Responsibility Of Chamberlain's Policy example essay topic

Appeasement was the policy adopted by Neville Chamberlain and his fellow politicians in the 1930's, in order to avoid war with Hitler. This policy culminated in three trips to meet Hitler in Munich, although these meetings ultimately ended in failure, resulting in the outbreak of war in September 1939, the policy itself is a contentiously debated issue. Especially in the latter part of the twentieth century, many historians have come out in support of Chamberlain, but equally the policy has been criticised heavily. One man whose opinion carried great weight at the time, was Winston Churchill, he told Chamberlain after the Munich crisis that he had been given the choice between, 'dishonour and war: you have chosen dishonour, but you will still have war. ' He was proved right in that war with Germany did occur, but there are many different views as to whether Chamberlain's attempt to avoid this was honourable. Churchill was a very influential politician, especially after the war, when he published his book, 'The Gathering Storm.

' He subtitled this book, 'how the English-speaking peoples through their unwisdom, carelessness and good nature allowed the wicked to rearm. ' He went on to write that, 'there was never a war more easy to stop,' and that it was an 'unnecessary war. ' His views were respected, and his denunciation of Chamberlain and appeasement led to the growth of the idea that there had been a series of lost opportunities to stop Hitler, that Chamberlain had had the chance to avoid war. Many other historians followed suit, and published their own opinions on Hitler. For example Michael Foot, who blamed Chamberlain for Britain's defeat in France and the retreat from Dunkirk in 1940. Following this, in 1963, Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott published their own indictment of Chamberlain, writing that the policy was characterised as a dishonourable submission, the pursuit of peace at any price.

The popular opinion among historians immediately after the war was that Chamberlain had acted foolishly, and was largely responsible for adopting the wrong policy, and leading Britain to war. The idea of this being honourable would not have crossed the minds of these historians. It was not until the 1960's that people's opinions of Chamberlain began to be revised. In 1968, the 30 year rule was introduced, making cabinet minutes and government papers available to read. People could now appreciate the complexities and restraints that Chamberlain had to deal with. They were given the opportunity to be more aware of the difficult strategic, economic and domestic context of the policy.

Maurice Cowley in 1965 highlighted the responsibility of Chamberlain's policy, and how he was realistic about Britain's interests, commitments, and resources. Responsibility is certainly a characteristic of Chamberlain which is often overlooked, and could certainly be described as an honourable trait to possess. Responsibility entails taking into account the needs of the country, and the other countries in Europe, which is something that he always endeavoured to do. This is far more honourable than going straight into war without thinking about the effects. There are certain aspects of Chamberlain's character, and his policies, which did not seem honourable either at the time, or in retrospect 65 years later. One of these was the disregard for Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary he had inherited from Stanley Baldwin's cabinet.

The disagreements which occurred between them essentially stemmed from a difference in policy. Chamberlain wanted to decrease the number of enemies, by appeasing the dictators, Hitler and Mussolini. Eden disagreed, he believed that Hitler couldn't be appeased and wanted to increase the number of allies. Eden was later proved to be right, and appeasement is commonly believed to have just whetted Hitler's appetite, and encouraged him.

Despite this, Chamberlain sidelined Eden. Within his cabinet, Chamberlain had surrounded himself by yes men; it was of these men who he had used instead of Eden as a foreign secretary, Lord Halifax. When Chamberlain sent Halifax to Germany to speak with Hitler in Berlin, and let him deal with the issues that were by right Eden's responsibility, this antagonise d Eden considerably. Eden was justified in his grievances, and many people agreed that he had been unfairly treated, so it did not reflect well on Chamberlain, and his government. Many people also believe that not only should Chamberlain have interfered with Eden's work because it was unfair, but because he was not capable of doing so. In his book, 'Britain: Foreign & Imperial Affairs 1919-1939, Alan Farmer lists the cases against Chamberlain, included in this is, that he had, 'little diplomatic experience, easily duped.

' This certainly seemed to be the case, and this coupled with his arrogance, and refusal to listen to other in the foreign office and parliament, proved to be an unwise move. By carrying out foreign policy himself, he took the future and safety of the country into his own hands, when he has a capable, qualified person to do it for him. The fact that he disregarded Eden at all was dishonourable, but that he went on the do it himself, despite having no qualities which suggested he could do so, was extremely irresponsible too. The way in which Chamberlain worked was in some ways very selfish.

