of the UN. Rwandan leaders were so distraught by the RPF takeover, that they asked the UN forces to reorganize or leave the territory altogether citing the missions as "costly, useless and undisciplined".

Rwandan leaders accused the peacekeepers of creating "tensions with the local population [s]" of their territory. These comments outraged the international community and labeled Rwandan leaders as being ungrateful, but the truth ofthe matter was that Rwandan officials were correct in their assessment of the accomplishment of the peacekeepers. Although disease was still rapidly spreading throughout Rwandan refugees and attempts to thwart violence in the area were unsuccessful, there was no longer enough international support to continue efforts to assist the Rwandan government. Without the support of Rwandan and RPF officials, the UN had no choice but to end the UNAMIR mission. By June of 1995 only 1,500 peacekeepers remained inRwanda and by March of 1996 the mission was officially ended with Security.