Persecution Of The Catholic Church Bismarck example essay topic
His father was an upper class, land owning Prussian more commonly known as a Junker. (World Book, 1999, p. 381) (German News, 1998, p. 1) (Passant, 1966, p. 45) (Godesky, 1997, p. 1) (Compton " sEncyclopedia, 1999, p. 1) During his early education Otto von Bismarck studied law at the universities of Berlin andGottingen. In 1836 he enrolled his services in the national army. But just a year later Bismarck found himself very dissatisfied with his subordinate post and resigned to manage his family's estate.
After a little more than decade, in 1847, Otto von Bismarck re-entered the government this time employing his skills as a politician. In 1851 he was chosen to represent Prussia in the Federal Diet and just eight years later he became an official ambassador of Prussia. (German News, 1998, p. 1) (Versaware, 1999, p. 1) (Chastain, 1998, p. 1) (World Book, 1999, p. 381) (Richards, 1977, p. 139-143) (Compton " sEncyclopedia, 1999, p. 1) This is when Bismarck, a beneficiary of good fortunes, set his own designs for Prussia into motion (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1994, p. 3) Otto von Bismarck, during the course of 1860-1862, benefit ted from some unpredictable circumstances. 'That same year [1862] a bitter dispute between the Prussian government and Parliament over the size of the army reached an impasses. In 1861 Parliament had granted the government additional funds for reforms, but in 1862 it refused to do so without a reduction of the compulsory military service from three to two years. King William Would not yield for fear that the draftees would be insufficiently imbued with conservative values; it was for that very reason that the liberal-dominated Parliament insisted on this concession.
In order to break the stalemate Bismarck was named minster- president. He proceeded to collect the additional taxes on the basis of the 1861 budget, arguing that because the constitution did not provide for the case of an impasse he would have to apply the questions of the day [meaning the unification of Germany] will not be settled by speeches and majority decisions... but by blood and iron. ' (Versaware, 1999, p. 1) Bismarck was making his intentions known to all, and it was fairly clear that he would use any means necessary to achieve his purpose, even if that meant armed conflict. Machiavelli, on the subject of war, stated in The Prince that 'A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than of arms they have lost their states. And the first cause of your losing it is to neglect this and; and what enables you to acquired a state is to master of the art.
' (Machiavelli, 1505, Ch. 14 p. 1) Bismarck understood this very well and that is why he said 'The questions of the day [meaning the unification of Germany] will not be settled by speeches and majority decisions... but by blood and iron' (Versaware, 1999, p. 1) (Christopher, 1991, p. 102) Otto von Bismarck realized that words alone would not unify the Germanic states and that they needed a common cause to unite them. Bismarck determined that this cause should be a war, (Richards, 1977,142) for there is no better bonding agent then that of the threat to one's livelihood. Bismarck used the Danish war to help consolidate his internal position in Prussia and to strengthen Prussian military transportation. (Christopher, 1991, p. 103) 'Liberal sentiment in Germany had always been stirred by a desire to separate Schleswig- Holstein from Denmark. The liberals called for a repudiation of international agreements by Prussia (such as the 1852 Protocol which put the Danish issue on ice), while Bismarck declared in the Diet that he would not be a party to a breach of international obligations.
So Bismarck made an agreement with Austria, the avowed enemy of German unity, to proceed within the context of the 1852 Protocol. The two powers then sent an ultimatum to Denmark on January 16, 1864 demanding a withdrawal of the constitution of November 18 (which incorporated Schleswig in Denmark) withing 48 hours or face military action. Denmark, counting on the support of European Powers, rejected the ultimatum. France hesitated to join England, which refused to act alone. So the powers did nothing. An attempt at mediation also failed.
Denmark was therefore reduced to submission by Prussian and Austrian military force. In the Treaty of Gas tien (August 1865) Prussia and Austria decided to dispose of the acquired duchies. The two powers decided to rule the two duchies jointly, with Austria administering Holstein and Prussia administering Schleswig. Prussia was given certain military roads through Holstein and command of Kiel, which was to be a port of the German Confederation. Both duchies were compelled to join the Zollverien, which was of course to Prussia's benefit since she controlled the customs union for all practical purposes. ' (Rempel, 1995, p. 1) (Richards, 1977, p. 144-146) (Passant, 1966, p. 48-52) (Russell, 1973, p. 161-163) Yet Bismarck felt asif he had not quite 'mastered the art' of war as Machiavelli had described and as such Germany, as he envisioned, lay un-united.
