Result Of Chamberlain's Appeasement Policy example essay topic

Arthur Neville Chamberlain was born in Birmingham, England, on March 18, 1869. After being educated at Rugby School he spent seven years managing his father's plantation in the Bahamas. Chamberlain arrived back in England in 1897 where he went into the copper-brass business. He was active in local politics and in 1915 was elected Lord Mayor of Birmingham.

In the 1918 General Election Chamberlain was elected as a Conservative in the House of Commons. He rose with speed and ease, and by 1923 Stanley Baldwin appointed him as Postmaster-General. The following year he became the Minister of Health, in which he served for five years. He also achieved the title of Chancellor of the Exchequer in the National Government headed by Ramsay MacDonald from 1931 to 1939. He was an efficient administrator abolishing the Poor Law and reorganizing unemployment assistance. Chamberlain became Prime Minister when Stanley Baldwin resigned in 1937.

The following year he travelled to Germany to meet Hitler in an attempt to avoid war between the two countries. The result of Chamberlain's appeasement policy was the signing of the Munich Pact Chamberlain confronted the threat to peace posed by Germany and Italy. Seeking to appease Adolf HITLER and Benito MUSSOLINI, he first negotiated a treaty with Italy accepting the conquest of Ethiopia on condition that Italy withdraw from the Spanish Civil War. Turning to the Czech question, Chamberlain conferred with Hitler and Mussolini.

The Munich pact was signed on September 29, 1938, by Chamberlain, along with Germany, Italy, France. The agreement accepted Hitler's territorial claims to predominantly German areas of Czechoslovakia. Though Chamberlain assured Britain that his concession had brought 'peace in our time, Hitler soon broke his agreement and marched into Czecho-Slovakia and subsequently made most of the country a German protectorate. In May 1939 Germany and Italy signed a pact pledging to support each other in war. ).

To prevent this in a new war Hitler and the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin signed a ten-year nonaggression pact on Aug. 23, 1939 (see Stalin). On Sept. 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland. England and France demanded that Germany withdraw its troops; Hitler refused.

Resulting in Britain and France declaring war on Germany. Under the pressure of Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, and India aligned themselves with Chamberlain. Ireland was the only member of the British Commonwealth to keep out of the war. Although his policies were discredited, he held on as prime minister until May 1940, when he resigned and was succeeded by Winston CHURCHILL. He died in Heck field on Nov. 9, 1940. David Dicks: The Twilight War and the Fall of France: Chamberlain and Churchill Transactions of the Royal Historical Society.

Fifth Series, Volume 28.1978. pp. 61-86. The belief that Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill were always divided by irreconcilable differences of policy persists strongly, not least because of the stern strictures passed by Churchill himself upon his predecessor in The Gathering Storm. Furthermore, during the decade which separated Churchill's departure from the Exchequer from his return to the Admiralty. differences of policy between him and his former colleagues had cut deep: his adherence to free trade [N.B. : In fact he abandoned Free Trade early in the 1930's. Ed. ], his violent dissent over India, altercations about disarmament and the pace of German rearmament, the row over the Abdication, outright and unqualified condemnation of the Munich settlement. But when Churchill joined Chamberlain's Government in September, 1939, there was agreement between the two on a number of issues. They felt deeply affronted by Stalin's decision to partition Poland and to supply raw materials vital to the Nazis' war effort; they agreed to wage the struggle at sea with unremitting vigor from the start; they entrusted the holding of the western front to France; they expected a long war; they did not wish to provoke Italy or Japan; and they did not anticipate much assistance from the United States.

Churchill bombarded the P.M. with memoranda. There was some initial disagreement on priorities. Chamberlain drew a lesson from the Polish experience that air power was critical and directed resources to the R.A.F. Churchill doubted that the French would pay almost the whole of the blood tax on land and give the British the sea and the air. The Prime Minister seemed to believe that some of the paper which he received from Churchill were plainly written for the purpose of future quotation to prow foresight. Indeed, as Chamberlain told his wife, his own memorandum on the efforts of air power in the Polish campaign was written because 'I thought I must get something on the record too, which would have to be quoted in the Book. ' Chamberlain was aware that Churchill wanted to be Minister of Defence, and in April he made him Chairman of the Military Co-ordination Committee - an experiment that did not work, because (in Chamberlain's opinion) of Churchill's dominating personality, refusal to delegate, and irregular work habits.

During the May crisis, it became clear that Lord Halifax had no stomach for power and that Churchill was clearly the choice of the opposition parties to head a national government. But the new Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, remained dependent on his successor for support within the Conservative Party. ('... To a very large extent I am in your hands - and I feel no fear of that. ' ) It seems that both men felt that the right man was now P.M.!

