Sale Of Arms To Iran example essay topic

Iran-contra Scandal Throughout the Cold War the fear of communist infiltration dominated every level of the American political structure. The threat to free market economies was certainly obvious and the extent to which Washington would go to combat the worldwide spread of communism was clearly exhibited by its policies toward Latin America. With the aim of defeating communism, Washington often found itself supporting brutal military dictatorships. As long as these nations displayed no inclination towards establishing communist regimes the U.S. would turn a blind eye toward the violent oppression practiced by their rulers. When the socialist Sandinista rebels took over Nicaragua in 1978, it came as no surprise that the newly elected Reagan administration approached the matter with a fierce dedication to reestablishing the historic balance of power. History would eventually reveal that the Reagan administration was willing to go to any end to accomplish this objective, explicitly undermining the law and, in the process, democracy itself.

In the case of Nicaragua the U.S. has a long history of military intervention, primarily regarding the protection of economic interests. It was the American military occupation from 1912-1933 that encouraged Augusto Cesar Sandino to create an opposition force that sought to extinguish American influence in Nicaragua (cia. gov). When the Marines left in 1933, the country was turned over to Anastasio Somoza Garcia, Commander of the Nicaraguan National Guard. In 1978, with the Samoza regime collapsing, President Carter authorized attempts at negotiating a reorganization of the Nicaraguan government by replacing top officials, but essentially leaving the dysfunctional political structure in place (Blum 291). When Samoza denied the offer the U.S. State Department announced that it would discontinue all aid to Nicaragua (cia. gov). With his safety net gone Samoza fled and the Sandinista rebels, named after revolutionary leader Augusto Sandino, took power.

Although the U.S. immediately extended the courtesy of diplomatic recognition and foreign aid, Nicaragua's new government rejected the offer, favoring instead a strong pro-Marxist orientation (cia. gov). The hope for a free society that many Nicaraguans shared was crushed when all of the media outlets were taken over by the government and it was announced that the free elections promised earlier would be suspended. The incoming Reagan administration publicly expressed disdain toward this new socialist presence and wasted little time coordinating a plan of action. On March 9, 1981, President Reagan issued an official finding that Nicaraguan arms smuggling threatened U.S. national security (Hunter 10). Now that a crisis had been established the wheels of justified intervention were in motion. Under the guise of arms interdiction Reagan authorized funding for the creation of a covert, CIA-trained guerrilla force, with the purpose of overthrowing the Sandinista establishment (Hunter 10).

The guerrilla army, known as the Contras, consisted primarily of former Samoza supporters and was trained by veterans of other CIA-sponsored Latin American coups. President Reagan's doctrine of overturning communist influence in the third world was now in full swing in Nicaragua. Attempting to maintain some control over the covert "arms interdiction" operations the U.S. Congress passed a series of amendments to the Fiscal Year 1983 Defense Appropriations Bill (cia. gov). Sponsored by Rep. Edward Boland of Massachusetts, these amendments explicitly prohibited the CIA from supporting any individuals or organizations seeking to overthrow the Sandinista regime (Walsh 1). When it became known, in 1984, that CIA agents working with the contras had planted mines throughout Nicaraguan harbors, Congress discontinued all funding for Nicaraguan covert operations.

According to National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, the president was undaunted by this and personally directed him to keep the contra movement alive "body and soul" (Walsh 2). McFarlane delegated this responsibility to National Security Council (NSC) staff member, and Marine lieutenant colonel, Oliver North. Being the NSC's deputy director of political-military affairs, North was certainly well aware of the devastating effects that a bureaucratic environment can have on the effectiveness of covert operations. In order to keep the contras alive, North initiated a complex global fundraising network in 1984, whereby money raised through international lobbying efforts was deposited into various protected offshore and Swiss bank accounts.

