Scientific Skepticism And Scientific Rationalism example essay topic

In order to continue our discussion of the legitimate philosophical, scientific, and religious aspects of the science and religion quagmire we need a frame of reference to guide us. What I present here is an elaboration on a classification scheme proposed by Michael Shermer. (5) Shermer suggests that there are three worldviews, or 'models,' that people can adopt when thinking about science and religion. According to the same worlds model there is only one reality and science and religion are two different ways of looking at it.

Eventually both will converge on the same final answers, within the limited capabilities of human beings to actually pursue such fundamental questions. The conflicting worlds model asserts that there is only one reality (as the same world scenario also acknowledges) but that science and religion collide head on when it comes to the shape that reality takes. Either one or the other is correct, but not both (or possibly neither, as Immanuel Kant might have argued). In the separate worlds model science and religion are not only different kinds of human activities, but they pursue entirely separate goals. Asking about the similarities and differences between science and religion is the philosophical equivalent of comparing apples and oranges.

'These are two such different things,' Shermer told Sharon Begley in Newsweek's cover story 'Science Finds God,' 'it would be like using baseball stats to prove a point in football. ' Using Shermer's model as a starting point for thinking about S&R, I realized that something is missing. One cannot reasonably talk about the conflict between science and religion unless one also specifies what is meant by religion or God (usually there is less controversy on what is meant by science, though some philosophers and social scientists would surely disagree). So what makes Shermer's picture incomplete is the very important fact that different people have different Gods.

I am not referring to the relatively minor variations of the idea of God among the major monotheistic religions, but to the fact that God can be one of many radically different things, and that unless we specify which God we are talking about, we will not make any further progress. My tentative solution to the problem is therefore presented in FIGURE 1. Here the panoply of positions concerning the S&R debate is arranged along two axes: on the abscissa we have the level of contrast between science and religion, which goes from none (same worlds model) to moderate (separate worlds) to high (conflicting worlds). On the ordinate is the 'fuzziness' of the concept of God, which ranges from a personal God who intervenes in everyday human affairs to the concept of a Naturalistic God who acts only through the laws of physics, to the most esoteric position of deism characterized by a God who created the universe but did not interfere with it since, or even no God (non theism). These conceptions of God may take many forms. However, the common denominator to the belief in a personal God is the idea that (S) He intervenes in individual lives, performs miracles, or otherwise shows direct concern for us mortals.

A naturalistic God, on the other hand, is a bit more detached: if (S) He intervenes at all it is through the tortuous ways of the natural laws that (S) He himself designed for this universe. Finally, the God of deism does not interfere, even indirectly, in human affairs, but simply answers the fundamental question of why there is something instead of nothing. The personalities as diverse as physicists Paul Davies and Frank Tipler, conservative Christian apologist Alvin Plantinga, and science-religion crusader John Templeton have in common, as well as where they differ. Sir John Templeton is a British citizen native of Tennessee, and he has invested $800 million of his personal fortune into furthering a better understanding of religion through science. The Templeton Foundation has sponsored a panoply of activities resulting in articles, books, and conferences whose goal is to 'discover spiritual information. ' (8) According to Sir John, science has made incredible progress in discovering truths about the natural world.

Ergo, its powerful methods should be useful to religion in order to augment our knowledge of God and matters spiritual. And Templeton is putting his money where his mouth is by funding several scientific projects (at the rate of hundreds of thousands of dollars each) as well as by awarding the Templeton Prize, which is financially heftier than the Nobel. Examples of the science-to-religion connection that Templeton envisions are illuminating. His Foundation has given hard cash to Pietro Pie trini of the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke to study 'Imaging brain activity in forgiving people' ($125,000); Lee Dug atkin of the University of Louisville was awarded $62,757 for research on 'Evolutionary and Judaic approaches to forgiving behavior. ' Herbert Benson of Harvard was aided in answering the question 'Does intercessory prayer help sick people? ,' while Frans de Waal of Emory University was given funds for studying 'forgiveness' among primates. Templeton's efforts (but not necessarily those of all the researchers who are receiving his money) fall into what can be termed scientific theism, that is, the idea that one can scientifically investigate the mind of God.

This particular position within the science and religion universe is actually a very old and revered one, having its roots in classical Christian Apologetics a la St. Thomas Aquinas and continuing today through the efforts of individuals like Plantinga and William Craig. If, however, one believes in a more remote kind of God but wishes to retain the concept of science and religion uncovering the same truth, the choice is not limited to scientific theism. Two other positions are possible, depending on whether one subscribes to a naturalistic or to a deistic God, the Strong Anthropic Principle and Weak Anthropic Principle, the latter also known as the 'God of the Big Bang. ' Of course, throughout this discussion the actual position of individuals within my framework maybe different from what I suggest here, either because the boundaries between categories are fuzzy rather than well delineated, or because I may have misunderstood particular individuals' positions based on their writings. The Weak Anthropic Principle says that there is very little variation in the known constants and laws of physics that could be tolerated if the universe were to be a place friendly to life as we know it. (9) As is, this is a rather trivial observation, but if one wants to read philosophical implications into it, then it is a small leap of faith to claim that the universe was created because life had to exist From here, there is another small logical gap to the Strong Anthropic Principle, which infers an intelligent designer with a purpose behind the whole shebang.