And the new Prime Minister grew in stature and character. As Baldwin said: '... the furnace of war smelted out all the base metal from him. ' Chamberlain became Lord President of the Council with primary responsibility for domestic problems. When Churchill was required to go to France, he said, 'Neville, please mind the shop!' After Chamberlain's death, Churchill delivered a memorable speech of tribute, but a private remark is perhaps even more revealing of his feelings: 'I shall never find such a colleague again. ' Character and Political Philosophy As befitted the son of the most famous Liberal Radical of the late 19th century, Neville Chamberlain was keenly interested in the amelioration of social conditions. But unlike his father, he brought little passion or demagogy to his work.

His political character was thus very different from that of most of his opponents in the Labour party, for whom the demonstration of public passion on behalf of the working classes was a political creed. To Laborites, Chamberlain's concern with administrative minutiae, financial probity, and individual responsibility (which he feared the careless extension of state welfare might undermine) appeared as inhuman indifference to the poor. Chamberlain was by temperament a businessman and a civil servant before he was a politician; although he did much to extend welfare services between the wars, his contribution was that of rationalization and was not based on a desire to change quickly and radically the existing qualities of social life. If to his domestic politics he brought little of the fervor of his Birmingham Radical upbringing, this quality was surprisingly present when he turned to foreign affairs. His 'appeasement has seldom been discussed in this light, and most of his critics have misrepresented his position. The urgent desire to negotiate with Hitler and Mussolini did not, in Chamberlain's case, spring from pacifism.

He strongly supported sanctions against Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and was a vocal supporter of rearmament after 1934. Nor was he ignorant of the menace of the dictators. Few people linked the need for rearmament more strongly with the ambitions of Germany. But the crucial characteristic of Chamberlain's support of rearmament lay in his vision of such rearmament as a support for negotiations that would institute a general peace.

Chamberlain believed that a lasting peace would be possible when British rearmament had helped demonstrate to the dictators that the alternatives to negotiation were unthinkable. Chamberlain's willingness to negotiate with Hitler was thus more than a result of a sense of military weakness and a refusal to regard the German minority in Czechoslovakia as worth fighting over -- although these considerations were present. It sprang also from a passionate desire to avert the horror of war and a firm belief in the possibility of a lasting general peace. This policy of 'negotiation through strength was always potentially self-defeating.

The more Britain rearmed, the less sincere her desire for peace might appear; the more she spoke of peace, the less credible the deterrence of rearmament might become. When the British declared war on Germany, Chamberlain's policy had failed. The deterrent was to be used, and he above all men was stricken by the catastrophe that he had striven to prevent. This repugnance to war made him appear to many to be unfitted for wartime politics; he resigned after the obvious discontent within his own party was combined with the refusal of the Labour party to join any government led by him.

On reflection, Chamberlain's apparent coldness is not easily distinguished from a strong sense of integrity and public service. If his self-confidence and rigidity of will were placed in policies now generally believed mistaken, they were policies supported by most of his contemporaries and ones that Chamberlain defended more intelligently than most " My good friends, for the second time in our history, a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time... Go home and get a nice quiet sleep.

' 1918 General Election Total Votes % MPs Conservative Coalition 3,472,738 32.5 332 Liberal Coalition 1,396,590 12.6 127 Labour Coalition 53,962 0.4 4 Independent Coalition 9,274 0.1 1 NDP Coalition 156,834 1.5 9 Conservative 671,454 6.2 50 Liberal 1,388,784 13.0 36 Labour 2,245,777 20.8 57 Sinn Fein 497,107 4.6 73 Appeasement is one of the most controversial and hotly contested issues in modern history. The arguments for and against are so finely balanced that it is immensely difficult for hard-pressed students - and academics - to make up their minds. No longer can we accept the simplistic theory that portrayed the appeasers, and especially Neville Chamberlain, as cowardly, short-sighted and wishful-thinking Guilty Men who encouraged Hitler's territorial appetites and whose almost criminal negligence left Britain undefended. Nor can the anti-appeasers, pre-eminently Winston Churchill, any longer be assigned the role of valiant heroes, struggling manfully to avoid 'the unnecessary war'. Instead, we have the unpleasant task of thinking for ourselves.

How should we approach the topic? The preliminary spade-work The obvious starting point is a knowledge of events. Hence you must be familiar with European history from 1918 onwards. Try drawing up a table of relevant facts.

