Proposed Form Of Government Unionist Politicians example essay topic

Account For The Failure Of Both The Account For The Failure Of Both The Power Sharing Executive And The Northern Ireland Assembly Account for the failure of both the Power Sharing Executive and the Northern Ireland Assembly Seminar No. 5 To account for such a failure in the power-sharing executive it is necessary for one to look at the structure and the organisation of the Assemblies as well as assessing its aims and directives as well as to examine the time scale to which this has taken place. My intention is to examine from the mid-seventies to the present day and all the questions that these many and various initiatives have raised. The power-sharing executive was the first and last examples of home rule since the collapse of Stormont. During this last period the establishment of Stormont lasted from 1973 to 1974. The aim of the British Government was to return the province to an eventual devolution. The issue of direct rule was to be only a temporary measure whilst the relevant sides talked it out at the negotiating table looking for a form of political settlement.

Essentially the main elements that both parties were looking for was to guarantee that the province remained a part of the United Kingdom as long as the majority deem that wish. Proportional Representation was held in order to elect the new seventy-eight Northern Irish Assembly. The two most contentious issue of all the issues of were the issue of institutionalised power sharing and that of the establishment of the Council of Ireland, which had, a direct input into the system of governance as well as a probable oversight into linking the whole system into the Irish political system, therefore adding an Irish dimension to the proceedings in order to placate republican feelings and sentiment. The executive failed on a series of levels due to the various claimed inconsistency by both sides. But one must really accredit claim to the Unionists for mobilising the populace with the help of the paramilitaries in organising strikes and protest marches in order to discredit the Republican gains in the region. Unionist felt that their position was somewhat a breach of trust from the then current labour government.

Unionist were strongly opposed to power sharing or any kind of Home Rule since the Unionists were so used to having their own way under the previous Stormont tenures with various Unionist majorities that they saw as keeping the Republicans in some form of check thus providing them with an opposition that would be of no trouble to quell. Another aspect that would provide the Unionist ammunition to carry on their concurrent course was that of the British Government to bring about a halt to the various strikes and civil disturbances caused by the Loyalists and the Protestant populous. As an immediate rise to the outrage of this proposed form of government Unionist Politicians requested mobilisation of their own religious sectors to rise up against the notion of a power-sharing executive and thus conduct a series of strikes to bolster their argument. This was also augmented by the Loyalist Paramilitary Organisations such as the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster Defence Association. These organisations set about intimidating individuals and their families in order to attend the current strikes and civil strife that was happening during that period of time.

The strikes were lead by the mainly Protestant ship builders at the Harland and Woolf ship yard in the East of Belfast this was to set the course for the duration of the unrest in the province, following the lead of the ship builders the electricity workers strikes as well plunging the region into a virtual blackout for a number of days. This was followed up by the use of paramilitary force to drive out police officers and attack British soldiers, inciting riots and barricading streets to prevent access to the law enforcement authorities, literally establishing no go zones to these various agencies. As well as disrupting various essential services such as the use of the emergency services and organisations of a similar nature. Essentially the power of the majority even exceeded the will of its masters in Westminster, from this one could assume that power in Ulster was firmly with the Unionist politicians and paramilitaries. This would appear to be the case due to the simple fact that the British government did not have the will or power to put the strikes down, the Army feared a massive backlash if it was seen to attempt to quell the strikes thus putting both them and the government in an untenable situation which would almost certainly lead to almost certain further deterioration to an already fragile state of affairs. The main fear allied to nearly all politicians on the main land was the fear of all out civil war.

As a result republican politicians reneged on their elected seats in the Northern Irish Assembly thus putting a stop to the prospect of a Northern Irish Assembly with a shared power base. It is very useful to look and assess the various events and processes but the underlying factors can provide answers that could explain the various events that could have been prevented if these were examined more closely. One is referring to examples such as social and class cleavages that are blatantly apparent in a society such as Ulster and the lack of input provided by both parties on the ground to resolve the crisis and attain some form of resolution to the perceived problems. In order to ascertain the problems in Ulster a direct correlation can be drawn up from the inequality or lack of homogenous society that is more then apparent in province like Northern Ireland. Due to the history and the discriminations imposed on the Catholic population of the mainly Protestant north it is hardly suprising that a large amount of Catholics feel animosity to their Protestant neighbours.

1975-76: A Constitutional Convention was convened to enable elected representatives from Northern Ireland to propose their own solution. The majority unionist parties proposed a return to majority rule, modified by a committee system with some minority rights inbuilt. It was rejected by both the British and the minority SDLP. 1977-78 and 1980: Two attempts to set up devolved institutions were initiated by two Northern Ireland secretaries of state, Roy Mason and Humphrey Atkins. Neither got to first base. They were opposed, for different reasons, by the SDLP and the UUP, but both simply petered out.

As a measure of the cultural gap between the two sides, two bars were set up in Stormont during the Atkins talks of 1980, one serving only non-alcoholic beverages. Students of national stereotyping may guess which bar was designed for which political parties. 1982-84: Rolling Devolution, introduced by James Prior, was perhaps the most ingenious proposal, again involving an elected assembly and a committee system. This envisaged a gradual return to power by elected representatives, but only if the proposed powers had ' Widespread acceptance', defined as 70 per cent agreement. In other words, the amount of power allowed to local political parties depended on their ability to agree, and would roll along at the speed of progress determined by them. It was boycotted by the SDLP because it did not guarantee power sharing.

1991-92: The Brooke-Mayhew initiatives sought to introduce phased talks, involving the Northern Irish parties first and the Dublin government at a later stage. This initiative followed the introduction of the Anglo-lrish Agreement in 1985, an agreement signed by the governments of the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic, but which did not involve local politicians and has been bitterly opposed by unionists. A major survey in 1990 confirmed that, for Protestants, the Anglo-lrish Agreement is still perceived to be the biggest single obstacle to peace. Prior to 1993 Sinn F? in was excluded from all major political talks, mainly because unionist parties refused to talk with terrorists. In 1988 and 1993, however, those whom they regarded as the leaders of the SDLP and Sinn F? in held two series of bilateral talks. The consequences remain to be seen.

1993: The Downing Street Declaration, jointly announced by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, John Major, and the Irish Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, introduced for the first time the possibility of Sinn F? in becoming involved in talks. The condition was an ending of violence for at least three months. In return, the Irish government accepted that any constitutional change in the status of Northern Ireland required the support of a majority within Northern Ireland. At the time of writing, three months after the Declaration, the unionist parties were divided on the initiative and Sinn F? in was still considering it.

The Declaration offered, for the first time, the possibility of addressing the constitutional and security problems together as part of a peace package. In summary, then, if a broader definition of conflict management or resolution is accepted, Northern Ireland has experience of a wide variety of approaches: Majority domination, from 1921 to 1972; Integration, for a three-month period in 1974 when a power-sharing executive was formed and failed; Administrative reforms, since 1969, when legislative changes covering housing, employment, social and educational reforms were introduced, with varying results; ' Holding the fort' with a standing army, since 1969; Political talks, as detailed above; Superordinate agreement between the two main governments, as with the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. Northern Ireland's Troubles Marie-Therese Fay Pluto Press 1999 The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland Caroline Kennedy-Pipe Longman 1997 Stormont in Crisis Ken Bloomfield Black staff Press Ltd 1993 Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism Since the Anglo-Irish Agreement Fear gal Cochrane Cork University Press 1997 The Anglo-Irish Agreement Ariel Ellis Owen University of Wales Press 1994.