Along with the help of CIA Director William Casey, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Elliot Abrams, and presidential candidate Pat Robertson, North raised tens of millions of dollars from private lenders, as well as several U.S. client states, including Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea and Brunei (Hunter 13). It was a carefully devised plan to subvert the intentions of Congress while at the same time sheltering the president just enough to allow the possibility for plausible denial. On October 5, 1986, a C-123 K cargo plane full of weaponry and carrying three Americans was shot down over Nicaragua by Sandinista anti-aircraft fire (Walsh 10). The only surviving crewmember, Eugene Hasenfus, was captured by Nicaraguan forces and claimed that he was part of an illegal CIA operation (cia. gov).

Speaking to Congress, Administration officials flatly denied these claims and insisted that Hasenfus did not work for the CIA. Within a month a Lebanon newspaper, Al-Shira a, published an article detailing the May 1986 visit to Tehran by an American delegation consisting of North and National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, during which time arms were delivered to the Iranians (Walsh 23). News that the U.S. had engaged in selling arms to Iran in exchange for the release of hostages being held in Lebanon began to appear in headlines around the globe. A series of Presidential addresses followed.

On November 6, 1986, President Reagan denied allegations that the U.S. sold arms to Iran, and only to modify the statement on November 13 by acknowledging the sale of arms to Iran but still denying the arms-for-hostages allegations (Walsh 51). In mid-November, 1986, Congressional committees began to hold briefings questioning the alleged arms shipments to Iran through 1985 and 1986 (Walsh 24). A primary concern among Congress, as well as Reagan's top advisers, was the possible violation of the Arms Export Control Act of 1947 (Walsh 447). On November 25, 1986, in a televised address to the nation President Reagan and Attorney General Edwin Meese announced that profits from the sale of weapons to Iran had been diverted to support the contras in Nicaragua (Walsh 24). On December 19, Lawrence Walsh was appointed Independent Counsel to investigate these alleged ties between the Iran arms sales and the contra support efforts. During his investigation Walsh found that during the U.S. had transferred arms through Israel to Iran on various occasions in 1985 and was involved in the direct sale of arms to Iran in late 1985 through 1986.

In all, Walsh's tally added up to nearly three thousand missiles. He found that bogus companies had been created to veil the transfer of the arms and money across international boundaries. The matter was further complicated by the fact that the U.S. was using profits from the sale of these arms to support the contras at a time when this was explicitly prohibited by law. In one particular sale North arranged for missiles to be sold to Iran at a price of $10,000 each and then lied to the Department of Defense saying that the negotiated price was $6,000 (Walsh 168).

In total, North managed to generate $30 million to keep the contras alive, "body and soul". On May 7, 1987, public hearings on the Iran / contra matter began before Congress (Walsh 51). Much of the testimony was based on memory due to the fact that many of the pertinent documents had been shredded with the intention of protecting the President. Of particular interest was the testimony of Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North from July 7 - 14, 1987, who was in charge of the contra aid operations.

North told Congress, "I shredded because I thought it was the right thing to do. When I didn't have a shredder I put it in a burn bag and it was burned" (Oliver North). When asked what President Reagan knew about the diversion of profits from the arms sales to the contras North replied, "I never personally discussed the use of profits with the president because I assumed that, through my superiors he was aware, and approved of what I was doing" (Oliver North). After all was said and done 14 people were charged with criminal violations of the law.

National security adviser John Poindexter and Lieutenant Colonel North appealed and had the convictions reversed. On June 16, 1992, former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was indicted on five felony charges of obstruction, perjury and making false statements during congressional testimony (Walsh 53). In December President Bush issued pre-trial pardons to six of those charged (Walsh 53). The executive summary of the Independent Counsel's investigation concluded that support for the contras violated the Boland amendment and that, although Administration officials went to great lengths to deceive the Congress as to the extent of official knowledge, the operations were carried out with the knowledge of President Reagan, Vice President Bush, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence and two national security advisers. There is no doubt that whatever the level of official knowledge may have been the Iran / contra scandal revealed an alarming flaw the American political system. It not only proved that the willingness of high-level government officials to sabotage the democratic process could be rewarded (in this case with a pardon), but also, it openly displayed the loophole of plausible denial that President Reagan jumped through with great enthusiasm and, in doing so, demonstrated a lack of accountability to the public that the American system affords its presidents..