Pilot Of A U 2 Spy Plane example essay topic

Many Americans regard the Cold War as a time when tensions ran high and war seemed inevitable; when the entire world was torn between two superpowers. What the common citizen did not know, however, was just how real the war was. There was a secret war being fought between America and the Soviet Union at the time and this took the form of arms buildup, the Space Race, and most notably, espionage. One important aspect of the constant spy game between the two countries was the introduction of the American's U-2 high altitude spy plane. This innovation gave the Americans a distinct advantage over the Communist Russians, but the project was kept secret from the American people. In fact, the American public only became aware of the existence of the U-2 after one had been shot down during a secret espionage mission over the Soviet Union.

The crises stirred up a great amount of controversy and some of the American people and all of Russian Ambassadors felt that it was an unjustifiable intrusion into the Soviet Union's territory. However, because of the technological advances made and the important information discovered as a result of the U-2's missions, its use was justifiable in the cold war and it was, in fact, a very important tool for the American government, despite its controversy. "The U-2 was, indeed one of the CIA's greatest intelligence achievements. In fact, it may be one of the greatest achievements of any intelligence service of any nation". ("A Rev. in Intelligence" 1).

This quote, spoken by George Tenet, former director of the CIA, summarizes what the U-2 accomplished. However, this only came about through months of hard work and research. President Dwight Eisenhower approved the U-2 project in 1954. The project was proposed as a means of gaining information on Fagan 2 the growing Soviet threat ("A Rev. in Intelligence" 1). As a budget, the U-2 project was granted $35 million to build 30 planes (resulting to just over $1 million per plane) (Sullivan 2). The concept of a high altitude spy plane was first introduced at the end of WWII and was finally given a means with which to become reality (Sullivan 1).

So, in December of 1954, the direction of the project was granted to Clarence "Kelly" Johnson and work on the plane began at the Lockheed "Skunk Works" (Sullivan 1). In order to keep its construction secret from the American public and from possible Soviet spies, the U-2 was designed under the guise of being a utility plane, hence the 'U' prefix ("Lockheed U-2 and TR-1" 1). The U-2 spy plane would be the most expensive project undertaken by the CIA at that time. A large part of the expense was the fact that the U-2 would use only the latest photographical and surveillance technology and equipment. Not only that, but it also included the latest fuel and engine advances as well ("A Rev. in Intelligence" 1). The camera that was used by the spy plane to take pictures from 70,000 feet in the air was designed by Edward Land and cost an estimated $57,000 to develop alone (Sullivan, 1).

Because the spy plane was expected to complete the flight over the Soviet Union with no stops or refueling times (a total range of about 6,250 miles, it would need to be both super light, and extremely fuel efficient ("Lockheed U-2 and TR-1" 2). Not only that, but the plane was planned and designed to fly at an unprecedented 70,000 feet in order to stay out of reach of the Soviets' anti air guns and planes (Pocock 34). In order to meet the extremely lightweight requirements that would be necessary to obtain such a high altitude and distance many staples of an airplane were not included in the design of the U-2. Fagan 3 Among the list of things that the U-2 did not come equipped with was an ejector seat for the pilot (Kent 56). It is thought by some circles that there was a dual-reason behind the choice to not have a means of ejection for the pilot. Yes it would conserve weight on the aircraft and, in turn, fuel, but it has been suggested that the American government had an ulterior motive in this matter.

If there were no ejector seats, then there would be no surviving pilot if the U-2 were to crash. It was feared that if a live U-2 pilot was captured by the Russians then he would be tortured without mercy and forced to give up technological secrets of the United States (Pedlow 22). American officials and President Eisenhower didn't want to take this risk so the ejector seat was not included in the plane. The developers of the plane also promised that no pilot of a U-2 spy plane would be captured (Pedlow 26). In other efforts to save weight on the plane, it was constructed with extremely long, lightweight wings. They were also very fragile and would crumple like paper under any substantial impact.

The tail was held on by only three steel bolts, making it vulnerable to breakage as well (Pocock 47). With the "long, high aspect ratio wings", the U-2 was given some of the traits of a glider to give it a longer range and carry as meager of an amount of fuel as possible ("Lockheed U-2 and TR-1" 4). With an extremely lightweight body and no counter-measures, the U-2 relied solely upon its capability to fly above other planes, specifically Russian MiGs, to keep it safe ("A Rev. in Intelligence" 3). After plans were complete the first U-2 took 88 days to build and made its first flight in August of 1955 (Sullivan 1). Fagan 4 After development of the spy plane was completed, all that was left for the American government was actually using it, and the U-2 became an effective tool for America such that it was indeed justifiable in its covert operation.

The U-2's mission statement was to analyze the extent of the Soviet Union ballistic missile threat. In short, photograph any Soviet arms factories and also any completed missiles that were present on the ground ("A Rev. in Intelligence" 2). To this effect, the U-2 missions began on July 4, 1956, launching from Wiesbaden Air Base in Western Germany (Orlov 3). The first flight was a success. It passed over the entire landmass of the Soviet Union taking substantial amounts of pictures of the Russian's weapons factories and actual military strength (Orlov 2). However, something happened that the Americans did not expect.

The U-2 was detected by Russian radar. It was thought that the plane flew so high and was so small that it would be overlooked by the Russian military. However, the Soviet Union did in fact know, that they were being spied on and protested vehemently against the intrusion of their airspace (Kent 18). That is all they could do though, since they had no available counter-measures that could shoot down planes that flew so high.