He took sole responsibility for maintaining the peace in Europe and in doing so often did things without permission. He may have believed he was acting in everyone's best interests when he went to meet Hitler in Munich, but what he did in September 1938 upset many people. Public opinion pointed towards Germany being punished too harshly by the Treaty of Versailles, so Chamberlain used this to his advantage, and gave Germany the Sudetenland at the second meeting. This was reasonable enough, but he did it without consulting France, who Britain was allied with, and even more astonishingly without consulting Czechoslovakia. At the third meeting, where the fate of the Sudetenland was confirmed, the Czechs weren't even invited. At the time, people did not seem too bothered about this, they definitely didn't want to go to war, especially not because some Germans wanted to be part of Germany.

There came a point however, addressing the grievances of the Treaty of Versailles, turned into satisfying the demands of a war-monger. This point came in March 1939 when Hitler invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia unopposed. Many people thought this was a step too far, and that Chamberlain should have acted then. Despite this, Chamberlain persevered, although not for long. He soon issued the Polish Guarantee, whereby he promised to intervene if anyone invaded Poland. Many people were shocked that Chamberlain would stand by and let Hitler take over a country which Britain helped to create but would help a country led by a military dictator, this was the point at which honourably fighting for peace in Europe, changed to dishonourable turned to fighting for peace at all costs, and then inexplicably failing to stand by his policy, with no moral obligation, or self-evident interest in war over Poland.

Chamberlain on the other hand can gain great creditability in how he bravely fought for what he believed the nation believed in. After the First World War, the British public became disenchanted with the use of force, and this public mood influenced the political policies of the time. Instead, the public put their faith in the League of Nations. The League of Nations Union had over 400,000 members, and was a major pressure group in British Society. Chamberlain listened to the people, and instead of acting purely on what he thought, he took into account the thoughts of the nation. This was very honourable, he did not bough to the pressure that parliament was putting him under; he fought for what the people wanted.

Chamberlain took advantage of this general feeling, and made use of the media, to gain support. Chamberlain's consideration for public support can also explain his actions. The British public had sympathy for the Germans, and accepted their grievances over the Treaty of Versailles. Just after the treaty had been signed, John Maynard Keynes, a famous economist, said that the reparations were too high, and would lead to problems. When this prediction came true, the belief grew that the treaty needed revising to avoid future problems. Chamberlain shared this opinion, and used this argument to defend his actions.

Giving the Germans back the Sudetenland was simply giving them back what was theirs. The belief that the Germans had been punished too harshly had been held for a long time, so many people applauded Chamberlain for this. He also received a warm welcome from the German public after this had been agreed. Chamberlain was the man with enough courage to set Europe right geographically, to many, this, and the way he represented his country, was honourable.

Not only did Chamberlain take into consideration his people, but also the welfare of Britain as a whole. Economically, Chamberlain was under pressure, because the trade unions wanted economic and social problems to take priority over the war. Also, the armed forces were firmly against the war, and advised Chamberlain as such. A secret report in 1935 revealed that Britain's army could not have realistically offered much help to the French, so engaging in a war with Germany would not only have been foolish, but would have put the country in danger. As well as the British Isles, Chamberlain also had to take into consideration the Empire. The collapse of the Empire, which was probable if Britain started a war, was unthinkable for the government in the 1930's.

This proves that the popular opinion that Chamberlain was weak is incorrect. He acted honourably to save his country, and passionately tried to avoid a war which Britain did not have the resources to win on its own. Britain was not ready for war. Chamberlain recognised that Germany was strong militarily, and attempted to solve their grievances by peaceful negotiation. In the book, 'Hitler, Appeasement and the Road to War 19933 - 41, Graham Darby wrote that there was, 'no doubt that Chamberlain's motives were honourable - he wanted to save a generation of young men from slaughter - but his judgement of Hitler's personality and how events were unfolding was mistaken.

' This is a fair assessment, Chamberlain always tried to act in the best interests of his country, which is honourable. However he did not always take into account the thoughts of other countries. By disregarding France and Czechoslovakia in Munich, and acting selfishly, he proved that he was trying to maintain peace at any cost. It is true that his intentions were honourable, but his consequent actions and the way he carried out his policy lacked good judgment, and he certainly was fooled by Hitler. Hitler, Appeasement and the Road to War - Graham Darby Britain: Foreign Policy and Imperial Affairs - Alan Farmer Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement - Frank McDonough.