Proactive Policy Towards Terrorists example essay topic

Terrorism is a rare, broad concept that affects individuals, schools, corporations, and governments alike. Generally terrorists end up wanting to make change with governments, and governments are usually the only groups powerful enough to try to deal with governments. But what should be the best strategy to deal with terrorists? Since September 11, 2001 game theory has been used to analyze how governments and how terrorists should act to achieve their best outcome. This paper will analyze the games that these competing forces can use to determine the best course of action. The current war on terrorism is tending to have three different sides: the United States, the European Union, and the terrorists.

Before the September 11th attacks all policies towards terrorism were reactive rather than proactive. So before we get involved with terrorists at all, there is a game in which based on what policy the EU is going to enact, the how should the US act towards terrorism. A proactive policy means that the government is going to attack POSSIBLE terror threats, whereas a reactive policy would mean that there would be no strikes against terrorism unless the terrorists decide to strike first. Now lets take a look at a model. Lets say, for analysis sake, that a proactive strategy costs a government 6, but casts a benefit of 4 for both governments. For example, if only the US has a proactive strategy, then it's net would be -2, but the EU would get all 4 of benefit.

If both governments are proactive, then the cost is still 6 for each, but the benefit is doubled to 8 because they benefit from each other's policies. Using this structure, we can construct this normal form of the game: from Acre & Sandler Vol. 34 In this model it is clear that the Nash Equilibrium is where neither government has a proactive policy towards terrorists. Because neither government is willing to bear the entire cost, neither government will be proactive although the largest benefit can be derived from both being proactive. This is why this is a type of prisoner's dilemma game. Real life is hardly ever as fair as this model would suggest. The United States is the target of 40% of all terrorism in the world.

(Oster) The US is also more often successful in thwarting terrorism than Europe. Thus, a more realistic model might be one in which the United States gets a benefit of 8 for it's proactive strategy. The EU still retains its ability to freeload for a benefit of 4 if they remain reactive while the US is proactive. This more realistic model would be represented in this manner: from Acre & Sandler Vol. 34 In this model, because the US is always better off if it has a proactive policy, thus giving it a dominant strategy of being preemptive. Because the US has a dominant strategy, the Nash equilibrium is moved up to wherever the EU can maximize benefit given the US being proactive.

This is quite possibly the case after the aforementioned September 11th attacks, because although the US policy was immediately reactive, now they are more proactive, while Europe tends to enjoy the benefits presented by the United States. Before we analyze which of these situations is most likely to occur in the real world, let's take a slightly different look at the situation. Let's assume that there is now a coordination game that the governments are playing, and that in order to receive benefits of 2, both countries must act proactively. In the instance that only one government is proactive, it has a cost of 4 and thus, has a benefit of -4. This setup gives us a coordination game in normal form: from Acre & Sandler Vol. 34 The solution of this game has 2 different Nash equilibrium's, with both countries acting preemptively or both re actively. Fortunately in real life situations, countries generally have established excellent lines of communication and can deduce the most efficient strategy available.

Which of these three models is most likely to happen? This depends on the manner of the benefits. If there is a benefit to being the first to act, then most likely model 3 would be the most likely scenario, because both countries would be looking to act first and be preemptive. If, however, there is no benefit to being the first to act, it is entirely possible that we would see the prisoner's dilemma game from the first model to be played out. In this game, the equilibrium is reached by neither country adopting a proactive strategy. This project has focused mainly on how countries interact with each other in efforts to stop terrorism.

Models have been done to show how terrorists and governments interact with each other, but these models are becoming outdated based on a more recent willingness of terrorists to kill themselves in their quest, making it difficult to predict how terrorists will respond to government actions. Years ago this may have seemed on too high a level to affect individuals and businesses, but with the developments in recent years, terrorism has touched every single person and business in this country and most others.

Bibliography

Arce, Daniel G., & Sandler, Todd. Terrorism and Game Theory. Simulation and Gaming. Vol. 34 September 2003 Oster, Christopher.
Can the Risk of Terrorism Be Calculated By Insurers? Game Theory Might Do It. (2002, April 8) The Wall Street Journal.