Austrian influence, in the smaller Germanic states, was still to strong in Prussia for the unification process to proceed any further and thus 'Bismarck believed that... [an] eventual war with Austria would be inevitable. ' (Rempel, 1995, p. 1). Bismarck was becoming more and more Machiavellian with every political movement. Bismarck took very delicate precautions to insure the success of his campaigns. (Gielen, 1995, p. 4) He perceived Russia and France as a possible threat to the Prussian unification process.
When the Polish revolution came along in 1863, Bismarck used this as an opportunity to secure his political position with Russia by aiding them in quelling the uprising. But France could not be won over so easily so Bismarck made 'all kinds of vague promises for territorial aggrandizement in 1865' (Rempel, 1995, p. 1) (Passant, 1966, p. 54-55). Since 'not a single German state was with Prussia' (Rempel, 1995, p. 1), Bismarck recognized that Prussia would benefit greatly from an alliance. So in April of 1866 Bismarck made an alliance with Italy 'through Napoleon's assistance, which stipulated that Italy would come to the aid of Prussia if a war with Austria broke out in three months. ' (Rempel, 1995, p. 1).
Prussia now needed to provoke a war with Austria within three months or else the alliance with Italy would be void. Bismarck seemed to be employing the Machiavellian principle 'the ends justifies the means. ' as he didn't care how the unification took place, even if it took several wars to accomplish. Through careful political maneuvers Bismarck, acting on behalf of Prussia, sucked Austria into a war. (Christopher, 1991, p. 103) 'Bismarck then moved towards the showdown by accusing Austria of arming and troop movements in Bohemia.
He called it 'seditious agitation' and further accused Austria of supporting the unlucky Augustenburg. Strangely enough, when the Prussian king put pressure on Vienna, Austria seemed willing to disarm, but false rumors that Italy was arming scared Austria and moved her in the opposite direction. So Austria mobilized first and at the same time brought the various minor problems which had developed over Schleswig-Holstein before the Federal Diet, in order to gain the support of the other German states. Bismarck immediately cried that this was a breach of the Gastein Convention. When Austria shortly thereafter convoked the Holstein diet, Prussian troops marched into Holstein. Meanwhile Bismarck presented a new plan for the reorganization of the Confederation.
This was laid on the table about the same time that Bavaria proposed to choose a commander for the Confederation armies and to mobilized the forces of the smaller states. When the Bavarian proposal won by a vote of 9 to 6, the Prussian delegate declared the Confederation dissolved and the existence of a state of war. ' (Rempel, 1995, p. 2) (Passant, 1966, p. 55) (Russell, 1973 p. 162) Through the Austro-Prussian war, the smaller Germanic states came one step closer to becoming unified with the fatherland, Prussia. Austrian influence had virtually been eliminated from the southern Germanic states. With the conclusion of the Austro-Prussian war, Bismarck was beginning see his plan for a unified Germany, unfold. This was due to the fact that the southern Germanic states were forced to sign a military alliance with Prussia.
This alliance was known as the Treaty of Prague. (Richards, 1977, p. 147) (Passant, 1966, p. 55) Through this treaty it was evident that Bismarck, as Machiavelli wrote, was not afraid to use cruelty to make 'his subjects untied and loyal' (Machiavelli, 1505, Ch. 17 p. 2). While Napoleon appeared to have secured the southern Germanic states against full union with Prussia, Bismarck had other ideas.
' [Bismarck] began by demanding territory & war indemnities, but proposed as an alternative secret alliance treaties. In such terms, if Prussia were involved in a war threatening its territory, the southern states would place their armies under Prussia's command. ' (Alexander, 1997, p. 4) (Passant, 1966, p. 57) (Russell, 1973, p. 162). Although Prussia now had control of the southern Germanic state armies and their economies, Prussia still was not whole. Bismarck, aware of the fact that Napoleon still had a loyal faction in the southern Germanic states, knew that he had to continue his reign of terror to totally eliminate outside influences over the unification process. Bismarck surmised that the only way to break the southern loyalty to France was to totally destroy France's influence in Prussia.
Bismarck was bound by the wording of the Treaty of Prague, and as such he had to force France to be the aggressor, for if France was the aggressor the southern Germanic states were obligated to give their military support. Bismarck, once again through very delicate political maneuvers, manipulated France into a war with Prussia. Thus Bismarck's attitude,' the ends justifies the means', was reflected through his actions as he caused France to become enraged, through his special editing techniques displayed in the famous Ems telegram. This telegram, sent to Bismarck by Emperor William IV, described the conference between the Prussians, the French and the Spanish.