(10) Several physicists and cosmologists have played with different versions of the Anthropic Principle, including Frank Tipler (one of the original proponents of the principle) and Paul Davies, whose exact position on the matter is a bit more difficult to ascertain, but whose awkward combination of a connection with the Templeton Foundation and very careful speculative writings on cosmology put him squarely in the upper left corner of my diagram. The anthropic principle is difficult to counter on purely philosophical grounds (see Ruse this issue), other than it seems to be begging the question and somehow reverses the direction of causality (a general cause is inferred from the observation of a particular result of that cause). Furthermore, it is not useful as a scientific hypothesis, since all it says is that we are here because we are here. The Principle has, however, been effectively attacked on positive scientific grounds by showing that many more possible universes could support some sort of life, an attack that has weakened the improbable' argument on which the Principle is based.

(12) A more Fatal blow might come in the near future from super string theory, the current working hypothesis for the reconciliation of the theories of relativity and of quantum mechanics. While all these positions are compatible with Shermer's 'same worlds's scenario, it is clear that a scientist feels more and more comfortable the more one moves toward the upper end of the ordinate in my diagram, that is, the more fuzzy and distant the concept of God becomes (notice that one can adopt a Strong Anthropic Principle scenario and slip toward a personal God at the same time, as indicated by the arrow in the figure). This observation in and of itself, I think, points toward a fundamental degree of discomfort between science and religion. The two positions whose exponents have a lot in common but who despise each other almost as much as they are opposed to everything else that populates the R&S conceptual space. I am referring to 'classical' creationism as embodied, for example, by Duane Gish and his colleagues at the Institute for Creation Research, (33) and to the 'neo-creationism' movement well represented by Michael Behe (34) (1996), William Dembski (35) (1998), Philip Johnson (36) (1997) and other associates of the 'Discovery Institute. ' No matter what kind of creationist you are, you are very likely to believe in a personal God and in a fundamental conflict between science and religion (or at least, so it seems from the array of publications within both the classical and neo-creationist camps).

The main difference between Gish's group and Johnson's ensemble is that the latter is more sophisticated philosophically and makes a more slick use of scientific terminology and pseudo scientific concepts. They are also much more politically savvy, though they do not enjoy the grassroots support of classical creationists because they ironically tend to be seen by most people as 'too intellectual. ' Essentially, most neo-creationists (among whom there is quite a bit of variation) do not believe in a young Earth, accept micro-evolution (though recently so do some classical creationists), don't believe in the literal truth of the Bible, and don't even call themselves creationists -- the preferred term for their version of things is 'intelligent design' (some even go so far as to avoid stating just who this intelligent designer might be). While debunking classical creationism is nowadays not too trying an intellectual exercise, (38) neo creationists are quite something else.

Behe's book on 'irreducible complexity' makes the point that the molecular machinery of living organisms is so complex and necessitates all of its parts working in synchrony that it must have been designed. A good rebuttal has to span from David Hume's devastating critique of the generalized version of the argument from design (39) to modern findings on the evolution of specific biochemical pathways. (40) Dembski's reasoning that intelligent design can be inferred by excluding all other alternative hypotheses on probabilistic reasoning entirely misses the more parsimonious explanation of unintelligent design (i. e., natural selection) to account for biological history and diversity. (41) Finally, Johnson's main thrust that science is really a philosophical enterprise with no better claim to reality than religion ca be dealt with by using Provine's argument about philosophy cal naturalism discussed above.

Last, but not least, lees consider the two main versions of modern skepticism, which have produced a lively debate within the skeptic community and which represent the forefront of rational thinking about science and religion.'s scientific skepticism' and 'scientific rationalism,' positions associated with people such as Carl Sagan, Will Provine, and Richard Dawkins (the fact that my name falls in one of those fields merely reflects the influence that these people have had on my thinking). (43) First, not ice that both skeptical positions are rather unusual, in that they span more than one quadrant, diagonally in the case of scientific skepticism, vertically for scientific rationalism. Scientific skepticism is the position that skepticism is possible only in regard to questions and claims that can be investigated empirically (i. e., scientifically). For example, Novella and Bloomberg state that 'Claims that are not testable are simply outside the realm of science.