From early in the period, you will no doubt include those provisions of the Treaty of Versailles which aggrieved the Germans. You should also be familiar with changing interpretations of the causes of the Great War. Initial notions of German war guilt, enshrined in Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, gave way by the early-1930's to the view that no one country had been responsible and that, in Lloyd George's phrase, 'the nations slithered over the brink into the seething cauldron of war'. Do not forget, either, the stories of the atrocities committed by retreating German troops in 1918 which were later revealed as gross distortions and which, in consequence, led many to doubt the veracity of Nazi atrocities. But, of course, the bulk of your attention should go to the period when Hitler was in power. How far, by 1933, had Versailles been peacefully revised?

In addition, you must know (which means not having to struggle to recall) a chronology of his actions and of the responses of the appeasers. Appeasement only has meaning in relation to Hitler's rearmament and to his territorial demands and acquisitions. Next, try formulating a working definition of appeasement. Do not give a value-laden definition.

At this stage you should avoid deciding whether appeasement was, essentially, 'a good thing' or 'a bad thing'. Later you can return to this issue and formulate a final judgement. Justifications for Appeasement. Another war would be even more destructive than the 1914-18 conflict.

Hitler presented a logical, convincing case in favour of revision; but he also seemed a dangerous fanatic who would risk major war if his grievances were not satisfied. Britain was too weak economically to fight another war. Nazi Germany was a useful barrier against the spread of Soviet Communism. Britain's defences meant that she was ill-prepared for war.

Avoiding war would help the National Government to win the general election due by 1940. A war would leave the vast and sprawling British Empire vulnerable to attack. Britain had too few allies: neither the French, the Americans, nor the Russians could be relied on. Appeasement bought time to rearm. Versailles was based on false notions of German war guilt. Britain had too many potential enemies and certainly could not afford to get involved in a war against Germany, Italy and Japan.

Public opinion seemed set against war Events in central and eastern Europe were of no direct concern to Britain The rationale for appeasement Once you are aware of what happened, you should list possible reasons why Britain's politicians tried to satisfy Hitler's grievances and thereby avoid war. Your list will probably include those in the panel below. But do not be satisfied with drawing up a list like this. Rearrange your points so that they are in coherent order. (How would you rearrange the list below, so that groups of related causes appear together?) You should also attempt to rank them into some sort of order of importance. Next, you should add evidence, in order to substantiate them.

This of course is absolutely vital, since a generalisation without evidence is merely an assertion. Try to compile enough evidence so that you can be confident of tackling any question that comes up, and try to pick the best evidence, which often means finding short, easily memorable quotations from contemporaries. For instance, quote Baldwin's assertion that 'the bomber will always get through' to show the fear of not her war. Or, to show defence weakness, quote General Ironside at the time of Munich insisting that 'Chamberlain is of course right. We have not the means of defending ourselves and he knows it... We cannot expose ourselves now to a German attack.

We simply commit suicide if we do. ' (Or, to get the highest grade, try to find evidence which is not quoted so often in the textbooks, in order to avoid boring the examiner with over-familiar material. Sometimes students assume that examiners are always fair, impartial and wide awake. Would that it were so!) Finally, try to judge when each of your points was most relevant. Guilt feelings about Versailles, for instance, may have been important in 1933-36 but they were far less important in the years that followed.

Similarly there is far more evidence that the politicians followed public opinion when the passive Baldwin was premier than in the period after May 1937, when Chamberlain followed a more active brand of appeasement. You must be sure to avoid giving the impression that the 1930's were a static period. The case for the prosecution It is easy to draw up reasons explaining appeasement - and even easier to fall into the trap of supposing that, because a policy can be explained, it was therefore a sensible policy to pursue, and perhaps the best policy to pursue. Hence it is vital to consider the case against appeasement, and especially against Chamberlain's appeasement. What points will you make? Perhaps you might focus on Chamberlain's relative ignorance of foreign affairs: he once insisted that it was right that the Sudetenland should be 'returned' to Germany, whereas in fact it had never been part of the German state.

Did he, as his critics asserted, see foreign affairs 'through the wrong end of a municipal drain-pipe'? Furthermore, did he ever really understand Hitler? Appeasement was based on the assumption that, at some point, Hitler would be satisfied with concessions; but every time Chamberlain was reasonable, Hitler's contempt for the man grew. 'Our opponents', he said, 'are little worms: I saw them at Munich.

' The guarantee to Poland at the end of March 1939 owed more to Halifax's initiative than to Chamberlain's, and the Premier continued to put pressure on Poland to make concessions over Danzig. Moreover Chamberlain made only half-hearted attempts to secure an alliance with the Soviet Union in the summer of 1939. He sent a relatively low-level delegation to Moscow, headed by Admiral Drax - and they travelled not by air by a slow boat. Nor did Chamberlain hasten to make good the guarantee when Hitler invaded Poland on 1 September.