They were left to protest through diplomatic channels to the American government, who was not about to relinquish their new powerful tool of surveillance. During the ten days after July 4, 1956, the U-2's made five incursions into USSR airspace and obtained hundreds of photographs of Russian airfields and shipyards. The pictures came as a relief to American officials as it was revealed that the amount of strategic bombers and actual ballistic missiles the Soviets controlled was far less then the estimated number and also far less then the amount the Americans controlled. While this eased the fears of the American Fagan 5 government, it did nothing to quell the worries of the American public, who were unaware of the surveillance flights into the Soviet Union (Orlov 3). Though the amount of strategic airplanes and ballistic missiles was less then the anticipated amount, the number of nuclear submarines was much larger.

It appeared that the Russian military had been concentrating its money in submarine research and construction, perhaps for use against the continental United States (Pocock 53). The U-2 flights were a great success and their pictures provided a useful tool for the American government. Though the American public never knew about them, they did a great deal to ensure American safety and allowed officials to make informed decisions concerning the Soviets. Instead of rushing to war on "assumptions" that the Soviets had a larger military, the Americans could instead, allow themselves a measure of relaxation, for they were in fact, not in as significant a danger as they had originally perceived. The U-2 flights guaranteed the safety of the American people and for that reason they were justified for use in the Cold War. The flights may have violated Russian airspace but it was all in an effort to become informed of their enemies capabilities and be able to better protect the peace and freedom that Americans lived under.

While the Soviets could not militarily respond to the U-2 planes' intrusion of their airspace, that did not stop them from establishing a new branch of the military in early 1960. Called the Strategic Missile Forces, its specific mission was to develop a new generation of anti aircraft weaponry particularly with the idea of countering the U-2 (Orlov 5). Soviets began deploying an increasing amount of strategic missiles, building new SAM (surface-to-air missiles) sites, and equipping their forces with advanced radar, Fagan 6 all in an effort to combat the U-2 intrusions (Orlov 4). However, for many years these efforts proved to be only a mild deterrent to scheduled U-2 flyovers.

Diplomacy remained the Soviets only option. Their negotiations and protests gained a brief pause in the flights in 1956, but they resumed again in 1957 (Orlov 5). In response to the Americans' domination of the sky, the Soviets turned to their space program. They made fantastic breakthroughs in the fields of rocketry and space travel, hoping to use this advantage as a lever to help put a stop to U-2 flyovers. In fact, it was believed by the Americans that the Soviets' ultimate goal was to put a nuclear device into space capable of attacking the United States with them being unable to counter it (Orlov 4).

Despite the edge that the Americans had held over the Soviets for so long concerning the U-2 missions, that gap began to lessen with time. Soviets eventually developed an anti-air missile that was capable of tracking aircraft in high altitudes (Orlov 6). This upgrading of Soviet weaponry made U-2 flights increasingly risky. There were reports from pilots of missiles fired from the ground coming much closer to the planes then previously had been thought possible (Orlov 7). There were even reports of a spy in the U-2 program who was handing over the secrets of the aircraft to the Russians. It seemed that the communist nation may soon develop their own version of the U-2 spy plane, possibly one with offensive weapons to counter the Americans' (Kent 39).

The tensions between America and the Soviet Union continued to grow until finally it was decided that a summit must be held to avoid war. The leaders of the countries prepared to meet in Paris to discuss a possible cut down on the stockpile of Fagan 7 armaments in both countries (Pocock 29). Because of the sensitivity of this summit and the fact that the frail negotiations to hold it could collapse at any time, the U-2 flights were suspended. The last one was scheduled to fly on May 1st by a veteran pilot, Francis Gary Powers (Sullivan 3). Powers' flight was immediately detected upon entrance to Soviet airspace. Unbeknownst to him was the fact that the Soviets had been sucessfully testing a new type of SAM missile that was capable of homing in on aircraft at high altitudes (Orlov 5).

A group of MiG's shadowed Power's entire flight in Soviet airspace and radioed his position to Russian military command (Sullivan 2). Powers was shot down by an anti-aircraft missle over Sverdlovsk. He crash landed and survived unscathed (Sullivan 2). Not only was Powers unable to activate the self-destruct charges that would destroy his aircraft to prevent the technology from falling into Soviet hands but he also did not ingest his cyanide pill to commit suicide (Sullivan 4).

As expected, Powers was captured by the KGB and held in Moscow where it was "uncertain" what information the Russians extracted from him; the American government assumed that Powers had been killed on impact and fed a cover story to the American public of an "accidental crash" in northern Russia (Pocock 67). The peace summit was to continue as planned. However, during the peace talks themselves, the Soviet Union expressed their anger at having their airspace violated by U-2 spy planes. The American government denied this claim and it was then that the Russians brought Powers into the summit, alive and well. This, of course, was a humiliating experience for America and the peace talks collapsed (Pocock 71). Not only Fagan 8 that, but President Eisenhower lost creditability with the American people because of the fact that he had denied the U-2 project existed and he was now shown to be lying.

Despite the dire ramifications that the Powers episode had on the peace talks between the USSR and America, it cannot be refuted that without the U-2 spy plane a war could have easily occurred because America did not know of Russia's weapon capability. The U-2 was an important tool in this aspect because it allowed the Americans to acquire photographical evidence of Russia's weapon sites. Despite the controversy that arose from the use of the spy plane, it was in fact justifiable in its use in order to protect America from getting involved in a costly feud with the Soviet Union during the Cold War Era.

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