'William communicated his version of events in the infamous Ems Dispatch to Bismarck. Bismarck edited the Dispatch to make it seem as if the French had been insulted and then published the account. The outraged French declared war. Stirred by national loyalty, the day after the French declaration of war reached Berlin, Bavaria joined Prussia, followed within days by the other south German states of Wurtemburg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt in the war against France. Throughout his diplomatic dealings and careful political maneuvering Bismarck clearly demonstrated many of Machiavelli's principals. But it wasn't just in war that Bismarck followed Machiavelli's principles, throughout his political career, after the unification, he dealt with situations as the arose with finesse and charisma.
Throughout his career as a politician Otto von Bismarck saw the Catholic church as an enemy and a threat to his power. 'In 1871, Otto von Bismarck embarked on a Kulturkampf, or cultural struggle, to maintain unity in the new German Empire. Bismarck was concerned about the powerful influence of the Roman Catholic church on German unity. Pope Pius IX (1792-1878) had taken an increasingly aggressive position and in 1870 had redefined papal infallibility.
In addition, German Catholics, particularly the Catholic Poles within the empire. Bismarck was also concerned that German Catholics might unite under papal authority with their Catholic neighbours in Austria and France. To Bismarck, the power of the Catholic church was a threat to German nationalism. To curb the influence of the Catholic church, on 8 July 1871 Bismarck abolished the special division for Catholic affairs in the Prussian Ministry for Public Worship and Education. The following year, on 4 July 1872, he succeeded in having the Reichstag pass a law dissolving the Jesuit order within the German Empire. Other anti-Catholic laws were passed by the Prussian minister for public worship and education, Ad albert Flak (1827-1900).
The May Laws, passed in 1873, 1874, and 1875 gave the state the power to supervise education and appoint and discipline all clergy. Religious marriage ceremonies were banned, making civil marriage compulsory. By 1876, the suppression of the Catholic church had reached the point where many bishops and priests had been imprisoned. (Christopher, 1991, p. 104) (Encyclopedia Britannic, 1999, p. 6) (Versaware, 1999, p. 2) (Passant, 1966, p. 89-91) (Russell, 1973, p. 166) Through the persecution of the Catholic church Bismarck revealed were he stood on issues. He declared his allies and his foes. As Machiavelli said 'A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a downright enemy, that to say, when, without any reservation, he declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which course will always be more advantageous than standing neutral.
21 p. 1). Alongwith his reforms against the Catholic church, Bismarck also used the two major political parties to his advantage. When Bismarck first began his political career, he was viewed asa conservative. (Godesky, 1997, p. 1) He used this position to sway the conservative vote to provide more money for the army. 'He [Bismarck] proceeded to collect the additional taxes... because the constitution did not provide for the case of an impasse he would have to apply the questions of the day [meaning the unification of Germany] will not be settled by speeches and majority decisions... but by blood and iron' (Versaware, 1991, p. 1) (Christopher, 1991, p. 103). After Bismarck received additional funds for the army, he abandoned his conservative roots to join with the liberals in hope that this position would further benefit his political career.
'From the defeat of Austria in 1866 until 1878 Bismarck was allied primarily with the National Liberals. Together they created a civil and criminal code for the new empire and accomplished Germany's adoption of the gold standard and move toward free trade. Just as they had earlier written off Bismarck as an arch-conservative, liberals now viewed him as a comrade- a man who had reject his conservative roots. ' (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1999, p. 6) But in 1878-79 Bismarck abandoned the liberal party and made a new alliance with the conservatives in order to discourage the 'great depression:', that swept over Europe in the mid- 1870's, through economic reforms and tariffs. (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1999, p. 6).
Bismarck switched parties when they became an inconvenience or if one party fit his plans more then another. He told the people what they wanted to hear, and then acted as he saw fit without a second thought about the people. Through the persecution of the Catholic church, and his political career in general, Bismarck followed Machiavelli's principals very carefully. He used three wars to unify German, he outlawed the religion that posed a threat to him, he allied himself with certain parties when it fit his plans and just generally told the people what they wanted to hear and then did what he wanted to do anyway. Bismarck left nothing up to fortune, he took ever precaution to ensure that his plans were a success. Thus German was established with a firm foundation.
' He who has relied least on fortune is established the strongest. 6 p. 1) Now it was evident to the populous of the world that Bismarck had the makings of the first Machiavellian politician in the modern world.
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