Rational Basis Review For The Challenged Classification example essay topic

Adam Smith, a lifeguard for 30 years at Hammon asset State Beach in Connecticut, was notified last spring that he would not be allowed to return for work for another season because he had reached the age of 55. Adam Smith was released from his employment under a Connecticut State Parks Department rule requiring all lifeguards be under the age of 55. The issue is whether the State of Connecticut is prohibited from enforcing this rule? In analyzing this issue, the question can be divided into two sub-issue: (1) whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the State of Connecticut from enforcing a rule that requires all lifeguards to be under the age of 55, and (2) if the Equal Protection clause does not prohibit the State of Connecticut from enforcing this rule, whether there are any statutes that prohibit the State of Connecticut from enforcing this rule?

As stated above, in determining whether the state of Connecticut is prohibited from enforcing the rule in question, the first question to ask is whether the rule violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The first step in answering any equal protection question is determining the appropriate level of review, strict scrutiny or rational basis review, for the challenged classification. Under rational basis review the rule would likely be upheld, whereas under strict scrutiny the rule would most likely be struck down. As should be clear from prior Equal Protection cases, rational basis is the appropriate level of review in this case.

Rational basis review is essentially a default rule; if a challenged classification does not fit under strict scrutiny, it will automatically be looked at under rational basis review. For a legislative classification to be analyzed under strict scrutiny it must either impermissible interfere with a fundamental right or burden a suspect class. Massachusetts Board of Retirement vs. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,312. In the absence of either of these situations, strict scrutiny will not be used.

The Supreme Court has never found the right to governmental employment to be a fundamental right, and in fact has been explicitly found not to be a fundamental right, Id. at 313, and since Murgia it has been settled that age is not a suspect class. Id. at 313. The court has limited suspect classifications to those involving race or national origin and has explicitly excluded age from consideration as a suspect class. Id. at 313. Though it can be said that the aged in this country have not been completely free from discrimination, neither are they a discrete and insular minority in need of protection from majoritarian political processes, nor have they been historically subjected to purposeful discrimination, unlike those groups that have been found to be suspect classes.

Id at 313. In Murgia, the court used rational basis review since the case involved governmental employment, not a fundamental right, and because the classification was one based on age, not a suspect class. Id at 313. Since, as in the case of Murgia, neither of the strict scrutiny prongs applies to Adam Smith, rational basis is the appropriate level of review. Under rational basis review, a classification will be upheld as long as is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Inquiry under rational basis review is divided into two parts: (1) is there a legitimate governmental interest to be furthered by the classification, and (2) if there is a legitimate governmental interest, is the classification rationally related to that interest.

The first factor under rational basis review is to determine whether there is a legitimate state interest furthered by the legislation. For example, in Murgia the court found there to be a legitimate state interest furthered by a legislative classification requiring state police officers to retire at the age of 50. Id at 314. The purpose of the statute was to protect the public by maintaining a physically fit police force, or, to put it a different way, to eliminate unfit police officers. The court found this clearly to be a legitimate state interest due to the strenuous and arduous demands of a state police officer's job. Id at 315.

As in the case of state police officers, the job of a lifeguard can be rigorous and demanding, and therefore requires that lifeguards be physically fit. Therefore, the State of Connecticut could have a legitimate state interest in eliminating unfit lifeguards. After determining that there be a legitimate state interest to be furthered by the challenged classification, which is quite a permissible standard, we must then inquire whether the classification is rationally related to that interest. A classification will be upheld under the equal protection clause so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The Supreme Court found the classification in Murgia to be rationally related to the purpose of eliminating unfit police officers because they found that since physical fitness generally tends to decline with age, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts could reasonably believe that setting a mandatory retirement age would eliminate a number of unfit police officers from the force. Id at 315.

Likewise, the state of Connecticut could reasonably believe that setting a mandatory retirement age of 55 for lifeguards would be rationally related to a legitimate state interest of eliminating unfit lifeguards since older lifeguards would be presumptively less fit than younger lifeguards. Though there are probably a number of lifeguards above 55 that are physically fit, and though there may also be some below 55 that are not physically fit, physical fitness does tend to decline with age, so there are likely to be more unfit people, especially lifeguards, above the age of 55 than below. The equal protection clause commands that we treated similarly situated people similarly; the converse of which it that we may treat dissimilarly situated people dissimilarly. In regards to the purpose of eliminating unfit lifeguards, the classes of people are not similarly situated since physical fitness does tend to decline with age. Further, a statute is no less constitutional merely because the classification made by its laws is imperfect. Id at 316.

