Rylands V Fletcher Case Non Natural Use Requirement example essay topic

If the rules in Rylands vs. Fletcher are to be used in the way Blackburn J in tented, should the 'non-natural' use requirement be clearly defined or abandoned? The principles of tort demonstrate that generally it must be shown that a wrongful act was committed intentionally or negligently. The rule in Rylands V Fletcher falls within the doctrine of strict liability, removing the need for fault. For one to justify strict liability there is a need to identify its aims. Case law identifies a turbulent history, especially in relation to 'non-natural' use. The Victorian era is a fine example.

Originally a loyal advocate of the principle, the Victorians then demonstrated a large degree of distance. What has emerged is that when judging the requirement of 'non-natural' use, in relation to Blackburn J's formulation, 'socio-economic and philosophical trends of the day' must be considered. For example, the closer integration of the UK with Europe has suggested the introduction of statutory authority as a measure of resolving issues associated with Rylands. On the other hand, the common law is suggesting a merger of Rylands principles into nuisance. On May 14 1866 the Exchequer Chamber reversed the decision made by the Court of Exchequer. Later, the House of Lords followed.

Society was developing at a rapid rate and the height of the Industrial Revolution was about to arrive. Generating economic activity would was a fundamental aim. Rylands vs. Fletcher posed a difficult question. In the time of Bract on, "injury created to one man without wilfulness or negligence, would not afford a title to a claim of damages". The House of Lords overruled this law- it was not socially or economically attractive to the situation, where the plaintiff had "lost gains and profits".

The seemingly harsh verdict of strict liability was imposed. It is necessary to ponder the hypothetical question of whether the same judgement would be found in the modern day. Atiyah describes strict liability as 'morally unjustifiable'. There is no fairness in holding a defendant liable for non-negligent behaviour. I have formed the view, therefore, that today's law courts would not have held Ryland & Horrocks liable for damages. This has been somewhat confirmed in the case of Cambridge Water Co vs. Eastern Countries Leather plc (as discussed below).

Blackburn J, delivering the original formulation of the Rylands vs. Fletcher rule, laid down the requirements that if a person accumulates on his land 'anything likely to do mischief if it escapes' is prima facie liable for any damage. Kramer states that 'the best account of tort law is as a system of law that compensates for wrongdoing'. It was found that holding a dangerous material was a wrongdoing, thus the judges imposed a new tort principle to fulfil this ideal. Ryland was unaware that when he employed competent contractors to construct a reservoir, the claimants mine would consequently be flooded. The principle of null um crime sine lege has been violated by the judge's power to create a new offence. Their Lordships have introduced the idea of corrective justice into the principles of the property torts.

In Benning V Wong Wind ewer J said 'that to regard strict liability as unjust' would be a mistake as this would not properly reflect 'present social values'. The weakness in this view is that it goes against the principles of individualism. Marx claims 'the individual is the social being'. If an objective approach was delivered in every case the tort system would be unworkable due to increased litigation and compensation. On the other hand, there is utilitarian; 'the condition which maximise happiness'. The required need is to find a balance.

Lord Cairns in the House of Lords restricted the scope of Blackburn J's formulation; he added the 'non-natural' use requirement. An example is Mason vs. Levy Auto Parts Ltd. This control devise brings wide judicial discretion. The advantage is flexibility of the tort system, ensuring fairness. Exercising fairness is a fundamental element of jus naturale. Finnis argued, 'there are human goods that can be secured only through the institutions of human law'.

As the laws' 'princes', judges must consider the doctrine of legal certainty. 'General norms' must be 'articulated' and 'applied to particular disputes', preventing uncertainty and complexity within tort. In relation to the requirement of 'non-natural' use, it would seem worthy for a judge to set a clear definition. Providing binding authoritative precedent creates analogous decisions within cases. Reflecting on the Rylands cases, one finds judges refuse to give a firm definition.

Lord Moulton in Richards vs. Lothian describes 'it must be some special use bringing with it increased danger to others'. This is ambiguous. Depending on the 'time' of a case, 'non-natural' uses vary. In Musgrove vs. Pen delis keeping a car in a garage with a full tank of petrol was held to be 'non-natural'.

This decision would not be made today, (Perry vs. Kendrick's Transport Ltd). Inconsistency creates difficulty of interpretation and application. Does this high degree of judicial discretion associated with 'non-natural' use rule go against the principles of democracy? Allen states that the 'equal dignity of citizens' must be ensured through 'fair treatment' of all individuals by the court. To deprive the individual of fairness strikes at the fundamental values of the rule of law.

