Post War Versailles Treaty example essay topic
All these came to an end when on 11 November 1918, Germany finally agreed to sign an armistice. What is very important to know, is that this armistice was actually based on United States' President Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points". However, the Treaty of Versailles, sharply differed from Wilson's points, and Germany, who felt betrayed, denounced the treaty as "morally invalid". Henig claimed that the fact that it did not survive the 1920's intact stemmed, not so much from the terms of the peace treaties themselves but from the reluctance of political leaders in the inter-war period to enforce them 2. Overall, the Treaty of Versailles was flawed to the extent that instead of preventing future wars it made a future war inevitable! But let's take things from the beginning in our attempt to demonstrate the reasons that led the Versailles Treaty, to be considered a failure.
The goal following World War I was to restore European stability and maintain everlasting peace. However, these goals were recognized by all of the leaders as not easily achievable. French Prime Minister Clemenceau commented on the day the armistice was signed on 11 November 1918, "We have won the war: now we have to win the peace, and it may be more difficult 3. The French politician Marshal Foch, as the Versailles Treaty was being signed, stated rather prophetically, "This is not peace; it is an armistice for 20 years 4". Indeed, Foch was absolutely correct. The Versailles Treaty did little to shape any sort of long-term peace from the results of World War I. Instead, the treaty, hastily put together, was vague, exposed the Allies' inability to cooperate toward an agreement, and fuel led German nationalism from resentment over her treatment by the Allies in the treaty.
The principle reasons for the failure of the Treaty of Versailles to establish a long-term peace include the following. Firstly, the Allies disagreed on how best to treat Germany, also Germany refused to accept the terms of reparations, and finally Germany's refusal to accept the "war-guilt" clause, that led to growing German resentment and nationalism. The Versailles Peace Conference exposed the ideological rift growing between the Allies. Throughout Versailles and after, Britain and France could not agree on how to treat Germany. While public opinions of both nations wanted Germany pay to the fullest extent, only France saw Germany as a potential threat to the future security of European stability. Thus, while Britain saw Germany as a barrier-fortress against the Russians and an economically strong nation with which to engage in international trade, the French viewed Germany as a threat to French security.
France feared that not levying harsh enough penalties upon Germany would only make her stronger and she would eventually rise up against France in revenge. In short, while the British felt that the Treaty of Versailles was too harsh on Germany, France felt as though it were not harsh enough. One aspect to deal with was German disarmament. Kitchen explains that there was general agreement that Germany should be disarmed but considerable differences about how this should best be achieved 5.
Eventually, the Allies came to an agreement regarding the new state of the German military. Among others, the German navy was to be limited to 15,000 officers and men, six battleships, twelve destroyers and torpedo boats, while the army was to be restricted to 100,000 men. The only problem was that the Germans never abide d by this part of the treaty. One of the most crucial omissions of this section was the absence of time limits, which worked in Germany's favour.
To expect Germany to be disarmed forever was completely unrealistic. What's more, the treaty offered no hint as to how long the disarmament should last. Therefore, this was one of the parts of the treaty that Germany continually abused and disobeyed out of bitterness. Another issue of significant note is how the Allies dealt with the war reparations that Germany owed.
One of the major question regarding the reparations was the following: should Germany be held accountable for what she owed to the Allies or should she be held accountable for what she could afford to pay? But even answering this question became difficult. For instance, for how much was Germany accountable? Was Germany to pay for all of the damage assessed? France felt that Germany should cover the costs of restoration of invaded territories and repayment of war debts, and that a long period of stiff repayments would have the added advantage of keeping Germany financially and economically weak. Britain, on the other hand, was concerned with the revival of international trade and knew that if Germany was heavily in debt with the Allied Powers, she would not be able to purchase British goods in sufficient quantities.
Because of all of the ambiguities involving the war reparations, an exact monetary figure owed by the Germans to the Allies was never included in the Treaty of Versailles. For Germany, the terms of reparations eventually arrived at by the Reparations Committee were unacceptable. The German delegates viewed the economic sanctions as being far too harsh. The British economist John Maynard Keynes wrote in 1920 The Economic Consequences of the Peace in which he argues that the German economy would be destroyed by the post-war Versailles Treaty. The fact of the matter is that Germany never felt as though they were defeated in World War I. Therefore, they had a hard time accepting the fact that they should have to pay for anything.
Reparations became the chief battleground of the post-war era, the focus of power between France and Germany over whether the Versailles Treaty was to be enforced or revised. Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, which laid the blame for World War I solely on the shoulders of Germany, remains to this day a subject of intense emotional debate among Germans. Henig argues that 'this clause, known as the 'war-guilt' clause, more than any other in the entire Treaty of Versailles, was to cause lasting resentment in Germany 6. ' The Treaty presented to the Germans at Versailles was a harsh break from the promise of a treaty based on Wilson's "Fourteen Points. The Germans felt betrayed by the treaty presented to them and resented the manner in which the Allied Powers were treating them. Because of this seemingly harsh treatment, every party in Germany, from the Communists on the extreme left to Hitler's National Socialists on the extreme right, concurred in condemning the Versailles Treaty as unjust and unacceptable.
Thus, the war-guilt clause and the reparations demanded from Germany did little more than to add fuel to the fire that was growing German resentment and nationalism. In fact, some say that the war-guilt clause proved to be a gift to German nationalism. As Foch predicted, the Versailles Treaty was indeed only a 20 year armistice for the European powers. The inability of the Allies to agree on how to deal with Germany, the main war-time aggressor, led to her regain of economic and political strength in the 1920's and 30's. The Second World War, which broke out in 1939, was waged by Germany against the Allies to exact revenge and to finish what could not be completed by World War I. The Germans had always resented the terms and conditions of the treaty. In a way the Peace of Versailles was like a big stick of dynamite, and Hitler was just like the little boy with the match.
Thus, the Treaty of Versailles failed to bring about everlasting European stability and peace for which the Allied Powers' governments had hoped. The treaty was put together in haste and the Germans refused to sign it because it treated them, or at least they thought so, too harshly in light of what they had been promised. What stopped the Treaty of Versailles from ever approaching success, however, was not the terms of the treaty, but rather the reluctance to enforce the terms by the Allies. They were na " ive to assume that Germany would cooperate with the treaty terms by themselves.
Thus within a year of the peace conference, the victorious alliance had crumbled away. It was this critical collapse, rather than the provisions of the peace terms themselves, which ensured that the Treaty of Versailles was never fully accepted or enforced 7. The Allies were strong enough to win the war, but not strong enough to secure the peace!
Bibliography
Adamthwaite, Antony. The Making of the Second World War (New York, 1992).
Henig, Ruth. Versailles and After: 1919-1933 (London: Routledge, 1995).
Hobsbawn, Eric. The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York, 1996).
Keynes, John Maynard. The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New York, 1920).
Kitchen, Martin. Europe Between the Wars (London, 2000).
Marks, Sally. The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918-1933 (London, 1976).