Was Chamberlain therefore an unconscious pacifist who, at heart, wanted peace at any price? Churchill said, after the Munich crisis, that Chamberlain had been given a choice between 'dishonour and war: you chose dishonour, but you will still have war'. This view was vindicated by events. Hence it is tempting to agree with Churchill's critique and to The critics criticised On the other hand, Churchill - an unrepentant imperialist - had a romantic, unrealistic view of Britain's position in world affairs (and of his glorious destiny in our unfolding history). Chamberlain considered, with good reasons, that an all-out programme of rearmament would severely weaken the whole economy, putting Britain at a severe disadvantage if a long war were to be fought. Nor was Churchill, in the 1930's, as implacably opposed to appeasement as he later claimed.

Indeed he was quite prepared to turn a blind eye to Japanese and Italian aggression, and his opposition to German appeasement was not as sharp or prolonged as he later indicated. In 1948, in The Gathering Storm, he decided that the Second World War could easily have been avoided but for the foolish policy of appeasement. But at other times in his career he viewed attempts to avoid war differently. In The World Crisis (1923) he decided that 'a war postponed may be a war averted'; and in a speech in Washington in June 1954 he insisted that to 'jaw-jaw is better than to war-war'. Make your mind up time Was Chamberlain right?

He said that he 'was hoping for the best [by appeasing Hitler] while preparing for the worst [by rearming]'. Did this make sense? Aware that declaring war on behalf of Czechoslovakia would have been an empty gesture, given Britain's inability to help the Czechs, he chose to appease Hitler while there still seemed to be a chance of avoiding a catastrophic war. By waiting until September 1939 he was able to enter the conflict with a united nation behind him, with the support of the Dominions, and with the moral support of neutral nations like the USA. A good case can be made out for Chamberlain.

And if he was motivated by an unconscious pacifism, it can still be argued that he did the right thing, even if for the wrong reason. Some would say that his policy went awry only with the guarantee to Poland. A fashionable argument nowadays is that Chamberlain should have persisted with his appeasement, and thereby kept Britain out of the Second World War. What verdict will you reach on the anti-appeasement argument?

Were Britons led astray into pursuing an unwise policy by their insularity, by their guilt feelings over Versailles and by fear of Armageddon? Would another, firmer stance have fared better, perhaps fuel ling anti-Nazi critics in Germany and even leading to Hitler's downfall? Some have said that Churchill was motivated by implacable anti-German feelings. If so, perhaps it was he who did the right thing for the wrong reason.

Reaching a final verdict is anything but easy. Try rehearsing the various arguments in your mind to see which ones makes most sense. Better still, try debating them with other people. Put yourself in the position of someone in the 1930's - and remember not to use hindsight. Events which, to us, are in the past were in the future - and therefore unknowable - in the 1930's.

To get best results, you will need to make a real imaginative effort. It is no good simply dodging inconvenient facts and evidence. Pretend that this is not merely an intellectual exercise. Pretend that you care and that the issue is vital - and, in the end, you probably will care. Then you will be in a position to argue a case convincingly. Now you should return to your initial definition of appeasement, expanding it and giving your final views.

By this stage you should have the satisfaction of knowing your own mind and of having squarely confronted the difficulties of this fiendishly complex but endlessly intriguing topic. Robert Pearce is Reader in History at the University College of St Martin, Lancaster. His latest books include Attlee (Longman, 1997) and Fascism and Nazism (Hodder & Stoughton, 1997). British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain gave this speech to the House of Commons on September 1, 1939, just hours after Hitler's troops had invaded Poland.

Chamberlain and others had spent years negotiating with Hitler in order to prevent another war in Europe, two decades after the Great War in which an entire generation of young men had been wiped out. Negotiations with Hitler had included surrendering the sovereign rights of Czechoslovakia and standing by as Hitler's troops took Austria. By 1939, Hitler desired war and any further attempts to negotiate peace were doomed to failure. The Nazis then staged a fake attack on a German radio outpost along the German-Polish border and used that as an excuse for invasion. I do not propose to say many words tonight.

The time has come when action rather than speech is required. Eighteen months ago in this House I prayed that the responsibility might not fall upon me to ask this country to accept the awful arbitrament of war. I fear that I may not be able to avoid that responsibility. But, at any rate, I cannot wish for conditions in which such a burden should fall upon me in which I should feel clearer than I do today as to where my duty lies. No man can say that the Government could have done more to try to keep open the way for an honorable and equitable settlement of the dispute between Germany and Poland. Nor have we neglected any means of making it crystal clear to the German Government that if they insisted on using force again in the manner in which they had used it in the past we were resolved to oppose them by force.