It is possible that a state could better provide a more precise determinate of fitness through individualized testing, but this does not mean that the means chosen to achieve the purpose of the statute was unconstitutional. For instance, the court in Murgia said that simply because the commonwealth chose not to require individualized testing for lifeguards over the age of 50, which they required for lifeguards between the ages of 40 and 50, in order to more precisely determine fitness, it did not mean that physical fitness was not "rationally furthered" by the age requirement. Id at 316. It merely meant that the classification was not the best means chosen to accomplish the statute's purpose. But neither does it mean that age requirement was unconstitutional.

It might be said, in the case of Adam Smith, that the State of Connecticut could require all lifeguards above a certain age to submit to individualized physical examinations to determine whether they were fit for the job. But there is nothing in Equal Protection jurisprudence that requires this, nor requires that a classification fit the purpose perfectly when rational basis review is used. As the court in Murgia stated, their decision was not that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts made a wise decision, but that the statute enacted by the State did not deny Murgia equal protection of the laws. Id at 317.

Similarly, it can be said that a statute rule requiring all lifeguards to be under the age of 55 is not a particularly wise piece of legislation, and the classification in question may not be the best means chosen to accomplish the statute's purpose, but neither does it deny Smith equal protection of the laws. Moreover, a state or other decision maker could reasonably use age as a proxy for other qualities or abilities that are relevant to the governmental interest. Kimel vs. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 64. For example, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Murgia could believe that the use of age could reasonably be a proxy for abilities and qualities, such as physical fitness, that are relevant to the states interest in maintaining a physically fit police force. Likewise, in the case of Adam Smith it was perfectly permissible for the State of Connecticut to use age as a proxy for qualities such as physical fitness that could be relevant to the legitimate state interest of eliminating unfit lifeguards. Further, age need not be an accurate proxy to be legitimate.

Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84. Under rational basis review legislative classifications are presumptively valid, Murgia, 427 U.S. at 214; therefore, the individual seeking to have the statute overturned bears the burden of proving that the lawmaker could not reasonably believe the truth of the facts on which the classification is based. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84. Consequently, Smith has the burden of presenting evidence and facts to dispute the factual basis of the Connecticut rule. Since the rule enacted by the State of Connecticut forcing lifeguards to retire at age 55 is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, the State of Connecticut would not be prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause from enforcing it. But our inquiry does not end here; Adam Smith may have statutory recourse available to him.

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), a federal statute, makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate against employees on account of age. Kimel 528 U.S. 634. Though it had originally only applied to private employers, the ADEA was subsequently amended to include state employers within its coverage. Id at 62. Does the ADEA prohibit the State of Connecticut from enforcing a rule requiring lifeguards to retire at age 55?

That might have been the case prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Kimel, and it is possible that Adam Smith likely would have prevailed under the ADEA. But Kimel precludes any possibility of the ADEA being used successfully against the States'. The Sovereignty Clause of the Eleventh Amendment protects the States against lawsuits by private individuals. Id at 72. This is not an absolute protection; the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment expanded the power of Congress to abrogate the States's overeign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, thereby allowing private individuals to bring lawsuits against the States.

Id at 73. But in order for federal legislation to properly subject the States to suits by private individuals, Congress must make its intention to abrogate the States's overeign immunity clear in the statute. Id at 73. Further, there must be a "congruence and proportionality" between the injury to be prevented and the remedy proposed. Id at 81.

"The appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented". Id at 89. In Kimel, the court held that that ADEA did not validly abrogate the States's overeign immunity as guaranteed under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id at 91. Though Congress had made it clear in the statute that they had intended to abrogate the States's overeign immunity, Id at 73, Congress had not identified any pattern of age discrimination, much less such that would amount to an unconstitutional violation, in enacting the ADEA. Id at 89.

Therefore, the Supreme Court found the ADEA to be invalid as applied to state employers. "Judged against the backdrop of our equal protection jurisprudence, it is clear that the ADEA is 'so out of proportion to a supposed remedial of preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. ' " Id at 86. After Kimel, the States' are protected from employment discrimination suits based on age. Therefore, the State of Connecticut is not barred from enforcing this rule under the ADEA. In conclusion, since there is no equal protection violation in the case at hand, and since the ADEA is not applicable as applied to state employers, the State of Connecticut is not prohibited from enforcing the regulation, at least not under the Equal Protection Clause or the ADEA.

Adam Smith is not completely without recourse, though. Employees, such as Adam Smith, who find themselves the victims of age-related discrimination can always turn to state anti-discrimination laws for protection. 528 U.S. at 64. They just cannot depend on the Equal Protection Clause or the ADEA to protect them..