(44) However, scientific skepticism immediately embarks on a slippery slope that the same authors acknowledge in their article. They admit that 'Testable religious claims, such as those of creationists, faith healers, and miracle men are amenable to scientific skepticism,' so that religion is not entirely out of the scope of skeptical inquiry. Furthermore, they acknowledge that there is no distinction in principle between religion and any other kind of nonsense believed by all sorts of people: 'There is no distinction between believing in leprechauns, alien abductions, ESP, reincarnation, or the existence of God -- each equally lacks objective evidence. From this perspective, separating out the latter two beliefs and labeling them as religion -- thereby exempting them from critical analysis -- is intellectually dishonest. ' That is, scientific skepticism converges toward scientific rationalism (see below) when one considers personal gods that intervene in everyday life, but moves toward a NOMA-like position if God is defined in a distant and incomprehensible fashion. One of the most convincing arguments adduced by scientific skeptics to keep religion out of skeptical inquiry is that a believer can always come up with unfalsifiable ad how explanations of any inconsistency in a religious belief.

While this is certainly true, is this not an equally valid critique of, say, skeptical inquiry into paranormal phenomena? After all, how many times have we heard the 'true believers's a ying that the reason a medium failed a controlled test is because of the negative vibrations produced by the skeptic? Nicholas Humphrey, in his excellent Leaps of Faith, (45) even reports that have come up with a negative theory of ESP that 'predicts' that the frequency of genuine paranormal phenomena is inversely proportional to attempts at empirically investigating them! This sounds like religious believers' attempts to save their cherished mythology. As much as one might question scientific skepticism on the basis of more or less subtle philosophical points, there is of course another, more practical side to this position, which also makes for a convergence toward NOMA. As Novella and Bloomberg honestly admit, it is a matter of resources: 'This single issue, which is not central to our purpose, could potentially drain our resources, monopolize our public image, and alienate many potential skeptics.

' (46) This is, unfortunately, very true. It is also true that the skeptic community cannot and should not require any article of faith (such as unbelief in God) from any of its members. However, we do require that there are no sacred cows. Anything and everything must be the subject of free inquiry and skeptical investigation. To allow otherwise, for practical or any other kind of reasons, is an intellectual travesty. On the other hand, what can and should be admitted is that God and religion truly do represent only one facet of the universe of interest to she p tics, and that skeptical analyses of the God question may or may not be fruitful.

Therefore, let us proceed with caution, but proceed nevertheless. Within the framework of scientific rationalism one arrives at the belief in the nonexistence of God, not because of certain knowledge, but because of a sliding scale of methods. At one extreme, we can confidently rebut the personal Gods of creationists on firm empirical grounds: science is sufficient to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that there never was a worldwide flood and that the evolutionary sequence of the Cosmos does not follow either of the two versions of Genesis. (47) The more we move toward a deistic and fuzzily defined God, however, the more scientific rationalism reaches into its toolbox and shifts from empirical science to logical philosophy informed by science.

Ultimately, the most convincing arguments against a deistic God are Hume's dictum and Occam's razor. These are philosophical arguments, but they also constitute the bedrock of all of science, and cannot therefore be dismissed as non-scientific. The reason we put our trust in these two principles is because their application in the em sciences has led to such spectacular successes throughout the last three centuries. Admittedly, the scientific rationalist is on less firm ground the more she moves vertically up in FIGURE 1. But this is not a fatal blow because no reasonable skeptic asserts her positions as definitive truths. All we are saying is 'show us.

' The main reason I prefer scientific rationalism to scientific skepticism (which is more akin to the philosophical position known as empiricism and espoused by many English philosophers between the 17th and 19th centuries) comes down to a matter of which trade-offs one is more willing to accept Scientific skepticism trades off the breadth of its inquiry (which is limited) for the power of its methods (which, being based on empirical science, are the most powerful devised thus far). Scientific rationalism, on the other hand, retains as much of the power of science as possible, but uses other instruments -- such as philosophy and logic -- to expand the scope of its inquiry. As a scientist I have been trained within scientific skepticism; as a somewhat rational human being, I y earn for the wide horizons of scientific rationalism. It should be obvious from this survey that there are many ways to slice the science-religion question, certainly more than I have discussed or can even think of. As mentioned at the onset, the point is not to censure any particular position, but rather to explore their differences from a logical as well as a psychological perspective. In fact, it is almost as interesting to debate the question as it is to wonder why some people subscribe to one point of view or to another (which is the main point of Shermer's 1999 book).

I have already stated my personal preference for scientific rationalism on the grounds that it is highly compatible with the empirical evidence and makes very reasonable assumptions where the evidence is lacking. However, scientific skepticism, NOMA, and even some very weak forms of the anthropic principle are certainly difficult to definitely exclude, and enough intelligent people adopt them to provide some pause for reflection.