It has, therefore, been suggested that the Ryland's rule should not be distinguished from nuisance, attempting to confine tort, preventing any injustices (Ellison vs. Ministry of Defence). On the other hand, Wein rib states that a rule must 'expand to fill into the space it naturally fills'. The opposing judgements made in Rainham Chemical Works Ltd vs. Belvedere Fish Guano Co and Read vs. Lyons & Co Ltd, shows 'non-natural' will vary according to the 'circumstances of... place... of mankind'. Read held that building and running a munitions factory during the Second World War was a natural use, (c. f Rainham). My opinion is that war is a time of extraordinary and special circumstance. Cases related to war will be approached with increased sensitivity and with different applicable rules.

The advantageous argument of the Rylands principle providing tort with a wide discrepancy, ensuring justice, must be questioned; allowances will be made without the rule if the situation demands it. It is interesting to note the recent case of Dennis vs. Ministry of Defence, where the claimants did not succeed in recovering damages as it was in the public's interest to train pilots. The concept that 'non-natural' use will change over time must be considered in light of future cases. If commercial planting of Genetically Modified Organism's (GMO's) is permitted in the UK, 'claims for injunctions to prevent planting may be brought'. In Leaky vs. National Trust, the Court of Appeal followed the Australian case of Goldman vs. Hargrave confirming a duty to abate a 'nuisance that arose on his land from natural causes'. Precedent has not yet been set concerning GM contamination potentially constituting a natural nuisance or whether it will fall under the Rylands rule.

The preliminary case of Hoffman Farms vs. Monsanto suggests a claim may be successful under the Rylands 'non-natural' rule. My opinion is that a GMO case will not succeed. Salving vs. Brancepeth Coal Co states that when evaluating a case, one must start with 'scientific evidence'. In Monsanto vs. Schmeiser it was held that GM crops are not dangerous, hence harvesting them is not a dangerous use. The 'non-natural' use requirement fails. Does this suggest that the 'non-natural' use will become redundant?

Recent cases must be considered. In Cambridge Water Co. vs. Eastern Counties Leather plc forseeability was added. Jones claims this 'significantly' reduces 'the distance' between 'non-natural' use and 'unreasonable user tests', paving the way for 'alignment'. This highlights two important aspects. Firstly, 'pleading nuisance and Rylands vs. Fletcher as separate causes' of action will be irrelevant.

The advantage of this being increased consistency through the confinement of law. Secondly forseeability reduces the strict liability approach of the Rylands rule. Lord Bingham in Transco plc vs. Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council declared that there was a 'category of case, in which it seemed just to impose liability even in the absence of fault'. The addition of forseeability to the non-natural use, reducing the strict liability approach, makes Lord Bingham's statement, in my opinion, seem incorrect. In Burnie Port Authority vs. General Jones Pty Ltd the Australian High Court held Ryland principles where now to be 'absorbed' into ordinary negligence. Lord Bingham's quote suggests the rules of liability should be expanded.

The expansion of Rylands within the American tort system must be compared. Lord Goff in Cambridge Water suggested a 'general rule for strict liability, for damage cause by ultra-hazardous operations's would be addressed. The Restatement (Second) of Torts does not consist of forseeability. It has been suggested that Lord Goff may, therefore, have 'misunderstood the nature of the strict liability concept as applied in the US'. What does seem to be emerging from British case law is a movement away from strict liability. Lord Goff's attempt to discover a clearer doctrinal purpose for the Rylands rule reflects the apprehension within the judiciary for alteration.

The Pearson Committee suggested the use of statutory authority. The advantages of a statutory provision include allowing parties to know what their rights are before a dispute in court arises. If this applied to the 'non-natural' rule, arbitrary decisions will be prevented by reducing judicial discrepancy. Quis custodi et ipsos custo des suggests that it would be more democratic to have the law defined and set in principle by a publicly elected body as opposed to judges. It must also be noted that as the supremacy of the EU increases its policies will have a direct effect on the British tort system. Rosalind English predicts 'an EC directive imposing liability... in the absence of fault... is waiting in the wings'.

The issue of ambiguity and complexity, however, remains. Ingman states how the ambiguity of statutory provision is a 'very common... state of affairs'. As the judiciary has been unable to give a clear definition of 'non-natural' use it would be fair to claim that the legislature would also encounter difficulty. In my opinion, the use of statutory authority would be of limited effect. Jones describes how the distribution mechanism works so that 'the true social cost is borne by the consumers in small amounts'.

My conclusion is that, as argued above, the 'non-natural' use requirement should be abandoned and the law on nuisance should be expanded to cater for principles within Rylands. If this route is followed, the loss distribution mechanisms will still work. The fault principle, employed in nuisance, will carry the role of placing 'non-negligent damages where it falls whereas under strict liability accidental harm is distributed'. The requirements of the Rylands rule where founded in 1866. To return to its original formulation would be forgetting social and legal developments. The area of tort law must take a step forward.

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