Now that all the relevant documents are being made public we shall stand at the bar of history knowing that the responsibility for this terrible catastrophe lies on the shoulders of one man, the German Chancellor, who has not hesitated to plunge the world into misery in order to serve his own senseless ambitions... Only last night the Polish Ambassador did see the German Foreign Secretary, Herr von Ribbentrop. Once again he expressed to him what, indeed, the Polish Government had already said publicly, that they were willing to negotiate with Germany about their disputes on an equal basis. What was the reply of the German Government? The reply was that without another word the German troops crossed the Polish frontier this morning at dawn and are since reported to be bombing open towns.

In these circumstances there is only one course open to us. His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin and the French Ambassador have been instructed to hand to the German Government the following document: 'Early this morning the German Chancellor issued a proclamation to the German Army which indicated that he was about to attack Poland. Information which has reached His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government indicates that attacks upon Polish towns are proceeding. In these circumstances it appears to the Governments of the United Kingdom and France that by their action the German Government have created conditions, namely, an aggressive act of force against Poland threatening the independence of Poland, which call for the implementation by the Government of the United Kingdom and France of the undertaking to Poland to come to her assistance. I am accordingly to inform your Excellency that unless the German Government are prepared to give His Majesty's Government satisfactory assurances that the German Government have suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will without hesitation fulfill their obligations to Poland. ' If a reply to this last warning is unfavorable, and I do not suggest that it is likely to be otherwise, His Majesty's Ambassador is instructed to ask for his passports.

In that case we are ready. Yesterday, we took further steps towards the completion of our defensive preparation. This morning we ordered complete mobilization of the whole of the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force. We have also taken a number of other measures, both at home and abroad, which the House will not perhaps expect me to specify in detail. Briefly, they represent the final steps in accordance with pre-arranged plans. These last can be put into force rapidly, and are of such a nature that they can be deferred until war seems inevitable.

Steps have also been taken under the powers conferred by the House last week to safeguard the position in regard to stocks of commodities of various kinds. The thoughts of many of us must at this moment inevitably be turning back to 1914, and to a comparison of our position now with that which existed then. How do we stand this time? The answer is that all three Services are ready, and that the situation in all directions is far more favorable and reassuring than in 1914, while behind the fighting Services we have built up a vast organization of Civil Defense under our scheme of Air Raid Precautions. As regards the immediate manpower requirements, the Royal Navy, the Army and the Air Force are in the fortunate position of having almost as many men as they can conveniently handle at this moment. There are, however, certain categories of service in which men are immediately required, both for Military and Civil Defense.

These will be announced in detail through the press and the BBC. The main and most satisfactory point to observe is that there is today no need to make an appeal in a general way for recruits such as was issued by Lord Kitchener 25 years ago. That appeal has been anticipated by many months, and the men are already available. So much for the immediate present.

Now we must look to the future. It is essential in the face of the tremendous task which confronts us, more especially in view of our past experiences in this matter, to organize our manpower this time upon as methodical, equitable and economical a basis as possible. We, therefore, propose immediately to introduce legislation directed to that end. A Bill will be laid before you which for all practical purposes will amount to an expansion of the Military Training Act. Under its operation all fit men between the ages of 18 and 41 will be rendered liable to military service if and when called upon.

It is not intended at the outset that any considerable number of men other than those already liable shall be called up, and steps will be taken to ensure that the manpower essentially required by industry shall not be taken away. There is one other allusion which I should like to make before I end my speech, and that is to record my satisfaction of His Majesty's Government, that throughout these last days of crisis Signor Mussolini also has been doing his best to reach a solution. It now only remains for us to set our teeth and to enter upon this struggle, which we ourselves earnestly endeavored to avoid, with determination to see it through to the end. We shall enter it with a clear conscience, with the support of the Dominions and the British Empire, and the moral approval of the greater part of the world. We have no quarrel with the German people, except that they allow themselves to be governed by a Nazi Government. As long as that Government exists and pursues the methods it has so persistently followed during the last two years, there will be no peace in Europe.

We shall merely pass from one crisis to another, and see one country after another attacked by methods which have now become familiar to us in their sickening technique. We are resolved that these methods must come to an end. If out of the struggle we again re-establish in the world the rules of good faith and the renunciation of force, why, then even the sacrifices that will be entailed upon us will find their fullest justification. Neville Chamberlain - September 1, 1939 WORLD WAR II.