Russian Front example essay topic
British offensive in Palestine (Sept. ). Germans ask for armistice (Oct. 4). British armistice with Turkey (Oct. ).
German Kaiser abdicates (Nov. ). Hostilities cease on Western Front (Nov. 11). This atmosphere is strikingly similar to that which existed in post-Imperial Russia in 1917 and 1918, which led to the bloody dissolution of the democratically elected Constituent Assembly on January 18, 1918 by Lenin's Bolsheviks. Vladimir Brovkin, an expert on contemporary Russian politics and executive editor of DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, The Journal of Post-Soviet Affairs, argued during a briefing at RFE / RL's Washington office on 14 January that the stage is set for a further dissolution of the Russian Federation -- even beyond the point where a democratic leader would be able to pull it back together. Brovkin asserts that the Russian people are less prepared today for democracy than they were in 1918. Russians see government in terms of a power that rules arbitrarily over them, not as a system in which they play a meaningful role.
This ruler-and-ruled ethic was strengthened by decades of totalitarian rule by the Soviet nomenklatura, which remains in power today in spite of the fall of the Soviet Union eight years ago. In addition, the ties that bound together the diverse regions and peoples of Russia dissolved along with the fall of Soviet power. Thus, government ministers and regional governors have been freed to "privatize" state assets and build personal political and economic fiefdoms, blurring the distinctions between state and non-state functions. Brovkin suggests that Russian politics today is more easily understood if one does not take the titles claimed by democratic Russia's leaders at face value. Many regional governors, for example, behave as they did prior to 1991 -- as appointed rulers rather than elected leaders. Although champions of democratic reform continue to exist in Russia, as they have in the past (the Cadet party of the 19th century, the Social Revolutionaries of 1918), the democracy movement of the early 1990's itself has disintegrated.
Many prominent "democratic" leaders of the late 1980's used their vision of "democracy" to gain power or make money, discrediting the movement in the eyes of the Russian people. Although much of the West's aid and advice over the past eight years has helped to bring about the current situation in Russia, Brovkin felt that the West could still play a positive role in encouraging reform. Investments in broad-based educational programs, especially rule-of-law programs that would help Russians learn that "law enforcement isn't crime enforcement", could be useful, as could efforts to convince Russians of the value of contractual relationships and of fulfilling them. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty is a private, international radio service to Eastern Europe and Southeastern Europe, Russia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. More than 20 million regular listeners rely on RFE / RL's daily news, analysis and current affairs programming to provide a coherent, objective account of events in their region and the world. In the late summer of 1914, the ancient monarchies of Austria, Russia and Germany plunged their countries into a world war which engulfed Europe in one of the bloodiest conflicts in history.
The Eastern Front of that great war had a profound impact on the remainder of the 20th century, even though the Western Front with its British, French and American combatants achieved somewhat greater fame. The statistics for the Eastern war are grim. More than three-million men died in the fighting, more than nine-million men were wounded, and every major country which participated lost its form of government. One of them, Russia, collapsed so completely and catastrophically that the ensuing consequences still resonate in today's world. It was into this conflict that the soldiers of 1914 marched, with an eagerness and confidence which has not since been repeated. The Russian Army of World War One has become notorious for its reputation as a large, ill-equipped force, yet in 1914, Russia's Imperial Troops were actually well trained and equipped.
The real problem with the Russian Army lay in its inadequate transportation infrastructure, which was not able to supply and maintain Russian field formations at wartime establishments. As far as equipment was concerned, the average Russian soldier in the 1st and 2nd Line had sidearms, rifles and machine guns equal to his German counterparts, and probably superior to the Austrians. The standard Russian Field Guns, the 76.2 mm and 122 mm, were robust enough to be used in World War Two and still be in reserve units in the 1980's. Because of the many logistical disadvantages under which they labored, the Russian Army High Command had maintained a lively pre-war debate over what action would be taken in case of war with Germany. By 1910 it was decided to launch major offensive operations immediately upon the outbreak of any war.
This decision clearly catered to the "spirit of the offensive" which then pervaded European military thought, and in pursuit of this doctrine, most Russian fortress units were deactivated. The age-old Russian strategy of defense-in-depth supported by counteroffensives was cast aside in favor of the latest trends. This was to exact a brutal toll in Russian lives, which in turn helped to spur later unrest. The Austro-Hungarian Army of 1914 had been starved of proper equipment and resources throughout the pre-war period. It was also composed of an increasingly nationalistic soldiery, three-quarters of whom were from Slavic recruiting districts. The reluctance of these troops to follow Austrian officers into combat against their Russian brethren became a major liability, especially after the enormous losses suffered during the first year of war.
The main German armies in the East operated with characteristic Teutonic efficiency. Indeed it was here that their troops enjoyed the luxury of fighting the battles of maneuver for which they had been trained. The Russian front also saw the rise of the great German "artillery virtuosos" of the war, men such as Lieutenant Colonel Georg Bruchm " uller. Lieutenant Colonel Bruchm " uller was capable of orchestrating artillery firepower with ferocious efficiency, but more importantly he undertook aggressive training measures to assure near perfect coordination between the artillery and infantry branches of the army..